

OPTLS Rationale

- New to TLS: Forward secrecy (PFS), O-RTT, ECC-centric instantiation
- Calls for:
 - \Box DH as the essential primitive (PFS and ECC)
 - ☐ Server static DH key (to encrypt 1st flow data, signatures useless for 0-RTT)
 - Caching of static key at client (0-RTT and optimizations)
- Observation: Instead of using two different protocol logics for regular 1-RTT and 0-RTT/Caching, unify via static DH key:
 - Server signs static key; then uses it for session authentication, caching, and 0-RTT
 - □ Uniform spec, unified key derivation, single protocol analysis (also applies to PSK with and without PFS)
 - \square Performance optimization (esp. huge savings with RSA via static key caching)

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OPTLS Overview


- C to S: C-hello, g^x, [C-ed]
- S to C: S-hello, g^y , [S-ske], S-fin = prf(g^{xs} ; session-hash)
- C to S: C-fin = $prf(g^{xs}; session-hash)$
- C-ed (client early data): $Enc(g^{xs}; early-data)$
- S-ske (server static key envelope): qs, S-cert, Sig(qs, session-hash)
- Cases (all run Basic protocol plus possible additions)
 - \square Cached 1-RTT: Basic only; assumes C has g^s but no C-ed (0 sig, 2 exp)
 - \square Cached O-RTT: Basic + [C-ed], assumes C has g^s (0 sig, 2 exp)
 - \square Transport 1-RTT: Basic + [S-ske], C caches g^s (1 amortized sig, 2 exp)
 - \Box Ephemeral 1-RTT: Basic + [S-ske], ephemeral g^s , no caching (1 sig, 1 exp)
 - Ephemeral derives record keys from g^{xy} only, others from both g^{xy} and g^{xs}

Notation

■ Upper arrow: key

Side arrow: input

Down arrow: output



■ ES: ephemeral-static g^{xs}

EE: ephemeral-ephemeral g^{xy}

MS = Master Secret

AMS = Authentication MS

AKey = Authentication Key

EAD = Early Application Data

■ HTK = Handshake Traffic Keys ATK = Application Traffic Keys

■ UMS = Update MS

RMS = Resumption MS

 \blacksquare hash₀, hash₁, hash₂ = incremental session hash values



