Internet-Draft Using SHA3 with the CMS October 2023
Housley Expires 21 April 2024 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash-02
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Author:
R. Housley
Vigil Security

Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)

Abstract

This document describes the conventions for using the four one-way hash functions in the SHA3 family with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 April 2024.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents. This specification describes the use of the four one-way hash functions in the SHA3 family (SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512) [SHA3] with the CMS. In addition, this specification describes the use of these four one-way hash functions with the RSASSA PKCS#1 version 1.5 signature algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [DSS] with the CMS signed-data content type.

This document should not be confused with RFC 8702 [RFC8702], which defines conventions for using the the SHAKE family of SHA3-based extensible output functions with the CMS.

1.1. ASN.1

CMS values are generated using ASN.1 [X.680], using the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690].

1.2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Message Digest Algorithms

One-way hash functions are also referred to as message digest algorithms.
This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS implementations that support SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 [SHA3].

Digest algorithm identifiers are located in the SignedData digestAlgorithms field, the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field, the DigestedData digestAlgorithm field, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm field.

Digest values are located in the DigestedData digest field and the Message Digest authenticated attribute. In addition, digest values are input to signature algorithms.

SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 produce output values with 224, 256, 384, and 512 bits, respectively. The object identifiers for these four one-way hash functions are as follows:

   hashAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 }

   id-sha3-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 7 }

   id-sha3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 8 }

   id-sha3-384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 9 }

   id-sha3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 10 }

When using the id-sha3-224, id-sha3-s256, id-sha3-384, or id-sha3-512 algorithm identifiers, the parameters field MUST be absent; not NULL but absent.

3. Signature Algorithms

This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS implementations that support the four SHA3 one-way hash functions with the RSASSA PKCS#1 version 1.5 signature algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [DSS] with the CMS signed-data content type.

Signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData. Also, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field of countersignature attributes.

Signature values are located in the SignerInfo signature field of SignedData. Also, signature values are located in the SignerInfo signature field of countersignature attributes.

3.1. RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA3

The RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 is defined in [RFC8017]}}. When RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 is used in conjunction with one of the SHA3 one-way hash functions, the object identifiers are:

   OID ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   sigAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 }

   id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-224 OID ::= { sigAlgs 13 }

   id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-256 OID ::= { sigAlgs 14 }

   id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-384 OID ::= { sigAlgs 15 }

   id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-512 OID ::= { sigAlgs 16 }

The algorithm identifier for RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 subject public keys in certificates is specified in [RFC3279], and it is repeated here for convenience:

   rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
       us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1 }

When the rsaEncryption, id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-224, id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-256, id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-384, and id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-512 algorithm identifier is used, AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST contain NULL.

When the rsaEncryption algorithm identifier is used, the RSA public key, which is composed of a modulus and a public exponent, MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type as specified in [RFC3279]. The output of this encoding is carried in the certificate subject public key. The definition of RSAPublicKey is repeated here for convenience:

   RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
      modulus INTEGER, -- n
      publicExponent INTEGER } -- e

When signing, the RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm generates a single value, and that value is used directly as the signature value.

3.2. ECDSA with SHA3

The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in [DSS]. When ECDSA is used in conjunction with one of the SHA3 one-way hash functions, the object identifiers are:

   sigAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 }

   id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sigAlgs 9 }

   id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sigAlgs 10 }

   id-ecdsa-with-sha3-384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sigAlgs 11 }

   id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sigAlgs 12 }

When using the id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224, id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256, id-ecdsa-with-sha3-384, and id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512 algorithm identifiers, the parameters field MUST be absent; not NULL but absent.

The conventions for ECDSA public keys is as specified in [RFC5480]. The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signers certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.

When signing, the ECDSA algorithm generates two values. These values are commonly referred to as r and s. To easily transfer these two values as one signature, they MUST be ASN.1 encoded using the ECDSA-Sig-Value defined in [RFC3279] and repeated here for convenience:

   ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
       r  INTEGER,
       s  INTEGER }

4. Message Authentication Codes using HMAC aand SHA3

This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS implementations that support the HMAC [RFC2104] with SHA3 message authentication code (MAC).

