RE: [XCON] CPCP Issue 28: <pin> and <password>
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
RE: [XCON] CPCP Issue 28: <pin> and <password>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Niemi Aki (Nokia-NRC/Helsinki)
> Sent: 14.September.2004 16:41
> To: ext Paul Kyzivat
> Cc: Khartabil Hisham (Nokia-TP-MSW/Helsinki); XCON WG
> Subject: Re: [XCON] CPCP Issue 28: <pin> and <password>
>
>
> Inline.
>
> On Mon, 2004-09-13 at 20:14, ext Paul Kyzivat wrote:
> > By common usage today, it would be obtained because the initial
> > connection is to an IVR that prompts for it. that dialog
> isn't really
> > part of the conference. How the result of it gets back to
> the focus may
> > need clarification.
>
> Indeed, or how the call ends up in the IVR in the first place (more on
> this below).
>
> > One possibility is that limited function voice only calls
> are directed
> > at a different server - an IVR. It does its prompting to
> get a pin, and
> > maybe conference id. Then it could:
> > - redirect the caller with a url to the focus that also
> embeds the pin.
> > In this case, the condition that checks the pin makes
> perfect sense.
> > The check is distinct from authentication, because the caller may
> > not be authenticated at all, or may be authenticated
> with an arbitrary
> > identity.
>
> If the URL is secret (embeds the pin as you suggest) and the IVR is
> configured to redirect callers that entered the correct id/pin to that
> secret URL, why does there need to be a pin condition? Isn't the fact
> that the caller enters the focus using a secret URL enough?
>
> > - act as a b2bua. In this case it can provide suitable
> authentication
> > info which is chosen based on the pin. In this case no special
> > conditions are needed - authorization can be based on the
> > authenticated id provided by the b2bua.
>
> I agree, this is one possibility. And it need not necessarily
> be a B2BUA
> either. Simple proxy authentication is enough in most cases
> where digest
> credentials can be used.
>
> > Or, all calls can go directly to the focus. The
> authorization rules can
> > be applied based on what authenticated identity is
> available, if any. If
> > the call is going to be rejected, it can instead then be
> treated with an
> > IVR that prompts for a pin. Then the rules are applied
> again with it.
>
> Hmm... Do we in fact need another action defined, that redirects all
> callers to an IVR if they call the focus without proper authenticated
> identity?
>
> > I'm sure there are other ways to handle this stuff as well.
> But maybe
> > these kinds of scenarios need to be explored to understand how the
> > pin/password fits in with other authentication and
> authorization strategies.
>
> You're probably right. It seems there is at least a concept here of an
> "authentication service", that is able to provide authentication
> information to the focus to be used in matching with the rule
> conditions. An authenticated identity carried in for example as a
> P-Asserted-Identity is an obvious example, but non-identity based
> information could also be used, e.g., some SAML assertions
> described in
> draft-tschofenig-sip-saml-00.txt.
>
> But the <pin> condition is a poor attempt at that, especially as it is
> trivially transformed into an equivalent <identiy> condition.
>
> Say, instead of:
>
> <conditions>
> <pin/>
> </conditions>
>
> you would have:
>
> <conditions>
> <identity>
> <id>those_who_knew_the_PIN</id>
> </identity>
> </conditions>
The focus would have to create such identity (URI) based on the PIN. A user cannot create such URI. Also, what would be in the <id> element above that looks like an identity user at domain but tells the focus to interpret it as the secret URI for the conference that was somewhere created.
I don't by into this complexity at the conferece policy level. <pin> is enough to achieve that your asking for. <pin> condition exactly means "those_who_knew_the_PIN". Why does it have to an identity that is created somewhere? I don't think this is needed in a conference policy.
/Hisham
>
> Cheers,
> Aki
>
> > Paul
> >
> > Aki Niemi wrote:
> > > Ok, I'll try.
> > >
> > > There are different methods to access a conference. Some
> can readily
> > > provide an identity to use in the conditions, others
> can't. Some require
> > > that users are collectively authenticated using a
> passcode, others can
> > > contain a random secret in the URI itself, or use specific
> > > username/password pairs for this collective passcode.
> > >
> > > If you have all of the above type accesses to a
> conference, and a single
> > > set of rules, for which accesses does the condition apply to?
> > >
> > > What if I want all PSTN-access allowed using a passcode,
> but all SIP
> > > access only using authenticated identities, and *not*
> using a passcode?
> > > I can't see a single <passcode> condition covering both of these
> > > orthogonal cases.
> > >
> > > That's why I proposed a separate ruleset for each access
> method. If you
> > > have that, there's no need for the conditions you
> propose. For example,
> > > if you've configured for a PSTN access to always prompt
> for a PIN, then
> > > the only way ever anyone is ever going to get through
> using that access
> > > is to know the PIN. (That would actually mean that you wouldn't
> > > necessarily need any conditions at all...)
> > >
> > > Another option is to assign a special identity for the
> PSTN-users in the
> > > system (who've entered the PIN correctly), and use that in the
> > > <identity> conditions. In other words, anyone who entered the PIN
> > > correctly will get that authenticated identity assigned
> by the system.
> > >
> > > This involves as much out-of-band configuration as
> setting the PIN and
> > > configuring the PIN-prompt for it in the first place, and
> requires no
> > > additional conditions to be defined.
> > >
> > > Cheers,
> > > Aki
> > >
> > >
> > > On Mon, 2004-09-13 at 17:56, Khartabil Hisham
> (Nokia-TP-MSW/Helsinki)
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > >>Hi Aki,
> > >>
> > >>I don't understand your argument here. The way PSTN users are
> > >>authorised to join a conference is through a PIN. The
> condition is if
> > >>they know the PIN, then they get in the conference. You
> cannot know
> > >>the user behind a PSTN number and therefore need an
> authorisation rule
> > >>based on PIN.
> > >>
> > >>Perhaps I didn't fully understand your proposal, can you re-state?
> > >>
> > >>Thanks,
> > >>Hisham
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > XCON mailing list
> > > XCON at ietf.org
> > > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/xcon
> > >
> >
>
_______________________________________________
XCON mailing list
XCON at ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/xcon
Note: Messages sent to this list are the opinions of the senders and do not imply endorsement by the IETF.