Secure Failure Detection Overview

IPsecME WG

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The basic scenario

- Alice and Bob have SAs up and ESP traffic is flowing, but then Bob crashes
- Alice keeps sending ESP to Bob
- When Bob finally comes back up, he replies to Alice's ESP with INVALID_SPI notifications
- Alice starts sending IKE liveness checks until she is "sure" that the INVALID_SPI responses are not a DoS attack; this could be "several minutes"
- Then Alice rekeys

Some other problem cases

- Bob has two gateways in some failover architecture
  - One gateway goes down, the other gateway detects this and wants to tell Alice to rekey
- Bob has a bunch of gateways in some load-balancing or cluster architecture
  - One gateway is taken down on purpose, and the system wants to tell Alice to rekey
- Protocol robustness
  - Bob's gateway loses the SA without going down

What we want

- As soon as Bob starts sending INVALID_SPI responses to Alice's ESP traffic, the two parties should be able to quickly determine that this is not an attack and therefore they probably want to rekey right away
- It is still up to Alice and Bob to do the rekeying, but at least they know they can do in now

Two proposed solutions

- QCD
  - Bob gives Alice a token in the AUTH exchange
  - Bob puts the token in his INVALID_SPI response as a way to say “this SPI is gone”
- SIR
  - Alice sends a new Check_SPI query with a stateless cookie
  - Bob responds “I’m sure I don’t know that SPI”

QCD overview

- draft-nir-ike-qcd
- Bob generates a token using a secret that is remembered across reboots, and is used with all SA partners
- Alice must remember the token (or a hash of it) for each SA

SIR overview

- draft-ditienne-ikev2-recovery
- Alice asks “do you really not know about this SPI?”
- Nothing is stored on either side
- A man-in-the-middle can attack this to cause an unnecessary rekey just as they can normal IKE

Criteria for choosing

- Support for different scenarios (load-balancer, active cluster, failover)
- Security from man-in-the-middle DoS attacks
- Resources used
- IPR