

# DKIM WG IETF-67

## DKIM Originating Signing Policy

Douglas Otis

[Doug\\_Otis@trendmicro.com](mailto:Doug_Otis@trendmicro.com)

<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-otis-dkim-dosp-02.txt>

# ***What Does DKIM-Base Not Accomplish?***

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- Accountability for unsolicited bulk email
- Safe white-listing with independent envelopes
- Authorizations outside the signing domain
- Validation of rfc2821 MailFrom addresses or SMTP clients
- Autonomous administration of provider relationships
- Independent vanity email-address domain authorization
- Minimized number of DKIM keys
- Correlation of the signing domain with the SMTP client

# ***What can “Domain Associations” Accomplish?***

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- Eliminate any reason to:
  - Exchange DKIM private keys
  - Use CNAMEs at key-selector leafs
  - Delegate DNS zones to email providers
  - Deprecate email-addresses beyond signing domain
- Allows safe white-listing
- Assures rfc2821 MailFrom address for DSNs
- Policy & authorizations can extend beyond signing domain
- Relationships with providers are autonomously managed
- Freedom to authorize vanity email-domains independently

# *What Associated Identities are Assured?*

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Is the email-address valid or trustworthy?

- rfc2822 From ('F' & 'LF' annotation)
- rfc2822 Resent-\* & Sender ('O' & 'LO' annotation)
- rfc2821 MailFrom ('M' protects DSNs)
- rfc2821 Ehlo ('E' protects white-list signing-domains)

Annotation or DSN Protection:

<base32(sha1(signing-domain))>.\_DKIM-x.email-domain

<base32(sha1(local-part))>.\_DKIM-Lx.email-domain

White-listing Protections:

<base32(sha1(ehlo-domain))>.\_DKIM-E.signing-domain

(Label confirmed by element in answer.)



# *Suggested Policies*

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DKIM-F & DKIM-LF rfc2822.From

DKIM-Ø & DKIM-LØ rfc2822.Resent-\* or Sender

DKIM-M rfc2821.MailFrom

DKIM-E rfc2821.Ehlo

d= domain-list not assuring valid email-address

a= domain-list assuring valid email-address

l= local-part

f= flags:

A - All initial messages signed by listed domains

D - Default record

L - Local-Part policy is published

N - Not signing

O - Only compliant services employed

T - Trusted Designated Local-Parts

V - Valid Designated Local-Parts

# *Why Use an Association Mechanism?*

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- Email-providers won't require customer's private DKIM keys
- DNS delegation or external CNAME records never needed
- All originating domains can leverage single DKIM signature
- Protects signing-domains used for white-listing
- Assures rfc2821.MailFrom domain for DSNs
- Far safer and more reliable than address-path registration
- Permits annotation of messages signed by other domains
- Permits trust based on UTF-8 (EAI) local-part addresses
- Permits autonomous management with large-scale use
- Minimizes use of DNS resources (replaces separate keys)
- Better retains:
  - Choice of providers
  - Authorization of vanity email-domains with different providers

# ***Strong/Weak Points of DOSP***

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- Strong:
  - All originating domains can assert separate policies
  - Unlimited scalability with minimal DNS transactions
  - Private Key sharing completely avoided
  - Prevents abuse of signing-domains when used to white-list
  - Autonomous management of domain associations
  - Deterministic DNS lookups and labels
  - Indicates when stringent compliance can be expected
  - Indicates when message can be trusted based upon domain
  - Indicates when email-address is valid within different domains
  - Safe use of TXT Resource Records without added overhead
  - Exceeds SSP-Req-02 except the 6.3 (7) prohibition
- Weak:
  - NXDomain will not end a search for policy  
(fixed by incorporating `_DKIM-x` within SHA1 hash & new RR)



***Questions?***

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