"Locally-served DNS Zones", Mark Andrews, 26-Feb-09. ( bytes)
Experience with the Domain Name System (DNS) has shown that there are a number of DNS zones all iterative resolvers and recursive nameservers should automatically serve, unless configured otherwise. RFC 4193 specifies that this should occur for D.F.IP6.ARPA. This document extends the practice to cover the IN-ADDR.ARPA zones for RFC 1918 address space and other well known zones with similar characteristics.
"I'm Being Attacked by PRISONER.IANA.ORG!", Joe Abley, William Maton, 9-Mar-09. ( bytes)
Many sites connected to the Internet make use of IPv4 addresses which are not globally unique. Examples are the addresses designated in RFC1918 for private use within individual sites. Hosts should never normally send DNS reverse mapping queries for those addresses on the public Internet. However, such queries are frequently observed. Authoritative servers are deployed to provide authoritative answers to such queries as part of a loosely- coordinated effort known as the AS112 project. Since queries sent to AS112 servers are usually not intentional, the replies received back from those servers are typically unexpected. Unexpected inbound traffic can trigger alarms on intrusion detection systems and firewalls, and operators of such systems often mistakenly believe that they are being attacked. This document provides background information and technical advice to those firewall operators.
"AS112 Nameserver Operations", Joe Abley, William Maton, 9-Mar-09. ( bytes)
Many sites connected to the Internet make use of IPv4 addresses which are not globally unique. Examples are the addresses designated in RFC1918 for private use within individual sites. Devices in such environments may occasionally originate reverse DNS queries corresponding to those private-use addresses. Since the addresses concerned have only local significance, it is good practice for site administrators to ensure that they are answered locally. However, it is not uncommon for such queries to follow the normal delegation path in the public DNS instead of being answered within the site. It is not possible for public DNS servers to give useful answers to such queries. In addition, due to the wide deployment of private-use addresses and the continuing growth of the Internet, the volume of such queries is large and growing. The AS112 project aims to provide a distributed sink for such queries in order to reduce the load on the root and IN-ADDR.ARPA authority servers. This document describes the steps required to install a new AS112 node, and offers advice relating to such a node's operation.
"DNSSEC Trust Anchor Configuration and Maintenance", Matt Larson, Olafur Gudmundsson, 9-Mar-09. ( bytes)
This document recommends a preferred format for specifying trust anchors in DNSSEC validating security-aware resolvers and describes how such a resolver should initialize trust anchors for use. This document also describes different mechanisms for keeping trust anchors up to date over time.
"Requirements for Management of Name Servers for the DNS", Wesley Hardaker, 4-May-09. ( bytes)
Management of name servers for the Domain Name System (DNS) has traditionally been done using vendor-specific monitoring, configuration and control methods. Although some service monitoring platforms can test the functionality of the DNS itself there is not an interoperable way to manage (monitor, control and configure) the internal aspects of a name server itself. This document discusses the requirements of a management system for name servers and can be used as a shopping list of needed features for such a system.
"DNSSEC Operational Practices, Version 2", Olaf Kolkman, Miek Gieben, 6-Mar-09. ( bytes)
This document describes a set of practices for operating the DNS with security extensions (DNSSEC). The target audience is zone administrators deploying DNSSEC. The document discusses operational aspects of using keys and signatures in the DNS. It discusses issues of key generation, key storage, signature generation, key rollover, and related policies. This document obsoletes RFC 2541, as it covers more operational ground and gives more up-to-date requirements with respect to key sizes and the new DNSSEC specification.

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