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Intended status: Standards Track	Ping Identity
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	June 29, 2017

Mutual TLS Profile for OAuth 2.0

draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-02

Abstract

This document describes Transport Layer Security (TLS) mutual authentication using X.509 certificates as a mechanism for both OAuth client authentication to the token endpoint as well as for sender constrained access to OAuth protected resources.

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1. Introduction

This document describes Transport Layer Security (TLS) mutual authentication using X.509 certificates as a mechanism for both OAuth client authentication to the token endpoint as well as for sender constrained access to OAuth protected resources.

The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [\[RFC6749\]](#) defines a shared secret method of client authentication but also allows for the definition and use of additional client authentication mechanisms when interacting with the authorization server's token endpoint. This document describes an additional mechanism of client authentication utilizing mutual TLS [\[RFC5246\]](#) certificate-based authentication, which provides better security characteristics than shared secrets.

Mutual TLS sender constrained access to protected resources ensures that only the party in possession of the private key corresponding to the certificate can utilize the access token to get access to the associated resources. Such a constraint is unlike the case of the basic bearer token described in [\[RFC6750\]](#), where any party in possession of the access token can use it to access the associated resources. Mutual TLS sender constrained access binds the access token to the client's certificate thus preventing the use of stolen access tokens or replay of access tokens by unauthorized parties.

Mutual TLS sender constrained access tokens and mutual TLS client authentication are distinct mechanisms that don't necessarily need to be deployed together.

1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#).

1.2. Terminology

This specification uses the following phrases interchangeably: [TLS 1.2](#) this requires the client to send Client Certificate and Certificate Verify messages during the TLS handshake and for the server to verify these messages.

Transport Layer Security (TLS) Mutual Authentication

Mutual TLS

These phrases all refer to the process whereby a client uses its X.509 certificate to authenticate itself with a server when negotiating a TLS session. In

2. Mutual TLS for Client Authentication

2.1. Mutual TLS Client Authentication to the Token Endpoint

The following section defines, as an extension of [OAuth 2.0, Section 2.3](#), the use of mutual TLS X.509 client certificates as client credentials. The requirement of mutual TLS for client authentications is determined by the authorization server based on policy or configuration for the given client (regardless of whether the client was dynamically registered or statically configured or otherwise established). OAuth 2.0 requires that access token requests by the client to the token endpoint use TLS. In order to utilize TLS for client authentication, the TLS connection MUST have been established or reestablished with mutual X.509 certificate authentication (i.e. the Client Certificate and Certificate Verify messages are sent during the TLS Handshake [[RFC5246](#)]).

For all access token requests to the token endpoint, regardless of the grant type used, the client MUST include the `client_id` parameter, described in [OAuth 2.0, Section 2.2](#). The presence of the `client_id` parameter enables the authorization server to easily identify the client independently from the content of the certificate and allows for trust models to vary as appropriate for a given deployment. The authorization server can locate the client configuration by the client identifier and check the certificate presented in the TLS Handshake against the expected credentials for that client. As described in [Section 5.2](#), the authorization server MUST enforce some method of binding a certificate to a client.

2.2. Authorization Server Metadata

`tls_client_auth` is used as a new value of the `token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported` metadata parameter to indicate server support for mutual TLS as a client authentication method in authorization server metadata such as [[OpenID.Discovery](#)] and [[I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery](#)].

2.3. Dynamic Client Registration

This draft adds the following values and metadata parameters to [OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration](#).

The value `tls_client_auth` is used to indicate the client's intention to use mutual TLS as an authentication method to the token endpoint for the `token_endpoint_auth_method` client metadata field.

For authorization servers that associate certificates with clients using subject information in the certificate, the following two new metadata parameters can be used:

`tls_client_auth_subject_dn`

An [\[RFC4514\]](#) string representation of the expected subject distinguished name of the certificate the OAuth client will use in mutual TLS authentication.

tls_client_auth_root_dn

An [\[RFC4514\]](#) string representation of a distinguished name that can optionally be used to constrain, for the given client, the expected distinguished name of the root issuer of the client certificate.

For authorization servers that use the key or full certificate to associate clients with certificates, the existing `jwtks_uri` or `jwtks` metadata parameters from [\[RFC7591\]](#) should be used.

3. Mutual TLS Sender Constrained Resources Access

When mutual TLS is used at the token endpoint, the authorization server is able to bind the issued access token to the client certificate. Such a binding is accomplished by associating the certificate with the token in a way that can be accessed by the protected resource, such as embedding the certificate hash in the issued access token directly, using the syntax described in [Section 3.1](#), or through token introspection as described in [Section 3.2](#). Other methods of associating a certificate with an access token are possible, per agreement by the authorization server and the protected resource, but are beyond the scope of this specification.

