IETF PKIX WG Sean Turner, IECA Internet Draft Daniel Brown, Certicom Intended Status: Standard Track Kelvin Yiu, Microsoft Updates: 4055 (once approved) Russ Housley, Vigil Security Expires: September 9, 2009 Tim Polk, NIST March 9, 2009 Update for RSAES-OAEP Algorithm Parameters draft-ietf-pkix-rfc4055-update-02.txt Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2009. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow Turner, et al Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 1] Internet-Draft RFC 4055 Update March 2009 modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English. Abstract This document updates RFC 4055. It updates the conventions for using the RSA Encryption Scheme - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-OAEP) key transport algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Specifically, it updates the conventions for algorithm parameters in an X.509 certificate's subjectPublicKeyInfo field. Conventions used in this document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. Discussion This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-pkix' mailing list. To subscribe, send a message to ietf-pkix-request@imc.org with the single word subscribe in the body of the message. There is a Web site for the mailing list at . 1. Introduction RFC 4055 specifies conventions for using the RSA Encryption Scheme - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-OAEP) key transport algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). It provides algorithm identifiers and parameters for RSAES-OAEP. This document updates the conventions for RSAES-OAEP parameters in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of an X.509 certificate. The PKIX WG Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) design team recommended that Key Derivation Functions (KDFs) should not be constrained within a certificate; rather, KDF constraints should be negotiated in protocols that need to employ certificates. Only two paragraphs in [RFC4055] discuss RSAES-OAEP parameters in X.509 certificates: the second paragraph of section 4 and the first paragraph of section 4.1. This document only updates these two Turner, et al Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 2] Internet-Draft RFC 4055 Update March 2009 paragraphs. Section 3 updates the second paragraph in section 4 while section 3 updates the second paragraph in section 4.1. "Old:" prefaces the text to be replaced and "New:" prefaces the replacement text. This document also replaces incorrect references to the publicKeyAlgorithms field in Section 3 with references to the parameters field in the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field. No other changes are made to the RSASSA-PSS sections. 2. Changes to Section 3 2nd and 3rd Paragraph This change clarifies the placement of RSASSA-PSS-params in the signature, signatureAlgorithm, and subjectPublicKeyInfo fields for CA and EE certificates. It also clarifies the placement of RSASSA-PSS- params in the signatureAlgorithm field in CRLs. Old: CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSASSA-PSS algorithm identifier SHOULD require the presence of parameters in the publicKeyAlgorithms field if the cA boolean flag is set in the basic constraints certificate extension. CAs MAY require that the parameters be present in the publicKeyAlgorithms field for end-entity certificates. CAs that use the RSASSA-PSS algorithm for signing certificates SHOULD include RSASSA-PSS-params in the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm parameters in their own certificates. CAs that use the RSASSA-PSS algorithm for signing certificates or CRLs MUST include RSASSA-PSS- params in the signatureAlgorithm parameters in the TBSCertificate or TBSCertList structures. New: When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier appears in the TBSCertificate or TBSCertList signature algorithm field, then the RSASSA-PSS-params structure MUST be included in the TBSCertificate or TBSCertList signature parameters field. When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier appears in the TBSCertificate subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field of CA certificates, then the parameters field SHOULD include the RSASSA- PSS-params structure. When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier appears in the TBSCertificate subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field of EE certificates, then the parameters field MAY include the RSASSA- PSS-params structure. Turner, et al Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 3] Internet-Draft RFC 4055 Update March 2009 All certificates and CRLs signed by a CA that supports the id-RSASSA- PSS algorithm MUST include the RSASSA-PSS-params in the signatureAlgorithm parameters in Certificate and CertList structures, respectively. 3. Changes to Section 4 2nd Paragraph This change prohibits the inclusion of RSAES-OAEP-params in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field. This was done because a) it does not affect interoperability b) aligns with PKIX practice to not include limitations on how the public key can be used in subjectPublicKeyInfo. A poll of implementers was taken and there were no objections to this change as it did not affect current implmentations. Old: CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSAES-OAEP algorithm identifier SHOULD require the presence of parameters in the publicKeyAlgorithms field for all certificates. Entities that use a certificate with a publicKeyAlgorithm value of id-RSA-OAEP where the parameters are absent SHOULD use the default set of parameters for RSAES-OAEP-params. Entities that use a certificate with a publicKeyAlgorithm value of rsaEncryption SHOULD use the default set of parameters for RSAES-OAEP-params. New: CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSAES-OAEP algorithm identifier MUST NOT include parameters in the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field. 4. Changes to Section 4.1 1st Paragraph This change prohibits the inclusion of parameters in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field. This was done because a) it does not affect interoperability b) aligns with PKIX practice to not include limitations on how the public key can be used in subjectPublicKeyInfo. A poll of implementers was taken and there were no objections to this change as it did not affect current implmentations. Old: When id-RSAES-OAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters MUST employ the RSAES-OAEP-params syntax. The parameters may be either absent or present when used as subject public key information. Turner, et al Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 4] Internet-Draft RFC 4055 Update March 2009 The parameters MUST be present when used in the algorithm identifier associated with an encrypted value. New: When id-RSAES-OAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters MUST employ the RSAES-OAEP-params syntax. The parameters MUST be absent when used in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field. The parameters MUST be present when used in the algorithm identifier associated with an encrypted value. 5. Security Considerations The security considerations from [RFC4055] apply. If the RSAES-OAEP-params are negotiated, then the negotiation mechanism needs to provide integrity for these parameters. For example, an S/MIME Agent can advertise their capabilities in the SMIMECapabilities attribute, which is either signed attribute [RFC3851bis] or a certificate extension [RFC4262]. 6. IANA Considerations None {{Please remove this section prior to publication as an RFC.}} 7. References 7.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005. Turner, et al Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 5] Internet-Draft RFC 4055 Update March 2009 7.2. Informative References [RFC4262] S. Santesson, "X.509 Certificate Extension for Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Capabilities", RFC 4262, December 2005. [RFC3851bis] Turner, S., Farrell, S., and R. Housley, "An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization", draft-ietf-pkix-3281update-04.txt, work-in-progress. /*** RFC EDITOR: Please replace RFC3851bis with RFCXYAZ when draft- ietf-pkix-3281update is published. Turner, et al Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 6] Internet-Draft RFC 4055 Update March 2009 Author's Addresses Sean Turner IECA, Inc. 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 Fairfax, VA 22031 USA EMail: turners@ieca.com Kelvin Yiu Microsoft One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052-6399 USA Email: kelviny@microsoft.com Daniel R. L. Brown Certicom Corp 5520 Explorer Drive #400 Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1 CANADA EMail: dbrown@certicom.com Russ Housley Vigil Security, LLC 918 Spring Knoll Drive Herndon, VA 20170 USA EMail: housley@vigilsec.com Tim Polk NIST Building 820, Room 426 Gaithersburg, MD 20899 USA EMail: wpolk@nist.gov Turner, et al Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 7]