Internet Engineering Task Force D. Harkins, Ed.
InternetDraft The Industrial Lounge
Intended status: Standards Track June 29, 2007
Expires: December 31, 2007
SIV Authenticated Encryption using AES
draftdharkinssivaes00
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Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract
This memo describes SIV, a block cipher mode of operation. SIV takes
a key, a plaintext, and a vector of data which will be authenticated
but not encrypted. It produces a ciphertext having the same length
as the plaintext and a synthetic initialization vector. Depending on
how it is used, SIV achieves either the goal of deterministic
authenticatedencryption or the goal of noncebased, misuseresistant
authenticatedencryption.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3.1. Key Wrapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3.2. Resistance to Nonce Misuse/Reuse . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.3. Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.4. Robustness versus Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Specification of SIVAES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Doubling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. S2VCMACAES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5. SIVCTRAES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6. SIVAES Encrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.7. SIVAES Decrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Noncebased Authenticated Encryption with SIVAES . . . . . . 13
4. Deterministic Authenticated Encryption with SIVAES . . . . . 13
5. Optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. AEAD_SIV_AES_256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. AEAD_SIV_AES_384 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.3. AEAD_SIV_AES_512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.1. Deterministic Authenticated Encryption Example . . . . . . 18
A.2. Probabilistic Authenticated Encryption Example . . . . . . 19
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 22
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Various attacks have been described (e.g. [BADESP]) when data is
merely privacyprotected and not additionally authenticated or
integrity protected. Therefore combined modes of encryption and
authentication have been developed ([GCM], [JUTLA], [CCM], [OCB],
[AEAD]). These provide conventional, probabilistic authenticated
encryption when used with a nonce ("a number used once") and
typically accept additional inputs that are authenticated but not
encrypted.
A deterministic, nonceless, form of authenticatedencryption has
been used to protect the transportation of cryptographic keys (e.g.
[X9F1], [RFC3217], [RFC3394]). This is generally referred to as "Key
Wrapping".
This memo descirbes a new block cipher mode, SIV, that provides both
probabilistic, noncebased authenticated encryption as well as
deterministic, nonceless key wrapping. It contains a PRF
construction called S2V. Both S2V and SIV were specified by Phillip
Rogaway and Thomas Shrimpton [DAE]. The underlying block cipher used
herein for both S2V and SIV is AES. S2V uses AESCMAC and will be
referred to as AESCMACAES and SIV uses AESCTR and will be referred
to as SIVCTRAES.
1.2. Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
1.3. Motivation
1.3.1. Key Wrapping
A key distribution protocol must protect keys it is distibuting.
This has not always been done right. For example RADIUS [RFC2548]
uses MPPE to encrypt a key prior to transmission from server to
client. It provides no integrity checking of the encrypted key.
[RADKEY] specifies the use of [RFC3394] to wrap a key in a RADIUS
[RFC2865] request but because of the inability to pass additional
authenticated data an HMAC [RFC2104] is necessary to provide
authentication of the entire request.
SIV can be used as a dropin replacement for any specification that
uses [RFC3394] or [RFC3217], including the aforementioned use. It is
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a more general purpose solution as it allows for additional
authenticated data to be specified.
1.3.2. Resistance to Nonce Misuse/Reuse
The probabilistic, noncebased authenticated encryption schemes
described above are susceptible to reuse and/or misue of the nonce.
Depending on the specific scheme there are subtle and critical
requirements placed on the nonce or counter. [GCM] states that it
provides "excellent security" if its initialization vector (IV) is
guaranteed to be distinct but provides "no security" otherwise.
Confidentiality guarantees are voided if a counter in [CCM] is
reused. In many cases guaranteeing no reuse of a nonce/counter/IV is
not a problem but in others it will be. For example, if one's
environment is (knowingly or unknowingly) a virtual machine it may be
possible to roll back a virtual state machine and cause nonce reuse
thereby gutting the security of the authenticated encryption scheme
(see [VIRT]).
Also, if the nonce is random a requirement that it be nonrepeating
will dramatically limit the amount of data that can be safely
protected with a single key.
SIV provides a level of resistance to nonce reuse and misuse. If the
nonce is never reused then the usual notion of noncebased security
of an authenticated encryption mode is achieved. If, however, the
nonce is reused authenticity is retained and confidentiality is only
compromised to the extent that an attacker can determine that the
same plaintext (and same additional authenticated data) was protected
with the same nonce and key. See Security Considerations
(Section 7).
1.3.3. Key Derivation
A PRF is frequently used as a key derivation function (e.g. [WLAN])
by passing it a key and a single string. Typically this single
string is the concatenation of a series of smaller strings for
example, a label and some context to bind into the derived string.
These strings are logically a vector of strings but are mapped to a
single string because of the way PRFs are typically defined two
inputs: a key and data. Such a crude mapping is inefficient because
additional data must be included the length of inputs must be
encoded separately and, depending on the PRF, memory allocation and
copying is needed. Also, if only one or two of the inputs changed
when deriving a new key it may still be necessary to process all of
the other constants that preceded it every time the PRF is invoked.
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When a PRF is used in this manner its input is a vector of strings
