TOC 
NetworkS. Dotson
Internet-DraftCox
Intended status: Standards TrackS. Hoggan
Expires: August 25, 2008S. Channabasappa
 CableLabs
 February 22, 2008


Proxy Mutual Authentication in SIP
draft-dotson-sip-mutual-auth-01

Status of this Memo

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Abstract

This document defines the Proxy-Authentication-Info header field for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). When a UA is required to authenticate to a proxy using digest authentication specified in SIP this header field allows for the UA to authenticate the proxy, enabling mutual authentication. This header field can also provide integrity checks over the bodies.



Table of Contents

1.  Introduction
2.  Terminology
3.  Overview
4.  User Agent Client (UAC) Behavior
5.  User Agent Server Behavior
6.  Proxy Behavior
7.  Extensibility Considerations
8.  Header Field Definition
9.  Security Considerations
10.  IANA Considerations
11.  Acknowledgements
12.  References
    12.1.  Normative References
    12.2.  Informative References
§  Authors' Addresses
§  Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements




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1.  Introduction

The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP, [RFC3261] (Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,” June 2002.)) provides a stateless, challenge-response based mechanism for authentication that is based on authentication in HTTP [RFC2617] (Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication,” June 1999.). A proxy or a user receiving a request can challenge the initiator of the request to obtain assurance of the originator's identity. A UAS, registrar, or redirect server can use 401 (Unauthorized), where as proxies use 407 (Proxy Authentication Required), for authentication challenges. Challenges result in a resend of the requests with the digest authentication information that can be used to verify the authenticity of the originator. The two parties share a username and password to support this authentication mechanism. Refer to [RFC3261] (Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,” June 2002.) for more information on Digest authentication.

The SIP Digest mechanism parallels the HTTP Digest mechanism specified in [RFC2617] (Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication,” June 1999.). HTTP Digest [RFC2617] (Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication,” June 1999.) also allows for mutual authentication by allowing the client to authenticate the challenging entity, such as a proxy. Mutual authentication is facilitated via two headers: Authentication-Info for mutual authentication with a server, and Proxy-Authentication-Info for authentication with a proxy. These headers may be used by the challenging entities, server or proxy, to send challenge responses for authentication by the client. SIP specifies and allows for the usage of the Authentication-Info header by a server, but does not mention the Proxy-Authentication-Info header. This document presents an extension to allow for the use of the Proxy-Authentication-Info header. The header can be sent along with 2xx responses from the proxy to the client during digest authentication. The response digest in the "response-auth" directive allows the client to authenticate the proxy, i.e., it ensures that the proxy has knowledge of the password. This provides for mutual authentication when proxies challenge clients, and provides for limited integrity protection. It also allows for the Proxy to provide additional information such as the nonce value to use for a future authentication response.



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2.  Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 (Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March 1997.) [RFC2119].



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3.  Overview





   +--------+                  +--------+
   |  UAC   |                  |  Proxy |
   +--------+                  +--------+
       |                            |
       |   SIP REQ (e.g., INVITE)   |
       |--------------------------> |
       |                            |
       | 407 (Proxy Auth. Required) |
       |<-------------------------- |
       |                            |
       |                            |
       |   SIP REQ (with creds)     |
       |--------------------------> |
       |                            |
       |          200 OK            |
       |<-------------------------- |
       |                            |


 Figure 1: Proxy-to-User Digest Authentication in SIP 

Figure 1 (Proxy-to-User Digest Authentication in SIP) provides a sample message flow when the proxy challenges a client's request using digest authentication with SIP. As illustrated, the client sends a request that is challenged by the proxy via a 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response. The client then uses the information provided in the challenge (refer to [RFC3261] (Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,” June 2002.) for details) to prepare a response (to the challenge). The client then resends the request, and this time it includes the challenge response. If the response to the challenge authenticated the client, the proxy replies with a 200 OK. This allows for the proxy to authenticate the client. However, it neither allows for the proxy to send additional information regarding the successful authentication such as the nonce to use for a future authentication response, nor does it allow for a client to authenticate the proxy. This is in contrast to when the challenging entity is a server, since it can accomplish both - additional authentication information and mutual authentication - via the Authentication-Info header. This document proposes the inclusion of the Proxy-Authentication-Info header to address this deficiency in Proxy-to-User authentication. The header parallels a header of the same name for HTTP, as specified in [RFC2617] (Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication,” June 1999.). The header is used by the proxy during Proxy-to-User authentication to allow for mutual authentication and additional authentication information.



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4.  User Agent Client (UAC) Behavior

When this header field is included by a Proxy within the 2xx response, the requirements are the same as those of a client receiving an Authentication-Info header field from a Server, as specified in [RFC3261] (Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,” June 2002.).



