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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 S/MIME WG Sean Turner, IECA 2 Internet Draft Dan Brown, Certicom 3 Intended Status: Informational June 5, 2009 4 Obsoletes: 3278 (once approved) 5 Expires: December 5, 2009 7 Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms 8 in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 9 draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-09.txt 11 Status of this Memo 13 This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the 14 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may contain material 15 from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly 16 available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the 17 copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF 18 Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the 19 IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from 20 the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this 21 document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and 22 derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards 23 Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to 24 translate it into languages other than English. 26 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 27 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 28 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 29 Drafts. 31 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 32 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 33 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 34 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 36 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 37 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt 39 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 40 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 41 This Internet-Draft will expire on December 5, 2009. 43 Copyright Notice 45 Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 46 document authors. All rights reserved. 48 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 49 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of 50 publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). 51 Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights 52 and restrictions with respect to this document. 54 Abstract 56 This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 57 public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The 58 ECC algorithms support the creation of digital signatures and the 59 exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate content. The definition 60 of the algorithm processing is based on the NIST FIPS 186-3 for 61 digital signature, NIST SP800-56A and SEC1 for key agreement, RFC 62 3370 and RFC 3565 for key wrap and content encryption, NIST FIPS 180- 63 3 for message digest, SEC1 for key derivation, and RFC 2104 and RFC 64 4231 for message authentication code standards. This document 65 obsoletes RFC 3278. 67 Discussion 69 This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-smime' mailing list. To 70 subscribe, send a message to ietf-smime-request@imc.org with the 71 single word subscribe in the body of the message. There is a Web site 72 for the mailing list at . 74 Table of Contents 76 1. Introduction...................................................3 77 1.1. Requirements Terminology..................................4 78 2. SignedData using ECC...........................................4 79 2.1. SignedData using ECDSA....................................4 80 3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms.............................5 81 3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH...............6 82 3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV..........................8 83 4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC.............11 84 4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................11 85 4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................12 87 5. Certificates using ECC........................................13 88 6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC...........................13 89 7. ASN.1 Syntax..................................................21 90 7.1. Algorithm Identifiers....................................21 91 7.2. Other Syntax.............................................25 92 8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves....................27 93 9. Security Considerations.......................................29 94 10. IANA Considerations..........................................34 95 11. References...................................................34 96 11.1. Normative...............................................34 97 11.2. Informative.............................................36 98 Appendix A ASN.1 Modules.........................................37 99 Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module................................37 100 Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module................................46 101 Appendix B Changes since RFC 3278................................61 102 Acknowledgements.................................................63 103 Author's Addresses...............................................63 105 1. Introduction 107 The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm 108 independent. This specification defines a profile for the use of 109 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in the CMS. 110 The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following CMS content 111 types: 113 - 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods 114 (ECDSA) to sign content; 116 - 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement 117 methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption 118 keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content 119 encryption; 121 - 'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement 122 methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to 123 encrypt message-authentication keys used for content 124 authentication and integrity; and, 126 - 'AuthEnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement 127 methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to 128 encrypt message-authentication and content-encryption keys used 129 for content authentication, integrity, and encryption. 131 Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide public- 132 key distribution in support of the specified techniques. 134 The document will obsolete [CMS-ECC]. The technical changes 135 performed since RFC 3278 are detailed in Appendix B. 137 1.1. Requirements Terminology 139 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 140 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 141 document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST]. 143 2. SignedData using ECC 145 This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS 146 SignedData format to sign data. 148 2.1. SignedData using ECDSA 150 This section describes how to use the Elliptic Curve Digital 151 Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with SignedData. ECDSA is specified in 152 [FIPS186-3]. The method is the elliptic curve analog of the Digital 153 Signature Algorithm (DSA) [FIPS186-3]. ECDSA is used with the Secure 154 Hash Algorithm (SHA) [FIPS180-3]. 156 In an implementation that uses ECDSA with CMS SignedData, the 157 following techniques and formats MUST be used. 159 2.1.1. Fields of the SignedData 161 When using ECDSA with SignedData, the fields of SignerInfo are as in 162 [CMS], but with the following restrictions: 164 - digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash 165 algorithm (see Section 7.1.1) which MUST be one of the 166 following: id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, or id- 167 sha512. 169 - signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier 170 (see Section 7.1.3): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa- 171 with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512. The hash 172 algorithm identified in the name of the signature algorithm MUST 173 be the same as the digestAlgorithm (e.g., digestAlgorithm is id- 174 sha256 therefore signatureAlgorithm is ecdsa-with-SHA256). 176 - signature MUST contain the DER encoding (as an octet string) of a 177 value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section 7.2). 179 When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field MAY include the 180 certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of the 181 ECDSA signatures in SignedData. ECC certificates are discussed in 182 Section 5. 184 2.1.2. Actions of the sending agent 186 When using ECDSA with SignedData, the sending agent uses the message 187 digest calculation process and signature generation process for 188 SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To sign data, the sending 189 agent uses the signature method specified in [FIPS186-3]. 191 The sending agent encodes the resulting signature using the 192 ECDSA-Sig-Value syntax (see Section 7.2) and places it in the 193 SignerInfo signature field. 195 2.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent 197 When using ECDSA with SignedData, the receiving agent uses the 198 message digest calculation process and signature verification process 199 for SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To verify SignedData, 200 the receiving agent uses the signature verification method specified 201 in [FIPS186-3]. 203 In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the 204 integers r and s from the SignerInfo signature field of the received 205 message. 207 3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms 209 This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS 210 EnvelopedData format. 212 This document does not specify the static-static ECDH, method C(0,2, 213 ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A]. Static-static ECDH is analogous to 214 static-static DH, which is specified in [CMS-ALG]. Ephemeral-static 215 ECDH and 1-Pass ECMQV were specified because they provide better 216 security due to the originator's ephemeral contribution to the key 217 agreement scheme. 219 3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH 221 This section describes how to use the ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve 222 Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData, 223 method C(1, 1, ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A] and ECDH with the standard 224 primitive from Section 3.3.1 of [SEC1]. Ephemeral-static ECDH is the 225 elliptic curve analog of the ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key 226 agreement algorithm specified jointly in the documents [CMS-ALG] and 227 [CMS-DH]. 229 If an implementation uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData, then the 230 following techniques and formats MUST be used. 232 The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS]; as ECDH is a key 233 agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. 235 3.1.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 237 When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of 238 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as follows: 240 - version MUST be 3. 242 - originator MUST be the alternative originatorKey. The 243 originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey 244 object identifier (see Section 7.1.2). The parameters 245 associated with id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent, ECParameters, or 246 NULL. The parameters associated with id-ecPublicKey SHOULD be 247 absent or ECParameters, and NULL is allowed to support legacy 248 implementations. The previous version of this document required 249 NULL to be present. If the parameters are ECParameters, then 250 they MUST be namedCurve. The originatorKey publicKey field MUST 251 contain the DER-encoding of the value of the ASN.1 type ECPoint 252 (see Section 7.2), which represents the sending agent's 253 ephemeral EC public key. The ECPoint in uncompressed form MUST 254 be supported. 256 - ukm MAY be present or absent. However, message originators 257 SHOULD include the ukm. As specified in RFC 3852 [CMS], 258 implementations MUST support ukm message recipient processing, 259 so interoperability is not a concern if the ukm is present or 260 absent. The ukm is placed in the entityUInfo field of the ECC- 261 CMS-SharedInfo structure. When present, the ukm is used to 262 ensure that a different key-encryption key is generated, even 263 when the ephemeral private key is improperly used more than 264 once, by using the ECC-CMS-SharedInfo as an input to the key 265 derivation function (see Section 7.2). 267 - keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the object identifier of the 268 key encryption algorithm, which in this case is a key agreement 269 algorithm (see Section 7.1.4). The parameters field contains 270 KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the algorithm 271 identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm 272 used to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with the key- 273 encryption key (KEK) and any associated parameters (see Section 274 7.1.5). Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8. 276 - recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted 277 key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey 278 KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the 279 issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or 280 the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier 281 from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the 282 recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static ECDH 283 public key. RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the 284 content-encryption key encrypted with the ephemeral-static, 285 ECDH-generated pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm 286 specified by the KeyWrapAlgorithm. 