Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Kong, D. Internet Draft Seo, K. Expires: October 2010 Kent, S. Intended Status: BCP BBN Technologies March 8, 2010 Template for an Internet Service Provider's Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the Resource PKI (RPKI) draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-04.txt Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html This Internet-Draft will expire on October 31, 2010. Abstract This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Service Provider (ISP) that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). Conventions used in this document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119]. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 Table of Contents Preface...........................................................7 1. Introduction...................................................8 1.1. Overview..................................................8 1.2. Document name and identification..........................9 1.3. PKI participants..........................................9 1.3.1. Certification authorities............................9 1.3.2. Registration authorities.............................9 1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................10 1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................10 1.3.5. Other participants..................................10 1.4. Certificate usage........................................10 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................10 1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................10 1.5. Policy administration....................................11 1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............11 1.5.2. Contact person......................................11 1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...11 1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................11 1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................11 2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................13 2.1. Repositories.............................................13 2.2. Publication of certification information.................13 2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................13 2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................13 3. Identification And Authentication.............................15 3.1. Naming...................................................15 3.1.1. Types of names......................................15 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................15 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............15 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........15 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................15 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.16 3.2. Initial identity validation..............................16 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........16 3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............16 3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............16 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................17 3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................17 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................17 3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....17 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key17 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation.................................................18 3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.18 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 4.1. Certificate Application..................................19 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19 4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions19 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...19 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20 4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate................................................20 4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities...................................................20 4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................20 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........20 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............20 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................20 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21 4.6. Certificate renewal......................................21 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................21 4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................21 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber22 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate ...........................................................22 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....22 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities...................................................22 4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................22 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................22 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...23 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........23 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber23 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate................................................23 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...24 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities...................................................24 4.8. Certificate modification.................................24 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............24 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........24 4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber.................................................25 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate ...........................................................25 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...25 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities...................................................25 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25 4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................25 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................26 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request ...........................................................26 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.26 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................26 4.10. Certificate status services.............................26 5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls................27 5.1. Physical controls........................................27 5.1.1. Site location and construction......................27 5.1.2. Physical access.....................................27 5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................27 5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................27 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................27 5.1.6. Media storage.......................................27 5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................27 5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................27 5.2. Procedural controls......................................27 5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................27 5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................27 5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....27 5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................27 5.3. Personnel controls.......................................27 5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements28 5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................28 5.3.3. Training requirements...............................28 5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............28 5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................28 5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................28 5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................28 5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................28 5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................28 5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................28 5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................28 5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................29 5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................29 5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................29 5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]..................................................29 5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....29 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................29 5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................29 