Integrity Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)

This document, which extends and replaces , specifies Two TLVs for carrying Integrity Check Values (ICVs) and timestamps in packets, messages, and address blocks as defined by . A generic framework for ICVs, accounting (for Message TLVs) for mutable message header fields (<msg-hop-limit> and <msg&nbhy;hop&nbhy;count>), where these fields are present in messages. This document describes, and updates where required, IANA registries for recording code points for hash-functions, cryptographic functions, and ICV calculations. Moreover, in , this document defines the following: One common method for generating ICVs as a cryptographic function, calculated over the hash value of the content.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in . This document uses the terminology and notation defined in . In particular, the following TLV fields from are used in this specification: is the hop limit of a message, as specified in Section 5.2 of . is the hop count of a message, as specified in Section 5.2 of . is the length of a TLV in octets, as specified in Section 5.4.1 of .

MANET routing protocols using the format defined in are accorded the ability to carry additional information in control messages and packets, through the inclusion of TLVs. Information so included MAY be used by a MANET routing protocol, or by an extension of a MANET routing protocol, according to its specification. This document specifies how to include an ICV for a packet, a message, and addresses in address blocks within a message, by way of such TLVs. This document also specifies a) how to treat "mutable" fields, specifically the <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit> fields, if present in the message header when calculating ICVs, such that the resulting ICV can be correctly verified by any recipient, and b) how to include this ICV. This document describes a generic framework for creating ICVs, and how to include these ICVs in TLVs. In , an example method for calculating such ICVs is given, using a cryptographic function over the hash value of the content.

Basic MANET routing protocol specifications are often "oblivious to security"; however, they have a clause allowing a control message to be rejected as "badly formed" or "insecure" prior to the message being processed or forwarded. MANET routing protocols such as the Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP) and the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 recognize external reasons (such as failure to verify an ICV) for rejecting a message that would be considered "invalid for processing". This architecture is a result of the observation that with respect to security in MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and that MANET routing protocol deployment domains have varying security requirements ranging from "unbreakable" to "virtually none". The virtue of this approach is that MANET routing protocol specifications (and implementations) can remain "generic", with extensions providing proper security mechanisms specific to a deployment domain. The MANET routing protocol "security architecture", in which this specification situates itself, can therefore be summarized as follows: Security-oblivious MANET routing protocol specifications, with a clause allowing an extension to reject a message (prior to processing/forwarding) as "badly formed" or "insecure". MANET routing protocol security extensions, rejecting messages as "badly formed" or "insecure", as appropriate for a given security requirement specific to a deployment domain. Code points and an exchange format for information, necessary for specification of such MANET routing protocol security extensions. This document addresses the last of the issues listed above by specifying a common exchange format for cryptographic ICVs, making reservations from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV, and Address Block TLV registries of , to be used (and shared) among MANET routing protocol security extensions. For the specific decomposition of an ICV into a cryptographic function over a hash value (specified in ), this document reports two IANA registries for code points for hash functions and cryptographic functions adhering to . With respect to , this document is Intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of use described in Appendix B of . A specific example of the Security Considerations section of (the authentication part).

This document specifies a syntactical representation of security-related information for use with addresses, messages, and packets, and also reports and updates IANA registrations of TLV types and type extension registries for these TLV types. Moreover, this document provides guidelines for how MANET routing protocols and MANET routing protocol extensions using this specification should treat ICV and Timestamp TLVs, and mutable fields in messages. This specification does not represent a stand-alone protocol; MANET routing protocols and MANET routing protocol extensions, using this specification, MUST provide instructions as to how to handle packets, messages, and addresses with security information, associated as specified in this document. This document reports previously assigned TLV types from the registries defined for Packet, Message, and Address Block TLVs in . When a TLV type is assigned from one of these registries, a registry for type extensions for that TLV type is created by IANA. This document reports and updates these type extension registries, in order to specify internal structure (and accompanying processing) of the <value> field of a TLV. For example, and as defined in this document, an ICV TLV with type extension = 0 specifies that the <value> field has no pre-defined internal structure but is simply a sequence of octets. An ICV TLV with type extension = 1 specifies that the <value> field has a pre-defined internal structure and defines its interpretation. An ICV TLV with type extension = 2 specifies a modified version of this definition. (Specifically, with type extension = 1 or type extension = 2, the <value> field consists of a cryptographic operation over a hash value, with fields indicating which hash function and cryptographic operation have been used; this is specified in . The difference between the two type extensions is that the ICV TLV with type extension = 2 also protects the source address of the IP datagram carrying the packet, message, or address block.) Other documents can request assignments for other type extensions; if they do so, they MUST specify their internal structure (if any) and interpretation.

