Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography
Watsen Networks
kent+ietf@watsen.net
Huawei
wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com
Operations
NETCONF Working Group
This document defines YANG identities, typedefs, the groupings
useful for cryptographic applications.
This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced
with finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes
all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor
instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.
Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
progress. Please apply the following replacements:
XXXX --> the assigned RFC value for this draft
Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date
of publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:
2019-06-07 --> the publication date of this draft
The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:
Appendix B. Change Log
This document defines a YANG 1.1 module
specifying identities, typedefs, and groupings useful for cryptography.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14
when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
This section provides a tree diagram for
the "ietf-crypto-types" module. Only the groupings as represented,
as tree diagrams have no means to represent identities or typedefs.
This module has normative references to ,
, , ,
, , ,
, , ,
, , ,
, , ,
, , ,
, , and .
This module has an informational reference to ,
, , ,
, , ,
, , ,
.
file "ietf-crypto-types@2019-06-07.yang"
module ietf-crypto-types {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types";
prefix ct;
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}
import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm;
reference
"RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web:
WG List:
Author: Kent Watsen
Author: Wang Haiguang ";
description
"This module defines common YANG types for cryptographic
applications.
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices.;
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2019-06-07 {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
}
/****************/
/* Features */
/****************/
feature generate-key {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the configuration
private key values using the 'value-to-be-generated'
prefix.";
}
feature hidden-key {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the configuration
of hidden private keys, whether by the using the
'value-to-be-generated-and-hidden' value or the
'value-to-be-hidden' prefix.";
}
/**************************************/
/* Identities for Hash Algorithms */
/**************************************/
identity hash-algorithm {
description
"A base identity for hash algorithm verification.";
}
identity sha-224 {
base hash-algorithm;
description
"The SHA-224 algorithm.";
reference
"RFC 6234: US Secure Hash Algorithms.";
}
identity sha-256 {
base hash-algorithm;
description
"The SHA-256 algorithm.";
reference
"RFC 6234: US Secure Hash Algorithms.";
}
identity sha-384 {
base hash-algorithm;
description
"The SHA-384 algorithm.";
reference
"RFC 6234: US Secure Hash Algorithms.";
}
identity sha-512 {
base hash-algorithm;
description
"The SHA-512 algorithm.";
reference
"RFC 6234: US Secure Hash Algorithms.";
}
/***********************************************/
/* Identities for Asymmetric Key Algorithms */
/***********************************************/
identity asymmetric-key-algorithm {
description
"Base identity from which all asymmetric key
encryption Algorithm.";
}
identity rsa1024 {
base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 1024-bit key.";
reference
"RFC 8017:
PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
}
identity rsa2048 {
base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 2048-bit key.";
reference
"RFC 8017:
PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
}
identity rsa3072 {
base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 3072-bit key.";
reference
"RFC 8017:
PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
}
identity rsa4096 {
base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 4096-bit key.";
reference
"RFC 8017:
PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
}
identity rsa7680 {
base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 7680-bit key.";
reference
"RFC 8017:
PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
}
identity rsa15360 {
base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 15360-bit key.";
reference
"RFC 8017:
PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
}
identity secp192r1 {
base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
description
"The ECDSA algorithm using a NIST P192 Curve.";
reference
"RFC 6090:
Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms.
RFC 5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
identity secp224r1 {
base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
description
"The ECDSA algorithm using a NIST P224 Curve.";
reference
"RFC 6090:
Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms.
RFC 5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
identity secp256r1 {
base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
description
"The ECDSA algorithm using a NIST P256 Curve.";
reference
"RFC 6090:
Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms.
RFC 5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
identity secp384r1 {
base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
description
"The ECDSA algorithm using a NIST P384 Curve.";
reference
"RFC 6090:
Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms.
RFC 5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
identity secp521r1 {
base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
description
"The ECDSA algorithm using a NIST P521 Curve.";
reference
"RFC 6090:
Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms.