and not a single string and the PRF should handle the data as such.
The S2V ("string to vector") PRF construction accepts a vector of
inputs and provides a more natural mapping of input that does not
require additional lengths encodings and obviates the memory and
processing overhead to marshall inputs and their encoded lengths into
a single string. Constant inputs to the PRF need only be computed
once.
1.3.4. Robustness versus Performance
SIV can not perform at the same high troughput rates that other
authenticated encryption schemes can (e.g. [GCM] or [OCB]) but for
situations where performance is not a limiting factor e.g. control
plane applications it can provide a robust alternative.
2. Specification of SIVAES
2.1. Notation
SIV and S2V use the following notation:
len(A)
returns the number of bits in A.
X10*
indicates padding of string X, len(X) < 128, out to 128 bits by
the concatenation of a single bit of 1 followed by as many 0 bits
as are necessary.
leftmost(A,n)
the n most significant bits of A.
rightmost(A,n)
the n least significatn bits of A.
A  B
means concatenation of string A with string B.
A xor B
is the exclusive OR operation on two equal length strings, A and
B.
A xorend B
where len(A) >= len(B), means xoring a string B onto the end of
string A i.e. leftmost(A, len(A)len(B))  (rightmost(A,
len(B)) xor B)
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dbl(S)
is the multiplication of S and 0...010 in a finite field
represented using the primitive polynomial x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x
+ 1. See Doubling (Section 2.3)
indicates a string represented by 128 zero bits.
indicates a string represented by 127 zero bits concatenated with
a single one bit.
E(K,X)
indicates AES encryption using key K of 128bit string X
2.2. Overview
SIVAES uses AES in CTR mode, called SIVCTRAES, and a pseudo random
function (PRF) based on AESCMAC called S2VCMACAES. SIVAES takes
either a 256, 384, or 512 bit key which is broken up into two equal
sized keys, one for S2VCMACAES and the other for SIVCTRAES.
2.3. Doubling
The doubling operation on an input string is performed using a left
shift of the input followed by a conditional xor operation on the
result with the constant:
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000087
The condition under which the xor operation is performed is when the
bit being shifted off is one.
Note that this is the same operation used to generate subkeys for
AESCMAC
2.4. S2VCMACAES
The S2VAESCMAC operation consists of the doubling and xoring of the
outputs of AESCMAC operations over individual strings in the input
vector. The operation is bootstrapped by performing AESCMAC on a
128bit string of zeros. If the length of the final string in the
vector is greater than or equal to 128 bits the doubled and xored
output is xored onto the end of the final input string. That result
is input to a final AESCMAC operation to produce the output Z. If
the length of the final string is less than 128 bits the doubled and
xored output is doubled once more and it is xored with the final
string padded with 10* up to 128 bits. That result is input to a
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final AESCMAC operation to produce the output Z.
S2VAESCMAC with key k on a vector of m inputs X1, X2, ..., Xm1,
Xm, and len(Xm) >= 128:
++ ++ ++ ++
 X1   X2  . . .  Xm1   Xm 
++ ++ ++ ++
K    
     V
V  V V V /> xorend
++  ++ ++ ++  
 AES_    AES_   AES_   AES   
 CMAC <> CMAC  K> CMAC  K> CMAC   V
++ ++ ++ ++  ++
      AES_ 
     K> CMAC 
     ++
\> dbl > xor > dbl > xor > dbl > xor/ 
V
++
 Z 
++
where 'dbl' is the double operation
Figure 2
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S2VAESCMAC with key k on a vector of m inputs X1, X2, ..., Xm1,
Xm, and len(Xm) < 128:
++ ++ ++ ++
 X1   X2  . . .  Xm1   Xm10* 
++ ++ ++ ++
K    
     V
V  V V V /> xor
++  ++ ++ ++  
 AES_    AES_   AES_   AES_   
 CMAC <> CMAC  K> CMAC  K> CMAC   V
++ ++ ++ ++  ++
      AES_ 
     K> CMAC 
     ++
\> dbl > xor > dbl > xor > dbl > xor> dbl 
V
++
 Z 
++
where 'dbl' is the double operation
Figure 3
Algorithmically S2VAESCMAC can be described as:
S2VAESCMAC(K, X1, ..., Xm) {
if m = 0 then
return AESCMAC(K, )
fi
S < AESCMAC(K, )
for i = 1 to m1 do
S < dbl(S) xor AESCMAC(K, Xi)
done
if len(Xm) >= 128 then
T < Xm xorend S
else
T < dbl(S) xor Xm10*
fi
return Z < AESCMAC(T)
}
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2.5. SIVCTRAES
SIVAESCTR is a counter mode of AES. It takes as input a plaintext,
P, that is less than [(2^32  1) * 128] bits, a key K of length 256,
384 or 512 bits, and a counter CTR that is 128 bits in length, and
outputs Z which represents a concatenation of the synthetic
initialization vector SIV, and the ciphertext, C, which is the same
length as the plaintext. The size limitation on the plaintext is a
tradeoff made for efficient incrementing of the counter.
When len(K) is 256 bits then the underlying AES cipher uses a 128 bit
key; when len(K) is 384 bits then the underlying AES cipher uses a
192 bit key; and, when len(K) is 512 bits then the underlying AES
cipher uses a 256 bit key.
The ciphertext is produced by xoring the plaintext with the first
len(P) bits of the following string:
E(K, CTR)  E(K, CTR+1)  E(K, CTR+2)  ...
The increment function is handled by treating the initial counter as
96 bits of constant salt followed by a 32 bit nonnegative integer
which is incremented modulo 2^32. More formally,
SALT=leftmost(CTR,96)
n=rightmost(CTR,32)
CTR+i = SALT  (n + i mod 2^32).
2.6. SIVAES Encrypt
SIVAESencrypt takes as input a key K of length 256, 384 or 512
bits, plaintext of length less than [(2^32  1) * 128] bits, and
additional data which is authenticated but not encrypted. It
produces output, Z, which is the concatenation a 128 bit synthetic IV
and ciphertext whose length is equal to the length of the plaintext.
The key is split into two, K1 = leftmost(K, len(K)/2) and K2 =
rightmost(K, len(K)/2). K1 is used for S2VAESCMAC and K2 is used
for AESCTR.
In the encryption mode the additional authenticated data and
plaintext represent the vector of inputs to S2VAESCMAC, with the
plaintext being the last string in the vector. The output of S2V
AESCMAC is a synthetic IV which represents the initial counter used
on the plaintext with AESCTR mode.
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The encryption construction of SIV is as follows:
++ ++ ++ ++
 AAD 1   AAD 2  ...  AAD n   P 
++ ++ ++ ++
   
