Network Working Group A. Azimov Internet-Draft Yandex Intended status: Standards Track E. Uskov Expires: 2 August 2023 JetLend R. Bush Internet Initiative Japan J. Snijders Fastly R. Housley Vigil Security B. Maddison Workonline 29 January 2023 A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-12 Abstract This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) protected content type for Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) objects for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). An ASPA is a digitally signed object through which the issuer (the holder of an Autonomous System identifier), can authorize one or more other Autonomous Systems (ASes) as its upstream providers. When validated, an ASPA's eContent can be used for detection and mitigation of route leaks. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Azimov, et al. Expires 2 August 2023 [Page 1] Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile January 2023 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 August 2023. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. customerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3.1. ProviderAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3.1.1. providerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3.1.2. afiLimit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.1. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier registry . . . 7 5.2. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type registry . . . . 7 5.3. RPKI Signed Object registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.4. RPKI Repository Name Scheme registry . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.5. Media Type registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Implementation status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appendix A. Example ASPA eContent Payload . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Azimov, et al. Expires 2 August 2023 [Page 2] Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile January 2023 1. Introduction The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security [RFC6480]. As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed to facilitate holders of Autonomous System (AS) identifiers in their capacity as Customer to authorize other ASes as their Provider(s). A Provider AS (PAS) is a network that: a. offers its customers outbound (customer to Internet) data traffic connectivity and/or b. further propagates in all directions (towards providers, lateral peers, and customers) any BGP Updates that the customer may send. The digitally signed Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object described in this document provides the above-mentioned authorization mechanism. See [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification] for a specification how to use Validated ASPA Payloads (VAPs) to filter BGP UPDATE messages. An ASPA object is a cryptographically verifiable attestation signed by the holder of an Autonomous System identifier (hereafter called the "Customer AS", or CAS). An ASPA contains lists one or more ASes, each listing meaning the listed AS is authorized to act as Provider network. When the CAS has multiple Providers, all Provider ASes that provide service to the CAS are listed in the ASPA, including any non- transparent Internet Exchange Point (IXP) Route Server (RS) ASes. The common case for Route Servers (RS) at Internet Exchange Points is to operate transparently (see Section 2.2.2.1 [RFC7947]), thus usually, the ASNs of IX Route Servers are not listed as PAS in ASPAs. The ASPA content type definition conforms to the [RFC6488] template for RPKI signed objects. In accordance with Section 4 of [RFC6488], this document defines: 1. The object identifier (OID) that identifies the ASPA signed object. This OID appears in the eContentType field of the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo structure. 2. The ASN.1 syntax for the ASPA content, which is the payload signed by the CAS. The ASPA content is encoded using the ASN.1 [X.680] Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690]. 3. The steps required to validate an ASPA beyond the validation steps specified in [RFC6488]. Azimov, et al. Expires 2 August 2023 [Page 3] Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile January 2023 2. ASPA Content Type The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-ct-ASPA, which has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49. This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo structure (see [RFC6488]). 3. ASPA eContent The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as the Set of Provider ASes (SPAS) that are authorized by the CAS to be its Providers. If a Customer AS is connected to multiple transit providers/non- transparent route servers, all Provider ASes MUST be registered in a single ASPA object. This rule is important to avoid possible race conditions during updates of ASPAs. The eContent of an ASPA is an instance of ASProviderAttestation, formally defined by the following ASN.1 [X.680] module: Azimov, et al. Expires 2 August 2023 [Page 4] Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile January 2023 RPKI-ASPA-2022 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-rpki-aspa-2022(TBD) } DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS CONTENT-TYPE FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- RFC 6268 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ; id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) aspa(49) } ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::= { TYPE ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA } ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0, customerASID ASID, providers ProviderASSet } ProviderASSet ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ProviderAS ProviderAS ::= SEQUENCE { providerASID ASID, afiLimit AddressFamilyIdentifier OPTIONAL } ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295) AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (2)) END Note that this content appears as the eContent within the encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488]. 