The client makes protected resource requests as described in [\[RFC6750\]](#), however, those requests MUST be made over a mutually authenticated TLS connection using the same certificate that was used for mutual TLS at the token endpoint.

The protected resource MUST obtain the client certificate used for mutual TLS authentication and MUST verify that the certificate matches the certificate associated with the access token. If they do not match, the resource access attempt MUST be rejected with an error.

3.1. X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint Confirmation Method for JWT

When access tokens are represented as a JSON Web Tokens (JWT)[\[RFC7519\]](#), the certificate hash information SHOULD be represented using the `x5t#S256` confirmation method member defined herein.

To represent the hash of a certificate in a JWT, this specification defines the new JWT Confirmation Method [RFC 7800](#) member `x5t#S256` for the X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint. The value of the `x5t#S256` member is a base64url-encoded SHA-256[\[SHS\]](#) hash (a.k.a. thumbprint or digest) of the DER encoding of the X.509 certificate[\[RFC5280\]](#) (note that certificate thumbprints are also sometimes also known as certificate fingerprints).

The following is an example of a JWT payload containing an `x5t#S256` certificate thumbprint confirmation method.

```
{
  "iss": "https://server.example.com",
  "sub": "ty.webb@example.com",
  "exp": 1493726400,
  "nbf": 1493722800,
  "cnf": {
    "x5t#S256": "bwcK0esc3ACC3DB2Y5_IESsXE8o9ltc05O89jdN-dg2"
  }
}
```

Figure 1: Example claims of a Certificate Thumbprint Constrained JWT

3.2. Confirmation Method for Token Introspection

[OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection](#) defines a method for a protected resource to query an authorization server about the active state of an access token as well as to determine meta-information about the token.

For a mutual TLS sender constrained access token, the hash of the certificate to which the token is bound is conveyed to the protected resource as meta-information in a token introspection response. The hash is conveyed using same structure as the certificate SHA-256 thumbprint confirmation method, described in [Section 3.1](#), as a top-level member of the introspection response JSON. The protected resource compares that certificate hash to a hash of the client certificate used for mutual TLS authentication and rejects the request, if they do not match.

[Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens](#) defined the `cnf` (confirmation) claim, which enables confirmation key information to be carried in a JWT. However, the same proof-of-possession semantics are also useful for introspected access tokens whereby the protected resource obtains the confirmation key data as meta-information of a token introspection response and uses that information in verifying proof-of-possession. Therefore this specification defines and registers proof-of-possession semantics for [OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection](#) using the `cnf` structure. When included as a top-level member of an OAuth token introspection response, `cnf` has the same semantics and format as the claim of the same name defined in [\[RFC7800\]](#). While this specification only explicitly uses the `x5t#S256` confirmation method member, it needed to define and register the higher level `cnf` structure as an introspection response member in order to define and use its more specific `x5t#S256` confirmation method.

The following is an example of an introspection response for an active token with an `x5t#S256` certificate thumbprint confirmation method.