The value of the ICV TLV is

<value> := <ICV-value> where is a field, of <length> octets, which contains the information to be interpreted by the ICV verification process, as specified by the type extension. Note that this does not stipulate how to calculate the <ICV-value> nor the internal structure thereof, if any; such information MUST be specified by way of the type extension for the ICV TLV type. See . This document specifies three such type extensions -- one for ICVs without pre-defined structures, and two for ICVs constructed by way of a cryptographic operation over a hash value.

The value of the Timestamp TLV is

<value> := <time-value> where is an unsigned integer field, of length <length>, which contains the timestamp. Note that this does not stipulate how to calculate the <time&nbhy;value> nor the internal structure thereof, if any; such information MUST be specified by way of the type extension for the TIMESTAMP TLV type. See . A timestamp is essentially "freshness information". As such, its setting and interpretation are to be determined by the MANET routing protocol, or MANET routing protocol extension, that uses the timestamp and can, for example, correspond to a UNIX timestamp, GPS timestamp, or a simple sequence number.

Two Packet TLVs are defined: one for including the cryptographic ICV of a packet and one for including the timestamp indicating the time at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated.

A Packet ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in . The following considerations apply: Because packets as defined in are never forwarded by routers, no special considerations are required regarding mutable fields (e.g., <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit>), if present, when calculating the ICV. Any Packet ICV TLVs already present in the Packet TLV block MUST be removed before calculating the ICV, and the Packet TLV block size MUST be recalculated accordingly. Removed ICV TLVs MUST be restored after having calculated the ICV value. The rationale for removing any Packet ICV TLV already present prior to calculating the ICV is that several ICVs may be added to the same packet, e.g., using different ICV functions.

A Packet TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described in . If a packet contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the packet before any ICV TLV, in order that it be included in the calculation of the ICV.

Two Message TLVs are defined: one for including the cryptographic ICV of a message and one for including the timestamp indicating the time at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated.

A Message ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in . When determining the <ICV-value> for a message, the following considerations MUST be applied: The fields <msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count>, if present, MUST both be assumed to have the value 0 (zero) when calculating the ICV. Any Message ICV TLVs already present in the Message TLV block MUST be removed before calculating the ICV, and the message size as well as the Message TLV block size MUST be recalculated accordingly. Removed ICV TLVs MUST be restored after having calculated the ICV value. The rationale for removing any Message ICV TLV already present prior to calculating the ICV is that several ICVs may be added to the same message, e.g., using different ICV functions.

A Message TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described in . If a message contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the message before the ICV TLV, in order that it be included in the calculation of the ICV.

Two Address Block TLVs are defined: one for associating a cryptographic ICV to an address and one for including the timestamp indicating the time at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated.

An Address Block ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in . The ICV is calculated over the address, concatenated with any other values -- for example, any other Address Block TLV <value> fields -- associated with that address. A MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol extension using Address Block ICV TLVs MUST specify how to include any such concatenated attribute of the address in the verification process of the ICV. When determining the <ICV&nbhy;value> for an address, the following consideration MUST be applied: If other TLV values are concatenated with the address for calculating the ICV, these TLVs MUST NOT be Address Block ICV TLVs already associated with the address. The rationale for not concatenating the address with any ICV TLV values already associated with the address when calculating the ICV is that several ICVs may be added to the same address, e.g., using different ICV functions.

An Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described in . If both a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV are associated with an address, the TIMESTAMP TLV <value> MUST be covered when calculating the value of the ICV to be contained in the ICV TLV value (i.e., concatenated with the associated address and any other values as described in ).

The basic ICV, represented by way of an ICV TLV with type extension = 0, is a simple bit-field containing the cryptographic ICV. This assumes that the mechanism stipulating how ICVs are calculated and verified is established outside of this specification, e.g., by way of administrative configuration or external out-of-band signaling. Thus, the <ICV-value>, when using type extension = 0, is

<ICV-value> := <ICV-data> where is an unsigned integer field, of length <length>, which contains the cryptographic ICV.

One common way of calculating an ICV is applying a cryptographic function over a hash value of the content. This decomposition is specified in this section, using either type extension = 1 or type extension = 2, in the ICV TLVs.