288 3.1.2. Actions of the sending agent 290 When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending 291 agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain 292 parameters (e.g. from the recipient's certificate). The sending 293 agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the 294 KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string 295 "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see 296 Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and 297 the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 298 Scheme specified in [SP800-56A] or [SEC1]; in either case, use the 299 KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1] with the hash algorithm 300 identified in the key agreement algorithm. As a result the sending 301 agent obtains: 303 - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of the 304 type ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string and 305 placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator originatorKey 306 publicKey field, and 308 - a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise 309 key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS]. 311 In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient, 312 then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for 313 that recipient in each of the different layers. 315 3.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent 317 When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving 318 agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER 319 encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer 320 "keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The 321 receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the bit 322 string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, with a value of the type 323 ECPoint (see Section 7.2) encapsulated as a bit string, and if 324 present, originally supplied additional user key material from the 325 ukm field. The receiving agent performs the key agreement operation 326 of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SP800-56A] 327 or [SEC1]; in either case, use the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of 328 [SEC1]. As a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit 329 string "K", which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to 330 unwrap the CEK. 332 3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV 334 This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV 335 (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData, method 336 C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. Like the KEA algorithm [CMS-KEA], 337 1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair, a static 338 key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the receiving 339 agent. Using an algorithm with the sender static key pair allows for 340 knowledge of the message creator, this means that authentication can, 341 in some circumstances, be obtained for AuthEnvelopedData and 342 AuthenticatedData. This means that 1-Pass ECMQV can be a common 343 algorithm for EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData, 344 while ECDH can only be used in EnvelopedData. 346 If an implementation uses 1-Pass ECMQV with CMS EnvelopedData, then 347 the following techniques and formats MUST be used. 349 The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS]; as 1-Pass ECMQV is a key 350 agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When 351 using 1-Pass ECMQV, the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY 352 include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the 353 formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in 354 Section 5. 356 3.2.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 358 When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the fields of 359 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are: 361 - version MUST be 3. 363 - originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender. It 364 SHOULD be one of the alternatives, issuerAndSerialNumber or 365 subjectKeyIdentifier, and point to one of the sending agent's 366 certificates. 368 - ukm MUST be present. The ukm field is an octet string which MUST 369 contain the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see 370 Section 7.2). The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey 371 algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object 372 identifier (see Section 7.1.2). The parameters associated with 373 id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent, ECParameters, or NULL. The 374 parameters associated with id-ecPublicKey SHOULD be absent or 375 ECParameters, as NULL is allowed to support legacy 376 implementations. The previous version of this document required 377 NULL to be present. If the parameters are ECParameters, then 378 they MUST be namedCurve. The MQVuserKeyingMaterial 379 ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field MUST contain the DER-encoding 380 of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section 7.2) representing the 381 sending agent's ephemeral EC public key. The 382 MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm field, if present, contains 383 additional user keying material from the sending agent. 385 - keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the object identifier of the 386 key encryption algorithm, which in this case is a key agreement 387 algorithm (see Section 7.1.4). The parameters field contains 388 KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric 389 encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK 390 generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm and any associated 391 parameters (see Section 7.1.5). Algorithm requirements are 392 found in Section 8. 394 - recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted 395 key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey 396 KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the 397 issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or 398 the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier 399 from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the 400 recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static ECMQV 401 public key. RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the 402 content-encryption key encrypted with the 1-Pass ECMQV-generated 403 pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm specified by the 404 KeyWrapAlgorithm. 406 3.2.2. Actions of the sending agent 408 When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first 409 obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters (e.g. 410 from the recipient's certificate), and checks that the domain 411 parameters are the same as the sender's domain parameters. The 412 sending agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the 413 KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string 414 "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see 415 Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and 416 key agreement operations of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified 417 in [SP800-56A], but uses the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. 418 As a result, the sending agent obtains: 420 - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of type 421 ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string, placed 422 in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field 423 (see Section 7.2), and 425 - a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise 426 key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS]. 428 In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient, 429 then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for 430 that recipient in each of the different layers. 432 3.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent 434 When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent 435 determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of 436 ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer "keydatalen" 437 from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving 438 agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC public keys of the 439 originator, from the originator and ukm fields as described in 440 Section 3.2.1, and its static EC public key identified in the rid 441 field and checks that the originator's domain parameters are the same 442 as the recipient's domain parameters. The receiving agent then 443 performs the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme 444 [SP800-56A], but uses the KDF defined in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. As 445 a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string "K", 446 which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK. 448 4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC 450 This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS 451 AuthenticatedData format. AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation, 452 and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData. (For example, 453 the sending agent might not want the message to be authenticated when 454 forwarded.) 456 This section also describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS 457 AuthEnvelopedData format [CMS-AUTHENV]. AuthEnvelopedData supports 458 authentication and encryption, and in some instances is preferable to 459 signing and then encrypting data. 461 For both AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData, data origin 462 authentication with 1-Pass ECMQV can only be provided when there is 463 one and only one recipient. When there are multiple recipients, an 464 attack is possible where one recipient modifies the content without 465 other recipients noticing [BON]. A sending agent who is concerned 466 with such an attack SHOULD use a separate AuthenticatedData or 467 AuthEnvelopedData for each recipient. 469 Using an algorithm with the sender static key pair allows for 470 knowledge of the message creator; this means that authentication can, 471 in some circumstances, be obtained for AuthEnvelopedData and 472 AuthenticatedData. This means that 1-Pass ECMQV can be a common 473 algorithm for EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData 474 while ECDH can only be used in EnvelopedData. 476 4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV 478 This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV 479 (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData. ECMQV is 480 method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. 482 When using ECMQV with AuthenticatedData, the fields of 483 AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS], but with the following 484 restrictions: 486 - macAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the message 487 authentication code (MAC) algorithm (see Section 7.1.7) which 488 MUST be one of the following: hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWITHSHA224, id- 489 hmacWITHSHA256, id-hmacWITHSHA384, or id-hmacWITHSHA512. 491 - digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash 492 algorithm (see Section 7.1.1) which MUST be one of the 493 following: id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, and id- 494 sha512. 496 As 1-Pass ECMQV is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari 497 choice is used in the AuthenticatedData. When using 1-Pass ECMQV, 498 the AuthenticatedData originatorInfo field MAY include the 499 certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the formation of the 500 pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in Section 5. 502 4.1.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 504 The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the 505 same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData 506 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document. 508 4.1.2. Actions of the sending agent 510 The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 511 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document. 513 In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient, 514 then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for 515 that recipient in each of the different layers. 517 4.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent 519 The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 520 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document. 522 4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV 524 This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV 525 (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthEnvelopedData. ECMQV is 526 method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. 528 When using ECMQV with AuthEnvelopedData, the fields of 529 AuthEnvelopedData are as in [CMS-AUTHENV]. 531 As 1-Pass ECMQV is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari 532 choice is used. When using 1-Pass ECMQV, the AuthEnvelopedData 533 originatorInfo field MAY include the certificate(s) for the EC public 534 key used in the formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are 535 discussed in Section 5. 537 4.2.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 539 The AuthEnvelopedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the 540 same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData 541 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document. 543 4.2.2. Actions of the sending agent 545 The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 1- 546 Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document. 548 In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient, 549 then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for 550 that recipient in each of the different layers. 552 4.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent 554 The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 555 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document. 