MAC algorithm identifiers are located in the AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field.

MAC values are located in the AuthenticatedData mac field.

When HMAC is used in conjunction with one of the SHA3 one-way hash functions, the object identifiers are:

   hashAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 }

   id-hmacWithSHA3-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 13 }

   id-hmacWithSHA3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 14 }

   id-hmacWithSHA3-384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 15 }

   id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 16 }

When the id-hmacWithSHA3-224, id-hmacWithSHA3-256, id-hmacWithSHA3-384, and id-hmacWithSHA3-512 algorithm identifier is used, the parameters field MUST be absent; not NULL but absent.

5. Key Derivation Functions

5.1. HKDF with SHA3

This section assigns four algorithm identifiers that can be employed by CMS implementations that support the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) [RFC5869] with the SHA3 family of hash functions. The CMS KEMRecipientInfo structure [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-kemri] is one place where algrithim identifiers for key-derivation functions are needed.

When HKDF is used in conjunction with one of the SHA3 one-way hash functions, the object identifiers are:

   id-alg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
       us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) 3 }

   id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD1 }

   id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD2 }

   id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD3 }

   id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD4 }

When the id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-224, id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-256, id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-384, and id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-512 algorithm identifier is used, the parameters field MUST be absent; not NULL but absent.

5.2. KDF2 and KDF3 with SHA3

This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS implementations that employ either the KDF2 or KDF3 functions defined in [ANS-X9.44]. The CMS KEMRecipientInfo structure [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-kemri] is one place where algorithm identifiers for key-derivation functions are needed.

When KDF2 and KDF3 are used, they are identified by the id-kdf-kdf2 and id-kdf-kdf3 object identifiers, respectively. The algorithm identifier parameters carries an algorithm identifier to indicate which hash function is being employed. To support SHA3, an algorithm identifier from Section 2 is carried in the parameter.

   x9-44 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
       tc68(133) country(16) x9(840) x9Standards(9) x9-44(44) }

   x9-44-components OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { x9-44 components(1) }

   id-kdf-kdf2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { x9-44-components kdf2(1) }

   id-kdf-kdf3 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { x9-44-components kdf3(2) }

6. Security Considerations

Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of the signer's private key permits masquerade.

When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key, data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the content could originate from any one of the parties.

Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication keys and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a ECDSA signature. In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs relies on a random numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate cryptographic such values can result in little or no security. An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys, searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole key space. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. RFC 4086 [RFC4086] offers important guidance in this area, and Appendix 3 of FIPS Pub 186-4 [DSS] provides some PRNG techniques.

Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms become weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular cryptographic algorithm will reduce. Therefore, cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their implementations.

7. IANA Considerations

IANA is asked to assign one object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix "Appendix. ASN.1 Module" in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifiers (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry [IANA-MOD]:

   id-mod-sha3-oids-2023 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
      iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
      pkcs-9(9) smime(16) mod(0) TBD0 }

IANA is asked to assign four object identifiers for the HKDF using SHA3 algorithm identifiers in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Algorithms (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.3)" registry [IANA-ALG]:

   id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD1 }

   id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD2 }

   id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD3 }

   id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg TBD4 }

8. References

8.1. Normative References

[ANS-X9.44]
American National Standards Institute, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry -- Key Establishment Using Integer Factorization Cryptography", American National Standard X9.44, .
[DSS]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS) version 4", FIPS PUB 186-4, , <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>.
[RFC2104]
Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3279]
Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3279>.
[RFC5480]
Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5480>.
[RFC5652]
Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652>.
[RFC5869]
Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869>.
[RFC8017]
Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2", RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[SHA3]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", FIPS PUB 202, , <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf>.
[X.680]
ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021, , <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.
[X.690]
ITU-T, "Information technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1:2021, , <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.