RFC 5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
/*************************************/
/* Identities for MAC Algorithms */
/*************************************/
identity mac-algorithm {
description
"A base identity for mac generation.";
}
identity hmac-sha1 {
base mac-algorithm;
description
"Generating MAC using SHA1 hash function";
reference
"RFC 3174: US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)";
}
identity hmac-sha1-96 {
base mac-algorithm;
description
"Generating MAC using SHA1 hash function";
reference
"RFC 2404: The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH";
}
identity hmac-sha2-224 {
base mac-algorithm;
description
"Generating MAC using SHA2 hash function";
reference
"RFC 6234:
US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and
HKDF)";
}
identity hmac-sha2-256 {
base mac-algorithm;
description
"Generating MAC using SHA2 hash function";
reference
"RFC 6234:
US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and
HKDF)";
}
identity hmac-sha2-256-128 {
base mac-algorithm;
description
"Generating a 256 bits MAC using SHA2 hash function and
truncate it to 128 bits";
reference
"RFC 4868:
Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512
with IPsec";
}
identity hmac-sha2-384 {
base mac-algorithm;
description
"Generating MAC using SHA2 hash function";
reference
"RFC 6234:
US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and
HKDF)";
}
identity hmac-sha2-384-192 {
base mac-algorithm;
description
"Generating a 384 bits MAC using SHA2 hash function and
truncate it to 192 bits";
reference
"RFC 4868:
Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with
IPsec";
}
identity hmac-sha2-512 {
base mac-algorithm;
description
"Generating MAC using SHA2 hash function";
reference
"RFC 6234:
US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and
HKDF)";
}
identity hmac-sha2-512-256 {
base mac-algorithm;
description
"Generating a 512 bits MAC using SHA2 hash function and
truncating it to 256 bits";
reference
"RFC 4868:
Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with
IPsec";
}
identity aes-128-gmac {
base mac-algorithm;
description
"Generating MAC using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) as a mechanism to
provide data origin authentication";
reference
"RFC 4543:
The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in
IPsec ESP and AH";
}
identity aes-192-gmac {
base mac-algorithm;
description
"Generating MAC using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) as a mechanism to
provide data origin authentication";
reference
"RFC 4543:
The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in
IPsec ESP and AH";
}
identity aes-256-gmac {
base mac-algorithm;
description
"Generating MAC using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) as a mechanism to
provide data origin authentication";
reference
"RFC 4543:
The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in
IPsec ESP and AH";
}
identity aes-cmac-96 {
base mac-algorithm;
description
"Generating MAC using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)";
reference
"RFC 4494: The AES-CMAC-96 Algorithm and its Use with IPsec";
}
identity aes-cmac-128 {
base mac-algorithm;
description
"Generating MAC using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)";
reference
"RFC 4493: The AES-CMAC Algorithm";
}
/********************************************/
/* Identities for Encryption Algorithms */
/********************************************/
identity encryption-algorithm {
description
"A base identity for encryption algorithm.";
}
identity aes-128-cbc {
base encryption-algorithm;
description
"Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CBC mode with a key
length of 128 bits";
reference
"RFC 3565:
Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Encryption
Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
identity aes-192-cbc {
base encryption-algorithm;
description
"Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CBC mode with a key
length of 192 bits";
reference
"RFC 3565:
Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Encryption
Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
identity aes-256-cbc {
base encryption-algorithm;
description
"Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CBC mode with a key
length of 256 bits";
reference
"RFC 3565:
Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Encryption
Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
identity aes-128-ctr {
base encryption-algorithm;
description
"Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CTR mode with a key
length of 128 bits";
reference
"RFC 3686:
Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode with
IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)";
}
identity aes-192-ctr {
base encryption-algorithm;
description
"Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CTR mode with a key
length of 192 bits";
reference
"RFC 3686:
Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode with
IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)";
}
identity aes-256-ctr {
base encryption-algorithm;
description
"Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CTR mode with a key
length of 256 bits";
reference
"RFC 3686:
Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode with
IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)";
}
/****************************************************/
/* Identities for Encryption and MAC Algorithms */
/****************************************************/
identity encryption-and-mac-algorithm {
description
"A base identity for encryption and MAC algorithm.";
}
identity aes-128-ccm {
base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
description
"Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CCM mode with a key
length of 128 bits; it can also be used for generating MAC";
reference
"RFC 4309:
Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM Mode with
IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)";
}
identity aes-192-ccm {
base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
description
"Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CCM mode with a key
length of 192 bits; it can also be used for generating MAC";
reference
"RFC 4309:
Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM Mode with
IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)";
}
identity aes-256-ccm {
base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
description
"Encrypt message with AES algorithm in CCM mode with a key
length of 256 bits; it can also be used for generating MAC";
reference
"RFC 4309:
Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM Mode with
IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)";
}
identity aes-128-gcm {
base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
description
"Encrypt message with AES algorithm in GCM mode with a key
length of 128 bits; it can also be used for generating MAC";
reference
"RFC 4106:
The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP)";
