Network Working Group K.W. Burgin Internet Draft National Security Agency Intended Status: Standards Track M.A. Peck Expires: December 10, 2011 The MITRE Corporation June 8, 2011 AES-CBC Mode with HMAC-SHA2 For Kerberos 5 draft-burgin-kerberos-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-00 Abstract This document specifies two encryption types and two corresponding checksum types for Kerberos 5. The new types use AES in CBC mode with PKCS#5 padding for confidentiality and HMAC with a SHA-2 hash for integrity. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 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Burgin & Peck Expires December 10, 2011 [Page 1] Internet-Draft AES-CBC HMAC-SHA2 For Kerberos 5 June 2011 Table of Contents 1. Introduction ................................................. 3 2. Conventions used in this Document ............................ 3 3. Protocol Key Representation .................................. 3 4. Key Generation from Pass Phrases or Random Data .............. 3 5. Key Derivation Function ...................................... 4 6. Kerberos Algorithm Profile Parameters ........................ 4 7. IANA Considerations .......................................... 7 8. Security Considerations ...................................... 8 9. References .................................................... 8 9.1. Normative References ..................................... 8 9.2. Informative References ................................... 9 Appendix A. Test Vectors ........................................ 9 Authors' Addresses ............................................... 9 Burgin & Peck Expires December 10, 2011 [Page 2] Internet-Draft AES-CBC HMAC-SHA2 For Kerberos 5 June 2011 1. Introduction This document defines two encryption types and two corresponding checksum types for Kerberos 5 using AES with 128-bit or 256-bit keys. The new types conform to the framework specified in [RFC3961], but do not use the simplified profile. The new encryption types use AES in CBC mode, but do not use ciphertext stealing as in [RFC3962]. Instead, the messages are padded to a multiple of the AES block size as described in Section 6.3 of [RFC5652]. The new types use the PBKDF2 algorithm for key generation from strings, with a modification to the use in [RFC3962] that the hash algorithm in the pseudorandom function used by PBKDF2 will be SHA-256 instead of SHA-1. The new types use key derivation to produce keys for encryption, integrity protection, and checksum operations as in [RFC3962]. However, a key derivation function from [SP800-108] which uses the SHA-256 or SHA-384 hash algorithm is used in place of the DK key derivation function used in [RFC3961]. The new types use the HMAC algorithm with a hash from the SHA-2 family for integrity protection and checksum operations. 2. Conventions used in this Document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 3. Protocol Key Representation The AES key space is dense, so we can use random or pseudorandom octet strings directly as keys. The byte representation for the key is described in [FIPS197], where the first bit of the bit string is the high bit of the first byte of the byte string (octet string). 4. Key Generation from Pass Phrases We use a variation on the key generation algorithm specified in Section 4 of [RFC3962] with the following changes: * The pseudorandom function used by PBKDF2 will be the SHA-256 HMAC of the passphrase and salt, instead of the SHA-1 HMAC of the passphrase and salt. The salt SHOULD contain at least 128 random bits as recommended in [SP800-132]. It MAY also contain other information such as the principal's realm and name Burgin & Peck Expires December 10, 2011 [Page 3] Internet-Draft AES-CBC HMAC-SHA2 For Kerberos 5 June 2011 components as well as the enctype name. * The final key derivation step uses the algorithm KDF-HMAC-SHA2 defined below in Section 5 instead of the DK function. * If no string-to-key parameters are specified, the default number of iterations is raised to 32,768. The user's long-term AES encryption key is derived as follows tkey = random2key(PBKDF2(passphrase, salt, iter_count, keylength)) key = KDF-HMAC-SHA2(tkey, "kerberos") where "kerberos" is the byte string {0x6b 0x65 0x72 0x62 0x65 0x72 0x6f 0x73}. where the pseudorandom function used by PBKDF2 is the SHA-256 HMAC of the passphrase and salt, the value for keylength is the AES key length, and the algorithm KDF-HMAC-SHA2 is defined in Section 5. 5. Key Derivation Function We use a key derivation function from Section 5.1 of [SP800-108] which uses the HMAC algorithm as the PRF. The counter i is expressed as four octets in big-endian order. The length of the output key in bits (denoted as k) is also represented as four octets in big-endian order. The "Label" input to the KDF is the usage constant supplied to the key derivation function, and the "Context" input is null. When the encryption type is aes128-cbc-hmac-sha256-128: n = 1 K1 = HMAC-SHA-256(key, 00 00 00 01 | constant | 0x00 | 00 00 00 80) DR(key, constant) = First 128 bits of K1 KDF-HMAC-SHA2(key, constant) = random-to-key(DR(key, constant)) When the encryption type is aes256-cbc-hmac-sha384-192: n = 1 K1 = HMAC-SHA-384(key, 00 00 00 01 | constant | 0x00 | 00 00 01 00) DR(key, constant) = First 256 bits of K1 KDF-HMAC-SHA2(key, constant) = random-to-key(DR(key, constant)) 6. Kerberos Algorithm Protocol Parameters The following parameters apply to the encryption types aes128-cbc- hmac-sha256-128 and aes256-cbc-hmac-sha384-192. The key-derivation function described in the previous section is Burgin & Peck Expires December 10, 2011 [Page 4] Internet-Draft AES-CBC HMAC-SHA2 For Kerberos 5 June 2011 used to produce the three intermediate keys. CBC mode [SP800-38A] requires the input be padded to a multiple of the encryption algorithm block size, which is 128 bits for AES. The input will be padded as described in Section 6.3 of [RFC5652] in which the value of each added octet equals the number of octets that are added. Each encryption will use a freshly generated 16-octet initialization vector generated at random by the message originator. The ciphertext is the concatenation of the initialization vector, the