EAP-SIM Security Analysis



Mobility Solutions

Keyspace and Mutual Authentication Weaknesses


Uri Blumenthal (analysis done by Sarvar Patel) Member of Technical Staff



EAP-SIM Draft and its Security Claims

- Current EAP-SIM provides interoperability with GSM 2G cellular
- Current EAP-SIM claims to provide 128-bit security
 - Two 64-bit attacks are described
- Current EAP-SIM claims to be a Mutually Authenticated Protocol with Session Independence.
 - Session independence at the triplet level cannot be achieved

EAP-SIM Cryptographic Essentials



Attack 1 – bring strength down to 64-bits

- Impersonator chooses R and guesses corresponding K_c
 - Probability of success 2⁻⁶⁴ not 2⁻¹²⁸
 - Now attacker knows appropriate K_c for the R
- Impersonator sends <R R R> to the victim
 - Attacker makes <u>all the triplets equal</u>
 - Thus attacker knows K_c for all R's
- Attacker creates Master Key MK and completes protocol
- <u>Solution 1</u>: Enforce the check on R's in the protocol
 - <u>Client</u> must ensure that all received R's are different, or reject
- <u>Solution 2</u>: Include SRES into key derivation input for MK
 - Gives 96-bit strength in total (even for one triplet)

Attack 2 - brute-force the 64-bit key

- Condition: network uses N=1 and then moves to N=3
 - Attacker observes the exchanges of single triplets
 - The network later switches to multiple triplets
- Attacker brute-forces 3 keys of 64-bit when N=1
 - Each Kc recovery requires 2⁶⁴ operations
 - Verification: compare responses calculated with observed
- Now attacker can impersonate the network for N=3
 - Send < R₁, R₂, R₃, MAC> to the victim (since Kc_{1,2,3} are known)
 - Complete the protocol
- <u>Solution 1</u>: never allow using single triplet
- <u>Solution 2</u>: include SRES to key derivation input for MK

Lack of session independence

- If Kc values for three triplets are compromised, then attacker can impersonate the network forever
- <u>Reason</u>: Rc is not included in the Kc derivation
 - GSM specific: triplets are usually pre-computed by Network
 - GSM does not offer mutual authentication
- Assumption <u>"But Kc will never get exposed!"</u>
 - If such were true, there would be <u>no need</u> to ever generate <u>new</u> <u>triplets</u>
 - Kc in GSM designed to be used for <u>one session only</u>!
 - <u>Solution</u>: none

Conclusions

- Current EAP-SIM does <u>not</u> provide 128-bit security
 - Two successful 64-bit attacks were described
 - Solutions minor improvements to the protocol (not currently incorporated)
- Lack of session independence on triplet level
 - Can't be practically solved