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If these are generic example addresses, they should be changed to use any of the ranges defined in RFC 6890 (or successor): 192.0.2.x, 198.51.100.x or 203.0.113.x. Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document date (February 4, 2014) is 3731 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Informational ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == Outdated reference: A later version (-21) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-04 Summary: 0 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 4 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan 4 Intended status: Informational February 4, 2014 5 Expires: August 8, 2014 7 Responsible Grandparenting in the RPKI 8 draft-ymbk-rpki-grandparenting-04 10 Abstract 12 There are circumstances in RPKI operations where a resource holder's 13 parent may not be able to, or may not choose to, facilitate full and 14 proper registration of the holder's data. As in real life, the 15 holder may form a relationship with their grandparent who is willing 16 to aid the grandchild. This document describes simple procedures for 17 doing so. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 8, 2014. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not 52 be created, and it may not be published except as an Internet-Draft. 54 Table of Contents 56 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 57 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 3. What to Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 6. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 62 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 1. Introduction 66 There are circumstances in RPKI operations where a resource holder's 67 parent may not be able to, or may not choose to, facilitate full and 68 proper registration of the holder's data. As in real life, the 69 holder may form a relationship with their grandparent who is willing 70 to aid the grandchild. This document describes simple procedures for 71 doing so. 73 An example might be when provider A allowed a child, C, to move to 74 other provider(s) and keep their address space, either temporarily or 75 permanently, and C's child, G, wished to stay with provider A. 77 Or a child, C, in the process of going out of business might place 78 their grandchildren in precarious circumstances until they can re- 79 home. The grandparent, without disturbing the child's data, could 80 simply issue ROAs for the grandchildren, or issue certificates for 81 those willing to manage their own rpki data. 83 Certification Authorities with a large number of children, e.g. very 84 large ISPs or RIRs, might offer documented grandparenting processes 85 and/or agreements. This might reassure grandchildren with worries 86 about irresponsible parents. 88 Other examples occur in administrative hierarchies, such as large 89 organizations or military and other government hierarchies, when A's 90 child C wishes to manage their own data but does not wish the 91 technical or administrative burden of managing their children's, Gs', 92 data. 94 2. Suggested Reading 96 It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI, see [RFC6480], 97 ROAs, see [RFC6482], BGPSEC Router Certificates, see 98 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles], and the operational guidance for 99 origin validation, [RFC7115]. 101 3. What to Do 103 A hypothetical example might be that A has the rights to 10.0.0.0/8, 104 has delegated 10.42.0.0/16 to their child C, who delegated 10.42.2.0/ 105 23 to their child G. C has changed providers and kept, with A's 106 consent, 10.42.0.0/16, but G wishes to stay with A and keep 10.42.2.0 107 /23. 109 Perhaps there are also AS resources involved, and G wishes to issue 110 Router Certificates for their AS(s). 112 Managing RPKI data in such relationships is simple, but should be 113 done carefully. 115 First, using whatever administrative and/or contractual procedures 116 are appropriate in the local hierarchy, the grandparent, A, should 117 ensure their relationship to the grandchild, G, and that G has the 118 right to the resources which they wish to have registered. These are 119 local matters between A and G. 121 Although A has the rights over their child's, C's, resources, it 122 would be prudent and polite to ensure that C agrees to A forming a 123 relationship to G. Again, these are local matters between A, C, and 124 G. Often, no one outside of one of these bi-lateral relationships 125 actually knows the agreement between the parties. 127 Then, it is trivial within the RPKI for A to certify G's data, even 128 though it is a subset of the resources A delegated to C. A may 129 certify G's resources, or issue one or more EE certificates and ROAs 130 for G's resources. Which is done is a local matter between A and G. 132 4. Security Considerations 134 This operational practice presents no technical security threats 135 beyond those of the relevant RPKI specifications. 137 There are threats of social engineering by G, lying to A about their 138 relationship to and rights gained from C. 140 There are also threats of social engineering by C, attempting to 141 prevent A from giving rights to G which G legitimately deserves. 143 5. IANA Considerations 145 This document has no IANA Considerations. 147 6. Informative References 149 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] 150 Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for 151 BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, 152 and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki- 153 profiles-04 (work in progress), October 2012. 155 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 156 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. 158 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 159 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. 161 [RFC7115] Bush, R., "Origin Validation Operation Based on the 162 Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, RFC 163 7115, January 2014. 165 Author's Address 167 Randy Bush 168 Internet Initiative Japan 169 5147 Crystal Springs 170 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 171 US 173 Email: randy@psg.com