}
identity aes-192-gcm {
base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
description
"Encrypt message with AES algorithm in GCM mode with a key
length of 192 bits; it can also be used for generating MAC";
reference
"RFC 4106:
The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP)";
}
identity mac-aes-256-gcm {
base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
description
"Encrypt message with AES algorithm in GCM mode with a key
length of 128 bits; it can also be used for generating MAC";
reference
"RFC 4106:
The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP)";
}
identity chacha20-poly1305 {
base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
description
"Encrypt message with chacha20 algorithm and generate MAC with
POLY1305; it can also be used for generating MAC";
reference
"RFC 8439: ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols";
}
/******************************************/
/* Identities for signature algorithm */
/******************************************/
identity signature-algorithm {
description
"A base identity for asymmetric key encryption algorithm.";
}
identity dsa-sha1 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using DSA algorithm with SHA1 hash
algorithm";
reference
"RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity rsassa-pkcs1-sha1 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with the SHA1
hash algorithm.";
reference
"RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity rsassa-pkcs1-sha256 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with the
SHA256 hash algorithm.";
reference
"RFC 8332:
Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 in the Secure Shell
(SSH) Protocol
RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity rsassa-pkcs1-sha384 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with the
SHA384 hash algorithm.";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity rsassa-pkcs1-sha512 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with the
SHA512 hash algorithm.";
reference
"RFC 8332:
Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 in the Secure Shell
(SSH) Protocol
RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity rsassa-pss-rsae-sha256 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PSS with mask generation
function 1 and SHA256 hash algorithm. If the public key is
carried in an X.509 certificate, it MUST use the rsaEncryption
OID";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity rsassa-pss-rsae-sha384 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PSS with mask generation
function 1 and SHA384 hash algorithm. If the public key is
carried in an X.509 certificate, it MUST use the rsaEncryption
OID";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity rsassa-pss-rsae-sha512 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PSS with mask generation
function 1 and SHA512 hash algorithm. If the public key is
carried in an X.509 certificate, it MUST use the rsaEncryption
OID";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity rsassa-pss-pss-sha256 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PSS with mask generation
function 1 and SHA256 hash algorithm. If the public key is
carried in an X.509 certificate, it MUST use the RSASSA-PSS
OID";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity rsassa-pss-pss-sha384 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PSS with mask generation
function 1 and SHA256 hash algorithm. If the public key is
carried in an X.509 certificate, it MUST use the RSASSA-PSS
OID";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity rsassa-pss-pss-sha512 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using RSASSA-PSS with mask generation
function 1 and SHA256 hash algorithm. If the public key is
carried in an X.509 certificate, it MUST use the RSASSA-PSS
OID";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity ecdsa-secp256r1-sha256 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using ECDSA with curve name secp256r1
and SHA256 hash algorithm.";
reference
"RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
Secure Shell Transport Layer
RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity ecdsa-secp384r1-sha384 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using ECDSA with curve name secp384r1
and SHA384 hash algorithm.";
reference
"RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
Secure Shell Transport Layer
RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity ecdsa-secp521r1-sha512 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using ECDSA with curve name secp521r1
and SHA512 hash algorithm.";
reference
"RFC 5656: Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
Secure Shell Transport Layer
RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity ed25519 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using EdDSA as defined in RFC 8032 or
its successors.";
reference
"RFC 8032: Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)";
}
identity ed448 {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using EdDSA as defined in RFC 8032 or
its successors.";
reference
"RFC 8032: Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)";
}
identity eccsi {
base signature-algorithm;
description
"The signature algorithm using ECCSI signature as defined in
RFC 6507.";
reference
"RFC 6507:
Elliptic Curve-Based Certificateless Signatures for
Identity-based Encryption (ECCSI)";
}
/**********************************************/
/* Identities for key exchange algorithms */
/**********************************************/
identity key-exchange-algorithm {
description
"A base identity for Diffie-Hellman based key exchange
algorithm.";
}
identity psk-only {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Using Pre-shared key for authentication and key exchange";
reference
"RFC 4279:
Pre-Shared Key cipher suites for Transport Layer Security
(TLS)";
}
identity dhe-ffdhe2048 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with 2048 bit
finite field";
reference
"RFC 7919:
Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
identity dhe-ffdhe3072 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with 3072 bit finite
field";
reference
"RFC 7919:
Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
identity dhe-ffdhe4096 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with 4096 bit
finite field";
reference
"RFC 7919:
Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
identity dhe-ffdhe6144 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with 6144 bit
finite field";
reference
"RFC 7919:
Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
identity dhe-ffdhe8192 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with 8192 bit
finite field";
reference
"RFC 7919:
Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
identity psk-dhe-ffdhe2048 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Key exchange using pre-shared key with Diffie-Hellman key