3.1. version The version number of the ASProviderAttestation MUST be v0. 3.2. customerASID The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Customer Autonomous System that is the authorizing entity. Azimov, et al. Expires 2 August 2023 [Page 5] Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile January 2023 3.3. providers The providers field contains the listing of ASes that are authorized as providers or route servers in the specified address family. Each element contained in the providers field is an instance of ProviderAS. In addition to the constraints described by the formal ASN.1 definition, the contents of the providers field MUST satisfy the following constraints: * The CustomerASID value MUST NOT appear in any providerASID field. * The elements of providers MUST be ordered in ascending numerical order by the value of the providerASID field. * Each value of providerASID MUST be unique (with respect to the other elements of providers). 3.3.1. ProviderAS 3.3.1.1. providerASID The providerASID field contains the AS number of an AS that has been authorized by the customer AS as its provider or RS in the specified address family. 3.3.1.2. afiLimit The afiLimit field optionally constrains the authorization given to the provider AS to a single address family. If present, it contains the two-octet Address Family Identifier (AFI) for which the relation between the customer and provider is authorized. This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6. Therefore, the value MUST be either 0001 or 0002, as specified in the Address Family Numbers registry [IANA-AF] maintained by IANA. If omitted, the authorization is valid for both IPv4 and IPv6 announcements. Azimov, et al. Expires 2 August 2023 [Page 6] Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile January 2023 4. ASPA Validation Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object itself. To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional ASPA-specific validation steps. * The Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension [RFC3779] MUST be present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ASPA), and the Customer ASID in the ASPA eContent MUST be contained within the set of AS numbers specified by the EE certificate's Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension. * The EE certificate's Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension MUST NOT contain any "inherit" elements. * The IP Address Delegation Extension [RFC3779] MUST be absent. 5. IANA Considerations 5.1. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier registry Please add the id-mod-rpki-aspa-2022 to the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi- numbers.xml#security-smime-0) as follows: Decimal | Description | Specification ----------------------------------------------------------- TBD2 | id-mod-rpki-aspa-2022 | [RFC-to-be] 5.2. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type registry Please add the ASPA to the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-1) as follows: Decimal | Description | Specification ----------------------------------------------------------- 49 | id-ct-ASPA | [RFC-to-be] 5.3. RPKI Signed Object registry Please add Autonomous System Provider Authorization to the RPKI Signed Object registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki/ rpki.xhtml#signed-objects) as follows: Azimov, et al. Expires 2 August 2023 [Page 7] Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile January 2023 Name | OID | Specification -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Autonomous System Provider Authorization | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49 | [RFC-to-be] 5.4. RPKI Repository Name Scheme registry Please add an item for the Autonomous System Provider Authorization file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Scheme" registry created by [RFC6481] as follows: Filename Extension RPKI Object Reference -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- .asa Autonomous System Provider Authorization [RFC-to-be] 5.5. Media Type registry The IANA is requested to register the media type application/rpki- aspa in the "Media Type" registry as follows: Type name: application Subtype name: rpki-aspa Required parameters: N/A Optional parameters: N/A Encoding considerations: binary Security considerations: Carries an RPKI ASPA [RFC-to-be]. This media type contains no active content. See Section 4 of [RFC-to-be] for further information. Interoperability considerations: None Published specification: [RFC-to-be] Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators Additional information: Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of AS identifers as defined in [RFC-to-be]. Magic number(s): None File extension(s): .asa Macintosh file type code(s): Person & email address to contact for further information: Job Snijders Intended usage: COMMON Restrictions on usage: None Change controller: IETF Azimov, et al. Expires 2 August 2023 [Page 8] Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile January 2023 6. Security Considerations While it is not technically enforcable, it is highly recommended that for a given Customer AS, a single ASPA object be maintained which contains all providers/route servers. Administrating all providers in a single object helps prevent race conditions during ASPA updates that might affect prefix propagation. The software that provides hosting for ASPA records SHOULD support enforcement of this rule. In the case of the transition process between different CA registries, the ASPA records SHOULD be kept identical in all registries in terms of their authorization contents. 