5.6. Key changeover...........................................29 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............29 5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................29 6. Technical Security Controls...................................30 6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................30 6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................30 6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................30 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........30 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........30 6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................31 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking31 6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)31 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls......................................................31 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........31 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......31 6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................31 6.2.4. Private key backup..................................32 6.2.5. Private key archival................................32 6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module ...........................................................32 6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........32 6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................32 6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................32 6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................32 6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................33 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................33 6.3.1. Public key archival.................................33 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods....................................................33 6.4. Activation data..........................................33 6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........33 6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................33 6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................33 6.5. Computer security controls...............................33 6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....33 6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................34 6.6.1. System development controls.........................34 6.6.2. Security management controls........................34 6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................34 6.7. Network security controls................................34 6.8. Time-stamping............................................34 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................35 8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................36 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................36 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................36 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............36 8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................36 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................36 8.6. Communication of results.................................36 9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................37 9.1. Fees.....................................................38 9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................38 9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............38 9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................38 9.2. Financial responsibility.................................38 9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................38 9.2.2. Other assets........................................38 9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....38 9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................38 9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................38 9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information................................................38 9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..38 9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................38 9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................38 9.4.2. Information treated as private......................38 9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................38 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......38 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......38 9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process....................................................38 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........38 9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............38 9.6. Representations and warranties...........................38 9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................38 9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........39 9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........39 9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................39 9.8. Limitations of liability.................................39 9.9. Indemnities..............................................39 9.10. Term and termination....................................39 9.10.1. Term...............................................39 9.10.2. Termination........................................39 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................39 9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.39 9.12. Amendments..............................................39 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................39 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................39 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................39 9.14. Governing law...........................................39 9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................39 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................39 9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................39 9.16.2. Assignment.........................................39 9.16.3. Severability.......................................39 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).39 9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................39 10. Security Considerations......................................39 11. IANA Considerations..........................................40 12. Acknowledgments..............................................40 13. References...................................................41 13.1. Normative References....................................41 13.2. Informative References..................................41 Author's Addresses...............................................42 Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer.....................................42 Copyright Statement..............................................43 Preface This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Service Provider that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). The user of this document should 1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., '' Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)'' with date, author, etc. 2. leave the table of contents 3. delete this Preface 4. fill in the information indicated below by 5. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a reference section with just the references in 13.2 6. update the table of contents to reflect the changes required by steps 4 and 5 above . Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 the section numbering scheme employed in the RFC to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC. [There are 4 sub-sections that I haven't removed yet due to Word problems.) 1. Introduction This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of . It describes the practices employed by the Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). These practices are defined in accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, [RFCxxxx]) of this PKI. The RPKI is designed to support validation of claims by current holders of Internet Number Resources (INRs, see definition in 1.7) in accordance with the records of the organizations that act as CAs in this PKI. The ability to verify such claims is essential to ensuring the unique, unambiguous distribution of these resources This PKI parallels the existing INR distribution hierarchy. These resources are distributed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries. In some regions, National Internet Registries (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy below the RIRs for internet number resource (INR) distribution. ISPs and network subscribers form additional tiers below registries. 1.1. Overview This CPS describes: . Participants . Publication of the certificates and CRLs . How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked . Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.) . Key management . Audit procedures . Business and legal issues Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see IETF document draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details): . CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for each subscriber . End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use to validate digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects (see definition in 1.7). . In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in support of access control for the repository system as described in 2.4. 1.2. Document name and identification The name of this document is '''s Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)''. 1.3. PKI participants Note: In a PKI, the term ''subscriber'' refers to an individual or organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives service from an ISP. In such cases the term ''network subscriber'' will be used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though some of them are individuals. 1.3.1. Certification authorities portion of the RPKI. It provides a secure revocation and recovery capability in case the production CA is compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus the offline CA issues certificates only to instances of the production CA; and the CRLs it issues are used to revoke only certificates issued to the production CA. The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to members, to whom INRs have been distributed.> 1.3.2. Registration authorities 1.3.3. Subscribers The primary types of organizations that receive distributions of INRs from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense are network subscribers. 1.3.4. Relying parties Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or RPKI- signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties. Relying parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See section 1.7 for the definition of an RPKI-signed object.) 1.3.5. Other participants operates a repository that holds certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI-signed objects, then indicate this here.> 1.4. Certificate usage 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs. Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal cited above, are also permitted under the RPKI certificate policy. Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access control for the repository system as described in 2.4. Such uses also are permitted under the RPKI certificate policy. 1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 1.5. Policy administration 1.5.1. Organization administering the document This CPS is administered by 1.5.2. Contact person 1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the distribution hence they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding. 1.5.4. CPS approval procedures Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the distribution hence they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding. 1.6. Definitions and acronyms BPKI - Business PKI: A BPKI is an optional additional PKI used to identify members to whom RPKI certificates can be issued. CP- Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of applications with common security requirements. CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs in issuing certificates. Distribution of INRs - - A process of distribution of the INRs along the respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of IP addresses and Autonomous System Numbers to the five Regional Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations within their service regions, who in turn distribute IP addresses to their customers. IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing systems and Autonomous System (AS) numbers used for routing internet traffic. IANA distributes INRs to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). INRs - Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three protocol parameter sets, namely: . IP Version 4 addresses, . IP version 6 addresses, and . Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently Border Gateway Protocol-4 Autonomous System numbers. ISP - - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing and selling Internet services to other organizations. NIR - - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that manages the distribution of INRs for a portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. NIRs form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage INR distribution. RIR - Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organization that manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area. RPKI-signed object - - An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed data object (other than a certificate or CRL) declared to be such by a standards track RFC, and that can be validated using certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of these data constructs depend on the context in which validation of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place. Examples of these objects are repository manifests and CRLs. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities 2.1. Repositories As per the CP, certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects MUST be made available for downloading by all relying parties, to enable them to validate this data. RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects via a repository that is accessible via RSYNC at rpki..net.''> 2.2. Publication of certification information MUST publish certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects issued by it to a repository that operates as part of a world-wide distributed system of repositories. will also publish to this repository system any RPKI-signed objects that it creates. 2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication As per the CP, the following standard exists for publication times and frequency: The CA MUST publish its CRL prior to the nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA. 2.4. Access controls on repositories Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data (certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects) published to a repository are digitally signed RPKI items that issues MUST be published to the repository that it runs by means not accessible to the outside world. offers Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 repository services to its subscribers, then Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 3. Identification And Authentication 3.1. Naming 3.1.1. Types of names The Subject of each certificate issued by this ISP is identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). The distinguished name will consist of a single Common Name (CN) attribute with a value generated by . Optionally, the serialNumber attribute may be included along with the common name (to form a terminal relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive instances of certificates associated with the same entity. 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique relative to all certificates issued by . However, there is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique in this PKI. Also, the name of the subscriber need not to be ''meaningful'' in the conventional, human-readable sense. The certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in support of applications that make use of attestations of Internet resource holding, not for identification 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers Although Subject names in certificates issued by this ISP need not be meaningful, and may appear ''random,'' anonymity is not a function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature is provided. 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms None 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names certifies Subject names that are unique among the certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor enforced through technical means. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is no provision to either recognize or authenticate trademarks, service marks, etc. 3.2. Initial identity validation 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key issuing the certificate. One possible approach makes use of the PKCS #10 format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This request format requires that the PKCS #10 request be signed using the (RSA) private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate request. This mechanism provides proof of possession by the requester.> 3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the organizational identity of subscribers, with the exception of registries. However, certificates are issued to subscribers in a fashion that preserves the accuracy of distributions of INRs in this records. subscriber database that maintains the resource distribution records. The certificate request could be matched against the database record for the subscriber in question, and an RPKI certificate would be issued only if the resources requested were a subset of those held by the subscriber. The specific procedures employed for this purpose should be commensurate with those you already employ as an ISP in the maintenance of INR distribution.