generation mechanism, where the DH group is FFDHE2048";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity psk-dhe-ffdhe3072 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Key exchange using pre-shared key with Diffie-Hellman key
generation mechanism, where the DH group is FFDHE3072";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity psk-dhe-ffdhe4096 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Key exchange using pre-shared key with Diffie-Hellman key
generation mechanism, where the DH group is FFDHE4096";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity psk-dhe-ffdhe6144 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Key exchange using pre-shared key with Diffie-Hellman key
generation mechanism, where the DH group is FFDHE6144";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity psk-dhe-ffdhe8192 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Key exchange using pre-shared key with Diffie-Hellman key
generation mechanism, where the DH group is FFDHE8192";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity ecdhe-secp256r1 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with elliptic group
over curve secp256r1";
reference
"RFC 8422:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier";
}
identity ecdhe-secp384r1 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with elliptic group
over curve secp384r1";
reference
"RFC 8422:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier";
}
identity ecdhe-secp521r1 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with elliptic group
over curve secp521r1";
reference
"RFC 8422:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier";
}
identity ecdhe-x25519 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with elliptic group
over curve x25519";
reference
"RFC 8422:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier";
}
identity ecdhe-x448 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange with elliptic group
over curve x448";
reference
"RFC 8422:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier";
}
identity psk-ecdhe-secp256r1 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Key exchange using pre-shared key with elliptic group-based
Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange over curve secp256r1";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity psk-ecdhe-secp384r1 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Key exchange using pre-shared key with elliptic group-based
Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange over curve secp384r1";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity psk-ecdhe-secp521r1 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Key exchange using pre-shared key with elliptic group-based
Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange over curve secp521r1";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity psk-ecdhe-x25519 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Key exchange using pre-shared key with elliptic group-based
Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange over curve x25519";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity psk-ecdhe-x448 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Key exchange using pre-shared key with elliptic group-based
Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange over curve x448";
reference
"RFC 8446:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3";
}
identity diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Using DH group14 and SHA1 for key exchange";
reference
"RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Using DH group14 and SHA256 for key exchange";
reference
"RFC 8268:
More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman (DH)
Key Exchange (KEX) Groups for Secure Shell (SSH)";
}
identity diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Using DH group15 and SHA512 for key exchange";
reference
"RFC 8268:
More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman (DH)
Key Exchange (KEX) Groups for Secure Shell (SSH)";
}
identity diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Using DH group16 and SHA512 for key exchange";
reference
"RFC 8268:
More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman (DH)
Key Exchange (KEX) Groups for Secure Shell (SSH)";
}
identity diffie-hellman-group17-sha512 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Using DH group17 and SHA512 for key exchange";
reference
"RFC 8268:
More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman (DH)
Key Exchange (KEX) Groups for Secure Shell (SSH)";
}
identity diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Using DH group18 and SHA512 for key exchange";
reference
"RFC 8268:
More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman (DH)
Key Exchange (KEX) Groups for Secure Shell (SSH)";
}
identity ecdh-sha2-secp256r1 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Elliptic curve-based Diffie Hellman key exchange over curve
secp256r1 and using SHA2 for MAC generation";
reference
"RFC 6239: Suite B Cryptographic Suites for Secure Shell
(SSH)";
}
identity ecdh-sha2-secp384r1 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"Elliptic curve-based Diffie Hellman key exchange over curve
secp384r1 and using SHA2 for MAC generation";
reference
"RFC 6239: Suite B Cryptographic Suites for Secure Shell
(SSH)";
}
identity rsaes-oaep {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
"RSAES-OAEP combines the RSAEP and RSADP primitives with the
EME-OAEP encoding method";
reference
"RFC 8017:
PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
}
identity rsaes-pkcs1-v1_5 {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
description
" RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 combines the RSAEP and RSADP primitives
with the EME-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method";
reference
"RFC 8017:
PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.";
}
/**********************************************************/
/* Typedefs for identityrefs to above base identities */
/**********************************************************/
typedef hash-algorithm-ref {
type identityref {
base hash-algorithm;
}
description
"This typedef enables importing modules to easily define an
identityref to the 'hash-algorithm' base identity.";
}
typedef signature-algorithm-ref {
type identityref {
base signature-algorithm;
}
description
"This typedef enables importing modules to easily define an
identityref to the 'signature-algorithm' base identity.";
}
typedef mac-algorithm-ref {
type identityref {
base mac-algorithm;
}
description
"This typedef enables importing modules to easily define an
identityref to the 'mac-algorithm' base identity.";
}
typedef encryption-algorithm-ref {
type identityref {
base encryption-algorithm;
}
description
"This typedef enables importing modules to easily define an
identityref to the 'encryption-algorithm'
base identity.";
}
typedef encryption-and-mac-algorithm-ref {
type identityref {
