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2 WEBSEC D. Ross
3 Internet-Draft Microsoft
4 Intended status: Standards Track T. Gondrom
5 Expires: January 7, 2013 July 6, 2012
7 HTTP Header Frame Options
8 draft-ietf-websec-frame-options-00
10 Abstract
12 To improve the protection of web applications against Clickjacking
13 this standards defines a http response header that declares a policy
14 communicated from a host to the client browser whether the
15 transmitted content MUST NOT be displayed in frames of other pages
16 from different origins which are allowed to frame the content.
18 Status of this Memo
20 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
21 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
23 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
24 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
25 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
26 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
28 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
29 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
30 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
31 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
33 This Internet-Draft will expire on January 7, 2013.
35 Copyright Notice
37 Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
38 document authors. All rights reserved.
40 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
41 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
42 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
43 publication of this document. Please review these documents
44 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
45 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
46 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
47 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
48 described in the Simplified BSD License.
50 Table of Contents
52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
53 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
54 2. Frame-Options Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
55 2.1. Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
56 2.2. Backus-Naur Form (BNF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
57 2.3. Design Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
58 2.3.1. Enable HTML content from other domains . . . . . . . . 5
59 2.3.2. Browser Behaviour and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . 5
60 2.4. Examples of Frame-Options Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
61 2.4.1. Example scenario for the ALLOW-FROM parameter . . . . . 6
62 3. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
63 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
64 4.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
65 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
66 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
67 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
68 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
69 Appendix A. Description of a Clickjacking attack . . . . . . . . . 8
70 A.1. Shop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
71 A.2. Confirm Purchase Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
72 A.3. Flash Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
73 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
75 1. Introduction
77 In 2009 and 2010 many browser vendors introduced the use of a non-
78 standard http header RFC 2616 [RFC2616] "X-Frame-Options" to protect
79 against Clickjacking [Clickjacking]. This standard is to replace the
80 non-standard header.
82 Existing anti-ClickJacking measures, e.g. Frame-breaking Javascript,
83 have weaknesses so that their protection can be circumvented as a
84 study [FRAME-BUSTING] demonstrated.
86 Short of configuring the browser to disable frames and script
87 entirely, which massively impairs browser utility, browser users are
88 vulnerable to this type of attack.
90 "Frame-Options" allows a secure web page from host B to declare that
91 its content (for example a button, links, text, etc.) must not be
92 displayed in a frame of another page (e.g. from host A). In
93 principle this is done by a policy declared in the HTTP header and
94 obeyed by conform browser implementations.
96 1.1. Requirements Language
98 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
99 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
100 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
102 2. Frame-Options Header
104 The Frame-Options HTTP response header indicates a policy whether a
105 browser MUST NOT allow to render a page in a or