Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Security Version 3
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Transport
NFSv4
This document specifies version 3 of the Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
security protocol (RPCSEC_GSS). This protocol provides
for multi-principal authentication of client hosts and
user principals to server (constructed by
generic composition), security label assertions for
multi-level and type enforcement, structured privilege assertions,
and channel bindings.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT",
"REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be
interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
The original RPCSEC_GSS protocol provided for
authentication of RPC clients and servers to each other using the
Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface (GSS-API)
. The second version of
RPCSEC_GSS added support
for channel bindings .
We find that GSS-API mechanisms are insufficient for communicating
certain aspects of authority to a server.
The GSS-API and its mechanisms certainly could be extended to address
this shortcoming, but it seems be far simpler to address it at the
application layer, namely, in this case, RPCSEC_GSS.
A major motivation for RPCSEC_GSSv3 is to add support for labeled security
and server-side copy for NFSv4.
Labeled NFS (see Section 8 of ) uses
the subject label provided by the client via the RPCSEC_GSSv3 layer to
enforce MAC access to objects owned by the server to enable server
guest mode. RPCSEC_GSSv3 label assertions provide the means to achieve
full mode labeled NFS.
A traditional inter-server file copy entails the user gaining access to
a file on the source, reading it, and writing it to a file on
the destination. In secure NFSv4 inter-server server-side copy
(see Section 3.4.1 of ),
the user first secures access to both source and destination files,
and then uses NFSv4.2 defined RPCSEC_GSSv3 structured
privileges to authorize the destination to copy the file from the
source on behalf of the user.
Multi-principal assertions can be used to address shared cache
poisoning attacks on the client cache by a user. As described
in Section 7 of , multi-user machines
with a single cache manager can fetch and cache data on a users'
behalf, and re-display it for another user from the cache without
re-fetching the data from the server.
The initial data acquisition is authenticated by the first user's
credentials, and if only that user's credentials are used, it may be
possible for a malicious user or users to "poison" the cache for
other users by introducing bogus data into the cache.
Another use of the multi-principal assertion is the secure conveyance
of privilege information for processes running with more (or even with
less) privilege than the user normally would be accorded.
We therefore describe RPCSEC_GSS version 3 (RPCSEC_GSSv3). RPCSEC_GSSv3
is the same as RPCSEC_GSSv2, except that
the following assertions of authority have been added.
Security labels for multi-level, type enforcement, and other
labeled security models. See ,
, ,
and .
Application-specific structured privileges. For an example
see server-side copy .
Multi-principal authentication of the client host and user to the server
done by binding two RPCSEC_GSS handles.
Simplified channel binding.
Assertions of labels and privileges are evaluated by the
server, which may then map the asserted values to other values, all
according to server-side policy.
We add an option for enumerating server supported label format specifiers
(LFS). The LFS and Label Format Registry are described in detail
in .
This document contains the External Data Representation (XDR)
() definitions for the RPCSEC_GSSv3 protocol.
The XDR description is provided in this document in a way
that makes it simple for the reader to extract into ready
to compile form. The reader can feed this document in the
following shell script to produce the machine readable XDR
description of RPCSEC_GSSv3:
<CODE BEGINS>
<CODE ENDS>
I.e. if the above script is stored in a file called "extract.sh",
and this document
is in a file called "spec.txt", then the reader can do:
<CODE BEGINS>
<CODE ENDS>
The effect of the script is to remove leading white space
from each line, plus a sentinel sequence of "///".
RPCSEC_GSSv3 is the same as RPCSEC_GSSv2,
except that support for assertions has been added.
The entire RPCSEC_GSSv3 protocol is not presented. Instead the differences
between RPCSEC_GSSv3 and RPCSEC_GSSv2 are shown.
RPCSEC_GSSv3 is patterned as follows:
A client uses an existing RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle established in the
usual manner (See Section 5.2 ) to protect
RPCSEC_GSSv3 exchanges, this will be termed the "parent" handle.
The server issues a "child" RPCSEC_GSSv3 handle in the
RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE response which uses the
underlying GSS-API security context of the parent handle in all
subsequent exchanges that uses the child handle.