  ...  
\  / / 
\  / / ++ 
\  / /  K = K1K2  
\  / / ++ V
\  / /   ++
\  / / K1   K2  
\  / / / \> AESCTR 
\  / / / > 
      ++
V V V V V  
++ ++ V
 S2VAESCMAC > SIV  ++
++ ++  C 
 ++
\ 
\ /
\ /
\ /
V V
++
 Z 
++
where the plaintext is P, the associated data is AAD1 through AADn,
SIV is the synthetic IV, the ciphertext is C, and Z is the output.
Figure 7
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Algorithmically SIVAES Encrypt can be described as:
SIVAESENCRYPT(K, P, AAD1, ..., AADn) {
K1 < leftmost(K, len(K)/2)
K2 < rightmost(K, len(K)/2)
V < S2VAESCMAC(K1, AAD1, ..., AADn, P)
m = (len(P) + 127)/128
for i = 0 to m1 do
X < AES(K2, V+i)
Ci < Pi xor X
done
C < C1, ... Cm
return V, C
}
2.7. SIVAES Decrypt
SIVAESdecrypt takes as input a key K of length 256, 384 or 512
bits, Z which represents a synthetic initialization vector SIV
concatentated with a ciphertext C, and additional data which is
authenticated but not encrypted. It produces either the original
plaintext or the special symbol FAIL.
The key is split as specified in Section 2.6
The synthetic IV acts as the initial counter to AESCTR mode to
decrypt the ciphertext. The additional authenticated data and the
output of AESCTR mode is used to represent the vector of inputs to
S2VAESCMAC, with the AESCTR mode output being the last string in
the vector. The output of S2VAESCMAC is then compared against the
synthetic IV that accompanied the original ciphertext. If they match
the output from AESCTR mode is returned as the decrypted and
authenticated plaintext otherwise the special symbol FAIL is
returned.
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The decryption construction of SIV is as follows:
++ ++ ++ ++
 AAD 1   AAD 2  ...  AAD n   P 
++ ++ ++ ++
   ^
   