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "active": true,
  "iss": "https://server.example.com",
  "sub": "ty.webb@example.com",
  "exp": 1493726400,
  "nbf": 1493722800,
  "cnf": {
    "x5t#S256": "bwcK0esc3ACC3DB2Y5_IESsXE8o9ltc05O89jdN-dg2"
  }
}
```

Figure 2: Example Introspection Response for a Certificate Constrained Access Token

4. IANA Considerations

4.1. JWT Confirmation Methods Registration

This specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods" registry [\[IANA.JWT.Claims\]](#) for JWT `cnf` member values established by [\[RFC7800\]](#).

4.1.1. Registry Contents

- Confirmation Method Value: `x5t#S256`
- Confirmation Method Description: X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint
- Change Controller: IESG
- Specification Document(s): [Section 3.1](#) of [\[\[this specification \]\]](#)

4.2. Token Endpoint Authentication Method Registration

This specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry [[IANA.OAuth.Parameters](#)] established by [[RFC7591](#)].

4.2.1. Registry Contents

- Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: `tls_client_auth`
- Change Controller: IESG
- Specification Document(s): [Section 2.2](#) of [[this specification]]

4.3. OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration

This specification requests registration of the following value in the IANA "OAuth Token Introspection Response" registry [[IANA.OAuth.Parameters](#)] established by [[RFC7662](#)].

4.3.1. Registry Contents

- Claim Name: `cnf`
- Claim Description: Confirmation
- Change Controller: IESG
- Specification Document(s): [Section 3.2](#) of [[this specification]]

4.4. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration

This specification requests registration of the following client metadata definitions in the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata" registry [[IANA.OAuth.Parameters](#)] established by [[RFC7591](#)]:

4.4.1. Registry Contents

- Client Metadata Name: `tls_client_auth_subject_dn`
- Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the expected subject distinguished name of the client certificate.
- Change Controller: IESG
- Specification Document(s): [Section 2.3](#) of [[this specification]]
- Client Metadata Name: `tls_client_auth_root_dn`
- Client Metadata Description: String value specifying the expected distinguished name of the root issuer of the client certificate
- Change Controller: IESG
- Specification Document(s): [Section 2.3](#) of [[this specification]]

5. Security Considerations

5.1. TLS Versions and Best Practices

[TLS 1.2](#) is cited in this document because, at the time of writing, it is latest version that is widely deployed. However, this document is applicable with other TLS versions supporting certificate-based client authentication. Implementation security considerations for TLS, including version recommendations, can be found in [Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security \(TLS\) and Datagram Transport Layer Security \(DTLS\)](#).

5.2. Client Identity Binding by the Authorization Server

No specific method of binding a certificate to a client identifier at the token endpoint is prescribed by this document. However, some method MUST be employed so that, in addition to proving possession of the private key corresponding to the certificate, the client identity is also bound to the certificate. One such binding would be to configure for the client a value that the certificate must contain in the subject field and possibly the expected trust anchor. An alternative method would be to configure a public key for the client directly that would have to match the subject public key info of the certificate.

6. References

6.1. Normative References

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- [SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "[Secure Hash Standard \(SHS\)](#)", FIPS PUB 180-4, March 2012.

6.2. Informative References

- [I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery] Jones, M., Sakimura, N. and J. Bradley, "[OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata](#)", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-oauth-discovery-04, August 2016.
- [IANA.JWT.Claims] IANA, "[JSON Web Token Claims](#)"
- [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] IANA, "[OAuth Parameters](#)"
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- [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura, "[JSON Web Token \(JWT\)](#)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015.
- [RFC7591] Richer, J., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M. and P. Hunt, "[OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol](#)", RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015.
- [RFC7662] Richer, J., "[OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection](#)", RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015.

Appendix A. Acknowledgements

Scott "not Tomlinson" Tomilson and Matt Peterson were involved in design and development work on a

mutual TLS OAuth client authentication implementation that informed some of the content of this document.

Additionally, the authors would like to thank the following people for their input and contributions to the specification: Sergey Beryozkin, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Samuel Erdtman, Phil Hunt, Sean Leonard, Kepeng Li, James Manger, Jim Manico, Nov Matake, Sascha Preibisch, Justin Richer, Dave Tonge, and Hannes Tschofenig.

Appendix B. Document(s) History

[[to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC]]

draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-02

- Fixed editorial issue <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/U46UMeh8XIOQnvXY9pHFq1MKPns>
- Changed the title (hopefully "Mutual TLS Profile for OAuth 2.0" is better than "Mutual TLS Profiles for OAuth Clients").

draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-01

- Added more explicit details of using RFC 7662 token introspection with mutual TLS sender constrained access tokens.
- Added an IANA OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration request for "cnf".
- Specify that `tls_client_auth_subject_dn` and `tls_client_auth_root_dn` are RFC 4514 String Representation of Distinguished Names.
- Changed `tls_client_auth_issuer_dn` to `tls_client_auth_root_dn`.
- Changed the text in the [Section 3](#) to not be specific about using a hash of the cert.
- Changed the abbreviated title to 'OAuth Mutual TLS' (previously was the acronym MTLSPOC).

draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-00

- Created the initial working group version from draft-campbell-oauth-mtls

draft-campbell-oauth-mtls-01

- Fix some typos.
- Add to the acknowledgements list.

draft-campbell-oauth-mtls-00

- Add a Mutual TLS sender constrained protected resource access method and a `x5t#S256` cnf method for JWT access tokens (concepts taken in part from draft-sakimura-oauth-jpop-04).
- Fixed `"token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported"` to `"token_endpoint_auth_method"` for client metadata.
- Add `"tls_client_auth_subject_dn"` and `"tls_client_auth_issuer_dn"` client metadata parameters and mention using `"jwks_uri"` or `"jwks"`.
- Say that the authentication method is determined by client policy regardless of whether the client was dynamically registered or statically configured.
- Expand acknowledgements to those that participated in discussions around draft-campbell-oauth-tls-client-auth-00
- Add Nat Sakimura and Torsten Lodderstedt to the author list.

draft-campbell-oauth-tls-client-auth-00

- Initial draft.

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