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[TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3

"Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com> Wed, 26 March 2014 18:43 UTC

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From: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
To: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3
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Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 18:43:18 +0000
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Subject: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3
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TLS has had cipher suites based on RSA key transport (aka "static RSA", TLS_RSA_WITH_*) since the days of SSL 2.0.   These cipher suites have several drawbacks including lack of PFS, pre-master secret contributed only by the client, and the general weakening of RSA over time.  It would make the security analysis simpler to remove this option from TLS 1.3.  RSA certificates would still be allowed, but the key establishment would be via DHE or ECDHE.  The consensus in the room at IETF-89 was to remove RSA key transport from TLS 1.3.  If you have concerns about this decision please respond on the TLS list by April 11, 2014.

Thanks,

Joe
[Speaking for the TLS chairs]

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