The following data structure allows representation of a cryptographic ICV, including specification of the appropriate hash function and cryptographic function used for calculating the ICV:

<ICV-value> := <hash-function> <cryptographic-function> <key-id-length> <key-id> <ICV-data> where is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the hash function. is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the cryptographic function. is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the length of the <key-id> field in number of octets. The value 0x00 is reserved for using a pre-installed, shared key. is a field specifying the key identifier of the key that was used to calculate the ICV of the message, which allows unique identification of different keys with the same originator. It is the responsibility of each key originator to make sure that actively used keys that it issues have distinct key identifiers. If <key-id-length> equals 0x00, the <key-id> field is not contained in the TLV, and a pre-installed, shared key is used. is an unsigned integer field, whose length is <length> - 3 - <key-id-length>, and which contains the cryptographic ICV. The version of this TLV, specified in this section, assumes that calculating the ICV can be decomposed into ICV-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(content)) The hash function and the cryptographic function correspond to the entries in two IANA registries, which are reported by this specification and are described in .

The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic function into two octets instead of having all combinations in a single octet -- possibly as a TLV type extension -- is that adding further hash functions or cryptographic functions in the future may lead to a non-contiguous number space. The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the cryptographic ICV in the TLV is that, before being able to validate a cryptographic ICV, routers have to exchange or acquire keys (e.g., public keys). Any additional parameters can be provided together with the keys in that bootstrap process. It is therefore not necessary, and would even entail an extra overhead, to transmit the parameters within every message. One implicitly available parameter is the length of the ICV, which is <length> - 3 - <key-id-length>, and which depends on the choice of the cryptographic function.

The considerations listed in the following subsections MUST be applied when calculating the ICV for Packet, Message, and Address ICV TLVs, respectively.

When determining the <ICV-value> for a packet, with type extension = 1, the ICV is calculated over the fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function>, <key&nbhy;id&nbhy;length>, and -- if present -- <key-id> (in that order), concatenated with the entire packet, including the packet header, all Packet TLVs (other than Packet ICV TLVs), and all included Messages and their message headers, in accordance with . When determining the <ICV-value> for a packet, with type extension = 2, the same procedure is used, except that the source address of the IP datagram carrying the packet is also concatenated, in the first position, with the data used.

When determining the <ICV-value> for a message, with type extension = 1, the ICV is calculated over the fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function>, <key&nbhy;id&nbhy;length>, and -- if present -- <key-id> (in that order), concatenated with the entire message. The considerations in MUST be applied. When determining the <ICV-value> for a message, with type extension = 2, the same procedure is used, except that the source address of the IP datagram carrying the message is also concatenated, in the first position, with the data used.

When determining the <ICV-value> for an address, block, with type extension = 2, the ICV is calculated over the fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function>, <key-id-length>, and -- if present -- <key-id> (in that order), concatenated with the address, and concatenated with any other values -- for example, any other address block TLV <value> that is associated with that address. A MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol extension using Address Block ICV TLVs MUST specify how to include any such concatenated attribute of the address in the verification process of the ICV. The considerations in MUST be applied. When determining the <ICV-value> for an address block, with type extension = 2, the same procedure is used, except that the source address of the IP datagram carrying the address block is also concatenated, in the first position, with the data used.

The sample message depicted in is derived from Appendix D of . The message contains an ICV Message TLV, with the value representing an ICV that is 16 octets long of the whole message, and a key identifier that is 4 octets long. The type extension of the Message TLV is 1, for the specific decomposition of an ICV into a cryptographic function over a hash value, as specified in .

0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | PV=0 | PF=8 | Packet Sequence Number | Message Type | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | MF=15 | MAL=3 | Message Length = 44 | Msg. Orig Addr| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Message Originator Address (cont) | Hop Limit | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Hop Count | Message Sequence Number | Msg. TLV Block| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Length = 27 | ICV | MTLVF = 144 | MTLVExt = 1 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |Value Len = 23 | Hash Func | Crypto Func |Key ID length=4| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Key Identifier | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | ICV Value | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | ICV Value (cont) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | ICV Value (cont) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | ICV Value (cont) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

This specification reports the following, originally specified in : Two Packet TLV types, which have been allocated from the 0-223 range of the "Packet TLV Types" repository of , as specified in . Two Message TLV types, which have been allocated from the 0-127 range of the "Message TLV Types" repository of , as specified in . Two Address Block TLV types, which have been allocated from the 0-127 range of the "Address Block TLV Types" repository of , as specified in . This specification updates the following, created in : A type extension registry for each of these TLV types with values as listed in Tables , , and . The following terms are used as defined in : "Namespace", "Registration", and "Designated Expert". The following policy is used as defined in : "Expert Review".

