]>
Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash
Functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)Cisco Systemspkampana@cisco.comNIST100 Bureau DriveGaithersburg, MD 20899quynh.Dang@nist.gov
General
LAMPS WGThis document updates the “Cryptographic Message Syntax Algorithms”
(RFC3370) and describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
hash functions in the Cryptographic Message Syntax as one-way hash
functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature
algorithms. The conventions for the
associated signer public keys in CMS are also described. [ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-16:
Minor nits.Using bytes instead of bits for consistency.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-15:
Minor editorial nits.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-14:
Fixing error with incorrect preimage resistance bits for SHA128 and SHA256.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-13:
Addressing comments from Dan M.'s secdir review.Addressing comment from Scott B.'s opsdir review about references in the abstract.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-12:
Nits identified by Roman, Barry L. in ballot position review.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-11:
Minor nits.Nits identified by Roman in AD Review.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-10:
Updated IANA considerations section to request for OID assignments. draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-09:
Fixed minor text nit.Updates in Sec Considerations section.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-08:
id-shake128-len and id-shake256-len were replaced with id-sha128 with 32 bytes output length and id-shake256 with 64 bytes output length.Fixed a discrepancy between section 3 and 4.4 about the KMAC OIDs that have parameters as optional. draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-07:
Small nit from Russ while in WGLC.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-06:
Incorporated Eric's suggestion from WGLC.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-05:
Added informative references.Updated ASN.1 so it compiles.Updated IANA considerations.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-04:
Added RFC8174 reference and text. Explicitly explained why RSASSA-PSS-params are omitted in section 4.2.1.Simplified Public Keys section by removing redundant info from RFCs.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-03:
Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in Deterministic ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis. Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about randomness of k because we are using deterministic ECDSA.Completed ASN.1 module and fixed KMAC ASN.1 based on Jim's feedback.Text fixes.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-02:
Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim. Started ASN.1 module.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-01:
Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the introduction, the new OIDs and their use in CMS.Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcodes hash, salt and MGF, according the WG consensus.Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and clarify the algorithm identifier usage.Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-00:
Various updates to title and section names.Content changes filling in text and references.draft-dang-lamps-cms-shakes-hash-00:
Initial versionThe "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)" is used to
digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents.
"Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms"
defines the use of common cryptographic algorithms with CMS. This
specification updates RFC3370 and describes the use of the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
specified in as new hash functions in CMS. In addition,
it describes the use of these functions with the RSASSA-PSS signature
algorithm and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) with the CMS signed-data content type.In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs), SHAKE128 and SHAKE256,
are defined. Four other hash function instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, are also defined but are out of scope for this document.
A SHAKE is a variable length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the
output is a d-bits-long digest of message M. The corresponding collision and second-preimage-resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) bits,
respectively (Appendix A.1 ). And the
corresponding collision and second-preimage-resistance
strengths for SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits, respectively.
In this specification we use d=256 (for SHAKE128) and d=512 (for SHAKE256).A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash the
message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA, message
authentication code and as the mask generation function (MGF) in RSASSA-PSS.
This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs to be used in
CMS and their meaning. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14
when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.This section identifies eight new object identifiers (OIDs)
for using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in CMS.Two object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are defined
in and we include them here for convenience.In this specification, when using the id-shake128 or id-shake256 algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent. That is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
[ EDNOTE: Update reference with the RFC when it is ready ]
defines two identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs which we include here for
convenience.The same RSASSA-PSS algorithm identifiers can be used for identifying
public keys and signatures.
[ EDNOTE: Update reference with the RFC when it is ready ]
also defines two algorithm
identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs which we include here for
convenience.The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers
MUST be absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component,
the OID.Two object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as
defined in by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
in
[EDNOTE: Make sure NIST has published these. ]
and we include them here for convenience.The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 are OPTIONAL., ,
and specify the required output length for each use
of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in message digests, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA
and KMAC.The id-shake128 and id-shake256 OIDs () can
be used as the digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData,
SignerInfo, DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm fields
in CMS . The OID encoding MUST omit the parameters field and the output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the message digest MUST be 32 or 64 bytes, respectively.The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the Message
Digest authenticated attribute included in the signedAttributes of the
SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest values are input to
signature algorithms. The digest algorithm MUST be the same as the
message hash algorithms used in signatures.In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and countersignature attribute.
Signature values are located in the SignerInfo signature field of
SignedData content type and countersignature attribute.Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and
ECDSA with SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize the
corresponding OIDs specified in .When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus or ECDSA
curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length. Refer to for more details.The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in .