> 3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual identity of a subscriber. However, maintains contact information for each subscriber in support of certificate renewal, rekey, or revocation. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that MUST be used to identify individuals who represent subscribers.'' The procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives for INR holders. Note that this authentication is solely for use by you in dealing with the organizations to which you distribute (or sub-distribute) INRs, and thus must not be relied upon outside of this CA-subscriber relationship.> 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued under this certificate policy except for SIA/AIA extensions. 3.2.5. Validation of authority 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any other PKI. 3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation 3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request Note that if a subscriber requests a new INR distribution, an existing RPKI certificate issued to the subscriber is NOT revoked, so long as the set of INRs distributed to the subscriber did not ''shrink,'' i.e., the new INRs are a superset of the old INR set. However, if a new INR distribution results in ''shrinkage'' of the set of INRs distributed to a subscriber, this triggers an implicit revocation of the old RPKI certificate(s) associated with that subscriber. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements 4.1. Certificate Application 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application Any subscriber who holds INRs distributed by this ISP may submit a certificate application to this CA. 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities 4.2. Certificate application processing 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications 4.3. Certificate issuance 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is published. 4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities 4.4. Certificate acceptance 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance When a certificate is issued, the CA MUST publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without subscriber review and acceptance. 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA Certificates MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository system once issued following the conduct described in 4.4.1. This will be done within . 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 20] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage The certificates issued by to subscribers are CA certificates. The private key associated with each of these certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and CRLs. Subscribers who are ISPs will issue CA certificates to any organizations to which they in turn distribute INRs, one or more end entity (EE) certificates for use in verifying signatures on RPKI- signed objects signed by the suscriber, and end entity certificates to operators in support of repository access control. Non-ISP INR holders will issue just the latter two kinds of certificates since they will not be distributing INRs to other organizations. 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage The primary relying parties in this PKI are organizations who will use EE certificates to verify RPKI-signed objects. Repositories will use operator certificates to verify the authorization of entities to engage in repository maintenance activities, and thus repositories represent a secondary type of relying party. 4.6. Certificate renewal 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate Subject. If initiates the renewal process based on the certificate expiration date, then will notify the subscriber The validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the previous certificate by , to ensure uninterrupted coverage. Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of Section 4.7 will apply. 4.6.2. Who may request renewal The subscriber or may initiate the renewal process. 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is published 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate When a renewal certificate is issued, the CA MUST publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without subscriber review and acceptance. 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities 4.7. Certificate re-key 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when required, based on: Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated private key, or 2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key pair If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time. If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous certificate will be revoked. Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that exceeds the validity period of the certificate. This places additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key. 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key Only the subscriber may request a re-key. In addition, may initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise report. BPKI. Describe how a compromise report received from other than a subscriber is verified.> 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will publish it in the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without subscriber review and acceptance. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities 4.8. Certificate modification 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate. A subscriber can request a certificate modification when this information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a result of changes in the INR holdings of the subscriber. If a subscriber is to receive a distribution of INRs in addition to a current distribution, and if the subscriber does not request that a new certificate be issued containing only these additional INRs, then this is accomplished through a certificate modification. When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued. The new certificate will contain the same public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate, but with the incidental information corrected and/or the INR distribution expanded. When previously distributed INRs are to be removed from a certificate, then the old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting the new distribution) issued. 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification The subscriber or may initiate the certificate modification process. 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without subscriber review and acceptance. 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities or the subject may choose to end the relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to revoke the certificate. If one or more of the INRs bound to the public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation. A certificate also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Finally, a certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by the private key associated with that certificate. 4.9.2. Who can request revocation The subscriber or may request a revocation. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request .> 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the need for revocation has been identified. 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate. 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency < Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be published at or before that time. will set the nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the next scheduled CRL will be issued. 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs A CRL will be published to the repository system within after generation. 4.10. Certificate status services does not support OCSP or SCVP. issues CRLs. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 26] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls 5.1. Physical controls 5.1.1. Site location and construction 5.1.2. Physical access 5.1.3. Power and air conditioning 5.1.4. Water exposures 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection 5.1.6. Media storage 5.1.7. Waste disposal 5.1.8. Off-site backup 5.2. Procedural controls 5.2.1. Trusted roles 5.2.2. Number of persons required per task 5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role 5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties 5.3. Personnel controls Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements 5.3.2. Background check procedures 5.3.3. Training requirements 5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements 5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence 5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions 5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements 5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel 5.4. Audit logging procedures 5.4.1. Types of events recorded Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the certification authority computing equipment. Audit records will include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary content data relating to the event. Auditable events include: . Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout) . Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications) . Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions . Posting of any material to a repository . Any attempts to change or delete audit data 5.4.2. Frequency of processing log Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 5.4.3. Retention period for audit log 5.4.4. Protection of audit log 5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures 5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED] 5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED] 5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments 5.5. Records archival [OMITTED] 5.6. Key changeover The CA certificate will contain a validity period that is at least as long as that of any certificate being issued under that certificate. When CA wishes to change keys, will create a new signature key pair, and acquire and publish a new certificate containing the public key of the pair, in advance of the scheduled change of the current signature key pair. 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED] 5.8. CA or RA termination Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 6. Technical Security Controls This section describes the security controls used by . 6.1. Key pair generation and installation 6.1.1. Key pair generation 6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer RPKI CA. These procedures should ensure that the public key has not been altered during transit and that the subscriber possesses the private key corresponding to the transferred public key. > 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are contained in certificates issued by other CAs and MUST be published to the RPKI repository system. Relying parties MUST download these certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data for (putative) trust anchors MUST be distributed out of band and accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally-defined criteria, e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made available to the Internet community. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 6.1.5. Key sizes The key sizes used in this PKI are as specified in RFC ZZZZ [RFCzzzz]. 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking The public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI are as specified in RFC ZZZZ [RFCzzzz]. is not responsible for performing such checks for subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking the quality of these subscriber key pairs.> 6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field) The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 5280. For 's CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) will be set FALSE, and the extension will be marked critical. 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls The CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated under FIPS 140-2/3, at level 2 or 3 [FIPS]. 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control out of multi-person control.''> 6.2.3. Private key escrow No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 6.2.4. Private key backup 6.2.5. Private key archival See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module The private key for 's production CA MUST be generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1. The private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted form for backup and/or transfer to a new module. 6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module The private key for 's production CA MUST be stored in the cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorized use in accordance with the FIPS 140-2/3 requirements applicable to the module. (See [FIPS]) 6.2.8. Method of activating private key 6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left unattended. After use, it will be deactivated by The module will be stored securely when not in use. 6.2.10. Method of destroying private key Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 32] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating The cryptographic module will be certified FIPS 140-2/3, at level 2 or 3 [FIPS]. 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management 6.3.1. Public key archival Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need to archive public keys. 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods The CA's key pair will have a validity interval of 6.4. Activation data 6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation 6.4.2. Activation data protection Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by . 6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data 6.5. Computer security controls 6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 33] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 6.6. Life cycle technical controls 6.6.1. System development controls 6.6.2. Security management controls 6.6.3. Life cycle security controls 6.7. Network security controls 6.8. Time-stamping The RPKI does not make use of time stamping. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 34] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy]. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 35] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity 8.4. Topics covered by assessment 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency 8.6. Communication of results Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 36] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 9. Other Business And Legal Matters Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 37] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 9.1. Fees 9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees 9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable) 9.1.3. Refund policy 9.2. Financial responsibility 9.2.1. Insurance coverage 9.2.2. Other assets 9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities 9.3. Confidentiality of business information 9.3.1. Scope of confidential information 9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information 9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information 9.4. Privacy of personal information 9.4.1. Privacy plan 9.4.2. Information treated as private 9.4.3. Information not deemed private 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information 9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances 9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable) 9.6. Representations and warranties 9.6.1. CA representations and warranties Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 38] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties 9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties 9.7. Disclaimers of warranties 9.8. Limitations of liability 9.9. Indemnities 9.10. Term and termination 9.10.1. Term 9.10.2. Termination 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival 9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants 9.12. Amendments 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions 9.14. Governing law 9.15. Compliance with applicable law 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions 9.16.1. Entire agreement 9.16.2. Assignment 9.16.3. Severability 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights) 9.16.5. Force Majeure 10. Security Considerations Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 39] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can include the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is done in a secure manner. Specifically, Section 3 Identification and Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7 Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and relying party systems. 11. IANA Considerations None. 12. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting and Ron Watro for assistance with the editing of this document. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 40] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 13. References 13.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFCxxxx] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", work in progress. [RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and Loomans, R., ''A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates'', work in progress. [RFCzzzz] Huston, G., ''A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure,'' work in progress. 13.2. Informative References [BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995. [FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3 (FIPS-140-3), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, work in progress. [RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 41] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 Author's Addresses Stephen Kent BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988 Email: skent@bbn.com Derrick Kong BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951 Email: dkong@bbn.com Karen Seo BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152 Email: kseo@bbn.com Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 42] Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010 Copyright Statement Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 43]