Internet-Draft PP http api July 2021
Valdez Expires 13 January 2022 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-ietf-privacypass-http-api-01
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Author:
S. Valdez
Google LLC

Privacy Pass HTTP API

Abstract

This document specifies an integration for Privacy Pass over an HTTP API, along with recommendations on how key commitments are stored and accessed by HTTP-based consumers.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 13 January 2022.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The Privacy Pass protocol as described in [draft-ietf-privacypass-protocol] can be integrated with a number of different settings, from server to server communication to browsing the internet.

In this document, we will provide an API to use for integrating Privacy Pass with an HTTP framework. Providing the format of HTTP requests and responses needed to implement the Privacy Pass protocol.

1.1. Terminology

We use the same definition of server and client that is used in [draft-ietf-privacypass-protocol] and [draft-ietf-privacypass-architecture].

We assume that all protocol messages are encoded into raw byte format before being sent. We use the TLS presentation language [RFC8446] to describe the structure of protocol messages.

1.2. Layout

  • Section 2: Describes the wrapping of messages within HTTP requests/responses.
  • Section 3: Describes how HTTP clients retrieve server configurations and key commitments.
  • Section 5: Describes how issuance requests are performed via a HTTP API.
  • Section 6: Describes how redemption requests are performed via a HTTP API.

1.3. Requirements

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Privacy Pass HTTP API Wrapping

Messages from HTTP-based clients to HTTP-based servers are performed as GET and POST requests. The messages are sent via the Sec-Privacy-Pass header.

Sec-Privacy-Pass is a Dictionary Structured Header [draft-ietf-httpbis-header-structure-15]. The dictionary has two keys:

Note that the requests may contain addition Headers, request data and URL parameters that are not specified here, these extra fields should be ignored, though may be used by the server to determine whether to fulfill the requested issuance/redemption.

3. Server key registry

A client SHOULD fetch a server's current public key information prior to performing issuance and redemption. This configuration is accessible via a CONFIG_ENDPOINT, either provided by the server or by a global registry that provides consistency and anonymization guarantees.

3.1. Key Registry

To ensure that a server isn't providing different views of their public key material to different users, servers are expected to write their commitments to a verifiable data structure.

Using a verifiable log-backed map ([verifiable-data-structures]), the server can publish their commitments to the log in a way that clients can detect when the server is attempting to provide a split-view of their key commitments to different clients.

The key to the map is the server_origin, with the value being:

struct {
    opaque public_key<1..2^16-1>;
    uint64 expiry;
    uint8 supported_methods; # 3:Issue/Redeem, 2:Redeem, 1:Issue
    opaque signature<1..2^16-1>;
} KeyCommitment;

struct {
    opaque server_id<1..2^16-1>;
    uint16 ciphersuite;
    opaque verification_key<1..2^16-1>;
    KeyCommitment commitments<1..2^16-1>;
}

The addition to the log is made via a signed message to the log operator, which verifies the authenticity against a public key associated with that server origin (either via the Web PKI or a out-of-band key). The signature should be computed under a long-term signing key that is associated with the server identity.

The server SHOULD then store an inclusion proof of the current key commitment so that it can present it when delivering the key commitment directly to the client or when the key commitment is being delivered by a delegated party (other registries/preloaded configuration lists/etc).

The client can then perform a request for the key commitment against either the global registry or the server as described in Section 4. Note that the signature should be verified by the client to ensure that the key material is owned by the server. This requires that the client know the public verification key that is associated with the server.

To avoid user segregation as a result of server configuration/commitment rotation, the log operator SHOULD enforce limits on how many active commitments exist and how quickly the commitments are being rotated. Clients SHOULD reject configurations/commitments that violate their requirements for avoiding user segregation. These considerations are discussed as part of [draft-ietf-privacypass-architecture].

3.2. Server Configuration Retrieval

Inputs: - server_origin: The origin to retrieve a server configuration for.

No outputs.

  1. The client makes an anonymous GET request to CONFIG_ENDPOINT/.well-known/privacy-pass with a message of type fetch-config and a body of: 
struct {
    opaque server_origin<1..2^16-1>;
}
  1. The server looks up the configuration associated with the origin server_origin and responds with a message of type config and a body of: 
struct {
    opaque server_id<1..2^16-1>;
    uint16 ciphersuite;
    opaque commitment_id<1..2^8-1>;
    opaque verification_key<1..2^16-1>;
}
  1. The client then stores the associated configuration state under the corresponding server_origin.