8.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-kemri]
Housley, R., Gray, J., and T. Okubo, "Using Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) Algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-kemri-05, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-cms-kemri-05>.
[IANA-ALG]
IANA, "SMI Security for for S/MIME Algorithms (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.3)", n.d., <https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/>.
[IANA-MOD]
IANA, "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)", n.d., <https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/>.
[RFC4086]
Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4086>.
[RFC5912]
Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5912>.
[RFC8702]
Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, "Use of the SHAKE One-Way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 8702, DOI 10.17487/RFC8702, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8702>.

Appendix. ASN.1 Module

This section contains the ASN.1 module for the algorithm identifiers using SHA3 family of hash functions [SHA3]. This module imports types from other ASN.1 modules that are defined in [RFC5912].

   SHA3-OIDs-2023
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-sha3-oids-2023(TBD0) }

   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS All

   IMPORTS

   AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
   KEY-DERIVATION, MAC-ALGORITHM
     FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009  -- [RFC5912]
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
         id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }

  mda-sha1, pk-rsa, pk-ec, ECDSA-Sig-Value
    FROM PKIXAlgs-2009  -- [RFC5912]
      { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
        security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
        id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }

  mda-sha224, mda-sha256, mda-sha384, mda-sha512
    FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009  -- [RFC5912]
      { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
        security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
        id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54) } ;


   --
   -- Alias
   --

   OID ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER


   --
   -- Object Identifier Arcs
   --

   nistAlgorithm OID ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
       us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) 4 }

   hashAlgs OID ::= { nistAlgorithm 2 }

   sigAlgs OID ::= { nistAlgorithm 3 }

   x9-44 OID ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133)
       country(16) x9(840) x9Standards(9) x9-44(44) }

   x9-44-components OID ::= { x9-44 components(1) }

   id-alg OID ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
       rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) 3 }


   --
   -- Message Digest Algorithms
   --

   id-sha3-224 OID ::= { hashAlgs 7 }

   id-sha3-256 OID ::= { hashAlgs 8 }

   id-sha3-384 OID ::= { hashAlgs 9 }

   id-sha3-512 OID ::= { hashAlgs 10 }

   mda-sha3-224 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-sha3-224
       PARAMS ARE absent }

   mda-sha3-256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-sha3-256
       PARAMS ARE absent }

   mda-sha3-384 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-sha3-384
       PARAMS ARE absent }

   mda-sha3-512 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-sha3-512
       PARAMS ARE absent }

   HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
                         { HashAlgorithms } }

   HashAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::=  {
       mda-sha3-224 |
       mda-sha3-256 |
       mda-sha3-384 |
       mda-sha3-512,
       ... }


   --
   -- Signature Algorithms
   --

   id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-224 OID ::= { sigAlgs 13 }

   id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-256 OID ::= { sigAlgs 14 }

   id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-384 OID ::= { sigAlgs 15 }

   id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-512 OID ::= { sigAlgs 16 }

   id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224 OID ::= { sigAlgs 9 }

   id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256 OID ::= { sigAlgs 10 }

   id-ecdsa-with-sha3-384 OID ::= { sigAlgs 11 }

   id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512 OID ::= { sigAlgs 12 }

   sa-rsaWithSHA3-224 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-224
       PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
       HASHES { mda-sha3-224 }
       PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa }
       SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY
           id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-224 } }

   sa-rsaWithSHA3-256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-256
       PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
       HASHES { mda-sha3-256 }
       PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa }
       SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY
           id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-256 } }

   sa-rsaWithSHA3-384 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-384
       PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
       HASHES { mda-sha3-384 }
       PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa }
       SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY
           id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-384 } }

   sa-rsaWithSHA3-512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-512
       PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
       HASHES { mda-sha3-512 }
       PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa }
       SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY
           id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1-5-with-sha3-512 } }

   sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-224 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224
       VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
       PARAMS ARE absent
       HASHES { mda-sha3-224 }
       PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
       SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224 } }

   sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256
       VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
       PARAMS ARE absent
       HASHES { mda-sha3-256 }
       PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
       SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256 } }

   sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-384 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-sha3-384
       VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
       PARAMS ARE absent
       HASHES { mda-sha3-384 }
       PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
       SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-sha3-384 } }

   sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512
       VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
       PARAMS ARE absent
       HASHES { mda-sha3-512 }
       PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
       SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512 } }