An RPCSEC_GSSv3 child handle MUST NOT be used as the parent handle
in an RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE control message.
The functionality of RPCSEC_GSSv2 is fully
supported by RPCSEC_GSSv3 with the exception of the RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL
operation which is deprecated (see ).
An initiator that supports version 3 of RPCSEC_GSS simply issues an
RPCSEC_GSS request with the rgc_version field set to
RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_3. If the target does not recognize
RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_3, the target will return an RPC error per Section
5.1 of .
The initiator MUST NOT attempt to use an RPCSEC_GSS handle returned
by version 3 of a target with version 1 or version 2 of the same target.
The initiator MUST NOT attempt to use an RPCSEC_GSS handle returned by
version 1 or version 2 of a target with version 3 of the same target.
A new reply verifier is needed for RPCSEC_GSSv3 due to the following:
The RPCSEC_GSSv3 child handle uses the same GSS context as the parent
handle, so a child and parent RPCSEC_GSSv3 handle could have the same
RPCSEC_GSS sequence numbers. Since the reply verifier of previous versions of
RPCSEC_GSS computes a MIC on just the sequence number, this provides
opportunities for man in the middle attacks.
This is easily addressed: RPCSEC_GSS version 3 changes the verifier of
the reply to compute the verifier using the exact same input as that is
used for verifier of the request, except for the mtype change from CALL
to REPLY. The new reply verifier computes a MIC over the following RPC
reply header data:
<CODE BEGINS>
<CODE ENDS>
As seen above, the RPCSEC_GSSv3 credential has the same format as the
RPCSEC_GSSv1 and
RPCSEC_GSSv2 credential. Setting
the rgc_version field
to 3 indicates that the initiator and target support the new RPCSEC_GSSv3
control procedures.
RPCSEC_GSSv3 provides a channel binding assertion that replaces
the RPCSEC_GSSv2 RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL operation.
RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL MUST NOT be used on RPCSEC_GSS version 3 handles.
RPCSEC_GSSv3 requires the addition of several values to the auth_stat
enumerated type definition. The use of each of these new auth_stat
values is explained throughout this document.
There are two new RPCSEC_GSSv3 control procedures: RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE,
RPCSEC_GSS_LIST.
The RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE procedure binds any combination of assertions:
multi-principal authentication, labels, structured privileges, or channel
bindings to a new RPCSEC_GSSv3 context returned in the rgss3_create_res
rcr_handle field.
The RPCSEC_GSS_LIST procedure queries the target for supported
assertions.
RPCSEC_GSS version 3 control messages are similar to the
RPCSEC_GSS version 1 and version 2
RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY control message (see section 5.4
) in that the sequence number
in the request must be valid, and the header checksum in the verifier
must be valid. As in RPCSEC_GSS version 1 and version 2, the
RPCSEC_GSSv version 3 control messages may contain call data
following the verifier in the body of the NULLPROC procedure.
In other words, they look a lot like an
RPCSEC_GSS data message with the header procedure set to NULLPROC.
The client MUST use one of the following security services to protect the
RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE or RPCSEC_GSS_LIST control message:
rpc_gss_svc_integrity
rpc_gss_svc_privacy
Specifically the client MUST NOT use rpc_gss_svc_none.
RPCSEC_GSS_LIST can also use rpc_gss_svc_channel_prot (see
RPCSEC_GSSv2) if the request is sent
using an RPCSEC_GSSv3 child handle with channel bindings enabled
as described in .
<CODE BEGINS>
<CODE ENDS>
The call data for an RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE request
consists of an rgss3_create_args which
binds one or more items of several kinds to the returned rcr_handle
RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle called the "child" handle:
Multi-principal authentication: another RPCSEC_GSS context handle
A channel binding
Authorization assertions: labels and or privileges
The reply to this message consists of either an error or an
rgss3_create_res structure. As noted in and
successful rgss3_assertions are
enumerated in rcr_assertions, and are REQUIRED be enumerated in the
same order as they appeared in the rca_assertions argument.