For TLV type extensions registries where an Expert Review is required, the Designated Expert SHOULD take the same general recommendations into consideration as those specified by . For the Timestamp TLV, the same type extensions for all Packet, Message, and Address Block TLVs SHOULD be numbered identically.

IANA has, in accordance with , made allocations from the "Packet TLV Types" namespace of for the Packet TLVs specified in . IANA are requested to modify this allocation (defining type extension = 2) as indicated. Name Type Type Extension Description ICV 5 0 ICV of a packet 1-2 ICV, decomposed into cryptographic function over a hash value, as specified in of this document 3-251 Unassigned; Expert Review 252-255 Experimental Use TIMESTAMP 6 0 Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary length, given by the TLV Length field. The MANET routing protocol has to define how to interpret this timestamp 1 Unsigned 32-bit timestamp, as specified in 2 NTP timestamp format, as defined in 3 Signed timestamp of arbitrary length with no constraints such as monotonicity. In particular, it may represent any random value 4-251 Unassigned; Expert Review 252-255 Experimental Use

IANA has, in accordance with , made allocations from the "Message TLV Types" namespace of for the Message TLVs specified in . IANA are requested to modify this allocation (defining type extension = 2) as indicated. Name Type Type Extension Description ICV 5 0 ICV of a message 1-2 ICV, decomposed into cryptographic function over a hash value, as specified in of this document 3-251 Unassigned; Expert Review 252-255 Experimental Use TIMESTAMP 6 0 Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary length, given by the TLV Length field. 1 Unsigned 32-bit timestamp, as specified in 2 NTP timestamp format, as defined in 3 Signed timestamp of arbitrary length with no constraints such as monotonicity. In particular, it may represent any random value 4-251 Unassigned; Expert Review 252-255 Experimental Use

IANA has, in accordance with , made allocations from the "Address Block TLV Types" namespace of for the Packet TLVs specified in . IANA are requested to modify this allocation (defining type extension = 2) as indicated. Name Type Type Extension Description ICV 5 0 ICV of an object (e.g., an address) 1-2 ICV, decomposed into cryptographic function over a hash value, as specified in of this document 3-251 Unassigned; Expert Review 252-255 Experimental Use TIMESTAMP 6 0 Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary length, given by the TLV Length field 1 Unsigned 32-bit timestamp, as specified in 2 NTP timestamp format, as defined in 3 Signed timestamp of arbitrary length with no constraints such as monotonicity. In particular, it may represent any random value 4-251 Unassigned; Expert Review 252-255 Experimental Use

IANA has, in accordance with , created a new registry for hash functions that can be used when creating an ICV, as specified in of this document. The initial assignments and allocation policies are specified in . This registry is unchanged by this specification. Hash Function Value Algorithm Description 0 none The "identity function": The hash value of an object is the object itself 1 SHA1 2 SHA224 3 SHA256 4 SHA384 5 SHA512 6-251 Unassigned; Expert Review 252-255 Experimental Use

IANA has, in accordance with , created a new registry for the cryptographic functions, as specified in of this document. Initial assignments and allocation policies are specified in . This registry is unchanged by this specification. Cryptographic Function Value Algorithm Description 0 none The "identity function": The value of an encrypted hash is the hash itself 1 RSA 2 DSA 3 HMAC 4 3DES 5 AES 6 ECDSA 7-251 Unassigned; Expert Review 252-255 Experimental Use

This document does not specify a protocol. It provides a syntactical component for cryptographic ICVs of messages and packets, as defined in . It can be used to address security issues of a MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol extension. As such, it has the same security considerations as . In addition, a MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol extension that uses this specification MUST specify how to use the framework, and the TLVs presented in this document. In addition, the protection that the MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol extensions attain by using this framework MUST be described. As an example, a MANET routing protocol that uses this component to reject "badly formed" or "insecure" messages if a control message does not contain a valid ICV SHOULD indicate the security assumption that if the ICV is valid, the message is considered valid. It also SHOULD indicate the security issues that are counteracted by this measure (e.g., link or identity spoofing) as well as the issues that are not counteracted (e.g., compromised keys).

The authors would like to thank Bo Berry (Cisco), Alan Cullen (BAE Systems), Justin Dean (NRL), Paul Lambert (Marvell), Jerome Milan (Ecole Polytechnique), and Henning Rogge (FGAN) for their constructive comments on . The authors also appreciate the detailed reviews of from the Area Directors, in particular Stewart Bryant (Cisco), Stephen Farrell (Trinity College Dublin), and Robert Sparks (Tekelec), as well as Donald Eastlake (Huawei) from the Security Directorate.