557 5. Certificates using ECC 559 Internet X.509 certificates [PKI] can be used in conjunction with 560 this specification to distribute agents' public keys. The use of ECC 561 algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in [PKI- 562 ALG]. 564 6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC 566 A sending agent MAY announce to receiving agents that it supports one 567 or more of the ECC algorithms specified in this document by using the 568 SMIMECapabilities signed attribute [MSG] in either a signed message 569 or a certificate [CERTCAP]. 571 The SMIMECapabilities attribute value indicates support for one of 572 the ECDSA signature algorithms in a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID 573 field containing the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA1 with NULL 574 parameters and ecdsa-with-SHA* (where * is 224, 256, 384, or 512) 575 with absent parameters. The DER encodings are: 577 ecdsa-with-SHA1: 30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00 579 ecdsa-with-SHA224: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 01 581 ecdsa-with-SHA256: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 583 ecdsa-with-SHA384: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 03 585 ecdsa-with-SHA512: 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 04 587 NOTE: The SMIMECapabilities attribute indicates that parameters for 588 ECDSA with SHA-1 are NULL; however, the parameters are absent when 589 used to generate a digital signature. 591 The SMIMECapabilities attribute value indicates support for 592 a) the standard ECDH key agreement algorithm, 593 b) the cofactor ECDH key agreement algorithm, or 594 c) the 1-Pass ECMQV key agreement algorithm and 595 is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object 596 identifier 597 a) dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha*kdf-scheme, 598 b) dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha*kdf-scheme, or 599 c) mqvSinglePass-sha*kdf-scheme 600 respectively (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) with the 601 parameters present. The parameters indicate the supported key- 602 encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier. 604 The DER encodings that indicate capabilities are as follows (KA is 605 key agreement, KDF is key derivation function, and Wrap is key wrap 606 algorithm): 608 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES 610 30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 611 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00 613 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=Triple-DES 615 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 00 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 616 09 10 03 06 618 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=Triple-DES 620 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 621 09 10 03 06 623 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=Triple-DES 625 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 626 09 10 03 06 628 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=Triple-DES 630 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 03 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 631 09 10 03 06 633 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-128 635 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 636 65 03 04 01 05 638 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-128 640 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 641 01 05 643 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-128 645 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 646 01 05 648 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-128 650 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 651 01 05 653 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-128 655 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 656 01 05 658 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-192 660 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 661 65 03 04 01 19 663 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-192 665 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 666 01 19 668 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-192 670 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 671 01 19 673 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-192 675 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 676 01 19 678 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-192 680 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 681 01 19 683 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-256 685 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 686 65 03 04 01 2D 688 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-256 690 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 691 01 2D 693 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-256 695 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 696 01 2D 698 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256 700 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 701 01 2D 05 00 703 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-256 705 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 706 01 2D 708 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES 710 30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 711 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00 713 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=Triple-DES 715 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 00 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 716 09 10 03 06 718 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=Triple-DES 720 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 721 09 10 03 06 723 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=Triple-DES 725 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 726 09 10 03 06 728 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=Triple-DES 730 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 03 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 731 09 10 03 06 733 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-128 735 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 736 65 03 04 01 05 738 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-128 740 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 741 01 05 743 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-128 745 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 746 01 05 748 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-128 750 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 751 01 05 753 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-128 755 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 756 01 05 758 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-192 760 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 761 65 03 04 01 19 763 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-192 765 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 766 01 19 768 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-192 770 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 771 01 19 773 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-192 775 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 776 01 19 778 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-192 780 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 781 01 19 783 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-256 785 30 15 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 786 65 03 04 01 2D 788 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-256 790 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 791 01 2D 793 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-256 795 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 796 01 2D 798 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256 800 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 801 01 2D 803 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-256 805 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 806 01 2D 808 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES 810 30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 811 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00 813 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=Triple-DES 815 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 00 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 816 09 10 03 06 818 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=Triple-DES 820 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 821 09 10 03 06 823 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=Triple-DES 825 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 826 09 10 03 06 828 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=Triple-DES 830 30 17 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 03 30 0d 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 831 09 10 03 06 833 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-128 835 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 836 65 03 04 01 05 838 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-128 840 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 841 01 05 843 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-128 845 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 846 01 05 848 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-128 850 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 851 01 05 853 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-128 855 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 856 01 05 858 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-192 860 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 861 65 03 04 01 19 863 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-192 865 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 866 01 19 868 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-192 870 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 871 01 19 873 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-192 875 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 876 01 19 878 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-192 880 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 881 01 19 883 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=AES-256 885 30 18 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 886 65 03 04 01 2D 888 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-224 Wrap=AES-256 890 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 00 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 891 01 2D 893 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-256 895 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 896 01 2D 898 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256 900 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 901 01 2D 903 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-512 Wrap=AES-256 905 30 15 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 03 30 0b 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 906 01 2D 908 NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities for the supported AES content 909 encryption key sizes are defined in [CMS-AES]. 911 NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities for the supported MAC algorithms are 912 defined in [CMS-ASN]. 914 7. ASN.1 Syntax 916 The ASN.1 syntax [X.680], [X.681], X.682], [X.683] used in this 917 document is gathered in this section for reference purposes. 919 7.1. Algorithm Identifiers 921 This section provides the object identifiers for the algorithms used 922 in this document along with any associated parameters. 924 7.1.1. Digest Algorithms 926 Digest algorithm object identifiers are used in the SignedData 927 digestAlgorithms and digestAlgorithm fields and the AuthenticatedData 928 digestAlgorithm field. The digest algorithms used in this document 929 are: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The object 930 identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found 931 in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-SHA2]. 933 7.1.2. Originator Public Key 935 The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field uses the following object 936 identifier to indicate an elliptic curve public key: 938 id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 939 ansi-x9-62 keyType(2) 1 } 941 where 943 ansi-x9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 944 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 } 946 When the object identifier id-ecPublicKey is used here with an 947 algorithm identifier, the associated parameters MUST be either absent 948 or ECParameters. Implementations MUST accept id-ecPublicKey with 949 absent and ECParameters parameters. If ECParameters is present, its 950 value MUST match the recipient's ECParameters. Implementations 951 SHOULD generate absent parameters for the id-ecPublicKey object 952 identifier in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field. 954 [CMS-ECC] indicated the parameters were NULL. Support for this 955 legacy form is OPTIONAL. 957 7.1.3. Signature Algorithms 959 Signature algorithm identifiers are used in the SignedData 960 signatureAlgorithm and signature fields. The signature algorithms 961 used in this document are ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA 962 with SHA-256, ECDSA with SHA-384, and ECDSA with SHA-512. The object 963 identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found 964 in [PKI-ALG]. 966 [CMS-ECC] indicated the parameters were NULL. Support for this 967 legacy form is OPTIONAL. 