Upon successful RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE, both the client and the server
SHOULD associate the resultant child rcr_handle context handle with the
parent context handle in their GSS context caches so as to be able to
reference the parent context given the child context handle.
RPCSEC_GSSv3 child handles MUST be destroyed upon the destruction of
the associated parent handle.
Server implementation and policy MAY result in labels,
privileges, and identities being mapped to concepts and values that
are local to the server.
Server policies should take into
account the identity of the client and/or user as authenticated via
the GSS-API.
<CODE BEGINS>
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RPCSEC_GSSv3 clients MAY assert a multi-principal authentication of
the RPC client host principal and a user principal.
This feature is needed, for example, when an RPC client host
wishes to use authority assertions that the server may only
grant if a user and an RPC client host
are authenticated together to the server. Thus a server
may refuse to grant requested authority to a user acting alone
(e.g., via an unprivileged user-space program), or to an RPC client
host acting alone (e.g. when an RPC client host is acting on behalf of
a user) but may grant requested authority to an RPC client host
acting on behalf of a user if the server identifies the user
and trusts the RPC client host.
It is assumed that an unprivileged user-space program would not have
access to RPC client host credentials needed to establish a GSS-API
security context authenticating the RPC client host to the server,
therefore
an unprivileged user-space program could not create an RPCSEC_GSSv3
RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE message that successfully binds an RPC client host
and a user security context.
In addition to the parent handle,
the multi-principal authentication call data has an
RPCSEC_GSS version 3 handle referenced via the rgmp_handle field
termed the "inner" handle.
Clients using RPCSEC_GSSv3 multi-principal authentication MUST use
an RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle that corresponds to a
GSS-API security context that authenticates the RPC client host for
the parent handle. The inner context handle it SHOULD use a context
handle to authenticate a user. The reverse (parent handle
authenticates user, inner authenticates an RPC client host) MUST NOT
be used.
Other multi-principal parent and inner context handle uses might
eventually make sense, but would need to be introduced in a new
revision of the RPCSEC_GSS protocol.
The child context handle returned by a successful multi-principal
assertion binds the inner RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle to the parent
RPCSEC_GSS context and MUST be treated by servers as authenticating
the GSS-API initiator principal authenticated by the inner context
handle's GSS-API security context. This principal may be mapped to a server-side notion of user or principal.
Multi-principal binding is done by including an assertion of
type rgss3_gss_mp_auth in the RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE rgss3_create_args
call data. The inner context handle is placed in the rgmp_handle
field. A MIC of the RPC call header up to and including the
credential
is computed using the GSS-API security context associated with
the inner context handle is placed in rgmp_rpcheader_mic field.
The target verifies the multi-principal authentication by first
confirming that the parent context used is an RPC client host context,
and then verifies the rgmp_rpcheader_mic using the GSS-API
security context associated with the rgmp_handle field.
On a successful verification, the rgss3_gss_mp_auth field in the
rgss3_create_res reply MUST be filled in with the inner
RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle
as the rgmp_handle, and a MIC computed over the RPC reply header
(see section ) using
the GSS-API security context associated with the inner handle.
On failure, the rgss3_gss_mp_auth field is not sent
(rgss3_gss_mp_auth is an optional field).
A MSG_DENIED reply to the RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE call is formulated
as usual.
As described in Section 5.3.3.3 of
the server maintains a list of contexts for the clients that are
currently in session with it. When a client request comes in, there
may not be a context corresponding to its handle. When this occurs
on an RPCSEC_GSS3_CREATE request processing of the parent handle,
the server rejects the request with a reply status of MSG_DENIED
with the reject_stat of AUTH_ERROR and with an auth_stat value of
RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM.
A new value, RPCSEC_GSS_INNER_CREDPROBLEM, has been added to the
auth_stat type.
With a multi-pricipal authorization request, the server must also have
a context corresponding to the inner context handle. When the server
does not have a context handle corresponding to the inner
context handle of a multi-pricipal authorization request, the server
sends a reply status of MSG_DENIED with the reject_stat of AUTH_ERROR
and with an auth_stat value of RPCSEC_GSS_INNER_CREDPROBLEM.