\  / /
\  / / 
\  / / ++ 
\  / /  K = K1k2  
\  / / ++ 
\  / /   ++
\  / / K1   K2  
\    // \> AESCTR 
\     > 
      ++
V V V V V  ^
++ ++ 
 S2VAESCMAC   SIV  ++
++ ++  C 
  ^ ++
   ^
  \ 
  \_______ 
V V \ 
++ ++ ++
 SIV' > if !=   Z 
++ ++ ++


V
FAIL
Figure 9
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Algorithmically SIVAES Decrypt can be described as:
SIVAESDECRYPT(K, C, V, AAD1, ..., AADn) {
K1 < leftmost(K, len(K)/2)
K2 < rightmost(K, len(K)/2)
m = (len(C) + 127)/128
for i = 0 to m1 do
X < AES(K2, V+i)
Pi < Ci xor X
done
P < P1, ... Pm
T < S2VAESCMAC(K1, AAD1, ..., AADn, P)
if T = V then
return P
else
return FAIL
fi
}
3. Noncebased Authenticated Encryption with SIVAES
SIVAES performs noncebased authenticated encryption when a
component of the additional authenticated data is a nonce. For
purposes of interoperability the final component i.e. the string
immediately preceding the plaintext in the vector input to S2VAES
CMAC is used for the nonce. Other additional authenticated data
are optional.
If the nonce is random it SHOULD be at least 128 bits in length and
be harvested from a pool having at least 128 bits of entropy. A non
random source MAY also be used, for instance a time stamp. The
definition of a nonce precludes reuse but SIVAES is resistant to
nonce reuse. See Section 1.3.2 for a discussion on the security
implications of nonce reuse.
It MAY be necessary to transport this nonce with the output generated
by S2VAESCMAC.
4. Deterministic Authenticated Encryption with SIVAES
When the plaintext to encrypt and authenticate contains a nonce
itself SIVAES can be used in a deterministic mode to perform "key
wrapping". Because S2VAESCMAC allows for additional authenticated
data and imposes no unnatural size restrictions on the data it is
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protecting (the only requirement being it is less than [(2^32  1) *
128] bits) it is a more useful and general purpose solution than
[RFC3394]. Protocols which use SIVAES for deterministic
authenticated encryption (i.e. for more than just wrapping of keys)
MAY define additional authenticated data inputs to SIVAES. No nonce
is necessary in this mode.
5. Optimizations
It is possible to optimize an implementation of S2VAESCMAC when it
is being used as a key derivation function (KDF), for example in
[WLAN]. This is because the S2V construct operates on a vector of
distinct strings and typically the data passed to a KDF contains
constant strings. Depending on the location of the varient component
of the input the AESCMAC'd output of intermediate and invarient
components can be computed once and xor'd with the running sum or an
intermediate value of the doubled and xor'd output up to the varient
component can be computed once and cached.
6. IANA Considerations
[AEAD] defines a uniform interface to cipher modes which provide
noncebased authenticated encryption with additional authentication
data (AEAD). It does this via a registry of AEAD algorithms.
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) will assign three
entries from the AEAD Registry for SIVAES256, SIVAES384, and SIV
AES512 based upon the following AEAD algorithm definitions. The
security analysis for each of these algorithms is in [DAE].
6.1. AEAD_SIV_AES_256
The SIVAES256 AEAD algorithm works as specified in Section 2.6 and
Section 2.7. The input and output lengths for SIVAES256 as defined
by [AEAD] are:
K_LEN is 32 octets.
P_MAX is 2^35 octets.
A_MAX is unlimited.
N_MIN is 1 octet.
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N_MAX is unlimited.
C_MAX is 2^35 + 16 octets.
The security implications of nonce reuse and/or misuse are
described in Section 1.3.2.
6.2. AEAD_SIV_AES_384
The SIVAES384 AEAD algorithm works as specified in Section 2.6 and
Section 2.7. The input and output lengths for SIVAES384 as defined
by [AEAD] are:
K_LEN is 48 octets.
P_MAX is 2^35 octets.
A_MAX is unlimited.
N_MIN is 1 octet.
N_MAX is unlimited.
C_MAX is 2^35 + 16 octets.
The security implications of nonce reuse and/or misuse are
described in Section 1.3.2.
6.3. AEAD_SIV_AES_512
The SIVAES512 AEAD algorithm works as specified in Section 2.6 and
Section 2.7. The input and output lengths for SIVAES512 as defined
by [AEAD] are:
K_LEN is 64 octets.
P_MAX is 2^35 octets.
A_MAX is unlimited.
N_MIN is 1 octet.
N_MAX is unlimited.
C_MAX is 2^35 + 16 octets.
The security implications of nonce reuse and/or misuse are