969 7.1.4. Key Agreement Algorithms 971 Key agreement algorithms are used in EnvelopedData, 972 AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 973 keyEncryptionAlgorithm field. The following object identifiers 974 indicate the key agreement algorithms used in this document [SP800- 975 56A], [SEC1]: 977 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 978 x9-63-scheme 2 } 980 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 981 secg-scheme 11 0 } 983 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 984 secg-scheme 11 1 } 986 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 987 secg-scheme 11 2 } 989 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 990 secg-scheme 11 3 } 992 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 993 x9-63-scheme 3 } 995 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 996 secg-scheme 14 0 } 998 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 999 secg-scheme 14 1 } 1001 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1002 secg-scheme 14 2 } 1004 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1005 secg-scheme 14 3 } 1007 mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1008 x9-63-scheme 16 } 1010 mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1011 secg-scheme 15 0 } 1013 mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1014 secg-scheme 15 1 } 1016 mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1017 secg-scheme 15 2 } 1019 mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1020 secg-scheme 15 3 } 1022 where 1024 x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1025 iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) 1026 x9(840) x9-63(63) schemes(0) } 1028 and 1030 secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1031 iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) } 1033 When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm 1034 identifier, the associated parameters field contains KeyWrapAlgorithm 1035 to indicate the key wrap algorithm and any associated parameters. 1037 7.1.5. Key Wrap Algorithms 1039 Key wrap algorithms are used as part of the parameters in the key 1040 agreement algorithm. The key wrap algorithms used in this document 1041 are Triple-DES, AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256. The object 1042 identifiers and parameters for these algorithms are found in [CMS- 1043 ALG] and [CMS-AES]. 1045 7.1.6. Content Encryption Algorithms 1047 Content encryption algorithms are used in EnvelopedData and 1048 AuthEnvelopedData in the EncryptedContentInfo 1049 contentEncryptionAlgorithm field. The content encryption algorithms 1050 used with EnvelopedData in this document are 3-Key Triple DES in CBC 1051 mode, AES-128 in CBC mode, AES-192 in CBC mode, and AES-256 in CBC 1052 mode. The object identifiers and parameters associated with these 1053 algorithms are found in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-AES]. The content 1054 encryption algorithms used with AuthEnvelopedData in this document 1055 are AES-128 in CCM mode, AES-192 in CCM mode, AES-256 in CCM mode, 1056 AES-128 in GCM mode, AES-192 in GCM mode, and AES-256 in GCM mode. 1057 The object identifiers and parameters associated with these 1058 algorithms are found in [CMS-AESCG]. 1060 7.1.7. Message Authentication Code Algorithms 1062 Message authentication code algorithms are used in AuthenticatedData 1063 in the macAlgorithm field. The message authentication code 1064 algorithms used in this document are HMAC with SHA-1, HMAC with SHA- 1065 224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384, and HMAC with SHA-512. 1066 The object identifiers and parameters associated with these 1067 algorithms are found in [CMS-ALG] and [HMAC-SHA2]. 1069 NOTE: [HMAC-SHA2] defines the object identifiers for HMAC with SHA- 1070 224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384, and HMAC with SHA-512, but 1071 there is no ASN.1 module from which to import these object 1072 identifiers. Therefore, the object identifiers for these algorithms 1073 are included in the ASN.1 modules defined in Appendix A. 1075 7.1.8. Key Derivation Algorithm 1077 The KDF used in this document is as specified in 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. 1078 The hash algorithm is identified in key agreement algorithm. For 1079 example, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme uses the KDF from [SEC1] 1080 but uses SHA-256 instead of SHA-1. 1082 7.2. Other Syntax 1084 The following additional syntax is used here. 1086 When using ECDSA with SignedData, ECDSA signatures are encoded using 1087 the type: 1089 ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { 1090 r INTEGER, 1091 s INTEGER } 1093 ECDSA-Sig-Value is specified in [PKI-ALG]. Within CMS, ECDSA-Sig- 1094 Value is DER-encoded and placed within a signature field of 1095 SignedData. 1097 When using ECDH and ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and 1098 AuthEnvelopedData, ephemeral and static public keys are encoded using 1099 the type ECPoint. Implementations MUST support uncompressed keys, MAY 1100 support compressed keys, and MUST NOT support hybrid keys. 1102 ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING 1104 When using ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and 1105 AuthEnvelopedData, the sending agent's ephemeral public key and 1106 additional keying material are encoded using the type: 1108 MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { 1109 ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, 1110 addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL } 1112 The ECPoint syntax is used to represent the ephemeral public key and 1113 is placed in the ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field. The additional 1114 user keying material is placed in the addedukm field. Then the 1115 MQVuserKeyingMaterial value is DER-encoded and placed within the ukm 1116 field of EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData. 1118 When using ECDH or ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or 1119 AuthEnvelopedData, the key-encryption keys are derived by using the 1120 type: 1122 ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1123 keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier, 1124 entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 1125 suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING } 1127 The fields of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo are as follows: 1129 keyInfo contains the object identifier of the key-encryption 1130 algorithm (used to wrap the CEK) and associated parameters. In 1131 this specification, 3DES wrap has NULL parameters while the AES 1132 wraps have absent parameters. 1134 entityUInfo optionally contains additional keying material 1135 supplied by the sending agent. When used with ECDH and CMS, the 1136 entityUInfo field contains the octet string ukm. When used with 1137 ECMQV and CMS, the entityUInfo contains the octet string addedukm 1138 (encoded in MQVuserKeyingMaterial). 1140 suppPubInfo contains the length of the generated KEK, in bits, 1141 represented as a 32 bit number, as in [CMS-DH] and [CMS-AES]. 1142 (E.g. for AES-256 it would be 00 00 01 00.) 1144 Within CMS, ECC-CMS-SharedInfo is DER-encoded and used as input to 1145 the key derivation function, as specified in Section 3.6.1 of [SEC1]. 1147 NOTE: ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified in 1148 [CMS-DH]. Here, a counter value is not included in the keyInfo field 1149 because the key derivation function specified in Section 3.6.1 of 1150 [SEC1] ensures that sufficient keying data is provided. 1152 8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves 1154 It is RECOMMENDED that implementations of this specification support 1155 SignedData and EnvelopedData. Support for AuthenticatedData and 1156 AuthEnvelopedData is OPTIONAL. 1158 In order to encourage interoperability, implementations SHOULD use 1159 the elliptic curve domain parameters specified by [PKI-ALG]. 1161 Implementations that support SignedData with ECDSA: 1163 - MUST support ECDSA with SHA-256; and, 1165 - MAY support ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA with SHA- 1166 384, and ECDSA with SHA-512; other digital signature algorithms 1167 MAY also be supported. 1169 When using ECDSA, to promote interoperability it is RECOMMENDED that 1170 the P-192, P-224, and the P-256 curves be used with SHA-256, the P- 1171 384 curve be used with SHA-384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA- 1172 512. 1174 If EnvelopedData is supported, then ephemeral-static ECDH standard 1175 primitive MUST be supported. Support for ephemeral-static ECDH co- 1176 factor is OPTIONAL and support for 1-Pass ECMQV is also OPTIONAL. 1178 Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static 1179 ECDH standard primitive: 1181 - MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme key 1182 agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and 1183 the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and, 1185 - MAY support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass- 1186 stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme and 1187 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, 1188 the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key 1189 wrap algorithms and the des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id- 1190 aes256-cbc content encryption algorithms; other algorithms MAY 1191 also be supported. 1193 Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static 1194 ECDH cofactor primitive: 1196 - MUST support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme key 1197 agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and 1198 the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and, 1200 - MAY support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme, 1201 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass- 1202 cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme, and dhSinglePass-cofactorDH- 1203 sha512kdf-scheme key agreement, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id- 1204 aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the des- 1205 ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id-aes256-cbc content encryption 1206 algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be supported. 1208 Implementations that support EnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV: 1210 - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement 1211 algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and the id- 1212 aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and, 1214 - MAY support mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- 1215 sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and 1216 mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id- 1217 alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap 1218 algorithms and the des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc, and id-aes256- 1219 cbc content encryption algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be 1220 supported. 1222 Implementations that support AuthenticatedData with 1-Pass ECMQV: 1224 - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement, 1225 the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, the id-sha256 message digest, and 1226 id-hmacWithSHA256 message authentication code algorithms; and, 1228 - MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- 1229 sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- 1230 sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-alg- 1231 CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap 1232 algorithms, the id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha384, and id-sha512, 1233 message digest algorithms, and the hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224, 1234 id-hmacWithSHA384, and id-hmacWithSHA512 message authentication 1235 code algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be supported. 1237 Implementations that support AuthEnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV: 1239 - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement, 1240 the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, and the id-aes128-ccm 1241 authenticated-content encryption; and, 1243 - MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- 1244 sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and 1245 mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id- 1246 alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap 1247 algorithms, the id-aes192-ccm, id-aes256-ccm, id-aes128-gcm, id- 1248 aes192-gcm, and id-aes256-ccm authenticated-content encryption 1249 algorithms; other algorithms MAY also be supported. 1251 9. Security Considerations 1253 Cryptographic algorithms will be broken or weakened over time. 1254 Implementers and users need to check that the cryptographic 1255 algorithms listed in this document continue to provide the expected 1256 level of security. The IETF from time to time may issue documents 1257 dealing with the current state of the art. 1259 Cryptographic algorithms rely on random numbers. See [RANDOM] for 1260 guidance on generation of random numbers. 1262 Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that 1263 encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing 1264 usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys 1265 larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could 1266 send keys and/or certificates with keys which would result in 1267 excessive cryptographic processing, for example keys larger than 1268 those mandated in this specification, which could swamp the 1269 processing element. Agents which use such keys without first 1270 validating the certificate to a trust anchor are advised to have some 1271 sort of cryptographic resource management system to prevent such 1272 attacks. 1274 Using secret keys of an appropriate size is crucial to the security 1275 of a Diffie-Hellman exchange. For elliptic curve groups, the size of 1276 the secret key must be equal to the size of n (the order of the group 1277 generated by the point g). Using larger secret keys provides 1278 absolutely no additional security, and using smaller secret keys is 1279 likely to result in dramatically less security. (See [SP800-56A] for 1280 more information on selecting secret keys.) 1281 This specification is based on [CMS], [CMS-AES], [CMS-AESCG], [CMS- 1282 ALG], [CMS-AUTHENV], [CMS-DH], [CMS-SHA2], [FIPS180-3], [FIPS186-3], 1283 and [HMAC-SHA2], and the appropriate security considerations of those 1284 documents apply. 