

draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements-02

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Outline

- Issues in draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements-02
- Next steps



- Several comments have been provided by Michael and Phil
- Most of them are editorial that can be easily worked out
- Some of comments provided by Michael need discussion



- Issue 1: For the following bullet, should we say the IPv4 or IPv6 address of the nodes to be more specific?
 - o identifiers of the PCN-ingress-node and the PCN-egressnode that specify the ingress-egress-aggregate to which the report refers
- Issue 2: Regarding flow identifiers, the following is not needed:
- o IP address of PCN-ingress-node;
- o IP address of PCN-egress-node
- Issue 3: requirement "2.3.2 Local information" exchange does not need to be explicitly stated

- Issue 4: Remove section "2.3.3 Carry identification of PCN edge nodes" since it is part of the content.
- Issue 5: Remove section "2.3.4 Carry identification of ingressegress-aggregates" since it is a part of the content.
- Issue 6: Add the following text to "Signaling load" requirement:
 - We give two examples that may help to achieve that goal:
 - o Piggy-backing the reports by the PCN-egress-nodes to the decision point(s) onto other signaling messages that are already in place
 - o Reducing the amount of reports to be sent by optional report suppression.

- Issue 7: Changed the definition of the Reliability requirement into:
- As PCN reports are sent regularly, additional reliability mechanisms are not needed. This also holds in the presence of optional report suppression, as reports are sent periodically if actions by the decision point(s) are needed.

- Issue 8: Removed the following text from the Security requirement:
- As PCN reports are sent regularly, additional reliability mechanisms are not needed. This also holds in the presence of optional report suppression, as reports are sent periodically if actions by the decision point(s) are needed.
 - PCN-signaling messages MUST NOT leak out of the PCN-domain. This can be easily accomplished, since messages are sent to the PCNboundary-node's address;
 - PCN-boundary-nodes MUST validate the signaling messages, to avoid that they come from an attacker. Considering that all PCN-nodes are trusted, see [RFC5559], this requirement could be easily fulfilled by verifying whether a message arrives on an interface internal to the PCN-domain.

- Issue 9: Removed completely section 3 and proposed new sections (proposed Section 3.3 is too abstract)
 - 3.3 Requirements for the Signaling Protocol that Carries Data between the Decision Point(s) and PCN-Ingress-Nodes
 - The request messages MUST be addressed to the PCN-ingress-nodes. The report messages MUST be addressed to the decision point(s). The requests by the decision points and the reports by the PCN-ingress-nodes are sent only when flow termination is needed. As flow termination is an urgent action, it is important that the messages arrive quickly and reliably. This implies that these messages SHOULD be sent
 - with high priority
 - in a reliably fashion

Next steps

Go to WG last call after solving current open issues?