base encryption-and-mac-algorithm;
}
description
"This typedef enables importing modules to easily define an
identityref to the 'encryption-and-mac-algorithm'
base identity.";
}
typedef asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref {
type identityref {
base asymmetric-key-algorithm;
}
description
"This typedef enables importing modules to easily define an
identityref to the 'asymmetric-key-algorithm'
base identity.";
}
typedef key-exchange-algorithm-ref {
type identityref {
base key-exchange-algorithm;
}
description
"This typedef enables importing modules to easily define an
identityref to the 'key-exchange-algorithm' base identity.";
}
/***************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 5280 */
/***************************************************/
typedef x509 {
type binary;
description
"A Certificate structure, as specified in RFC 5280,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
typedef crl {
type binary;
description
"A CertificateList structure, as specified in RFC 5280,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
/***********************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from 5652 */
/***********************************************/
typedef cms {
type binary;
description
"A ContentInfo structure, as specified in RFC 5652,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5652:
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
typedef data-content-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
data content type, as described by Section 4 in RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef signed-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
signed-data content type, as described by Section 5 in
RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef enveloped-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
enveloped-data content type, as described by Section 6
in RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef digested-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
digested-data content type, as described by Section 7
in RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef encrypted-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
encrypted-data content type, as described by Section 8
in RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef authenticated-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
authenticated-data content type, as described by Section 9
in RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
/***************************************************/
/* Typedefs for structures related to RFC 4253 */
/***************************************************/
typedef ssh-host-key {
type binary;
description
"The binary public key data for this SSH key, as
specified by RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.:
string certificate or public key format
identifier
byte[n] key/certificate data.";
reference
"RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
Protocol";
}
/*********************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures related to RFC 5280 */
/*********************************************************/
typedef trust-anchor-cert-x509 {
type x509;
description
"A Certificate structure that MUST encode a self-signed
root certificate.";
}
typedef end-entity-cert-x509 {
type x509;
description
"A Certificate structure that MUST encode a certificate
that is neither self-signed nor having Basic constraint
CA true.";
}
/*********************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures related to RFC 5652 */
/*********************************************************/
typedef trust-anchor-cert-cms {
type signed-data-cms;
description
"A CMS SignedData structure that MUST contain the chain of
X.509 certificates needed to authenticate the certificate
presented by a client or end-entity.
The CMS MUST contain only a single chain of certificates.
The client or end-entity certificate MUST only authenticate
to last intermediate CA certificate listed in the chain.
In all cases, the chain MUST include a self-signed root
certificate. In the case where the root certificate is
itself the issuer of the client or end-entity certificate,
only one certificate is present.
This CMS structure MAY (as applicable where this type is
used) also contain suitably fresh (as defined by local
policy) revocation objects with which the device can
verify the revocation status of the certificates.
This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData
structure that is commonly used to disseminate X.509
certificates and revocation objects (RFC 5280).";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.";
}
typedef end-entity-cert-cms {
type signed-data-cms;
description
"A CMS SignedData structure that MUST contain the end
entity certificate itself, and MAY contain any number
of intermediate certificates leading up to a trust
anchor certificate. The trust anchor certificate
MAY be included as well.
The CMS MUST contain a single end entity certificate.
The CMS MUST NOT contain any spurious certificates.
This CMS structure MAY (as applicable where this type is
used) also contain suitably fresh (as defined by local
policy) revocation objects with which the device can
verify the revocation status of the certificates.
This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData
structure that is commonly used to disseminate X.509
certificates and revocation objects (RFC 5280).";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.";
}
/**********************************************/
/* Groupings for keys and/or certificates */
/**********************************************/
grouping public-key-grouping {
description
"A public key and its associated algorithm.";
leaf algorithm {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the key's algorithm.";
reference
"RFC CCCC: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
}
leaf public-key {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"The binary value of the public key. The interpretation of
the value is defined by 'algorithm'. For example, a DSA
key is an integer, an RSA key is represented as RSAPublicKey
per RFC 8017, and an ECC key is represented using the
'publicKey' described in RFC 5915.";
reference
"RFC 8017: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.
RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
}
}
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping {
description
"A private key and its associated public key and algorithm.";
uses public-key-grouping;
leaf private-key {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type union {
type binary;
type string {
pattern
'permanently-hidden'
+ '|encrypted-by:.*:[A-Za-z0-9+/]+[=]{1,3}'
+ '|value-to-be-generated(-and-hidden)?'
+ '|value-to-be-hidden:[A-Za-z0-9+/]+[=]{1,3}';
}
}
mandatory true;
description
"Either the binary value of the private key or a value
indentifing special input and output values described
below. The key's value is interpreted by the 'algorithm'.
