NFSv4 T. Haynes, Ed. Internet-Draft NetApp Intended status: Standards Track N. Williams Expires: May 11, 2013 Cryptonector November 07, 2012 Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Security Version 3 draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gssv3-04.txt Abstract This document specifies version 3 of the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) security protocol (RPCSEC_GSS). This protocol provides for: compound authentication of client hosts and users to server (constructed by generic composition), channel binding, security label assertions for multi-level and type enforcement, privilege assertions, and identity assertions. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1]. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on May 11, 2013. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 1] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Applications of RPCSEC_GSSv3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. The RPCSEC_GSSv3 protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Control messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.1.1. New auth_stat values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.1.2. Create request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.1.3. Context handle destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.1.4. List request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.1.5. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3. Privileges and identity representation for NFSv4 . . . . . . . 17 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Appendix B. RFC Editor Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 2] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 1. Introduction The original RPCSEC_GSS protocol [2] provided for authentication of RPC clients and servers to each other using the Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface (GSS-API) [3]. The second version of RPCSEC_GSS [4] added support for channel binding [5]. We find that GSS-API mechanisms are insufficient for communicating certain aspects of a client's identity and authority to a server. The GSS-API and its mechanisms certainly could be extended to address this shortcomming, but it seems be far simpler to address it at the application layer, namely, in this case, RPCSEC_GSS. We therefore provide a new version of RPCSEC_GSS that allows for the following: o compound authentication of the client host and user to the server (done by binding of two RPCSEC_GSS handles) o channel binding (even though RPCSEC_GSSv2 provides this also; see below) o client-side assertions of authority: * security labels (for multi-level, type enforcement, and other labeled security models) (see [9], [10], and [11]) * application-specific privileges o client-side assertions of identity: * primary client/user identity * supplementary group memberships of the client/user, including support for specifying deltas to the membership list as seen on the server Assertions of labels, privilege and identity are evaluated by the server, which may then map the asserted values to other values, all according to server-side policy. We also add an option for enumerating server-side domains of interpretation (DOI), [[Comment.1: No DOI in the LFS, why here? Adapt with the new format! --TH]] RPCSEC_GSSv3 is patterned as follows: Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 3] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 o a client uses an existing RPCSEC_GSS context handle (of any RPCSEC_GSS version) to protect RPCSEC_GSSv3 exchanges (this will be termed the "parent" or "outer" handle) o the server issues a "child" RPCSEC_GSSv3 handle, but the underlying GSS-API security context for the parent handle is used in all subsequent exchanges using the child handle (this works because the RPCSEC_GSS handle is included in the integrity protected RPCSEC_GSS auth/verifier header for all versions of RPCSEC_GSS). This means that RPCSEC_GSSv3 depends on RPCSEC_GSS versions 1 and/or 2 for actual GSS-API security context establishment. This keeps the specification of RPCSEC_GSSv3 simple by avoiding the need to duplicate the core functionality of RPCSEC_GSS version 1. 1.1. Motivation The initial motivation for RPCSEC_GSSv3 is to add support for labeled security for NFSv4 (see [12]). We also realized that the assertion of security label is conceptually equivalent, protocol-wise, to assertions of privilege and identity. Additionally, assertions need to be verified, and in this case the one party that can verify an assertion is the client host, which can authenticate to the server using its own credentials. Yet we want to continue authenticating users as well. This calls for compound authentication. Finally, because the design of RPCSEC_GSSv3 relies on RPCSEC_GSSv1 (though v2 can also be used) to do the actual GSS-API security context establishment, we add support for channel binding so that implementors who have implemented RPCSEC_GSSv1 but not version 2 can still provide channel binding without having to implement version 2. Channel binding is accomplished in a more simple manner in v3 also. 1.2. Applications of RPCSEC_GSSv3 The common uses of RPCSEC_GSSv3, particularly for NFSv4 [6], are expected to be: a. labeled security: client-side process label assertion [+ privilege assertion] + compound client host & user authentication; b. compound client host & user authentication [+ privilege assertion]; Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 4] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 c. client-side process credentials assertion [+ privilege assertion] as a replacement for AUTH_SYS that is more secure than AUTH_SYS while not requiring per-user credentials. A traditional file copy entails the client gaining access to a file on the source, reading it, and writing it to a file on the destination. In Server-side Copy (see Section 2 of [6]), the client first secures access to both source and destination and then authorizes the destination and source to copy the file. RPCSEC_GSSv3 is used to allow the destination authentication with the source. Labeled NFS (see Section 7 of [6] uses the subject label provided by the client via the RPCSEC_GSSv3 layer to enforce MAC access to objects owned by the server. 