When processing the multi-principal authentication request, if the
GSS_VerifyMIC() call on the rgmp_rpcheader_mic fails to return
GSS_S_COMPLETE, the server sends a reply status of MSG_DENIED with
the reject_stat of AUTH_ERROR and with an auth_stat value of
RPCSEC_GSS_INNER_CREDPROBLEM.
<CODE BEGINS>
<CODE ENDS>
RPCSEC_GSSv3 provides a different way to do channel binding than
RPCSEC_GSSv2. Specifically:
RPCSEC_GSSv3 builds on RPCSEC_GSSv1 by reusing existing,
established context handles rather than providing a different
RPC security flavor for establishing context handles,
channel bindings data are not hashed because the
community now agrees that it is the secure channel's
responsibility to produce channel bindings data of
manageable size.
(a) is useful in
keeping RPCSEC_GSSv3 simple in general, not just for channel binding.
(b) is useful in keeping RPCSEC_GSSv3 simple specifically for channel
binding.
Channel binding is accomplished as follows. The client prefixes the
channel bindings data octet string with the channel type as described
in , then the client calls GSS_GetMIC()
to get a MIC of
resulting octet string, using the parent RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle's
GSS-API security context. The MIC is then placed in the
rca_chan_bind_mic field of RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE arguments
(rgss3_create_args).
If the rca_chan_bind_mic field of the arguments of a
RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE control message is set, then the server MUST
verify the client's channel binding MIC if the server supports this
feature. If channel binding verification succeeds then the server
MUST generate a new MIC of the same channel bindings and place it in
the rcr_chan_bind_mic field of the RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE rgss3_create_res
results. If channel binding verification fails or the server
doesn't support
channel binding then the server MUST indicate this in its reply by
not including a rgss3_chan_binding value in rgss3_create_res
(rgss3_chan_binding is an optional field).
The client MUST verify the result's rcr_chan_bind_mic value
by calling GSS_VerifyMIC() with the given MIC and
the channel bindings data (including the channel type prefix). If
client-side channel binding verification fails then the client MUST
call RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY. If the client requested channel binding
but the server did not include an rcr_chan_binding_mic field in the
results, then the client MAY continue to use the resulting context
handle as though channel binding had never been requested.
If the client considers channel binding critical, it MUST call
RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY.
As per-RPCSEC_GSSv2 :
"Once a successful [channel binding] procedure has been performed
on an [RPCSEC_GSSv3] context handle, the initiator's
implementation may map application requests for rpc_gss_svc_none
and rpc_gss_svc_integrity to rpc_gss_svc_channel_prot credentials.
And if the secure channel has privacy enabled, requests for
rpc_gss_svc_privacy can also be mapped to
rpc_gss_svc_channel_prot."
Any RPCSEC_GSSv3 child context handle that has been bound to a secure
channel in this way SHOULD be used only with the
rpc_gss_svc_channel_prot, and SHOULD NOT be used with
rpc_gss_svc_none nor rpc_gss_svc_integrity -- if the secure channel
does not provide privacy protection then the client MAY use
rpc_gss_svc_privacy where privacy protection is needed or desired.
<CODE BEGINS>
<CODE ENDS>
The client discovers which labels the server supports via the
RPCSEC_GSS_LIST control message.
Asserting a server supported label via RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE
enables server guest mode labels.
Full mode is enabled when an RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE label assertion is
combined with asserting the same label with the NFSv4.2
sec_label attribute.
Label encoding is specified to mirror the NFSv4.2 sec_label attribute
described in Section 12.2.2 of . The
label format specifier (LFS) is an identifier used by the client to
establish the syntactic format of the security label and the
semantic meaning of its components. The policy identifier (PI) is
an optional part of the definition of an LFS which allows for
clients and server to identify specific security policies.
The opaque label field of rgss3_label is dependent on the MAC
model to interpret and enforce.
If a label itself requires privacy protection (i.e., that the user
can assert that label is a secret) then the client MUST use the
rpc_gss_svc_privacy protection service for the RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE
request.
RPCSEC_GSSv3 clients MAY assert a server security label in some LSF by
binding a label assertion to the RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle. This is
done by including an assertion of type rgss3_label in the
RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE rgss3_create_args rca_assertions call data.