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5.  User Agent Server Behavior

UAS behavior is unaffected by this specification.



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6.  Proxy Behavior

A Proxy MAY include this header field in a 2xx response to a request that was successfully authenticated using digest based on the Authorization header field.

Syntax and semantics follow those specified in [RFC2617] (Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication,” June 1999.), which also defines mechanisms for backwards compatibility using the qop attribute in the request. These mechanisms MUST be used by a proxy to determine if the client supports the new mechanisms in [RFC2617] (Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication,” June 1999.) that were not specified in [RFC2069] (Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., Sink, E., and L. Stewart, “An Extension to HTTP : Digest Access Authentication,” January 1997.).

Example:

Proxy-Authentication-Info: nextnonce="47364c23432d2e131a5fb210812c



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7.  Extensibility Considerations

This document introduces the Proxy-Authentication-Info header that may be sent from a proxy to a client during authentication. If present, it provides an opportunity for the client to authenticate the proxy, enabling mutual authentication. A proxy that is not compliant with this specification will not include the header. However, implementors need to understand that without the specified header mutual authentication may not be possible within Proxy-to-User authentication as specified by SIP. Additionally, the presence of this header allows for the proxy to indicate the nonce to be used by the client during a future authentication response. If the nextnonce field is present the client SHOULD use it when constructing the Proxy-Authorization header for its next request. This document does not alter this requirement. However, implementers need to understand that the failure of the client to act on the nextnonce field may result in a request to re-authenticate from the proxy with the "stale=TRUE". This behavior is specified in [RFC2617] (Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication,” June 1999.), and is not altered by this document.



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8.  Header Field Definition

The grammar for the Proxy-Authentication-Info header is defined as follows:


Proxy-Authentication-Info = "Proxy-Authentication-Info" HCOLON painfo
                             *(COMMA painfo)
painfo                    =  nextnonce / message-qop
                             / response-auth / cnonce
                             / nonce-count
nextnonce                 =  "nextnonce" EQUAL nonce-value
response-auth             =  "rspauth" EQUAL response-digest
response-digest           =  LDQUOT *LHEX RDQUOT

Figure 2 (Extension to Table 3) is an extension to Table 3 of [RFC3261] (Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,” June 2002.) for the Proxy-Authentication-Info header:



  Header field                 where    proxy ACK BYE CAN INV OPT REG

Proxy-Authentication-Info       2xx       o    -   o   -   o   o   -


 Figure 2: Extension to Table 3 



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9.  Security Considerations

This document defines a SIP message header that provides mutual authentication during proxy authentication of a UA. When challenged by a proxy or server to perform authentication (e.g., after sending an INVITE or SUBSCRIBE request), the Proxy-Authorization header provides the proxy with proof the UA knows the correct credentials for the identity being used. By adding support for the Proxy-Authentication-Info header, proxies may provide UAs with a challenge response to prove to the UA it also knows the correct credentials. The use case most affected is where the proxy/server performing the challenge is not the next-hop proxy/server of the UA.

When the proxy/server is the next-hop proxy/server for the UA, TLS should be relied upon instead of this mechanism, as a malicious next-hop proxy or Man-in-The-Middle (MITM) could merely not challenge the UA, or simply not use the optional Proxy-Authorization-Info header. This header is most meaningful in environments where the UA is expecting (i.e., is configured) to perform mutual authenitication - malicious entities would be forced to prove knowledge of the UAs credentials, adding an additional layer of defense.



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10.  IANA Considerations

This document defines a new SIP header field "Proxy-Authentication-Info".

Name of header: Proxy-Authentication-Info

Short form: none

Registrant: Sumanth Channabasappa, sumanth@cablelabs.com

Normative description: RFCXXXX

Note to RFC Editor: Please replace XXXX with the RFC number for this document.



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11.  Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Keith Drage and Dean Willis for their assistance in the process for this change.



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12.  References



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12.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication,” RFC 2617, June 1999 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,” RFC 3261, June 2002 (TXT).


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12.2. Informative References

[RFC2069] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., Sink, E., and L. Stewart, “An Extension to HTTP : Digest Access Authentication,” RFC 2069, January 1997 (TXT).


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Authors' Addresses

  Steve Dotson
  Cox
  1400 Lake Hearn Drive
  Atlanta, GA 30319
  US
Email:  steve.dotson@cox.com
  
  Stuart Hoggan
  CableLabs
  858 Coal Creek Circle
  Louisville, CO 80027
  US
Email:  s.hoggan@cablelabs.com
  
  Sumanth Channabasappa
  CableLabs
  858 Coal Creek Circle
  Louisville, CO 80027
  US
Email:  sumanth@cablelabs.com


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Full Copyright Statement

Intellectual Property