For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA key is
represented as RSAPrivateKey as defined in RFC 8017, and
an ECC key is represented as ECPrivateKey as defined in
RFC 5915.
Special input and output values:
permanently-hidden
Primarily an output value indicating that the private
key value is not available in any form. The only time
this value MAY be used as a input value is when it is
being used to copy a manufacturer-generated value from
to .
encrypted-by:*:[A-Za-z0-9+/]+[=]{1,3}
Primarily an output value indicating that the private
key is encrypted using another key, identified by the
'by' attribute. The only time this value MAY be used
as a input value is when it is being used to copy a
manufacturer-generated value from to
. Following the prefix is the base64-encoded
value of the encrypted private key.
value-to-be-generated(-and-hidden)?
An input value used to request the system to generate,
and optionally hide, the public/private key pair. When
used, the 'public-key' value MUST be empty (zero bytes).
Without the optional '-and-hidden' postfix, the generated
key pair is stored in the configuration data store as if
the values had been configured by the client.
With the optional '-and-hidden' postfix, the generated
key pair is 'hidden' and thereafter be reported using
either 'permanently-hidden' or 'encrypted-by:*:'.
The server's support for 'value-to-be-generated' input
value is known by the 'generate-key' feature, and the
server's support for 'value-to-be-generated-and-hidden'
value is known by the combination of both the 'generate-
key' and 'hidden-key' features.
value-to-be-hidden:[A-Za-z0-9+/]+[=]{1,3}
An input value used to request the system to store the
provided private key such that it will thereafter be
reported using either as 'permanently-hidden' or
'encrypted-by:*:'. Following the prefix is the
base64-encoded value of the private key.
The server's support for 'value-to-be-hidden' input
value is known by the 'hidden-key' feature.";
reference
"RFC 8017: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2.
RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
}
}
grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping {
description
"A trust anchor certificate, and a notification for when
it is about to (or already has) expire.";
leaf cert {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type trust-anchor-cert-cms;
description
"The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
reference
"RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
}
notification certificate-expiration {
description
"A notification indicating that the configured certificate
is either about to expire or has already expired. When to
send notifications is an implementation specific decision,
but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a
month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and
then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved.";
leaf expiration-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
}
}
}
grouping trust-anchor-certs-grouping {
description
"A list of trust anchor certificates, and a notification
for when one is about to (or already has) expire.";
leaf-list cert {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type trust-anchor-cert-cms;
description
"The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
reference
"RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
}
notification certificate-expiration {
description
"A notification indicating that the configured certificate
is either about to expire or has already expired. When to
send notifications is an implementation specific decision,
but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a
month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and
then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved.";
leaf expiration-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
}
}
}
grouping end-entity-cert-grouping {
description
"An end entity certificate, and a notification for when
it is about to (or already has) expire. Implementations
SHOULD assert that, where used, the end entity certificate
contains the expected public key.";
leaf cert {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type end-entity-cert-cms;
description
"The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
reference
"RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
}
notification certificate-expiration {
description
"A notification indicating that the configured certificate
is either about to expire or has already expired. When to
send notifications is an implementation specific decision,
but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a
month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and
then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved.";
leaf expiration-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
}
}
}
grouping end-entity-certs-grouping {
description
"A list of end entity certificates, and a notification for
when one is about to (or already has) expire.";
leaf-list cert {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type end-entity-cert-cms;
description
"The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
reference
"RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
}
notification certificate-expiration {
description
"A notification indicating that the configured certificate
is either about to expire or has already expired. When to
send notifications is an implementation specific decision,
but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a
month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and
then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved.";
leaf expiration-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
}
}
}
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping {
description
"A private/public key pair and an associated certificate.
Implementations SHOULD assert that certificates contain
the matching public key.";
uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
uses end-entity-cert-grouping;
action generate-certificate-signing-request {
nacm:default-deny-all;
description
"Generates a certificate signing request structure for
the associated asymmetric key using the passed subject
and attribute values. The specified assertions need
to be appropriate for the certificate's use. For
example, an entity certificate for a TLS server
SHOULD have values that enable clients to satisfy
RFC 6125 processing.";
input {
leaf subject {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"The 'subject' field per the CertificationRequestInfo
structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1
encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding
rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
leaf attributes {
type binary; // FIXME: does this need to be mandatory?
description
"The 'attributes' field from the structure
CertificationRequestInfo as specified by RFC 2986,
Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
output {
leaf certificate-signing-request {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"A CertificationRequest structure as specified by
RFC 2986, Section 4.2 encoded using the ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
} // generate-certificate-signing-request
} // asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping {
description
"A private/public key pair and associated certificates.