1286 In addition, implementers of AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData 1287 should be aware of the concerns expressed in [BON] when using 1288 AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData to send messages to more than 1289 one recipient. Also, users of MQV should be aware of the 1290 vulnerability described in [K]. 1292 When implementing EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and 1293 AuthEnvelopedData, there are five algorithm related choices that need 1294 to be made: 1296 1) What is the public key size? 1297 2) What is the KDF? 1298 3) What is the key wrap algorithm? 1299 4) What is the content encryption algorithm? 1300 5) What is the curve? 1302 Consideration must be given to the strength of the security provided 1303 by each of these choices. Security algorithm strength is measured in 1304 bits, where bits is measured in equivalence to a symmetric cipher 1305 algorithm. Thus a strong symmetric cipher algorithm with a key of X 1306 bits is said to provide X bits of security. For other algorithms, the 1307 key size is mapped to an equivalent symmetric cipher strength. It is 1308 recommended that the bits of security provided by each are roughly 1309 equivalent. The following table provides comparable minimum bits of 1310 security [SP800-57] for the ECDH/ECMQV key sizes, KDFs, key wrapping 1311 algorithms, and content encryption algorithms. It also lists curves 1312 [PKI-ALG] for the key sizes. 1314 Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curves 1315 Bits of | ECQMV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption | 1316 Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. | 1317 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- 1318 80 | 160-223 | SHA-1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | sect163k1 1319 | | SHA-224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp163r2 1320 | | SHA-256 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | secp192r1 1321 | | SHA-384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | 1322 | | SHA-512 | | | 1323 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- 1324 112 | 224-255 | SHA-1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1 1325 | | SHA-224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | sect233k1 1326 | | SHA-256 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | sect233r1 1327 | | SHA-384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | 1328 | | SHA-512 | | | 1329 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- 1330 128 | 256-383 | SHA-1 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1 1331 | | SHA-224 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | sect283k1 1332 | | SHA-256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | sect283r1 1333 | | SHA-384 | | | 1334 | | SHA-512 | | | 1335 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- 1336 192 | 384-511 | SHA-224 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | secp384r1 1337 | | SHA-256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | sect409k1 1338 | | SHA-384 | | | sect409r1 1339 | | SHA-512 | | | 1340 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- 1341 256 | 512+ | SHA-256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1 1342 | | SHA-384 | | | sect571k1 1343 | | SHA-512 | | | sect571r1 1344 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- 1345 To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED: 1347 Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curve 1348 Bits of | ECQMV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption | 1349 Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. | 1350 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- 1351 80 | 192 | SHA-256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp192r1 1352 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- 1353 112 | 224 | SHA-256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1 1354 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- 1355 128 | 256 | SHA-256 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1 1356 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- 1357 192 | 384 | SHA-384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp384r1 1358 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- 1359 256 | 512+ | SHA-512 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1 1360 ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- 1362 When implementing SignedData, there are three algorithm related 1363 choices that need to be made: 1365 1) What is the public key size? 1366 2) What is the hash algorithm? 1367 3) What is the curve? 1369 Consideration must be given to the bits of security provided by each 1370 of these choices. Security is measured in bits, where a strong 1371 symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to provide X bits of 1372 security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by 1373 each choice are roughly equivalent. The following table provides 1374 comparable minimum bits of security [SP800-57] for the ECDSA key 1375 sizes and message digest algorithms. It also lists curves [PKI-ALG] 1376 for the key sizes. 1378 Minimum | ECDSA | Message | Curve 1379 Bits of | Key Size | Digest | 1380 Security | | Algorithm | 1381 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1382 80 | 160-223 | SHA-1 | sect163k1 1383 | | SHA-224 | secp163r2 1384 | | SHA-256 | secp192r1 1385 | | SHA-384 | 1386 | | SHA-512 | 1387 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1388 112 | 224-255 | SHA-224 | secp224r1 1389 | | SHA-256 | sect233k1 1390 | | SHA-384 | sect233r1 1391 | | SHA-512 | 1392 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1393 128 | 256-383 | SHA-256 | secp256r1 1394 | | SHA-384 | sect283k1 1395 | | SHA-512 | sect283r1 1396 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1397 192 | 384-511 | SHA-384 | secp384r1 1398 | | SHA-512 | sect409k1 1399 | | | sect409r1 1400 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1401 256 | 512+ | SHA-512 | secp521r1 1402 | | | sect571k1 1403 | | | sect571r1 1404 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1406 To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED: 1408 Minimum | ECDSA | Message | Curve 1409 Bits of | Key Size | Digest | 1410 Security | | Algorithm | 1411 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1412 80 | 192 | SHA-256 | sect192r1 1413 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1414 112 | 224 | SHA-256 | secp224r1 1415 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1416 128 | 256 | SHA-256 | secp256r1 1417 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1418 192 | 384 | SHA-384 | secp384r1 1419 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1420 256 | 512+ | SHA-512 | secp521r1 1421 ---------+----------+-----------+----------- 1423 10. IANA Considerations 1425 This document makes extensive use of object identifiers to register 1426 originator public key types and algorithms. The algorithm object 1427 identifiers are registered in the ANSI X9.62, ANSI X9.63, NIST, RSA, 1428 and SECG arcs. Additionally, object identifiers are used to identify 1429 the ASN.1 modules found in Appendix A (there are two). These are 1430 defined by the SMIME WG Registrar in an arc delegated by RSA to the 1431 SMIME Working Group: iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 1432 pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0). No action by IANA is 1433 necessary for this document or any anticipated updates. 1435 11. References 1437 11.1. Normative 1439 [CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 1440 3852, July 2004. 1442 [CMS-AES] Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard 1443 (AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message 1444 Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003. 1446 [CMS-AESCG] Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated 1447 Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax 1448 (CMS)", RFC 5084, November 2007. 1450 [CMS-ALG] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 1451 Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002. 1453 [CMS-AUTHENV] Housley, R. "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 1454 Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083, 1455 November 2007. 1457 [CMS-DH] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", 1458 RFC 2631, June 1999. 1460 [CMS-SHA2] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic 1461 Message Syntax", draft-ietf-smime-sha2, work-in- 1462 progress. 1464 [FIPS180-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology 1465 (NIST), FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard, 1466 October 2008. 1468 [FIPS186-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology 1469 (NIST), FIPS Publication 186-3: Digital Signature 1470 Standard, (draft) November 2008. 1472 [HMAC-SHA2] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC- 1473 SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA- 1474 512", RFC 4231, December 2005. 1476 [MUST] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate 1477 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 1479 [MSG] Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "S/MIME Version 3.2 1480 Message Specification", draft-ietf-smime-3851bis, 1481 work-in-progress. 1483 [PKI] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S. 1484 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 1485 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation 1486 List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 1488 [PKI-ALG] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and W. 1489 Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key 1490 Information", RFC 5480, March 2009. 1492 [RANDOM] Eastlake 3rd, D., Crocker, S., and J. Schiller, 1493 "Randomness Recommendations for Security", RFC 4086, 1494 June 2005. 1496 [RSAOAEP] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional 1497 Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for 1498 use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 1499 Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) 1500 Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005. 1502 [SEC1] SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for 1503 Efficient Cryptography Group, 2002. Available from 1504 http://www.secg.org/download/aid-780/sec1-v2.pdf. 1506 [SP800-56A] National Institute of Standards and Technology 1507 (NIST), Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation 1508 Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete 1509 Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), March 2007. 1511 [X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 1512 1:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 1513 Notation One. 1515 11.2. Informative 1517 [BON] D. Boneh, "The Security of Multicast MAC", 1518 Presentation at Selected Areas of Cryptography 2000, 1519 Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University 1520 of Waterloo, 2000. Paper version available from 1521 http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/mmac.ps 1523 [CERTCAP] Santesson, S., "X.509 Certificate Extension for 1524 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) 1525 Capabilities", RFC 4262, December 2005. 1527 [CMS-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for 1528 CMS", draft-ietf-smime-new-asn1, work-in-progress. 1530 [CMS-ECC] Blake-Wilson, S., Brown, D., and P. Lambert, "Use of 1531 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in 1532 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3278, April 1533 2002. 1535 [CMS-KEA] Pawling, J., "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", RFC 1536 2876, July 2000. 1538 [K] B. Kaliski, "MQV Vulnerability", Posting to ANSI X9F1 1539 and IEEE P1363 newsgroups, 1998. 1541 [PKI-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for 1542 PKIX", draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1, work-in-progress. 1544 [SP800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology 1545 (NIST), Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation 1546 for Key Management - Part 1 (Revised), March 2007. 1548 [X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 1549 2:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 1550 Notation One: Information Object Specification. 1552 [X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 1553 3:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 1554 Notation One: Constraint Specification. 1556 [X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 1557 4:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 1558 Notation One: Parameterization of ASN.1 1559 Specifications, 2002. 1561 Appendix A ASN.1 Modules 1563 Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the 1564 structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in 1565 [X.680] for compilers that support the 1988 ASN.1. 1567 Appendix A.2 provides informative ASN.1 definitions for the 1568 structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in 1569 [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683] for compilers that support the 1570 2002 ASN.1. This appendix contains the same information as Appendix 1571 A.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1 notation, however Appendix 1572 A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict. 1574 NOTE: The values for the TBAs will be included during AUTH48. 1576 //** RFC Editor: Remove this note prior to publication **// 1578 Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module 1580 CMSECCAlgs-2009-88 1581 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1582 smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-ecc-alg-2009-88(45) } 1584 DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= 1586 BEGIN 1588 -- 1589 -- Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as 1590 -- authors of the code. All rights reserved. 