

SEND WG

Chairs: James Kempf, Pekka Nikander

56th IETF, San Francisco Hilton, Tuesday March 18th, 2003

<http://www.tml.hut.fi/~pnr/SEND/slides.pdf>

Agenda bashing

- 5 min. - Agenda discussion
- 10 min. - Last Call Issues for draft-ietf-send-psreq.txt
- 10 min. - Self Signed Certificates for CGAs
- 20 min. - Open Issues on draft-ietf-send-ipsec-00.txt
- 10 min. - Interaction with PANA / DHCP
- 5 min. - Draft Status and Schedule

- Drafts:
 - draft-ietf-send-psreq-02.txt (to be submitted)
 - draft-ietf-send-ipsec-00.txt
 - draft-aura-cga-00.txt (not a WG item)

draft-ietf-send-psreq.txt

- WG Last Call from Jan 23 until Feb 6.
 - Thanks for everybody who cared to comment!
- 26 issues filed in addition to editorial comments
<http://www.tml.hut.fi/~pnr/SEND/issues.html>
- 1 issue later *merged* to another (#23 to #2)
- 12 issues resolved by *adding* more explanation
- 1 issue resolved by *removing* confusing text
- 6 issues *adopted* by adding the suggested text
- 4 issues (#2, 9, 21, 24) *rejected*
 - More on these on a separate slide
- 2 issues (#1 and #11) *resolved* after discussion
 - More on these on separate slides

Rejected issues

- 2 Clarify the scope of the work
 - The WG charter is clear enough
 - Did not contain any concrete proposals
- 9 Remove mitigation approaches from 4.3.1
 - Based on resolving issue #1; a separate slide later
- 21 Add a note about DDNS access controls
 - Valid comment but out of scope
- 24 Replace the current 3 trust scenarios
 - Rejected after discussion; working group consensus

Issue #11: Using the term "trust"

- Draft-01 reads: It should be noted that the term "trust" is used here in a rather non-technical *and loose* manner.
- Issue: The whole point of this document is to define trust models, so very rigid uses of to trust, trusted, and trusting are important.
- Further comment: Avoid using the term altogether
- Resolution:
 - Scanned all instances of "trust" etc.
 - Each instance seemed to be qualified
 - Removed the words "and loose" from the text above
- Personal comment: I am not really happy with this resolution, but IMHO it is probably good enough

Issue #1: Solution suggestions

- Draft-01 includes multiple suggestions for possible solutions, with the following disclaimer:
 - [T]he [solution] discussion is solely for illustrative purposes. It is meant to give the readers a more concrete idea of some possible solutions. It does NOT indicate any preference on solutions on the behalf of the authors or the working group.
- Issue: Why there is a need to talk about solutions?
- Opinions on the mailing list were mixed:
 - Some people supported solution examples
 - Others opposed including them to the text
- Currently there are solution examples, in [[brackets]]
- Question: Should the brackets be removed, or the solution examples be removed?

Self signed certificates for CGA

- draft-aura-cga-00.txt
- A separate set of slides

draft-ietf-send-ipsec-00.txt

- A separate set of slides


Interaction with PANA / DHCP

- SEND does not deal with access control
- PANA is mostly about network access control
- SEND only deals with ND, RD, and stateless autoconfig
- DHCP deals with stateful (server provided) autoconfig
- Usage scenarios
 - Baseline: Link layer authentication and SEND
 - SEND and PANA
 - SEND, PANA, and DHCP

SEND and PANA

- Client gets a link local address with SEND
- Using the link local address, it searches for a PAA
- PAA performs ND and sends back a reply
- Client performs ND and runs PANA with the PAA
- PANA creates key material
 - Also for Client - Router communication
- Client authenticates RA with the PANA key material

SEND and PANA



SEND, PANA and DHCP


- Same as SEND and PANA until Router Advertisement
 - Should PANA create keymat also for DHCP?
- Once the client receives RA, it runs DHCP

Client

Router

PAA

DHCP



Draft status and schedule

- draft-ietf-send-psreq-02.txt to the IESG
- draft-ietf-send-ipsec-00.txt
 - Should we split PK AH into a separate draft?
 - Should we split CGA into a separate draft?
 - Do we need a CGA-free version?
 - How to do Proxy ND?
 - Getting a regression of the protocol against the threats document?

Steps forward

- Run the DT for another couple months to resolve the remaining technical issues
- Continue talking with IPR holders on CGA to get IPR released specifically for SEND
- Generate another draft version (or two) pre-Vienna
- Line up a panel of dedicated reviewers (implementors, security Steves, an OPS person) to do a preIESG review
- If there are no show-stopper technical issues and CGA IPR gets resolved, submit to IESG post-Vienna