Internet-Draft Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3 November 2020
Whited Expires 22 May 2021 [Page]
Transport Layer Security
5802, 8446 (if approved)
Intended Status:
Standards Track
S. Whited

Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3


This document defines a channel binding type, tls-exporter, that is compatible with TLS 1.3 in accordance with RFC 5056, On Channel Binding.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at

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This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 May 2021.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The channel binding types defined in [RFC5929] were found to be vulnerable to the "triple handshake vulnerability" [TRIPLE-HANDSHAKE] without the extended master secret extension defined in [RFC7627]. Because of this they were not defined for TLS 1.3 (see [RFC8446] section C.5). To facilitate channel binding with TLS 1.3, a new channel binding type is needed.

1.1. Conventions and Terminology

Throughout this document the acronym "EKM" is used to refer to Exported Keying Material as defined in [RFC5705].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. The 'tls-exporter' Channel Binding Type

Channel binding mechanisms are not useful until TLS implementations expose the required data. To facilitate this, "tls-exporter" uses exported keying material (EKM) which is already widely exposed by TLS implementations. The EKM is obtained using the keying material exporters for TLS as defined in [RFC5705] and [RFC8446] section 7.5 by supplying the following inputs:

The ASCII string "EXPORTER-Channel-Binding" with no terminating NUL.
Context value:
Empty context value.
32 bytes.

When TLS renegotiation is enabled the "tls-exporter" channel binding type is not defined and implementations MUST NOT support it.

3. Security Considerations

While it is possible to use this channel binding mechanism with TLS versions below 1.3, extra precaution must be taken to ensure that the chosen cipher suites always result in unique master secrets. For more information see the Security Considerations section of [RFC5705].

The Security Considerations sections of [RFC5056], [RFC5705], and [RFC8446] apply to this document.

4. IANA Considerations

4.1. Registration of Channel Binding Type

This document adds the following registration in the "Channel-Binding Types" registry:

Registration of channel binding tls-exporter
Channel binding unique prefix:
Channel binding type:
Channel type:
TLS [RFC8446]
Published specification:
Channel binding is secret:
The EKM value obtained from the current TLS connection.
Intended usage:
Person and email address to contact for further information:
Sam Whited <>.
Owner/Change controller name and email address:
Expert reviewer name and contact information:
IETF KITTEN or TLS WG ( or, failing that,
See the published specification for advice on the applicability of this channel binding type.

4.2. Registration of Channel Binding TLS Exporter Label

This document adds the following registration in the "TLS Exporter Labels" registry:

This document

5. References

5.1. Normative References

Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <>.
Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, , <>.
Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705, , <>.
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <>.
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, , <>.

5.2. Informative References

Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings for TLS", RFC 5929, DOI 10.17487/RFC5929, , <>.
Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A., Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension", RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, , <>.
Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti, A., and P. Strub, "Password Storage", , <>.

Author's Address

Sam Whited
Atlanta, GA
United States of America