Servers that support labeling in the requested LFS MAY
map the requested label to different label as a result of server-side
policy evaluation.
The labels that are accepted by the target and bound to the
RPCSEC_GSSv3 context MUST be enumerated in the rcr_assertions
field of the rgss3_create_res RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE reply.
Servers that do not support labeling or that do not support the
requested LFS reject the label assertion with a reply status of
MSG_DENIED, a reject_status of AUTH_ERROR, and an auth_stat of
RPCSEC_GSS_LABEL_PROBLEM.
<CODE BEGINS>
<CODE ENDS>
A structured privilege is an RPC application defined privilege.
RPCSEC_GSSv3 clients MAY assert a structured privilege by binding
the privilege to the RPCSEC_GSSv3 context handle. This is done by
including an assertion of type rgss3_privs in the RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE
rgss3_create_args rca_assertions call data.
Encoding, server verification and any policies for structured
privileges are described by the RPC application definition.
A successful structured privilege assertion MUST be enumerated in
the rcr_assertions field of the rgss3_create_res
RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE reply.
If a server receives a structured privilege assertion that it
does not recognize the assertion is rejected with a reply
status of MSG_DENIED,
a reject_status of AUTH_ERROR, and an auth_stat of
RPCSEC_GSS_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE.
If a server receives a structured privilege assertion that it
fails to verify according to the requirements of the RPC
application defined behavior, the
assertion is rejected with a reply status of MSG_DENIED, a
reject_status of AUTH_ERROR,
and an auth_stat of RPCSEC_GSS_PRIVILEGE_PROBLEM.
Section 3.4.1.2. "Inter-Server Copy with RPCSEC_GSSv3"
of shows an example of structured
privilege definition and use.
<CODE BEGINS>
<CODE ENDS>
The call data for an RPCSEC_GSS_LIST request consists of a list
of integers (rla_list_what) indicating what assertions to be listed,
and the reply consists of an error or the requested list.
The result of requesting a list of rgss3_list_item LABEL
is a list of LFSs supported by the server. The client can then use
the LFS list to assert labels via the RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE label
assertions. See .
Assertion types may be added in the future by adding arms to the
'rgss3_assertion_u' union.
Other assertion types are described elsewhere and include:
Client-side assertions of identity:
Primary client/user identity
Supplementary group memberships of the client/user, including
support for specifying deltas to the membership list as seen on
the server.
RPCSEC_GSSv3 is a superset of RPCSEC_GSSv2
which in turn is a superset of RPCSEC_GSSv1,
and so can be used in all situations where RPCSEC_GSSv1
or RPCSEC_GSSv2 is used. RPCSEC_GSSv3 should be used when the new
functionality is needed.
This entire document deals with security issues.
The RPCSEC_GSSv3 protocol allows for client-side assertions of data
that is relevant to server-side authorization decisions. These
assertions must be evaluated by the server in the context of whether
the client and/or user are authenticated, whether multi-principal
authentication was used, whether the client is trusted, what ranges
of assertions are allowed for the client and the user (separately or
together), and any relevant server-side policy.
The security semantics of assertions carried by RPCSEC_GSSv3 are
application protocol-specific.
Note that RPSEC_GSSv3 is not a complete solution for labeling: it
conveys the labels of actors, but not the labels of objects. RPC
application protocols may require extending in order to carry object
label information.
There may be interactions with NFSv4's callback security scheme and
NFSv4.1's GSS-API "SSV" mechanisms.
Specifically, the NFSv4 callback
scheme requires that the server initiate GSS-API security contexts,
which does not work well in practice, and in the context of client-
side processes running as the same user but with different privileges
and security labels the NFSv4 callback security scheme seems
particularly unlikely to work well. NFSv4.1 has the server use an
existing, client-initiated RPCSEC_GSS context handle to protect
server-initiated callback RPCs. The NFSv4.1 callback security scheme
lacks all the problems of the NFSv4 scheme, however, it is important
that the server pick an appropriate RPCSEC_GSS context handle to
protect any callbacks. Specifically, it is important that the server
use RPCSEC_GSS context handles which authenticate the client to
protect any callbacks relating to server state initiated by RPCs
protected by RPCSEC_GSSv3 contexts.