2. The RPCSEC_GSSv3 protocol This document contains the External Data Representation (XDR) ([7]) definitions for the RPCSEC_GSSv3 protocol. The XDR description is provided in this document in a way that makes it simple for the reader to extract into ready to compile form. The reader can feed this document in the following shell script to produce the machine readable XDR description of RPCSEC_GSSv3: #!/bin/sh grep "^ *///" | sed 's?^ */// ??' | sed 's?^ *///$??' I.e. if the above script is stored in a file called "extract.sh", and this document is in a file called "spec.txt", then the reader can do: sh extract.sh < spec.txt > rpcsec_gss_v3.x The effect of the script is to remove leading white space from each line, plus a sentinel sequence of "///". The XDR description, with the sentinel sequence follows: /// /* /// * Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons /// * identified as the document authors. All rights /// * reserved. /// * /// * The document authors are identified in [RFC2203], /// * [RFC5403], and [RFCxxxx]. /// * /// * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 5] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 /// * with or without modification, are permitted /// * provided that the following conditions are met: /// * /// * o Redistributions of source code must retain the above /// * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the /// * following disclaimer. /// * /// * o Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the /// * above copyright notice, this list of /// * conditions and the following disclaimer in /// * the documentation and/or other materials /// * provided with the distribution. /// * /// * o Neither the name of Internet Society, IETF or IETF /// * Trust, nor the names of specific contributors, may be /// * used to endorse or promote products derived from this /// * software without specific prior written permission. /// * /// * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS /// * AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED /// * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE /// * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS /// * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO /// * EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE /// * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, /// * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT /// * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR /// * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS /// * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF /// * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, /// * OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING /// * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF /// * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. /// */ /// /// /* /// * This code was derived from [RFC2203]. Please /// * reproduce this note if possible. /// */ /// /// /* /// * rpcsec_gss_v3.x /// */ /// /// enum rpc_gss_service_t { /// /* Note: the enumerated value for 0 is reserved. */ /// rpc_gss_svc_none = 1, /// rpc_gss_svc_integrity = 2, Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 6] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 /// rpc_gss_svc_privacy = 3, /// rpc_gss_svc_channel_prot = 4 /// }; /// /// enum rpc_gss_proc_t { /// RPCSEC_GSS_DATA = 0, /// RPCSEC_GSS_INIT = 1, /// RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT = 2, /// RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY = 3, /// RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL = 4 /// }; /// /// struct rpc_gss_cred_vers_1_t { /// rpc_gss_proc_t gss_proc; /* control procedure */ /// unsigned int seq_num; /* sequence number */ /// rpc_gss_service_t service; /* service used */ /// opaque handle<>; /* context handle */ /// }; /// /// enum rpc_gss3_proc_t { /// RPCSEC_GSS3_DATA = 0, /// RPCSEC_GSS3_LIST = 5, /// RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE = 6, /// RPCSEC_GSS3_DESTROY = 7 /// }; /// /// struct rpc_gss_cred_vers_3_t { /// rpc_gss3_proc_t gss_proc; /// unsigned int seq_num; /// rpc_gss_service_t service; /// opaque handle<>; /// unsigned int handle_version; /// }; /// /// const RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1 = 1; /// const RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_2 = 2; /// const RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_3 = 3; /* new */ /// /// union rpc_gss_cred_t switch (unsigned int rgc_version) { /// case RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1: /// case RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_2: /// rpc_gss_cred_vers_1_t rgc_cred_v1; /// case RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_3: /* new */ /// rpc_gss_cred_vers_3_t rgc_cred_v3; /// }; /// /// const MAXSEQ = 0x80000000; /// Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 7] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 /// struct rpc_gss3_extension { /// int type; /// bool critical; /// opaque data<>; /// }; /// /// struct rpc_gss3_gss_binding { /// unsigned int vers; /// opaque handle<>; /// opaque nonce<>; /// opaque mic<>; /// }; /// /// typedef opaque rpc_gss3_chan_binding<>; /// /// typedef opaque rpc_gss3_doi<>; /// struct rpc_gss3_label { /// rpc_gss3_doi doi; /// opaque label<>; /// }; /// /// typedef opaque rpc_gss3_privs<>; /// /// typedef opaque rpc_gss3_name<>; /// /// typedef rpc_gss3_name rpc_gss3_group_list<>; /// struct rpc_gss3_id { /// rpc_gss3_name *username; /// rpc_gss3_group_list *groups; /// rpc_gss3_group_list groups_add; /// rpc_gss3_group_list groups_remove; /// }; /// /// enum rpc_gss3_assertion_type { /// LABEL = 0, /// PRIVS = 1, /// IDENTITY = 2 /// }; /// /// union rpc_gss3_assertion_u /// switch (rpc_gss3_assertion_type atype) { /// case LABEL: /// rpc_gss3_label label; /// case PRIVILEGES: /// rpc_gss3_privs privs; /// case IDENTITY: /// rpc_gss3_id id; /// default: Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 8] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 /// opaque ext<>; /// }; /// /// struct rpc_gss3_assertion { /// bool critical; /// rpc_gss3_assertion_u assertion; /// }; /// /// struct rpc_gss3_create_args { /// rpc_gss3_gss_binding *compound_binding; /// rpc_gss3_chan_binding *chan_binding_mic; /// rpc_gss3_assertion assertions<>; /// rpc_gss3_extension extensions<>; /// }; /// /// struct rpc_gss3_create_res { /// opaque handle<>; /// rpc_gss3_chan_binding *chan_binding_mic; /// rpc_gss3_assertion granted_assertions<>; /// rpc_gss3_assertion assertions_denied<>; /// rpc_gss3_assertion assertions_not_understood<>; /// rpc_gss3_assertion server_assertions<>; /// rpc_gss3_extension extensions<>; /// }; /// /// enum rpc_gss3_list_item { /// DOI = 0, /// PRIV = 1, /// PRIV_GROUP = 2 /// }; /// /// struct rpc_gss3_list_args { /// rpc_gss3_list_item list_what<>; /// }; /// /// union rpc_gss3_list_item_u /// switch (rpc_gss3_list_item itype) { /// case DOI: /// rpc_gss3_doi dois<>; /// case PRIV: /// string privs<>; /// case PRIV_GROUP: /// string priv_groups<>; /// default: /// opaque ext<>; /// }; /// /// typedef rpc_gss3_list_item_u rpc_gss3_list_res<>; Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 9] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 The rpc_gss_cred_vers_3_t type is used in much the same way that rpc_gss_cred_vers_1_t is used in RPCSEC_GSSv1, that is: as the arm of the rpc_gss_cred_t discriminated union corresponding to version 3 (RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_3). It differs from rpc_gss_cred_vers_1_t in that: a. the values for gss_proc corresponding to control messages are different, b. the presence of a field indicating the version of RPCSEC_GSS used to established the context handle used, if any. RPC data messages using RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handles differ from RPCSEC_GSSv1 only in that the version number used MUST be '3' instead of '1' and, as described above, in that there is one more field in the RPCSEC_GSS header to name the version of RPCSEC_GSS used to establish the context handle used to protect this message. All other protocol elements from RPCSEC_GSSv1-protected RPC data messages MUST remain the same in v3 as in v1. RPCSEC_GSSv3 control messages are the same as RPCSEC_GSSv3 data messages, but with a gss_proc value that indicates a control message is contained in the data payload. 2.1. Control messages There are two RPCSEC_GSSv3 control messages: RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE and RPCSEC_GSS3_LIST. The client MUST use one of the following security services to protect any RPCSEC_GSSv3 control message: o rpc_gss_svc_channel_prot (see RPCSEC_GSSv2) o rpc_gss_svc_integrity o rpc_gss_svc_privacy Specifically the client MUST NOT use rpc_gss_svc_none. 2.1.1. New auth_stat values RPCSEC_GSSv3 requires the addition of several values to the auth_stat enumerated type definition: Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 10] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 enum auth_stat { ... /* * RPCSEC_GSS errors */ RPCSEC_GSS3_COMPOUND_PROBEM = <>, RPCSEC_GSS3_LABEL_PROBLEM = <>, RPCSEC_GSS3_IDENTITY_PROBLEM = <> RPCSEC_GSS3_UNKNOWN_ASSERTION = <> RPCSEC_GSS3_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION = <> RPCSEC_GSS3_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE = <> }; [[Comment.2: XXX: fix above into YYY. All the entries are TBD... --NW]] 2.1.2. Create request The RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE call message consists of inputs to bind into a new RPCSEC_GSSv3 handle. The context handle used to protect the RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE call message is termed the "parent" (or "outer") handle. The reply to this message consists of either an error or a new RPCSEC_GSSv3 handle, termed the "child" handle. All uses of a child context handle MUST use the GSS-API security context associated with the parent context handle of the RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE request that produced the child context handle. The child context, however, has its own sequence number space and window, distinct from that of the parent. As described in the introduction, the RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE call message binds one or more items of several kinds into a new RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle: o another RPCSEC_GSS (version 1, 2, or 3) context handle o a channel binding o authorization assertions (label, privileges) o identity assertions Servers MUST either ignore, reject or apply policy to the authorization and identity assertions. Policies should take into account the identity of the client and/or user as authenticated via the GSS-API. Server implementation and policy MAY result in labels, privileges, and identities being mapped to concepts and values that are local to the server. Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 11] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 2.1.2.1. Compound authentication RPCSEC_GSSv3 allows for compound authentication of client hosts and users to servers. This is done by using an integrity protected RPCSEC_GSSv3 message of RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE type which includes a reference to the context handle to bind, a nonce and a MIC of that nonce using the GSS-API security context associated with the named context handle. We'll term the two context handles "parent" (or "outer") and "inner," and the resulting context handle the "child" handle, where the outer context handle is the context handle providing integrity protection to the RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE message, and the inner context handle is the one referenced via the compound_binding field of the RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE arguments structure (rpc_gss3_create_args). All uses of a child context handle that is bound to an inner context MUST be treated as speaking for the initiator principal (as modified by any assertions in the RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE message) of the inner context handle's GSS-API security context. This feature is needed, for example, when a client wishes to use authority assertions that the server may only grant if a user and a client are authenticated together to the server. Thus a server may refuse to grant requested authority to a user acting alone (e.g., via an unprivileged user-space program), but may grant requested authority to a client acting on behalf of a user if the server trusts the client. It is assumed that an unprivileged user-space program would not have access to client host credentials needed to establish a GSS-API security context authenticating the client to the server, therefore an unprivileged user-space program could not create an RPCSEC_GSSv3 RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE message that successfully binds a client and a user security context. Clients using RPCSEC_GSS context binding MUST use, as the outer context handle, an RPCSEC_GSS context handle that corresponds to a GSS-API security context that authenticates the client host, and for the inner context handle it SHOULD use a context handle to authenticates a user. The reverse (outer handle authenticates user, inner authenticates client) MUST NOT be used. Other compounds might eventually make sense. An RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle that is bound to another RPCSEC_GSS context MUST be treated by servers as authenticating the GSS-API initiator principal authenticated by the inner context handle's GSS- API security context. This principal may be mapped to a server-side notion of user or principal as modified by any identity assertions by Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 12] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 the client in the same RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE request that the server accepts. 2.1.2.2. Channel binding RPCSEC_GSSv3 provides a different way to do channel binding than RPCSEC_GSSv2. Specifically: a. RPCSEC_GSSv3 builds on RPCSEC_GSSv1 by reusing existing, established context handles rather than providing a different RPC security flavor for establishing context handles, b. channel bindings data are not hashed because the community now agrees that it is the secure channel's responsibility to produce channel bindings data of manageable size. (a) is useful in keeping RPCSEC_GSSv3 simple in general, not just for channel binding. (b) is useful in keeping RPCSEC_GSSv3 simple specifically for channel binding. Channel binding is accomplished as follows. The client prefixes the channel bindings data octet string with the channel type as described in [5], then the client calls GSS_GetMIC() to get a MIC of resulting octet string, using the outer RPCSEC_GSS context handle's GSS-API security context. The MIC is then placed in the chan_binding_mic field of RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE arguments (rpc_gss3_create_args). If the chan_binding_mic field of the arguments of a RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE control message is set, then the server MUST verify the client's channel binding MIC if the server supports this feature. If channel binding verification succeeds then the server MUST generate a new MIC of the same channel bindings and place it in the chan_binding_mic field of the RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE results. If channel binding verification fails or the server doesn't support channel binding then the server MUST indicate this in its reply by not including a chan_binding_mic value (chan_binding_mic is an optional field). The client MUST verify the result's chan_binding_mic value, if the server included it, by calling GSS_VerifyMIC() with the given MIC and the channel bindings data (including the channel type prefix). If client-side channel binding verification fails then the client MUST call RPCSEC_GSS3_DESTROY. If the client requested channel binding but the server did not include a chan_binding_mic field in the results, then the client MAY continue to use the resulting context handle as though channel binding had never been requested, otherwise (if the client really wanted channel binding) it MUST call RPCSEC_GSS3_DESTROY. Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 13] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 As per-RPCSEC_GSSv2: o "Once a successful [channel binding] procedure has been performed on an [RPCSEC_GSSv3] context handle, the initiator's implementation may map application requests for rpc_gss_svc_none and rpc_gss_svc_integrity to rpc_gss_svc_channel_prot credentials. And if the secure channel has privacy enabled, requests for rpc_gss_svc_privacy can also be mapped to rpc_gss_svc_channel_prot." o ... [[Comment.3: ...? --TH]] Any RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle that has been bound to a secure channel in this way SHOULD be used only with the rpc_gss_svc_channel_prot, and SHOULD NOT be used with rpc_gss_svc_none nor rpc_gss_svc_integrity -- if the secure channel does not provide privacy protection then the client MAY use rpc_gss_svc_privacy where privacy protection is needed or desired. 2.1.2.3. Label assertions RPCSEC_GSSv3 clients MAY assert a security label in some DOI by binding this assertion into an RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle. This is done by including an assertion of type rpc_gss3_label in the 'assertions' field (discriminant: 'LABEL') of the RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE arguments to the desired DOI and label. Label encoding is specific to each DOI and not described herein. DOI encoding is TBD. [[Comment.4: [fill in... Solaris uses integers to name DOIs, and there is an IANA registry of DOIs as 32-bit integers, and IPsec (whence the IANA registry) and CALIPSO use 32-bit integers for DOIs as well. So a 32-bit unsinged integer seems to be the way to go. Add references... -Nico] --NW]] [[Comment.5: This is just the LNFS format, so update it. --TH]] If a label itself requires privacy protection (i.e., that the user can assert that label is a secret) then the client MUST use the rpc_gss_svc_privacy protection service for the RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE request or, if the parent handle is bound to a secure channel that provides privacy protection, rpc_gss_svc_channel_prot. If a client wants to ensure that the server understands the asserted label then it MUST set the 'critical' field of the label assertion to TRUE, otherwise it MUST set it to FALSE. Servers that do not support labeling MUST ignore non-critical label Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 14] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 assertions. Servers that do not support the requested DOI MUST either ignore non-critical label assertions or map them to a suitable label in a supported DOI. Servers that do not support labeling or do not support the requested DOI MUST return an error if the label request is critical. Servers that support labeling in the requested DOI MAY map the requested label to different label as a result of server-side policy evaluation. 2.1.2.4. Privilege assertions Privilege assertions are similar to label assertions, except that there is no DOI, and the privileges supported are specified by the RPC application. Privileges are encoded US-ASCII strings containing comma-separated privilege names, as well as up to one privilege group name and zero or more exclusions, where each exclusion is a privilege name or privilege group name prefixed with an exclamation point. Two special privilege group names are defined here: "all" (which represents all possible privileges) and "basic" (which represents privileges normally granted to all users). RPC applications that wish to use this facility must define the set of known privileges, and must specify which privileges are in the "basic" privilege group. For example, NFSv4 might specify privileges for reading, writing, chowning, linking, etc. 2.1.2.5. Identity assertions Identity assertions can be used either to modify the set of groups assigned on the server-side to a given user (authenticated by the GSS-API) or to implement an AUTH_SYS-like [4]. In the latter case the client specifies at least a user-name and possibly groups that it thinks the user belongs to. Clients may set a username, a group list, and/or lists of groups to be added or removed from the group list that the server would normally use for the given user. The server MUST decide whether to accept identity assertions by applying local policy. Such policies is not described herein. Example policies: o "always accept identity assertions" o "always accept identity assertions where the identities are understood" Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 15] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 o "accept identity assertions ... only from trusted clients" (where the identity of the client is taken from the initiator principal of the outer context handle's GSS-API security context, or from the network address of the client...) o "accept identity assertions ... only from trusted clients where IPsec policy protects this application's packet flows between the clients and this server" o "accept only removals of groups from a user's group membership list as determined by the server" o "never accept identity assertions" o etc. Clients may mark an identity assertion as being critical, in which case the server MUST respond with an error if the server does not accept the identity assertion as-is. The representation of users and groups is not given here, but is left to the application. It is expected that RPCSEC_GSSv3 identity assertions in the context of the NFSv4 application would consist of NFSv4 user and group representations as used on the wire in NFSv4 access control lists (ACLs). 