[XCON] Re: [MMUSIC] BFCP: SDP usage and k=
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[XCON] Re: [MMUSIC] BFCP: SDP usage and k=
Nathan
I don't know if your questions are related to this particular thread
or not. If not, then I apologize for going off topic, but I comment
below.
On Feb 12, 2005, at 2:42 PM, Nathan Allen Stratton wrote:
On Sat, 12 Feb 2005, Mark Baugher wrote:
The specification that we're discussing makes no mention of MIKEY or
the kmgmt I-D. k= is a much different approach than kmgmt. If the
authors were to replace k= with something more expressive, then I'd
expect that they would use sdescriptions.
The question that I have raised and that I don't think has been
answered is whether k= is sufficient for carrying a digest key. The
authors could choose to use MIKEY/kmgmt or they could use
sdescriptions. Maybe k= meets the application requirements. I don't
know, which is why I asked the question: Is there a need to specify
the
algorithm with the key?
I am working with a number of hardware vendors and need to propose what
they implement in their devices. As a service provider I am looking for
someting like the Sipura SRTP implementation. A service provider has a
master cert and builds a private and public cert
I don't know what a private cert is. I expect that there is some kind
of
X.509 certificate in the solution and that the certificate contains the
public key of the subject, e.g. the phone. I can't guess who the
issuer would be.
for each UA device with
name, phone number and exp date. The keys are stored in the user config
and the config is securely loaded into the device.
Ok, so now the fun part, I am just getting into this security game, so
please forgive me if I am totally missing someting. The problem I have
with the Sipura implementation is that they exchange public keys SIP
INFO
and don't have plans to make that public so I can't use it between
vendors.
They may not have plans to make their proprietary solution public, but
they may have plans to migrate to a standard solution when the industry
settles on one. I think they can use MIKEY with kmgmt, or they can
use sdescriptions[1] with sip certificates[2].
[1]
(http://www.ietf.cnri.reston.va.us/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-mmusic-
sdescriptions-09.txt)
[2]
(http://www1.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sipping-certs-00.txt)
So are any of these systems based on public/private keys where
the public key can be exchanged clear text and the voice encrypted with
the endpoint secret key and the remote endpoint public key?
Both sets of solutions use public key cryptography, at least as an
option.
draft-ietf-sipping certs uses S/MIME.
It looks like the AES implementations are build around one key that is
based64 encoded and sent in plain text required TLS or some other
trusted
communication between endpoints.
draft-ietf-mmusic-sdescriptions does this. MIKEY does it differently.
Now if I want to have a few vendors implement a standard sway to
support
SRTP I don't see why I would need anything other then SDPnew k=, I
would
have them use it to exchange the public keys. However, the two vendors
I
am working with will do this, but I am wondering if there is a better
way.
It would work with k=, but as you pointed out, other endpoints would
have
no clue what algorithm was used to encrypt the keys. It could be the
public key of a RSA key pair or full AES key.
Since you're the service provider, the vendor might suggest which
of the standards they plan to offer for sale.
I need a system that is not proprietary and can be used among many
vendors,
is based on a master key so that I can decrypt any voice call if
required
to by law enforcement.
Most products will be using proprietary solutions for key establishment
since SRTP came out before the standards that key it. I would expect
that the astute product team will have a roadmap for inter-operable
key establishment.
Any pointers as to what I should have them implement?
Just the ones I mentioned above.
Mark
<>
Nathan Stratton BroadVoice, Inc.
nathan at robotics.net Talk IS Cheap
http://www.robotics.net
http://www.broadvoice.com
Mark
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