Re: [Raven] The impracticality of wiretapping

[Paul Krumviede <paul.krumviede@wcom.com>]

--On Tuesday, October 12, 1999, 12:26 PM -0400 Wendell_Bishop@nmss.com wrote:

> 
> 
> Wiretapping can only be effective if there is governmental control of the
> encryption devices.  Three possible locations for encryption are:
> 
> . in the network
> . hard wired into manufactured terminals
> . in the software of generic terminals

I think this misses the possible issues with what in the US are called
pen register orders, in which digits dialed, in things like conference
calls, party (3 way) calls, and other telephony services may require
the network or gateways to understand the signalling. Encryption of
the data channel doesn't avoid this (and the example of private
voice channels implies that the caller couldn't be using such
telephony services, at least not if they are implemented in the
network).

I don't know what the equivalents, if any, are in other countries,
but I am a bit surprised at the US-centric nature of some of the
comments (namely the CALEA specific comments). I think we
need to think about this in the more general setting, where
anything that is done may need to be capable of satisfying
differing criteria. This is not to advocate that anything be done.

-paul


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