2.1.2.6. Server assertions Servers MAY inform clients of assertions were granted by setting the 'granted_assertions' field of the RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE reply. The protocol provides a field ('server_assertions') for servers to make assertions about themselves. At this time there is not much use for this field, though servers MAY assert a single security label, indicating that all contents on the server is at that label. The client MUST, of course, either evaluate or ignore any server-side assertions. 2.1.3. Context handle destruction The RPCSEC_GSS3_DESTROY procedure is the same as for RPCSEC_GSSv1, but with the version 3 header. 2.1.4. List request The RPCSEC_GSS3_LIST call message consists of a single integer indicating what should be listed, and the reply consists of an error or the requested list. Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 16] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 The client may list DOIs, privilege names, or privilege group names. The result is an opaque octet string containing a list of DOIs [encoding TBD] or a US-ASCII string containing a comma-separated list of privilege names or privilege group names. 2.1.5. Extensibility Assertion types may be added in the future by adding arms to the 'rpc_gss3_assertion_u' union. Every assertion has a 'critical' flag that can be used to indicate criticality. New fields may be added through the 'extensions' typed hole. All such extensions have a 'critical' flag. New message types may be added. Clients receiving unknown critical server assertions MUST destroy the established RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle. Servers receiving unknown critical client assertions or unknown RPCSEC_GSS_v3 extensions MUST return an error. There is no IANA or other registry for RPCSEC_GSSv3 extensions. All extensions MUST be done by IETF Protocol Action. 3. Privileges and identity representation for NFSv4 The representation of users and groups for use in identity assertions in RPCSEC_GSSv3 SHALL be the same as the user and group representations used by NFSv4 for access control list subjects on the wire, cast as an octet string ("opaque"). The following privileges are defined for use with the NFSv4 protocol: file_chown Generally allows the caller to change a file's owner regardless of who owns the file. file_chown_self Generally allows the caller to change the owner of a file it owns. file_dac_execute Generally allows the caller to read any file for execution. file_dac_read Generally allows the caller to read any file or directory. Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 17] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 file_dac_search Generally allows the caller to search any directory. file_dac_write Generally allows the caller to write to any file (or create/delete/link objects in directories). file_link_any Generally allows the caller to create hardlinks to files not owned by the caller. file_owner Generally allows the caller to modify the access, modification and other timestamps of a filesystem object, as well as its permissions and ACL. file_setid Generally allows the caller to set the set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits of a file. file_downgrade_sl Generally allows the caller to downgrade the security label of a filesystem object. file_update_sl Generally allows the caller to upgrade the security label of a filesystem object. [[Comment.6: [What about NFSv3? The representation of privs would be the same for v3 as for v4, though there'd be no privs for dealing with labels (file_downgrade_sl and file_update_sl). And the representation of users/groups would NFSv3's representation thereof. But should we bother to specify this? -Nico] --NW]] [[Comment.7: Need a use case to justify v3 development. --TH]] [[Comment.8: [Also, this is derived from Solaris' notion of privileges. We should look at how well this scheme relates to other operating systems as NFSv4 clients and servers. -Nico] --NW]] [[Comment.9: On the radar. --TH]] The contents of the 'basic' privilege set is not defined herein. Note that 'file_link_any' and 'file_chown_self' may be present in the server's notion of the basic privilege set. The NFSv4-specific privileges may be limited by the server in ways not specified above. For example, the server may deny access for certain operations that would normally be granted given the granted assertion of a given privilege (e.g., "no one may write to files owned by such and such user"), or the server may require that all privileges be asserted (and granted, of course) in order to allow certain operations (e.g., "all privileges are required in order to write to files owned by such and such user, not just file_dac_write"). Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 18] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 4. Security Considerations This entire document deals with security issues. The RPCSEC_GSSv3 protocol allows for client-side assertions of data that is relevant to server-side authorization decisions. These assertions must be evaludated by the server in the context of whether the client and/or user are authenticated, whether compound authentication was used, whether the client is trusted, what ranges of assertions are allowed for the client and the user (separately or together), and any relevant server-side policy. The security semantics of assertions carried by RPCSEC_GSSv3 are application protocol-specific. RPCSEC_GSSv3 supports a notion of critical assertions (and extensions), but there's no need for peers to tell each other what assertions were granted, or what they were mapped to. Note that RPSEC_GSSv3 is not a complete solution for labeling: it conveys the labels of actors, but not the labels of objects. RPC application protocols may require extending in order to carry object label information. The RPCSEC_GSSv3 protocol also provides for a replacement of the old AUTH_SYS RPC authentication flavor. AUTH_SYS relies on "privileged port numbers" for "authentication," and was quite limited in what assertions it supported and incompatible with NFSv4 representations of identity. To replace AUTH_SYS with RPCSEC_GSSv3 simply use a GSS- API mechanism to authenticate the client (but not the user) and let the client assert the user's identity. This is more secure than AUTH_SYS in that at least the client can be strongly authenticated using GSS-API mechanisms, and it is more functional than AUTH_SYS in that identity representations are defined by the application layer. It is possible that a GSS-API mechanism that does not provide any security services could be created so as to make it possible to replace AUTH_SYS with RPCSEC_GSSv3 while retaining the same privileged port semantics. Such a mechanism is out of scope for this document and would have its own security considerations. There may be interactions with NFSv4's callback security scheme and NFSv4.1's GSS-API "SSV" mechanisms. Specifically, the NFSv4 callback scheme requires that the server initiate GSS-API security contexts, which does not work well in practice, and in the context of client- side processes running as the same user but with different privileges and security labels the NFSv4 callback security scheme seems particularly unlikely to work well. NFSv4.1 has the server use an Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 19] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 existing, client-initiated RPCSEC_GSS context handle to protect server-initiated callback RPCs. The NFSv4.1 callback security scheme lacks all the problems of the NFSv4 scheme, however, it is important that the server pick an appropriate RPCSEC_GSS context handle to protect any callbacks. Specifically, it is important that the server use RPCSEC_GSS context handles which authenticate the client to protect any callbacks relating to server state initiated by RPCs protected by RPCSEC_GSSv3 contexts. [[Comment.10: [Add text about interaction with GSS-SSV...] --NW]] 5. IANA Considerations This section uses terms that are defined in [8]. There are no IANA considerations in this document. TBDs in this document will be assigned by the ONC RPC registrart (which is not IANA, XXX: verify). 6. References 6.1. Normative References [1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", March 1997. [2] Eisler, M., Chiu, A., and L. Ling, "RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification", RFC 2203, September 1997. [3] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000. [4] Srinivasan, R., "RPC: Remote Procedure Call Protocol Specification Version 2", RFC 1831, August 1995. [5] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007. [6] Haynes, T., "NFS Version 4 Minor Version 2", draft-ietf-nfsv4-minorversion2-16 (Work In Progress), October 2012. [7] Eisler, M., "XDR: External Data Representation Standard", RFC 4506, May 2006. [8] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, May 2008. Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 20] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 6.2. Informative References [9] "Section 46.6. Multi-Level Security (MLS) of Deployment Guide: Deployment, configuration and administration of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, Edition 6", 2011. [10] Smalley, S., "The Distributed Trusted Operating System (DTOS) Home Page", . [11] Carter, J., "Implementing SELinux Support for NFS", . [12] Haynes, T., "Requirements for Labeled NFS", draft-ietf-nfsv4-labreqs-03 (work in progress). [13] Quigley, D. and J. Lu, "Registry Specification for MAC Security Label Formats", draft-quigley-label-format-registry (work in progress), 2011. Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix B. RFC Editor Notes [RFC Editor: please remove this section prior to publishing this document as an RFC] [RFC Editor: prior to publishing this document as an RFC, please replace all occurrences of RFCTBD10 with RFCxxxx where xxxx is the RFC number of this document] Authors' Addresses Thomas Haynes (editor) NetApp 9110 E 66th St Tulsa, OK 74133 USA Phone: +1 918 307 1415 Email: thomas@netapp.com Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 21] Internet-Draft NFSv4 November 2012 Nico Williams cryptonector.com 13115 Tamayo Dr Austin, TX 78729 USA Email: nico@cryptonector.com Haynes & Williams Expires May 11, 2013 [Page 22]