

TLS/DTLS AES-CTR

draft-modadugu-tls-ctr-00

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AES-CTR Overview

- Works like a stream cipher, e.g. RC4
 - XOR keystream with plain text:

$$CT[i] := PT[i] \oplus AES(CTR(i))$$

- Increment Counter
- Counter encrypted to generate keystream
 - Counter MUST never be re-used (with same key)
- No harm if Counter is public
 - But MUST be initially unpredictable


Motivation

- Low bandwidth
 - Save between 17-32 bytes compared to CBC
- Random access (for DTLS)
- Parallelizable/pipelining
- Implement both block/stream ciphers with AES

Strategy

1. Secure
2. Minimize differences between TLS/DTLS
3. Base off AES-CTR in IPsec if possible

Counter Design [1]



- `IV := {client_write_IV, server_write_IV}`
(Least significant 48-bits)
- `SEQ := {seq_num}` (64-bits)
- `BLOCK_CTR := 1` (16-bits)

Counter Design [2]

- IV's generated by TLS/DTLS KDF
 - Refreshed upon session re-negotiation
- Sequence number
 - Implicit for TLS
 - For DTLS, use (epoch || seq_num)
- Block counter
 - 16-bits plenty for TLS/DTLS records

Alternative Design

- Implicit record “tag” (in place of seq_num)
 - e.g. LFSR generated
- No point, since:
 - Uses up more bandwidth
 - Sufficient for counter to be unique

⇒ Back to original design

Questions?