



IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard (Ra-Guard) evasion draft-gont-v6ops-ra-guard-evasion

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Introduction


- **RFC 6104 introduces the problem statement of Rogue RAs**
 - Focuses on misconfigured routers
 - Mentions different filtering criteria for filtering
 - Most basic filtering criterion based on the incoming port for the RA
- **RFC 6105 specifies RA-Guard**
 - Focuses on malicious routers (security)
 - Very brief Security Considerations section
- **In many cases RA-Guard has been deployed and seen as a security mechanism**
- **It is a desired feature, since it parallels the DHCPv4-snooping of the IPv4 world**

draft-gont-v6ops-ra-guard-evasion

- **Describes RA-Guard evasion techniques**
- **Describes more advanced filtering to mitigate them (operational mitigation)**
- **Formally updates RFC 6105 -> the RA-Guard spec is updated such that these issues are addressed**
 - **Enhances the Security Considerations**
 - **Mitigates RA-Guard evasion techniques**


Evasion technique #1

- RA-Guard implementations fail to process the entire IPv6 header chain



Evasion technique #2

- Combination of a Destination Options header and fragmentation:



Mitigation:

How to filter RAs:

- Follow the entire IPv6 header chain (possibly enforcing a limit on number of Ext. Headers) -- drop the packet if it is an RA or the Ext. Header limit is hit.
- If the upper layer protocol is not found (e.g. the packet is fragmented), and the IPv6 Src. Addr. is a link-local address, drop the packet ¥
- Else, forward the packet

¥: RAs are required to use a link-local address

Discussion on the v6ops mailing-list

- **Was mostly focused on draft-gont-6man-nd-extension-headers**
 - **Related I-D about prohibiting the use of some Ext. Headers with ND**
- **There seemed to be general agreement that these evasion techniques can be mitigated as proposed**
- **Moving forward:**

Adopt this I-D as a v6ops wg item?