described in Section 1.3.2.
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7. Security Considerations
SIVAES provides privacy in the sense that the output of SIVAES
Encrypt is indistinguishable from a random string of bits. It
provides authenticity in the sense that an an attacker is unable to
construct a string of bits that will return other than FAIL when
input to SIVAES Decrypt. A proof of the security of SIV with an
"all in one" notion of security for an authenticated encryption
scheme is provided in [DAE].
SIVAES in the deterministic authenticated encryption mode provides
this sense of privacy and authenticity. In the deterministic mode a
nonce component is added to the plaintext. Even when this nonce is
made available to an attacker the output of SIVAES Encrypt is
indistinguishable from random bits. Similarly, even when this nonce
is made available to an attacker she is unable to construct a string
of bits that when input to SIVAES Decrypt will return a plaintext
encoded with the nonce i.e. it will only return FAIL.
When the nonce used in the noncebased authenticated encryption mode
of SIVAES is is treated with the care afforded a nonce or counter in
other probabilistic authenticated encryption schemes i.e. guarantee
that it will never be used with the same key for two distinct
invocations then SIVAES achieves the level of security described
above. If, however, the initialization vector is reused SIVAES
continues to provide the level of authenticity described above but
with a slightly reduced amount of privacy (see Section 1.3.2).
8. Acknowledgments
Thanks to Phil Rogaway for patiently answering numerous questions on
SIV and S2V and for useful critques of initial versions of this
paper. Thanks also to David McGrew for numerous helpful comments and
suggestions for improving this paper. Thanks to Jouni Malinen for
producing another independent implementation of S2V and thereby
confirming the correctness of the test vectors.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[DAE] Rogaway, P. and T. Shrimpton, "Deterministic Authenticated
Encryption, A ProvableSecurity Treatment of the KeyWrap
Problem", September 2006.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
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Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
9.2. Informative References
[AEAD] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", InternetDraft: draftmcgrewauthenc02.txt
(a work in progress), February 2007.
[BADESP] Bellovin, S., "Problem Areas for the IP Security
Protocols", July 1996.
[CCM] Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter With
CBCMAC (CCM)", June 2002.
[GCM] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Galois/Counter Mode of
Operation (GCM)".
[JUTLA] Jutla, C., "Encryption Modes With Almost Free Message
Integrity", Proceedings of the International Conference on
the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques:
Advances in Cryptography.
[OCB] Korvetz, T. and P. Rogaway, "The OCB Authenticated
Encryption Algorithm",
InternetDraft: draftkrovetzocb00.txt (a work in
progress).
[RADKEY] Zorn, G., "RADIUS Attributes for the Delivery of Keying
Material",
InternetDraft: draftzornradiuskeywrap13.txt (a work
in progress).
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed
Hashing for Message Authentication", February 1997,
.
[RFC2548] Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendorspecific RADIUS Attributes",
March 1999, .
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Williams, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service", June 2000,
.
[RFC3217] Housley, R., "TripleDES and RC2 Key Wrapping",
December 2001, .
[RFC3394] Housley, R., "AES Key Wrap", February 2005,
.
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[VIRT] Garfinkel, T. and M. Rosenblum, "When Virtual is Harder
than Real: Security Challenges in Virtual Machine Based
Computing Environments".
[WLAN] "Draft Standard for IEEE802.11: Wireless LAN Medium Access
Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specification",
2007.
[X9F1] Dworking, M., "Wrapping of Keys and Associated Data",
Request for review of key wrap algorithms. Cryptology
ePrint report 2004/340, 2004. Contents are excerpts from a
draft standard of the Accredited Standards Committee, X9,
entitled ANS X9.102.
Appendix A. Test Vectors
A.1. Deterministic Authenticated Encryption Example
Input:

