

draft-ietf-radext-radius-fragmentation-01

IETF 88

Status

- draft-perez-radext-radius-fragmentation-06 accepted as a WG document on August 26th
 - draft-ietf-radext-radius-fragmentation-00
- Solution focused on:
 - Transport of large amounts of authorization information between RADIUS client and server
 - Work through unmodified infrastructures
- Version 01 submitted
 - Addresses some issues raised on the mailing list
 - Fixes some minor errors

Issues

- Added text clarifying that proxies are assumed to base their routing decisions on the value of the *User-Name* attribute
 - And the MUST on User-Name in fragments
- New text regarding how proxies implementing RFC6929, but not this draft, will handle with truncated attributes
 - RFC states that packages SHOULD be forwarded even if invalid attributes are found
- Included a practical example of how many roundtrips would the transmission of a SAML assertion of 15,000 octets require
 - Expected overload is low: around 120 bytes (3%)

Issues

- Proxy-State-Len attribute
 - The server MAY artificially increase the quantity to be included in this attribute, in order to handle with situations where proxies behave inconsistently
 - The client MAY apply a value higher than the one suggested by this attribute in environments known to be problematic
- Detailed description of CoA handling
 - CoA packet fragmentation is not allowed
 - CoA clients are required to send a minimal CoA-Request packet, containing Service-Type=Authorize-Only
 - The NAS then performs fragmentation using this draft (Access-Request) through the RADIUS server it is configured to use
 - This server acts as proxy to forward authorization data to the RADIUS system which is co-located with the CoA client
 - Session identification and authorization are kept separated
 - The authorization process remains the same for initial authentication and for CoA

Other (Minor) Updates

- All references to radius-extensions draft now point to RFC6929
- Replaced User-Password attribute with NAS-Identifier for the pre-authorization example