output of AES in CBC mode, and the HMAC of the plaintext and padding using either SHA-256 or SHA-384. The output of SHA-256 is truncated to 128 bits and the output of SHA-384 is truncated to 192 bits. Sample test vectors are given in Appendix A. Decryption is performed by removing the HMAC, decrypting the remainder, and verifying the HMAC. The encryption and checksum mechanisms below use the following notation from [RFC3961]. HMAC output size, h message block size, m encryption/decryption functions, E and D cipher block size, c Encryption Mechanism for AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ protocol key format 128- or 256-bit string specific key structure Three protocol-format keys: { Kc, Ke, Ki }. required checksum As defined below. mechanism key-generation seed key size (128 or 256 bits) length cipher state Initial vector of length c (128 bits) initial cipher state All bits zero encryption function N = random nonce of length c (128 bits) pad = Shortest string to bring plaintext to a length that is a multiple of m. The value of each added octet equals the number of octets that are added. C1 = E(Ke, plaintext | pad, N) Burgin & Peck Expires December 10, 2011 [Page 5] Internet-Draft AES-CBC HMAC-SHA2 For Kerberos 5 June 2011 H1 = HMAC(Ki, plaintext | pad) ciphertext = N | C1 | H1[1..h] newstate.iv = N decryption function (N,C1,H1) = ciphertext P1 = D(Ke, C1, N) if (H1 != HMAC(Ki, P1)[1..h]) report error newstate.iv = N pseudo-random function Kp = KDF-HMAC-SHA2(protocol-key, "prf") PRF = HMAC(Kp, octet-string) key generation functions: string-to-key function tkey = random2key(PBKDF2(passphrase, salt, iter_count, keylength)) base-key = KDF-HMAC-SHA2(tkey, "kerberos") where the pseudorandom function used by PBKDF2 is the SHA-256 HMAC of the passphrase and salt default string-to-key 00 00 10 00 parameters random-to-key function identity function key-derivation function KDF-HMAC-SHA2 as defined in Section 5. The key usage number is expressed as four octets in big-endian order. Kc = KDF-HMAC-SHA2(base-key, usage | 0x99); Ke = KDF-HMAC-SHA2(base-key, usage | 0xAA); Ki = KDF-HMAC-SHA2(base-key, usage | 0x55); Checksum Mechanism for AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA2 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ associated cryptosystem AES-128-CBC or AES-256-CBC as appropriate get_mic HMAC(Kc, message)[1..h] verify_mic get_mic and compare Using this profile with each key size gives us two each of encryption and checksum algorithm definitions. Burgin & Peck Expires December 10, 2011 [Page 6] Internet-Draft AES-CBC HMAC-SHA2 For Kerberos 5 June 2011 +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ | encryption types | +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ | type name etype value key size | +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ | aes128-cbc-hmac-sha256-128 TBD1 128 | | aes256-cbc-hmac-sha384-192 TBD2 256 | +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ | checksum types | +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ | type name sumtype value length | +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ | hmac-sha256-128-aes128 TBD3 128 | | hmac-sha384-192-aes256 TBD4 192 | +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ These checksum types will be used with the corresponding encryption types defined above. 7. IANA Considerations IANA is requested to assign: 1. Encryption type numbers for aes128-cbc-hmac-sha256-128 and aes256-cbc-hmac-sha384-192 in the Kerberos Encryption Type Numbers registry. Etype encryption type Reference ----- --------------- --------- TBD1 aes128-cbc-hmac-sha256-128 [I.D.burgin-kerberos-aes- cbc-hmac-sha2] TBD2 aes256-cbc-hmac-sha384-192 [I.D.burgin-kerberos-aes- cbc-hmac-sha2] 2. Checksum type numbers for hmac-sha256-128-aes128 and hmac-sha384-192-aes256 in the Kerberos Checksum Type Numbers registry. Sumtype Checksum type Size Reference ------- ------------- ---- --------- TBD3 hmac-sha256-128-aes128 16 [I.D.burgin-kerberos- aes-cbc-hmac-sha2] TBD4 hmac-sha384-192-aes256 24 [I.D.burgin-kerberos- aes-cbc-hmac-sha2] Burgin & Peck Expires December 10, 2011 [Page 7] Internet-Draft AES-CBC HMAC-SHA2 For Kerberos 5 June 2011 8. Security Considerations This specification requires implementations to generate random values. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) can result in little or no security. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. NIST Special Publication 800-90 [SP800-90] and [RFC4086] offer random number generation guidance. This document specifies a mechanism for generating keys from pass phrases or passwords. The salt and iteration count resist brute force and dictionary attacks, however, it is still important to choose or generate strong pass phrases. 9. References 9.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC3961] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005. [RFC3962] Raeburn, K., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Encryption for Kerberos 5", RFC 3962, February 2005. [RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J. and Crocker, S., "Randomness Requirements for Security", RFC 4086, June 2005. [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5652, September 2009. [FIPS197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, November 2001. 9.2. Informative References [SP800-38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation - Methods and Techniques", NIST Special Publication 800-38A, February 2001. [SP800-90] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators (Revised), NIST Special Publication 800-90, March 2007. Burgin & Peck Expires December 10, 2011 [Page 8] Internet-Draft AES-CBC HMAC-SHA2 For Kerberos 5 June 2011 [SP800-108] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions", NIST Special Publication 800-108, October 2009. [SP800-132] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, Part 1: Storage Applications", NIST Special Publication 800-132, June 2010. Appendix A. AES-CBC Test Vectors TBD Authors' addresses Kelley W. Burgin National Security Agency EMail: kwburgi@tycho.ncsc.mil Michael A. Peck The MITRE Corporation EMail: mpeck@mitre.org Burgin & Peck Expires December 10, 2011 [Page 9]