(TODO: This might be mergable with key commitment retrieval if server_id = server_origin)

4. Key Commitment Retrieval

The client SHOULD retrieve server key commitments prior to both an issuance and redemption to verify the consistency of the keys and to monitor for key rotation between issuance and redemption events.

Inputs: - server_origin: The origin to retrieve a key commitment for.

No outputs.

  1. The client fetches the configuration state server_id, ciphersuite, commitment_id associated with server_origin.
  2. The client makes an anonymous GET request to CONFIG_ENDPOINT/.well-known/privacy-pass with a message of type fetch-commitment and a body of: 
struct {
    opaque server_id<1..2^16-1> = server_id;
    opaque commitment_id<1..2^8-1> = commitment_id;
}
  1. The server looks up the current configuration, and constructs a list of commitments to return, noting whether a key commitment is valid for issuance or redemption or both.
  2. The server then responds with a message of type commitment and a body of: 
struct {
    opaque public_key<1..2^16-1>;
    uint64 expiry;
    uint8 supported_methods; # 3:Issue/Redeem, 2:Redeem, 1:Issue
    opaque signature<1..2^16-1>;
} KeyCommitment;

struct {
    opaque server_id<1..2^16-1>;
    uint16 ciphersuite;
    opaque verification_key<1..2^16-1>;
    KeyCommitment commitments<1..2^16-1>;
    opaque inclusion_proofs<1..2^16-1>;
}
  1. The client then verifies the signature for each key commitment and stores the list of commitments to the current scope. The client SHOULD NOT cache the commitments beyond the current scope, as new commitments should be fetched for each independent issuance and redemption request. The client SHOULD verify the inclusion_proofs to confirm that the key commitment has been submitted to a trusted registry. Once the client receives the ciphersuite for the server, it should implement all Privacy Pass API functions (as detailed in [draft-ietf-privacypass-protocol]) using this ciphersuite.

5. Privacy Pass Issuance

Inputs: - server_origin: The origin to request token issuance from. - count: The number of tokens to request issuance for.

Outputs: - tokens: A list of tokens that have been signed via the Privacy Pass protocol.

  1. When a client wants to request tokens from a server, it should first fetch a key commitment from the server via the process described in Section 4 and keep the result as commitment.
  2. The client should then call the Generate function requesting count tokens storing the resulting input data.
  3. The client then makes a POST request to <server_origin>/.well-known/privacy-pass with a message of type request-issuance and a body of: 
enum { Normal(0) } IssuanceType;

struct {
    IssuanceType type = 0;
    opaque msg<0..2^16-1> = input.msg;
}
  1. The server, upon receipt of the request should call the Issue function with the public_key, secret_key and the value of msg with a result of resp.
  2. The server should then respond to the POST request with a message of type issue and a body of: 
struct {
    IssuanceType type = request.type;
    IssuanceResp resp = resp;
}
  1. The client should then should call the Process function with the public_key, stored inputs and resulting resp, to extract a list of redemption_tokens.
  2. The client should store the public_key associated with these tokens and the elements of redemption_tokens under storage partitioned by the server_origin, accessible only via the Privacy Pass API.

6. Privacy Pass Redemption

There are two forms of Privacy Pass redemption that could function under the HTTP API. Either passing along a token directly to the target endpoint, which would perform its own redemption Section 6.1, or the client redeeming the token and passing the result along to the target endpoint. These two methods are described below.

In the HTTP ecosystem, redemption contexts should generally be keyed by the same privacy boundary used for cookies and other local storage. Generally this is the top-level origin. Any redemption context should be built following the principles outlined in [draft-ietf-privacypass-architecture] and later in Section 8.

6.1. Generic Token Redemption

Inputs: - context: The request context to use. - server_id: The server ID to redeem a token against. - ciphersuite: The ciphersuite for this token. - public_key: The public key associated with this token. - redemption_token: A Privacy Pass token. - info: Additional data to bind to this token redemption.

Outputs: - result: The result of the redemption from the server.

  1. The client should check whether the server_id is present in the context. If it isn't and the size of the context is beneath the client's limit, it should be added.
  2. The client should call the Redeem function with redemption_token and additional data of info storing the resulting data and tag.
  3. The client makes a POST request to <server_origin>/.well-known/privacy-pass with a message of type token-redemption and a body of: 
struct {
    opaque server_id<1..2^16-1> = server_id;
    opaque data<1..2^16-1> = data;
    opaque tag<1..2^16-1> = tag;
    opaque info<1..2^16-1> = info;
}
  1. The server, upon receipt of request should call the Verify interface with public_key, secret_key and the received data, tag, info storing the resulting resp.
  2. The server should then respond to the POST request with a message of type redemption-result and a signed body of: 
struct {
    opaque info<1..2^16-1> = info;
    uint8 result = resp;
    // signature of info and result using
    // the server's verification key.
    opaque signature<1..2^16-1>;
}
  1. The client upon receipt of this message should verify the signature using the verification_key from the configuration and return the result.