Implementations SHOULD assert that certificates contain
the matching public key.";
uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
container certificates {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description
"Certificates associated with this asymmetric key.
More than one certificate supports, for instance,
a TPM-protected asymmetric key that has both IDevID
and LDevID certificates associated.";
list certificate {
key "name";
description
"A certificate for this asymmetric key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the certificate. If the name
matches the name of a certificate that exists
independently in (i.e., an IDevID),
then the 'cert' node MUST NOT be configured.";
}
uses end-entity-cert-grouping;
}
} // certificates
action generate-certificate-signing-request {
nacm:default-deny-all;
description
"Generates a certificate signing request structure for
the associated asymmetric key using the passed subject
and attribute values. The specified assertions need
to be appropriate for the certificate's use. For
example, an entity certificate for a TLS server
SHOULD have values that enable clients to satisfy
RFC 6125 processing.";
input {
leaf subject {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"The 'subject' field per the CertificationRequestInfo
structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1
encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding
rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
leaf attributes {
type binary; // FIXME: does this need to be mandatory?
description
"The 'attributes' field from the structure
CertificationRequestInfo as specified by RFC 2986,
Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
output {
leaf certificate-signing-request {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"A CertificationRequest structure as specified by
RFC 2986, Section 4.2 encoded using the ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
} // generate-certificate-signing-request
} // asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
}
]]>
In order to use YANG identities for algorithm identifiers, only
the most commonly used RSA key lengths are supported for the RSA
algorithm. Additional key lengths can be defined in another module
or added into a future version of this document.
This document limits the number of elliptical curves supported.
This was done to match industry trends and IETF best practice (e.g.,
matching work being done in TLS 1.3). If additional algorithms are
needed, they can be defined by another module or added into a future
version of this document.
This document uses PKCS #10 for the
"generate-certificate-signing-request" action. The use of Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF) was considered,
but is was unclear if there was market demand for it. If it is desired
to support CRMF in the future, a backwards compatible solution can be
defined at that time.
The YANG module in this document defines "grouping" statements
that are designed to be accessed via YANG based management
protocols, such as NETCONF and RESTCONF
. Both of these protocols have
mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS)
with mutual authentication.
The NETCONF access control model (NACM)
provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a
pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and
content.
Since the module in this document only define groupings,
these considerations are primarily for the designers of other
modules that use these groupings.
There are a number of data nodes defined by the grouping
statements that are writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config
true, which is the default). Some of these data nodes may be
considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments.
Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes
without proper protection can have a negative effect on
network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes
and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
All of the data nodes defined by
all the groupings are considered sensitive to write
operations. For instance, the modification of a
public key or a certificate can dramatically alter
the implemented security policy. For this reason,
the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been
applied to all the data nodes defined by all the
groupings.
Some of the readable data nodes in the YANG module may
be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network
environments. It is thus important to control read access
(e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these
data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes and
their sensitivity/vulnerability:
The "private-key" node
defined in the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping
is additionally sensitive to read operations such that,
in normal use cases, it should never be returned to a
client. For this reason, the NACM extension
"default-deny-all" has been applied to it here.
Some of the operations in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is
thus important to control access to these operations. These
are the operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
All of the "action" statements defined by
groupings SHOULD only be executed by authorized users. For
this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-all" has been
applied to all of them. Note that NACM uses "default-deny-all"
to protect "RPC" and "action" statements; it does not define,
e.g., an extension called "default-deny-execute".
For
this action, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations assert
channel binding , so as to ensure
that the application layer that sent the request is the same
as the device authenticated when the secure transport layer
was established.
This document registers one URI in the "ns" subregistry
of the IETF XML Registry . Following
the format in , the following
registration is requested:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document registers one YANG module in the
YANG Module Names registry .
Following the format in , the
the following registration is requested:
name: ietf-crypto-types
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types
prefix: ct
reference: RFC XXXX
Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)
International Telecommunication Union
The following example module has been constructed to illustrate
use of the "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping defined
in the "ietf-crypto-types" module.
Note that the "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping uses both
the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" and "end-entity-cert-grouping" groupings,
and that the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping uses the
"public-key-grouping" grouping. Thus, a total of four of the five groupings
defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module are illustrated through the
use of this one grouping. The only grouping not represented is the
"trust-anchor-cert-grouping" grouping.