As described in Section 2.10.10
the client is permitted to associate multiple RPCSEC_GSS handles
with a single SSV GSS context. RPCSEC_GSSv3 handles will work well
with SSV in that the man-in-the-middle attacks described in
Section 2.10.10 are solved by
the new reply verifier . Using
an RPCSEC_GSSv3 handle backed by a GSS-SSV mechanism context as
a parent handle in an RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE call while permitted
is complicated by the lifetime rules of SSV contexts and their
associated RPCSEC_GSS handles.
There are no IANA considerations in this document.
Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement LevelsHarvard University1350 Mass. Ave.CambridgeMA 02138- +1 617 495 3864sob@harvard.eduRPCSEC_GSS Protocol SpecificationSun Microsystems, Inc.M/S UCOS032550 Garcia AvenueMountain ViewCA 94043+1 (719) 599-9026mre@eng.sun.comSun Microsystems, Inc.M/S UMPK17-2032550 Garcia AvenueMountain ViewCA 94043+1 (415) 786-6465hacker@eng.sun.comSun Microsystems, Inc.M/S UMPK17-2012550 Garcia AvenueMountain ViewCA 94043+1 (415) 786-5084lling@eng.sun.com
Security
generic security serviceremote procedure callsecurity
This memo describes an ONC/RPC security flavor that allows RPC
protocols to access the Generic Security Services Application
Programming Interface (referred to henceforth as GSS-API).
Generic Security Service Application
Program Interface Version 2, Update 1RSA Laboratories20 Crosby DriveBedfordMA01730US+1 781 687 7817jlinn@rsasecurity.comThe Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface (GSS-API), Version 2, as defined in, provides
security services to callers in a generic fashion,
supportable with a range of underlying mechanisms and
technologies and hence allowing source-level portability of
applications to different environments. This specification
defines GSS-API services and primitives at a level
independent of underlying mechanism and programming language
environment, and is to be complemented by other, related
specifications:documents defining specific parameter bindings for
particular language environmentsdocuments defining token formats, protocols, and
procedures to be implemented in order to realize GSS-API
services atop particular security mechanismsThis
memo obsoletes making specific, incremental changes in
response to implementation experience and liaison
requests. It is intended, therefore, that this memo or a
successor version thereto will become the basis for
subsequent progression of the GSS-API specification on the
standards track.NFS Version 4 Minor Version 2Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor Version 1 ProtocolOn the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure ChannelsSun Microsystems, Inc.XDR: External Data Representation StandardNetAppRPCSEC_GSS Version 2NetApp5765 Chase Point CircleColorado SpringsCO 80919+1 (719) 599-9026mike@eisler.com
Security
generic security serviceremote procedure callsecurity
This document describes version 2 of the RPCSEC_GSS protocol.
Version 2 is the same as version 1 (specified in RFC 2203) except
that support for channel bindings has been added. RPCSEC_GSS allows
remote procedure call (RPC) protocols to access the Generic Security
Services Application Programming Interface (GSS-API).
Requirements for Labeled NFS
NetApp
Section 46.6. Multi-Level Security (MLS) of Deployment Guide:
Deployment, configuration and administration of Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 5, Edition 6
The Distributed Trusted Operating System (DTOS) Home Page
National Security Agency
Implementing SELinux Support for NFS
National Security Agency
9800 Savage Rd.Suite 6534Ft. MeadeMD20755-6534jwcart2@tycho.nsa.govRegistry Specification for MAC Security Label FormatsIntegrating rxgk with AFS
Andy Adamson would like to thank NetApp, Inc. for its funding of his
time on this project.
We thank Lars Eggert, Mike Eisler, Ben Kaduk, and Bruce Fields for
their most helpful reviews.
[RFC Editor: please remove this section prior to publishing
this document as an RFC]
[RFC Editor: prior to publishing this document as an RFC, please replace all occurrences of RFCTBD10
with RFCxxxx where xxxx is the RFC number of this document]