6.2. Direct Redemption

Inputs: - context: The request context to use. - server_origin: The server origin to redeem a token for. - target: The target endpoint to send the token to. - additional_data: Additional data to bind to this redemption request.

  1. When a client wants to redeem tokens for a server, it should first fetch a key commitment from the server via the process described in Section 4 and keep the result as commitment.
  2. The client should then look up the storage partition associated with server_origin and fetch a redemption_token and public_key.
  3. The client should verify that the public_key is in the current commitment. If not, it should discard the token and fail the redemption attempt.
  4. As part of the request to target, the client will include the token as part of the request in the Sec-Privacy-Pass header along with whatever other parameters are being passed as part of the request to target. The header will contain a message of type token-redemption with a body of: 
struct {
    opaque server_id<1..2^16-1> = server_id;
    uint16 ciphersuite = ciphersuite;
    opaque public_key<1..2^16-1> = public_key;
    RedemptionToken token<1..2^16-1> = redemption_token;
    opaque additional_data<1..2^16-1> = additional_data;
}

At this point, the target can perform a generic redemption as described in Section 6.1 by forwarding the message included in the request to target.

6.3. Delegated Redemption

Inputs: - context: The request context to use. - server_origin: The server origin to redeem a token for. - target: The target endpoint to send the token to. - additional_data: Additional data to bind to this redemption request.

  1. When a client wants to redeem tokens for a server, it should first fetch a key commitment from the server via the process described in Section 4 and keep the result as commitment.
  2. The client should then look up the storage partition associated with server_origin and fetch a redemption_token and public_key.
  3. The client should verify that the public_key is in the current commitment. If not, it should discard the token and fail the redemption attempt.
  4. The client constructs a bytestring info made up of the target, the current timestamp, and additional_data: 
struct {
    opaque target<1..2^16-1>;
    uint64 timestamp;
    opaque additional_data<0..2^16-1>;
}
  1. The client then performs a token redemption as described in Section 6.1. Storing the resulting redemption-result message.
  2. As part of the request to target, the client will include the redemption result as part of the request in the Sec-Privacy-Pass header along with whatever other parameters are being passed as part of the request to target. The header will contain a message of type signed-redemption-result with a body of: 
struct {
    opaque server_origin<1..2^16-1>;
    opaque target<1..2^16-1>;
    uint64 timestamp;
    opaque additional_data<1..2^16-1> = additional_data;
    opaque signed_redemption<1..2^16-1>;
}

At this point, the target can verify the integrity of signed_redemption.info based on the values of target, timestamp, and additional_data and verify the signature of the redemption result by querying the current configuration of the Privacy Pass server. The inclusion of target and timestamp proves that the server attested to the validity of the token in relation to this particular request.

7. Security Considerations

Security considerations for Privacy Pass are discussed in [draft-ietf-privacypass-architecture].

8. Privacy considerations

General privacy considerations for Privacy Pass are discussed in [draft-ietf-privacypass-architecture].

In order to implement this API with redemption contexts, a client needs to maintain strong privacy boundaries between different redemption contexts to avoid privacy leakage from redemptions across them. Notably in the web/HTTP world, cross-site tracking and fingerprinting will need to be considered and mitigated in order to maintain these privacy boundaries.

9. IANA Considerations

9.1. Well-Known URI

This specification registers a new well-known URI.

URI suffix: "privacy-pass"

Change controller: IETF.

Specification document(s): this specification

10. Normative References

[draft-ietf-httpbis-header-structure-15]
Nottingham, M. and P-H. Kamp, "Structured Headers for HTTP", n.d., <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-header-structure-15>.
[draft-ietf-privacypass-architecture]
Davidson, A., "Privacy Pass: Architectural Framework", n.d., <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-privacypass-architecture-00>.
[draft-ietf-privacypass-protocol]
Davidson, A., "Privacy Pass: The Protocol", n.d., <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-privacypass-protocol-00>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8446]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[verifiable-data-structures]
"Verifiable Data Structures", n.d., <https://github.com/google/trillian/blob/master/docs/papers/VerifiableDataStructures.pdf>.

Author's Address

Steven Valdez
Google LLC