

SIPCORE WG

IETF-79

History-Info header and Support of target-uri Solution Requirements

`draft-ietf-sipcore-4244bis-02.txt`

Mary Barnes (mary.ietf.barnes@gmail.com)

Francois Audet (francois.audet@skype.net)

Shida Schubert (shida@agnada.com)

Christer.Holmberg (@ericsson.com)

Hans-Erik Van Elburg (ietf.hanserik@gmail.com)

November 11, 2010

What we want to achieve today

- Status
- Issue discussion & resolution
- Way forward

Status

- Lots of changes in -02 per issues in tracker and some email feedback - many of the issues are related to RFC 4244 text and editorial.
- Missed a set of comments from John Elwell - email discussion resolved majority.
- Adhoc session on Monday extremely useful for evaluating proposals to resolve open issues (discussed in subsequent charts)

Current Issues

- What messages contain HI?
- Privacy
- Reason

What messages contain HI?

- **Current:**
 - Any initial request for a dialog, standalone request or responses associated with these requests: INVITE, REGISTER, MESSAGE, REFER, OPTIONS, SUBSCRIBE, and PUBLISH and any valid responses, plus NOTIFY requests that initiate a dialog.
- **Proposal to not include HI in the following:**
 - 100 responses (i.e., MUST include HI in non-100 provisional responses)
 - Out of Dialog REFER

Privacy (1)

- Issue 1: Removing privacy header after anonymization.

Recommendation: Add text about removing the privacy header field in the SIP Request and the Privacy header field escaped in the hi-entries when the hi-targeted-to-uris in the hi-entires are anonymized.

- Issue 2: Anonymizing hi-entries in responses (not just for last hi-entry).

Recommendation: Update text that all the hi-entries in the response (with an escaped Privacy header field) MUST be anonymized

- Issue 3: Privacy header field added by the UAC in the SIP request indicates that the initial Request-URI should be anonymized

Proposal: the Privacy header field added by the UAC should indicate that all hi-entries associated with the domain MUST be anonymized when the request “leaves” the domain.

 **Email summary:** <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sipcore/current/msg03717.html>

Privacy (2)

- Issue 4: “none”.
 - What does it indicate?
 - Basic functionality defined in RFC 3323 - indicates that UAC wants NO privacy applied to the Identity associated with the request.
 - Is it useful?
 - Keep in mind that RFC 3323 relates to privacy of the Identity of the UAC
 - HI captures Request URIs associated with the UAS
 - How should it be handled in the context of HI?
 - Option 1: “none” is applicable to the hi-entries added in the UAC’s domain. None doesn’t preclude intermediaries outside the domain from applying privacy to hi-entries.
 - Option 2: ignore - “none” doesn’t apply to HI since HI doesn’t reveal identity of UAC

Reason in History-Info

- Currently (as in RFC 4244), the “Reason” for the retargeting is captured in a SIP Reason header field escaped in the hi-targeted-to-uri that was retargeted.
 - The Reason header field is set based on the response that triggered the retargeting.
 - No new values for the Reason header are added - as with RFC 3326 the values are determined directly from the SIP Response codes.
 - In the case of a new request triggered by a SIP Response (e.g., 3xx), the Reason header field in the SIP Request matches that in the “old” hi-entry.
- Proposal (on mailing list) : Reason header field should be escaped in the “new” hi-entry, thus matching the Reason header field in the Request in which the Request-URI is the value captured in the hi-targeted-to-uri in the “new” hi-entry.
- Issue: breaks backwards compatibility.
- Recommendation: Leave Reason as is.

Way Forward

- Update document reflecting mailing list discussion/ consensus & issue conclusions (by end of November)
- Update call flow document (by end of November)
- 2nd WGLC (Early December)
- Forward to AD for IESG review (by yearend).
- Agree call flows as a WG document and progress shortly after 4244bis.