1591 -- 1592 -- Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or 1593 -- without modification, are permitted provided that the following 1594 -- conditions are met: 1595 -- 1596 -- - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 1597 -- notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 1598 -- 1599 -- - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above 1600 -- copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following 1601 -- disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided 1602 -- with the distribution. 1603 -- 1604 -- - Neither the name of Internet Society, IETF or IETF Trust, nor 1605 -- the names of specific contributors, may be used to endorse or 1606 -- promote products derived from this software without specific 1607 -- prior written permission. 1608 -- 1609 -- 1610 -- 1611 -- THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND 1612 -- CONTRIBUTORS 'AS IS' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, 1613 -- INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF 1614 -- MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE 1615 -- DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR 1616 -- CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 1617 -- SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT 1618 -- LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS 1619 -- OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER 1620 -- CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 1621 -- STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 1622 -- ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF 1623 -- ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 1624 -- 1625 -- This version of the ASN.1 module is part of RFC XXXX; 1626 -- see the RFC itself for full legal notices. 1627 -- 1629 -- EXPORTS ALL 1631 IMPORTS 1633 -- From [PKI] 1635 AlgorithmIdentifier 1636 FROM PKIX1Explicit88 1637 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) 1638 internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) mod(0) 1639 pkix1-explicit(18) } 1641 -- From [RSAOAEP] 1643 id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512 1644 FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms 1645 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 1646 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 1647 id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs(33) } 1649 -- From [PKI-ALG] 1651 id-sha1, ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, 1652 ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, ecdsa-with-SHA512, 1653 id-ecPublicKey, ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint, ECParameters 1654 FROM PKIX1Algorithms2008 1655 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 1656 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 45 } 1658 -- From [CMS] 1660 OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial 1661 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 1662 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1663 smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) } 1665 -- From [CMS-ALG] 1667 hMAC-SHA1, des-ede3-cbc, id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, CBCParameter 1668 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms 1669 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1670 smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) } 1672 -- From [CMS-AES] 1674 id-aes128-CBC, id-aes192-CBC, id-aes256-CBC, AES-IV, 1675 id-aes128-wrap, id-aes192-wrap, id-aes256-wrap 1676 FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep 1677 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1678 smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) } 1680 -- From [CMS-AESCG] 1682 id-aes128-CCM, id-aes192-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, CCMParameters 1683 id-aes128-GCM, id-aes192-GCM, id-aes256-GCM, GCMParameters 1684 FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM 1685 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1686 smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(32) } 1688 ; 1690 -- 1691 -- Message Digest Algorithms: Imported from [PKI-ALG] and [RSAOAEP] 1692 -- 1694 -- id-sha1 Parameters are preferred absent 1695 -- id-sha224 Parameters are preferred absent 1696 -- id-sha256 Parameters are preferred absent 1697 -- id-sha384 Parameters are preferred absent 1698 -- id-sha512 Parameters are preferred absent 1700 -- 1701 -- Signature Algorithms: Imported from [PKI-ALG] 1702 -- 1704 -- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Parameters are NULL 1705 -- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Parameters are absent 1706 -- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Parameters are absent 1707 -- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Parameters are absent 1708 -- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Parameters are absent 1710 -- ECDSA Signature Value 1711 -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING 1713 -- ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { 1714 -- r INTEGER, 1715 -- s INTEGER 1716 -- } 1718 -- 1719 -- Key Agreement Algorithms 1720 -- 1722 x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1723 iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840) 1724 x9-63(63) schemes(0) } 1726 secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1727 iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) } 1729 -- 1730 -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs 1731 -- 1733 -- Parameters are always present and indicate the key wrap algorithm 1734 -- with KeyWrapAlgorithm. 1736 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1737 x9-63-scheme 2 } 1739 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1740 secg-scheme 11 0 } 1742 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1743 secg-scheme 11 1 } 1745 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1746 secg-scheme 11 2 } 1748 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1749 secg-scheme 11 3 } 1751 -- 1752 -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs 1753 -- 1755 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1756 x9-63-scheme 3 } 1758 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1759 secg-scheme 14 0 } 1761 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1762 secg-scheme 14 1 } 1764 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1765 secg-scheme 14 2 } 1767 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1768 secg-scheme 14 3 } 1770 -- 1771 -- MQV Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs 1772 -- 1774 mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1775 x9-63-scheme 16 } 1777 mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1778 secg-scheme 15 0 } 1780 mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1781 secg-scheme 15 1 } 1783 mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1784 secg-scheme 15 2 } 1786 mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1787 secg-scheme 15 3 } 1789 -- 1790 -- Key Wrap Algorithms: Imported from [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-AES] 1791 -- 1793 KeyWrapAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier 1795 -- id-alg-CMS3DESwrap Parameters are NULL 1796 -- id-aes128-wrap Parameters are absent 1797 -- id-aes192-wrap Parameters are absent 1798 -- id-aes256-wrap Parameters are absent 1800 -- 1801 -- Content Encryption Algorithms: Imported from [CMS-ALG] 1802 -- and [CMS-AES] 1803 -- 1805 -- des-ede3-cbc Parameters are CBCParameter 1806 -- id-aes128-CBC Parameters are AES-IV 1807 -- id-aes192-CBC Parameters are AES-IV 1808 -- id-aes256-CBC Parameters are AES-IV 1809 -- id-aes128-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters 1810 -- id-aes192-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters 1811 -- id-aes256-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters 1812 -- id-aes128-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters 1813 -- id-aes192-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters 1814 -- id-aes256-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters 1815 -- 1816 -- Message Authentication Code Algorithms 1817 -- 1819 -- hMAC-SHA1 Parameters are preferred absent 1821 -- HMAC with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA_384, and SHA-512 Parameters are 1822 -- absent 1824 id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1825 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 1826 digestAlgorithm(2) 8 } 1828 id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1829 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 1830 digestAlgorithm(2) 9 } 1832 id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1833 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 1834 digestAlgorithm(2) 10 } 1836 id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1837 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 1838 digestAlgorithm(2) 11 } 1840 -- 1841 -- Originator Public Key Algorithms: Imported from [PKI-ALG] 1842 -- 1844 -- id-ecPublicKey Parameters are absent, NULL, or ECParameters 1846 -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys: Imported from 1847 -- [PKI-ALG] 1849 -- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING 1850 -- ECParameters ::= CHOICE { 1851 -- namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1852 -- commented out in [PKI-ALG] implicitCurve NULL 1853 -- commented out in [PKI-ALG] specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain 1854 -- commented out in [PKI-ALG] ... 1855 -- } 1856 -- implicitCurve and specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX. 1857 -- Details for SpecifiedECDomain can be found in [X9.62]. 1858 -- Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated 1859 -- with ANSI X9. 1861 -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with 1862 -- ECMQV 1864 MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { 1865 ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, 1866 addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL 1867 } 1869 -- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with 1870 -- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData 1872 ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1873 keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier, 1874 entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 1875 suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING 1876 } 1878 -- 1879 -- S/MIME Capabilities 1880 -- An identifier followed by type. 1881 -- 1883 -- 1884 -- S/MIME Capabilities: Message Digest Algorithms 1885 -- 1887 -- Found in [CMS-SHA2]. 1889 -- 1890 -- S/MIME Capabilities: Signature Algorithms 1891 -- 1893 -- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Type NULL 1894 -- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Type absent 1895 -- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Type absent 1896 -- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Type absent 1897 -- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Type absent 1899 -- 1900 -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Standard 1901 -- 1903 -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1904 -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1905 -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1906 -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1907 -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1909 -- 1910 -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Cofactor 1911 -- 1913 -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1914 -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1915 -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1916 -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1917 -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1919 -- 1920 -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECMQV, Single Pass, Standard 1921 -- 1923 -- mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1924 -- mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1925 -- mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1926 -- mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1927 -- mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm 1928 -- 1929 -- S/MIME Capabilities: Message Authentication Code Algorithms 1930 -- 1932 -- hMACSHA1 Type is preferred absent 1933 -- id-hmacWithSHA224 Type is absent 1934 -- if-hmacWithSHA256 Type is absent 1935 -- id-hmacWithSHA384 Type is absent 1936 -- id-hmacWithSHA512 Type is absent 1938 END 1940 Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module 1942 CMSECCAlgs-2009-02 1943 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 1944 smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-ecc-alg-2009-02(46) } 1946 DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= 1948 BEGIN 1950 -- 1951 -- Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as 1952 -- authors of the code. All rights reserved. 1953 -- 1954 -- Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or 1955 -- without modification, are permitted provided that the following 1956 -- conditions are met: 1957 -- 1958 -- - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 1959 -- notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 1960 -- 1961 -- - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above 1962 -- copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following 1963 -- disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided 1964 -- with the distribution. 1965 -- 1966 -- - Neither the name of Internet Society, IETF or IETF Trust, nor 1967 -- the names of specific contributors, may be used to endorse or 1968 -- promote products derived from this software without specific 1969 -- prior written permission. 1970 -- 1971 -- 1972 -- 1973 -- THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND 1974 -- CONTRIBUTORS 'AS IS' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, 1975 -- INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF 1976 -- MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE 1977 -- DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR 1978 -- CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 1979 -- SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT 1980 -- LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS 1981 -- OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER 1982 -- CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 1983 -- STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 1984 -- ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF 1985 -- ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 1986 -- 1987 -- This version of the ASN.1 module is part of RFC XXXX; 1988 -- see the RFC itself for full legal notices. 