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Re: [TLS] Request for review: Next Protocol Negotiation Extension

Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Mon, 16 August 2010 18:01 UTC

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Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2010 14:02:04 -0400
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From: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
To: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Request for review: Next Protocol Negotiation Extension
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On Mon, Aug 16, 2010 at 1:42 PM, Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com> wrote:
> I understand the desire to keep this information private, but it comes
> with a cost.  If the server is handling many protocols and desires to
> use different certificates for each because of different security
> requirements such as lists of supported cipher suites per protocol, or
> maybe they are hosting multiple virtual hosts and need to select the
> proper certificate from a particular customer.

I agree that it's a trade off. The design, as is, was picked because
the use cases considered were either ambivalent on this point or
favoured the privacy side (i.e. Tor).

Following a more traditional "client presents a list, server picks" is
a reasonable solution, and one that we could accept if opinion was
overwhelming on the matter. But this draft was partly born as a result
of the decay of the end-of-end principal which has rendered TCP port
numbers an ineffective solution. Thus this draft made efforts to be
more future-proof.


AGL

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