When id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in
is used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is,
the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component,
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.
defines RSASSA-PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs
to the algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the
hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer and salt are embedded in
the OID definition.The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be
the same: both SHAKE128 or both SHAKE256. The output length of
the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 (for SHAKE128)
or 64 bytes (for SHAKE256). The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be
used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that
uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in
Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as
the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with input being the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-
SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, respectively. The mgfSeed is the seed
from which mask is generated, an octet string .
As explained in Step 9 of section 9.1.1 of , the output
length of the MGF is emLen - hLen - 1 bytes. emLen is the maximum message
length ceil((n-1)/8), where n is the RSA modulus in bits. hLen is 32 and
64-bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, respectively.
Thus when SHAKE is used as the MGF, the SHAKE output length maskLen is
(8*emLen - 264) or (8*emLen - 520) bits, respectively. For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048,
the output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 1784 or 1528-bits
when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used, respectively.The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
or 64 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.
Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
field with hexadecimal value 0xBC .The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
. When the id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256
(specified in ) algorithm identifier appears, the
respective SHAKE function is used as the hash.
The encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier
SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or
id-ecdsa-with-shake256.For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
The output length for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be 32
or 64 bytes, respectively. Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE signatures
in certificates or CRLs SHOULD generate such signatures with a
deterministically generated, non-random k in accordance with all
the requirements specified in .
They MAY also generate such signatures
in accordance with all other recommendations in or
if they have a stated policy that requires
conformance to those standards. Those standards have not specified
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and
SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 octets, respectively can
be used instead of 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as SHA256
and SHA512.In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in the
OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute.
The conventions and encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA
public keys algorithm identifiers are as specified in
Section 2.3 of ,
Section 3.1 of
and Section 2.1 of .
Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to
identify RSA public keys. The rsaEncryption object identifier
continues to identify the public key when the RSA private
key owner does not wish to limit the use of the public key
exclusively to RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs. When the RSA private key
owner wishes to limit the use of the public key exclusively
to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifier for RSASSA-PSS defined
in SHOULD be used as the algorithm attribute
in the OriginatorPublicKey sequence. Conforming client
implementations that process RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE public keys
in CMS message MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs in .Conforming implementations MUST specify and process the
algorithms explicitly by using the OIDs specified in
when encoding ECDSA with SHAKE
public keys in CMS messages. The identifier parameters, as explained in ,
MUST be absent. KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in .
In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the AuthenticatedData
macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in the AuthenticatedData mac field.When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OID
is used as the MAC algorithm identifier, the parameters field is optional
(absent or present). If absent, the SHAKE256 output length used in KMAC is
32 or 64 bytes, respectively, and the customization string is an empty string by default.Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs
when processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers.When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S
is an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output
length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or KmacWithSHAKE256,
respectively, in this specification.One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in
was requested for the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifiers
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry: DecimalDescriptionReferencesTBDCMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019[EDNOTE: THIS RFC]This document updates . The security considerations
section of that document applies to this specification as well.NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of the algorithm
strengths and expected time frames for secure use in Special Publications (SPs)
and .
These documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes
for various security scenarios. SHAKE128 with output length of 32 bytes offers 128-bits of collision and preimage resistance. Thus, SHAKE128 OIDs in this specification are RECOMMENDED with 2048 (112-bit security) or 3072-bit (128-bit security) RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256-bits (128-bit security). SHAKE256 with 64 bytes output length offers 256-bits of collision and preimage resistance. Thus, the SHAKE256 OIDs in this specification are RECOMMENDED with 4096-bit RSA modulus or higher or curves with group order of at least 512 bits such as NIST Curve P-521 (256-bit security). Note that we recommended 4096-bit RSA because we would need 15360-bit modulus for 256-bits of security which is impractical for today's technology.When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the
message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the
content could originate from any one of the parties.This document is based on Russ Housley's draft
.
It replaces SHA3 hash functions by SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as the LAMPS
WG agreed.The authors would like to thank Russ Housley for his guidance and
very valuable contributions with the ASN.1 module. Valuable
feedback was also provided by Eric Rescorla.
&RFC2119;
&RFC3370;
&RFC8174;
&RFC5652;
&RFC8017;
&RFC4055;
&RFC5480;
SHA-3 Standard - Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output FunctionsNational Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of CommerceSHA-3 Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and ParallelHash. NIST SP 800-185National Institute of Standards and Technology
&RFC3279;
&RFC5753;
&RFC5911;
&RFC6268;
&RFC6979;
&I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake;
Computer Security Objects RegisterNational Institute of Standards and TechnologyX9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Standard (ECDSA)American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI)SP800-78-4: Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity VerificationNational Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)SP800-107: Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash AlgorithmsNational Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)SEC 1: Elliptic Curve CryptographyStandards for Efficient Cryptography GroupThis appendix includes the ASN.1 modules for SHAKEs in CMS.
This module includes some ASN.1 from other standards for reference.