Key:
fffefdfc fbfaf9f8 f7f6f5f4 f3f2f1f0
f0f1f2f3 f4f5f6f7 f8f9fafb fcfdfeff
AAD:
10111213 14151617 18191a1b 1c1d1e1f
20212223 24252627
Plaintext:
11223344 55667788 99aabbcc ddee
S2VAESCMAC

CMAC(zero):
0535e2dc b1e95ad2 3b168837 c2a2430b
double():
0a6bc5b9 63d2b5a4 762d106f 85448616
CMAC(aad):
f1f922b7 f5193ce6 4ff80cb4 7d93f23b
xor:
fb92e70e 96cb8942 39d51cdb f8d7742d
double():
f725ce1d 2d971284 73aa39b7 f1aee8dd
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pad:
11223344 55667788 99aabbcc ddee8000
xor:
e607fd59 78f1650c ea00827b 2c4068dd
CMAC(final):
38c07e2c 86fc416d 18cfa186 7832f0fa
SIVAESCTR

CTR:
38c07e2c 86fc416d 18cfa186 7832f0fa
E(K,CTR):
60caaec0 312b627d 934b1293 5840ce08
ciphertext:

71e89d84 644d15f5 0ae1a95f 85ae
A.2. Probabilistic Authenticated Encryption Example
Input:

Key:
7f7e7d7c 7b7a7978 77767574 73727170
40414243 44454647 48494a4b 4c4d4e4f
AAD1:
00112233 44556677 8899aabb ccddeeff
deaddada deaddada ffeeddcc bbaa9988
77665544 33221100
AAD2:
10203040 50607080 90a0
IV:
09f91102 9d74e35b d84156c5 635688c0
Plaintext:
74686973 20697320 74686520 706c6169
6e746578 7420746f 20656e63 72797074
20757369 6e672053 49562d41 4553
S2VAESCMAC

CMAC(zero):
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ba64ea67 710db6de ebdb99bd 08cc8c45
double():
74c9d4ce e21b6dbd d7b7337a 1199180d
CMAC(aad1)
3c9b689a b41102e4 80954714 1dd0d15a
xor:
4852bc54 560a6f59 5722746e 0c49c957
double():
90a578a8 ac14deb2 ae44e8dc 189392ae
CMAC(aad2)
d98c9b0b e42cb2d7 aa98478e d11eda1b
xor:
4929e3a3 48386c65 04dcaf52 c98d48b5
double():
9253c746 9070d8ca 09b95ea5 931a916a
CMAC(IV)
128c62a1 ce3747a8 372c1c05 a538b96d
xor:
80dfa5e7 5e479f62 3e9542a0 36222807
xorend:
74686973 20697320 74686520 706c6169
6e746578 7420746f 20656e63 7279f0ab
85922d2e f1051ec6 0bf61b63 6d54
CMAC(final)
efa831fb c6eb3ba8 84b81f30 ed59225e
SIVAESCTR

CTR:
efa831fb c6eb3ba8 84b81f30 ed59225e
E(K,CTR):
5fc2a9a6 b95e341c 6497f5e5 026eb7fa
CTR+1:
efa831fb c6eb3ba8 84b81f30 ed59225f
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E(K,CTR+1):
6404c208 74585e4f 15b3d6a0 4f7e70f0
CTR+2
efa831fb c6eb3ba8 84b81f30 ed592260
E(K,CTR+2):
130a7acb f337caaf a06c1eac b2d60acc
ciphertext:

2baac0d5 9937473c 10ff90c5 7202d693
0a70a770 00782a20 35d6b8c3 3d070084
337f09a2 9d50eafc e93a33ed f785
Author's Address
Dan Harkins (editor)
The Industrial Lounge
Email: dharkins@lounge.org
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