1989 -- 1991 -- EXPORTS ALL 1993 IMPORTS 1995 -- From [PKI-ASN] 1997 mda-sha1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA224, sa-ecdsaWithSHA256, 1998 sa-ecdsaWithSHA384, sa-ecdsaWithSHA512, id-ecPublicKey, 1999 ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint, ECParameters 2000 FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 2001 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 2002 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 2003 id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } 2005 -- From [PKI-ASN] 2007 mda-sha224, mda-sha256, mda-sha384, mda-sha512 2008 FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009 2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 2010 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 2011 id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54) } 2013 -- FROM [CMS-ASN] 2015 KEY-WRAP, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM, 2016 PUBLIC-KEY, MAC-ALGORITHM, CONTENT-ENCRYPTION, KEY-AGREE, SMIME-CAPS, 2017 AlgorithmIdentifier{} 2018 FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 2019 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 2020 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 2021 id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) } 2023 -- From [CMS-ASN] 2025 OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial 2026 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009 2027 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 2028 smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) } 2030 -- From [CMS-ASN] 2032 maca-hMAC-SHA1, cea-3DES-cbc, kwa-3DESWrap, CBCParameter 2033 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms-2009 2034 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 2035 smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cmsalg-2001-02(37) } 2037 -- From [CMS-ASN] 2039 cea-aes128-cbc, cea-aes192-cbc, cea-aes256-cbc, kwa-aes128-wrap, 2040 kwa-aes192-wrap, kwa-aes256-wrap 2041 FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep-2009 2042 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 2043 smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes-02(38) } 2045 -- From [CMS-ASN] 2047 cea-aes128-CCM, cea-aes192-CCM, cea-aes256-CCM, cea-aes128-GCM, 2048 cea-aes192-GCM, cea-aes256-GCM 2049 FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM-2009 2050 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 2051 smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes-ccm-gcm-02(44) } 2053 ; 2054 -- Constrains the SignedData digestAlgorithms field 2055 -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field 2056 -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm field 2058 -- Message Digest Algorithms: Imported from [PKI-ASN] 2060 -- MessageDigestAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { 2061 -- mda-sha1 | 2062 -- mda-sha224 | 2063 -- mda-sha256 | 2064 -- mda-sha384 | 2065 -- mda-sha512, 2066 -- ... 2067 -- } 2069 -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field 2071 -- Signature Algorithms: Imported from [PKI-ASN] 2073 -- SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { 2074 -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA1 | 2075 -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 | 2076 -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 | 2077 -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 | 2078 -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA512, 2079 -- ... 2080 -- } 2082 -- ECDSA Signature Value: Imported from [PKI-ALG] 2083 -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING 2085 -- ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { 2086 -- r INTEGER, 2087 -- s INTEGER 2088 -- } 2090 -- 2091 -- Key Agreement Algorithms 2092 -- 2094 -- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 2095 -- keyEncryption Algorithm field 2096 -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo 2097 -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field 2098 -- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo 2099 -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field 2101 -- DH variants are not used with AuthenticatedData or 2102 -- AuthEnvelopedData 2104 KeyAgreementAlgs KEY-AGREE ::= { 2105 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme | 2106 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme | 2107 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme | 2108 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme | 2109 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme | 2110 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme | 2111 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme | 2112 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme | 2113 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme | 2114 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme | 2115 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme | 2116 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme | 2117 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme | 2118 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme | 2119 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme, 2120 ... 2121 } 2123 x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2124 iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840) 2125 x9-63(63) schemes(0) } 2127 secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2128 iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) } 2130 -- 2131 -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs 2132 -- 2134 -- Parameters are always present and indicate the Key Wrap Algorithm 2136 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2137 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme 2138 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2139 UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent 2140 SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme 2141 } 2142 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2143 x9-63-scheme 2 } 2145 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2146 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme 2147 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2148 UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent 2149 SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme 2150 } 2152 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2153 secg-scheme 11 0 } 2155 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2156 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme 2157 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2158 UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent 2159 SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme 2160 } 2162 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2163 secg-scheme 11 1 } 2165 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2166 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme 2167 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2168 UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent 2169 SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme 2170 } 2172 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2173 secg-scheme 11 2 } 2175 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2176 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme 2177 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2178 UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent 2179 SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme 2180 } 2182 dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2183 secg-scheme 11 3 } 2185 -- 2186 -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs 2187 -- 2189 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2190 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme 2191 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2192 UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent 2193 SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme 2194 } 2196 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2197 x9-63-scheme 3 } 2199 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2200 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme 2201 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2202 UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent 2203 SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme 2204 } 2206 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2207 secg-scheme 14 0 } 2209 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2210 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme 2211 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2212 UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent 2213 SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme 2214 } 2216 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2217 secg-scheme 14 1 } 2219 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2220 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme 2221 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2222 UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent 2223 SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme 2224 } 2226 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2227 secg-scheme 14 2 } 2229 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2230 IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme 2231 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2232 UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent 2233 SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme 2234 } 2236 dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2237 secg-scheme 14 3 } 2239 -- 2240 -- MQV Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs 2241 -- 2243 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2244 IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme 2245 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2246 UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent 2247 SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme 2248 } 2250 mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2251 x9-63-scheme 16 } 2253 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2254 IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme 2255 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2256 UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent 2257 SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme 2258 } 2260 mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2261 secg-scheme 15 0 } 2263 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2264 IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme 2265 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2266 UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent 2267 SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme 2268 } 2270 mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2271 secg-scheme 15 1 } 2273 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2274 IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme 2275 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2276 UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent 2277 SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme 2278 } 2280 mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2281 secg-scheme 15 2 } 2283 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme KEY-AGREE ::= { 2284 IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme 2285 PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required 2286 UKM -- TYPE unencoded data -- ARE preferredPresent 2287 SMIME-CAPS cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme 2288 } 2290 mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2291 secg-scheme 15 3 } 2293 -- 2294 -- Key Wrap Algorithms: Imported from [CMS-ASN] 2295 -- 2297 KeyWrapAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {KEY-WRAP, { KeyWrapAlgs } } 2299 KeyWrapAlgs KEY-WRAP ::= { 2300 kwa-3DESWrap | 2301 kwa-aes128-wrap | 2302 kwa-aes192-wrap | 2303 kwa-aes256-wrap, 2304 ... 2305 } 2306 -- 2307 -- Content Encryption Algorithms: Imported from [CMS-ASN] 2308 -- 2310 -- Constrains the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent 2311 -- field and the AuthEnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo 2312 -- contentEncryptionAlgorithm field 2314 -- ContentEncryptionAlgs CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= { 2315 -- cea-3DES-cbc | 2316 -- cea-aes128-cbc | 2317 -- cea-aes192-cbc | 2318 -- cea-aes256-cbc | 2319 -- cea-aes128-ccm | 2320 -- cea-aes192-ccm | 2321 -- cea-aes256-ccm | 2322 -- cea-aes128-gcm | 2323 -- cea-aes192-gcm | 2324 -- cea-aes256-gcm, 2325 -- ... 2326 -- } 2328 -- des-ede3-cbc and aes*-cbc are used with EnvelopedData and 2329 -- EncryptedData 2330 -- aes*-ccm are used with AuthEnvelopedData 2331 -- aes*-gcm are used with AuthEnvelopedData 2332 -- (where * is 128, 192, and 256) 2334 -- 2335 -- Message Authentication Code Algorithms 2336 -- 2338 -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData 2339 -- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field 2340 -- 2342 MessageAuthAlgs MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { 2343 -- maca-hMAC-SHA1 | 2344 maca-hMAC-SHA224 | 2345 maca-hMAC-SHA256 | 2346 maca-hMAC-SHA384 | 2347 maca-hMAC-SHA512, 2348 ... 