   SignatureAlg ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
                         { SignatureAlgs } }

   SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
       sa-rsaWithSHA3-224 |
       sa-rsaWithSHA3-256 |
       sa-rsaWithSHA3-384 |
       sa-rsaWithSHA3-512 |
       sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-224 |
       sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-256 |
       sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-384 |
       sa-ecdsaWithSHA3-512,
       ... }


   --
   -- Message Authentication Codes
   --

   id-hmacWithSHA3-224 OID ::= { hashAlgs 13 }

   id-hmacWithSHA3-256 OID ::= { hashAlgs 14 }

   id-hmacWithSHA3-384 OID ::= { hashAlgs 15 }

   id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OID ::= { hashAlgs 16 }

   maca-hmacWithSHA3-224 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA3-224
       PARAMS ARE absent
       IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
       SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA3-224 } }

   maca-hmacWithSHA3-256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA3-256
       PARAMS ARE absent
       IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
       SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA3-256 } }

   maca-hmacWithSHA3-384 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA3-384
       PARAMS ARE absent
       IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
       SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA3-384 } }

   maca-hmacWithSHA3-512 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA3-512
       PARAMS ARE absent
       IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
       SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA3-512 } }

   MACAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ MAC-ALGORITHM,
                       { MACAlgorithms } }

   MACAlgorithms MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
       maca-hmacWithSHA3-224 |
       maca-hmacWithSHA3-256 |
       maca-hmacWithSHA3-384 |
       maca-hmacWithSHA3-512,
       ... }


   --
   -- Key Derivation Algorithms
   --

   id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-224 OID ::= { id-alg TBD1 }

   id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-256 OID ::= { id-alg TBD2 }

   id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-384 OID ::= { id-alg TBD3 }

   id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-512 OID ::= { id-alg TBD4 }

   id-kdf-kdf2 OID ::= { x9-44-components kdf2(1) }

   id-kdf-kdf3 OID ::= { x9-44-components kdf3(2) }

   kda-hkdf-with-sha3-224 KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-224
       PARAMS ARE absent
       -- No S/MIME caps defined -- }

   kda-hkdf-with-sha3-256 KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-256
       PARAMS ARE absent
       -- No S/MIME caps defined -- }

   kda-hkdf-with-sha3-384 KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-384
       PARAMS ARE absent
       -- No S/MIME caps defined -- }

   kda-hkdf-with-sha3-512 KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-alg-hkdf-with-sha3-512
       PARAMS ARE absent
       -- No S/MIME caps defined -- }

   kda-kdf2 KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-kdf-kdf2
       PARAMS TYPE KDF2-HashFunction ARE required
       -- No S/MIME caps defined -- }

   kda-kdf3 KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
       IDENTIFIER id-kdf-kdf3
       PARAMS TYPE KDF3-HashFunction ARE required
       -- No S/MIME caps defined -- }

   KDF2-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
                             { KDF2-HashFunctions } }

   KDF2-HashFunctions DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
      X9-HashFunctions,
      ... }

   KDF3-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
                             { KDF3-HashFunctions } }

   KDF3-HashFunctions DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
      X9-HashFunctions,
      ... }

   X9-HashFunctions DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
       mda-sha1 |
       mda-sha224 |
       mda-sha256 |
       mda-sha384 |
       mda-sha512 |
       mda-sha3-224 |
       mda-sha3-256 |
       mda-sha3-384 |
       mda-sha3-512,
       ... }

   KeyDerivationFunction ::=  AlgorithmIdentifier{ KEY-DERIVATION,
                                  { KeyDevAlgs } }

   KeyDevAlgs KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
       kda-hkdf-with-sha3-224 |
       kda-hkdf-with-sha3-256 |
       kda-hkdf-with-sha3-384 |
       kda-hkdf-with-sha3-512 |
       kda-kdf2 |
       kda-kdf3,
       ... }

   END

Author's Address

Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
Herndon, VA,
United States of America