";
description
"This module illustrates the grouping
defined in the crypto-types draft called
'asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping'.";
revision "1001-01-01" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC ????: Usage Example for RFC XXXX";
}
container keys {
description
"A container of keys.";
list key {
key name;
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this key.";
}
uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping;
description
"An asymmetric key pair with associated certificates.";
}
}
}
]]>
Given the above example usage module, the following example
illustrates some configured keys.
ex-key
ct:rsa2048
base64encodedvalue==
base64encodedvalue==
ex-cert
base64encodedvalue==
ex-hidden-key
ct:rsa2048
base64encodedvalue==
permanently-hidden
ex-hidden-key-cert
base64encodedvalue==
ex-encrypted-key
ct:rsa2048
base64encodedvalue==
encrypted-by:ex-key:base64encodedvalue==
ex-encrypted-key-cert
base64encodedvalue==
]]>
The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing-request"
action in use with the NETCONF protocol.
REQUEST
ex-key-sect571r1
base64encodedvalue==
base64encodedvalue==
]]>
RESPONSE
base64encodedvalue==
]]>
The following example illustrates the "certificate-expiration"
notification in use with the NETCONF protocol.
2018-05-25T00:01:00Z
locally-defined key
my-cert
2018-08-05T14:18:53-05:00
]]>
Removed groupings and notifications.
Added typedefs for identityrefs.
Added typedefs for other RFC 5280 structures.
Added typedefs for other RFC 5652 structures.
Added convenience typedefs for RFC 4253, RFC 5280, and RFC 5652.
Moved groupings from the draft-ietf-netconf-keystore here.
Removed unwanted "mandatory" and "must" statements.
Added many new crypto algorithms (thanks Haiguang!)
Clarified in asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping,
in certificates/certificate/name/description, that
if the name MUST NOT match the name of a certificate
that exists independently in <operational>, enabling
certs installed by the manufacturer (e.g., an IDevID).
renamed base identity 'asymmetric-key-encryption-algorithm' to 'asymmetric-key-algorithm'.
added new 'asymmetric-key-algorithm' identities for secp192r1, secp224r1, secp256r1,
secp384r1, and secp521r1.
removed 'mac-algorithm' identities for mac-aes-128-ccm, mac-aes-192-ccm, mac-aes-256-ccm,
mac-aes-128-gcm, mac-aes-192-gcm, mac-aes-256-gcm, and mac-chacha20-poly1305.
for all -cbc and -ctr identities, renamed base identity 'symmetric-key-encryption-algorithm'
to 'encryption-algorithm'.
for all -ccm and -gcm identities, renamed base identity 'symmetric-key-encryption-algorithm'
to 'encryption-and-mac-algorithm' and renamed the identity to remove the "enc-" prefix.
for all the 'signature-algorithm' based identities, renamed from 'rsa-*' to 'rsassa-*'.
removed all of the "x509v3-" prefixed 'signature-algorithm' based identities.
added 'key-exchange-algorithm' based identities for 'rsaes-oaep' and 'rsaes-pkcs1-v1_5'.
renamed typedef 'symmetric-key-encryption-algorithm-ref' to 'symmetric-key-algorithm-ref'.
renamed typedef 'asymmetric-key-encryption-algorithm-ref' to 'asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref'.
added typedef 'encryption-and-mac-algorithm-ref'.
Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, and folding algorithm.
ran YANG module through formatter.
fixed broken symlink causing reformatted YANG module to not show.
Added NACM annotations.
Updated Security Considerations section.
Added 'asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping' grouping.
Removed text from 'permanently-hidden' enum regarding
such keys not being backed up or restored.
Updated the boilerplate text in module-level "description"
statement to match copyeditor convention.
Added an explanation to the 'public-key-grouping' and
'asymmetric-key-pair-grouping' statements as for why the
nodes are not mandatory (e.g., because they may exist only
in <operational>.
Added 'must' expressions to the 'public-key-grouping' and
'asymmetric-key-pair-grouping' statements ensuring sibling
nodes are either all exist or do not all exist.
Added an explanation to the 'permanently-hidden' that the
value cannot be configured directly by clients and servers
MUST fail any attempt to do so.
Added 'trust-anchor-certs-grouping' and 'end-entity-certs-grouping'
(the plural form of existing groupings).
Now states that keys created in <operational> by the
*-hidden-key actions are bound to the lifetime of the parent
'config true' node, and that subsequent invocations of either
action results in a failure.
Added clarifications that implementations SHOULD assert that
configured certificates contain the matching public key.
Replaced the 'generate-hidden-key' and 'install-hidden-key' actions
with special 'crypt-hash' -like input/output values.
The authors would like to thank for following for
lively discussions on list and in the halls (ordered
by last name):
Martin Bjorklund,
Nick Hancock,
Balázs Kovács,
Juergen Schoenwaelder,
Eric Voit,
and Liang Xia.