2349 } 2350 maca-hMAC-SHA224 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { 2351 IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA224 2352 PARAMS ARE absent 2353 IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE 2354 SMIME-CAPS cap-hMAC-SHA224 2355 } 2357 id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2358 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 2359 digestAlgorithm(2) 8 } 2361 maca-hMAC-SHA256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { 2362 IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA256 2363 PARAMS ARE absent 2364 IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE 2365 SMIME-CAPS cap-hMAC-SHA256 2366 } 2368 id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2369 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 2370 digestAlgorithm(2) 9 } 2372 maca-hMAC-SHA384 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { 2373 IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA384 2374 PARAMS ARE absent 2375 IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE 2376 SMIME-CAPS cap-hMAC-SHA384 2377 } 2379 id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2380 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 2381 digestAlgorithm(2) 10 } 2383 maca-hMAC-SHA512 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { 2384 IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA512 2385 PARAMS ARE absent 2386 IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE 2387 SMIME-CAPS cap-hMAC-SHA512 2388 } 2390 id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2391 iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 2392 digestAlgorithm(2) 11 } 2394 -- 2395 -- Originator Public Key Algorithms 2396 -- 2398 -- Constraints on KeyAgreeRecipientInfo OriginatorIdentifierOrKey 2399 -- OriginatorPublicKey algorithm field 2401 OriginatorPKAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY ::= { 2402 opka-ec, 2403 ... 2404 } 2406 opka-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::={ 2407 IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey 2408 KEY ECPoint 2409 PARAMS TYPE CHOICE { n NULL, p ECParameters } ARE preferredAbsent 2410 } 2412 -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys: Imported from 2413 -- [PKI-ALG] 2415 -- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING 2417 -- ECParameters ::= CHOICE { 2418 -- namedCurve CURVE.&id({NamedCurve}) 2419 -- commented out in [PKI-ALG] implicitCurve NULL 2420 -- commented out in [PKI-ALG] specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain 2421 -- commented out in [PKI-ALG] ... 2422 -- } 2423 -- implicitCurve and specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX. 2424 -- Details for SpecifiedECDomain can be found in [X9.62]. 2425 -- Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated 2426 -- with ANSI X.9. 2428 -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with 2429 -- ECMQV 2431 MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { 2432 ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, 2433 addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL 2434 } 2435 -- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with 2436 -- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData 2438 ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 2439 keyInfo KeyWrapAlgorithm, 2440 entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 2441 suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING 2442 } 2444 -- 2445 -- S/MIME CAPS for algorithms in this document 2446 -- 2448 SMimeCAPS SMIME-CAPS ::= { 2449 -- mda-sha1.&smimeCaps | 2450 -- mda-sha224.&smimeCaps | 2451 -- mda-sha256.&smimeCaps | 2452 -- mda-sha384.&smimeCaps | 2453 -- mda-sha512.&smimeCaps | 2454 -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA1.&smimeCaps | 2455 -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA224.&smimeCaps | 2456 -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA256.&smimeCaps | 2457 -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA384.&smimeCaps | 2458 -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA512.&smimeCaps | 2459 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps | 2460 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps | 2461 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps | 2462 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps | 2463 kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps | 2464 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps | 2465 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps | 2466 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps | 2467 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps | 2468 kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps | 2469 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps | 2470 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps | 2471 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps | 2472 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps | 2473 kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme.&smimeCaps | 2474 -- kwa-3des.&smimeCaps | 2475 -- kwa-aes128.&smimeCaps | 2476 -- kwa-aes192.&smimeCaps | 2477 -- kwa-aes256.&smimeCaps | 2478 -- cea-3DES-cbc.&smimeCaps | 2479 -- cea-aes128-cbc.&smimeCaps | 2480 -- cea-aes192-cbc.&smimeCaps | 2481 -- cea-aes256-cbc.&smimeCaps | 2482 -- cea-aes128-ccm.&smimeCaps | 2483 -- cea-aes192-ccm.&smimeCaps | 2484 -- cea-aes256-ccm.&smimeCaps | 2485 -- cea-aes128-gcm.&smimeCaps | 2486 -- cea-aes192-gcm.&smimeCaps | 2487 -- cea-aes256-gcm.&smimeCaps | 2488 -- maca-hMAC-SHA1.&smimeCaps | 2489 maca-hMAC-SHA224.&smimeCaps | 2490 maca-hMAC-SHA256.&smimeCaps | 2491 maca-hMAC-SHA384.&smimeCaps | 2492 maca-hMAC-SHA512.&smimeCaps, 2493 ... 2494 } 2496 cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::= { 2497 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2498 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme 2499 } 2501 cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::= { 2502 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2503 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme 2504 } 2506 cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::= { 2507 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2508 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme 2509 } 2511 cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::= { 2512 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2513 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme 2514 } 2516 cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::= { 2517 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2518 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme 2519 } 2521 cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ 2522 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2523 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme 2524 } 2525 cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ 2526 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2527 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme 2528 } 2530 cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ 2531 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2532 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme 2533 } 2535 cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ 2536 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2537 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme 2538 } 2540 cap-kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ 2541 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2542 IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme 2543 } 2545 cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ 2546 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2547 IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme 2548 } 2550 cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ 2551 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2552 IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme 2553 } 2555 cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ 2556 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2557 IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme 2558 } 2560 cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ 2561 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2562 IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme 2563 } 2565 cap-kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme SMIME-CAPS ::={ 2566 TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm 2567 IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme 2568 } 2569 cap-hMAC-SHA224 SMIME-CAPS ::={ IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA224 } 2571 cap-hMAC-SHA256 SMIME-CAPS ::={ IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA256 } 2573 cap-hMAC-SHA384 SMIME-CAPS ::={ IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA384 } 2575 cap-hMAC-SHA512 SMIME-CAPS ::={ IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA512 } 2577 END 2579 Appendix B Changes since RFC 3278 2581 The following summarizes the changes: 2583 - Abstract: The basis of the document was changed to refer to NIST 2584 FIPS 186-3 and SP800-56A. However, to maintain backwards 2585 compatibility the Key Derivation Function from ANSI/SEC1 is 2586 retained. 2588 - Section 1: A bullet was added to address AuthEnvelopedData. 2590 - Section 2.1: A sentence was added to indicate FIPS180-3 is used 2591 with ECDSA. Replaced reference to ANSI X9.62 with FIPS186-3. 2593 - Section 2.1.1: The permitted digest algorithms were expanded from 2594 SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. 2596 - Section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3: The bullet addressing integer "e" was 2597 deleted. 2599 - Section 3: Added explanation of why static-static ECDH is not 2600 included. 2602 - Section 3.1: The reference for DH was changed from RFC 3852 to 2603 RFC 3370. Provided text to indicate fields of EnvelopedData are 2604 as in CMS. 2606 - Section 3.1.1: The text was updated to include description of all 2607 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields. Parameters for id-ecPublicKey 2608 field changed from NULL to absent or ECParameter. Additional 2609 information about ukm was added. 2611 - Section 3.2: The sentence describing the advantages of 1-Pass 2612 ECMQV was rewritten. 2614 - Section 3.2.1: The text was updated to include description of all 2615 fields. Parameters for id-ecPublicKey field changed from NULL 2616 to absent or ECParameters. 2618 - Sections 3.2.2 and 4.1.2: The re-use of ephemeral keys paragraph 2619 was reworded. 2621 - Section 4.1: The sentences describing the advantages of 1-Pass 2622 ECMQV was moved to Section 4. 2624 - Section 4.1.2: The note about the attack was moved to Section 4. 2626 - Section 4.2: This section was added to address AuthEnvelopedData 2627 with ECMQV. 2629 - Section 5: This section was moved to Section 8. The 1st 2630 paragraph was modified to recommend both SignedData and 2631 EnvelopedData. The requirements were updated for hash 2632 algorithms and recommendations for matching curves and hash 2633 algorithms. Also the requirements were expanded to indicate 2634 which ECDH and ECMQV variants, key wrap algorithms, and content 2635 encryption algorithms are required for each of the content types 2636 used in this document. The permitted digest algorithms used in 2637 key derivations functions (KDFs) were expanded from SHA-1 to 2638 SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. 2640 - Section 6 (formerly 7): This section was updated to allow for 2641 SMIMECapabilities to be present in certificates. The S/MIME 2642 capabilities for ECDSA with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA- 2643 512 were added to the list of S/MIME Capabilities. Also updated 2644 to include S/MIME capabilities for ECDH and ECMQV using the SHA- 2645 224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms as the KDF. 2647 - Section 7.1 (formerly 8.1): Added sub-sections for digest, 2648 signature, originator public key, key agreement, content 2649 encryption, key wrap, and message authentication code 2650 algorithms. Pointed to algorithms and parameters in appropriate 2651 documents for: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as well as 2652 SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 with ECDSA. Also added 2653 algorithm identifiers for ECDH std, ECDH cofactor, and ECMQV 2654 with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms as the 2655 KDF. Changed id-ecPublicKey parameters to be absent, NULL, or 2656 ECParameters, and if present the originator's ECParameters must 2657 match the recipient's ECParameters. 2659 - Section 7.2 (formerly 8.2): Updated to include AuthEnvelopedData. 2660 Also, added text to address support requirement for compressed, 2661 uncompressed, and hybrid keys, changed pointers from ANSI X9.61 2662 to PKIX (where ECDSA-Sig-Value is imported), changed pointers 2663 from SECG to NIST specs, and updated example of suppPubInfo to 2664 be AES-256. keyInfo's parameters changed from NULL to any 2665 associated parameters (AES wraps have absent parameters). 2667 - Section 9: Replaced text, which was a summary paragraph, with an 2668 updated security considerations section. Paragraph referring to 2669 definitions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 is 2670 deleted. 2672 - Updated references. 2674 - Added ASN.1 modules. 2676 - Updated acknowledgements section. 2678 Acknowledgements 2680 The methods described in this document are based on work done by the 2681 ANSI X9F1 working group. The authors wish to extend their thanks to 2682 ANSI X9F1 for their assistance. The authors also wish to thank Peter 2683 de Rooij for his patient assistance. The technical comments of 2684 Francois Rousseau were valuable contributions. 2686 Many thanks go out to the other authors of RFC 3278: Simon Blake- 2687 Wilson and Paul Lambert. Without RFC 3278 this version wouldn't 2688 exist. 2690 The authors also wish to thank Alfred Hoenes, Paul Hoffman, Russ 2691 Housley, and Jim Schaad for their valuable input. 2693 Authors' Addresses 2695 Sean Turner 2697 IECA, Inc. 2698 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 2699 Fairfax, VA 22031 2700 USA 2702 Email: turners@ieca.com 2703 Daniel R. L. Brown 2705 Certicom Corp 2706 5520 Explorer Drive #400 2707 Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1 2708 CANADA 2710 Email: dbrown@certicom.com