7. Implementation status This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist. According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit". * A validator implementation [rpki-client] (version 8.0 and higher), written in C was provided by Job Snijders from Fastly. * A signer and decoder implementation [rpkimancer] written in Python was provided by Ben Maddison from Workonline. * A signer implementation [krill] written in Rust was provided by Tim Bruijnzeels from NLnetLabs. * At IETF114 Ties de Kock from RIPE NCC shared a signer implementation had been developed internally. Azimov, et al. Expires 2 August 2023 [Page 9] Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile January 2023 * Di Ma reported success [rpstir2] in RPSTIR2 validating objects produced by Tim Bruijnzeels. * A signer implementation [koenvh] written in PHP based on OpenSSL was provided by Koen van Hove. * A signer implementation [aspa-demo] written in Perl based on OpenSSL was provided by Tom Harrison from APNIC. 8. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Keyur Patel for helping kick-start the ASPA profile project, Ties de Kock & Tim Bruijnzeels for suggesting that the ProviderASSet be in a canonical form, and Kotikalapudi Sriram & Claudio Jeker for review and several suggestions for improvements. 9. References 9.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, . [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, . [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012, . [RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6485, DOI 10.17487/RFC6485, February 2012, . Azimov, et al. Expires 2 August 2023 [Page 10] Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile January 2023 [RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [X.680] ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T Recommendation X.680, 2021. [X.690] ITU-T, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2021. 9.2. Informative References [aspa-demo] Harrison, T., "RPKI ASPA Demo", 2022, . [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification] Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., Snijders, J., and K. Sriram, "BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa- verification-11, 24 October 2022, . [IANA-AF] IANA, "Address Family Numbers", . [koenvh] van Hove, K., "Relying Party Resiliency Platform", 2022, . [krill] Bruijnzeels, T., "Krill", 2022, . [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, . Azimov, et al. Expires 2 August 2023 [Page 11] Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile January 2023 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, February 2012, . [RFC7947] Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker, "Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", RFC 7947, DOI 10.17487/RFC7947, September 2016, . [rpki-client] Snijders, J., "rpki-client", 2022, . [rpkimancer] Maddison, B., "rpkimancer-aspa", 2022, . [rpstir2] Ma, D., "RPSTIR2", 2022, . Appendix A. Example ASPA eContent Payload Below an example of a DER encoded ASPA eContent is provided with annotation following the '#' character. $ echo 302002023cca301a300402020b6230040202205b3005020300c7903005020303259e \ | xxd -r -ps \ | openssl asn1parse -inform DER -i -dump 0:d=0 hl=2 l= 32 cons: SEQUENCE 2:d=1 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :3CCA # Customer ASID 15562 6:d=1 hl=2 l= 26 cons: SEQUENCE # ProviderASSet 8:d=2 hl=2 l= 4 cons: SEQUENCE # ProviderAS 10:d=3 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :0B62 # ASID 2914 14:d=2 hl=2 l= 4 cons: SEQUENCE # ProviderAS 16:d=3 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :205B # ASID 8283 20:d=2 hl=2 l= 5 cons: SEQUENCE # ProviderAS 22:d=3 hl=2 l= 3 prim: INTEGER :C790 # ASID 51088 27:d=2 hl=2 l= 5 cons: SEQUENCE # ProviderAS 29:d=3 hl=2 l= 3 prim: INTEGER :03259E # ASID 206238 Below is a complete Base64 [RFC4648] encoded RPKI ASPA Signed Object. Azimov, et al. Expires 2 August 2023 [Page 12] Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile January 2023 MIIGpAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGlTCCBpECAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwMwYLKoZIhvcNAQkQ ATGgJAQiMCACAjzKMBowBAICC2IwBAICIFswBQIDAMeQMAUCAwMlnqCCBJgwggSUMIIDfKAD AgECAgoAocd1L/ix0uAdMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKGNhYTgwNWRiYWMz NjQ3NDliOWIxMTU1OTBhYjZlZjBmOTcwY2RiZDgwHhcNMjIxMjE2MTIyOTU3WhcNMjMxMjE2 MTIyOTU3WjAVMRMwEQYDVQQDDAoxNjcxMTkzNTkxMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8A MIIBCgKCAQEAsL/HdNkIhbYMis9xNfwvRYd3nqvlUQuzexfuX/HCLGIODNfbTqWaDeUcREyS w+8cBP3gu1LwOjBSOdjDPFu9ceC1/EDHNXLhLG+CuOH/OePFFxwzdBb4yNKCFvoKd+F9JP57 55CDk8QusbJtWhRNL2lKHQevPAQpSqTkSF1SdFyzyBiEJE21CfOHBuDysLAj21c89gJst+lN n2P9jBwaMqYibT2qbX9Chh3susjZk2M/etiIIxyRKBWLZT8V85KFghdf++mDc099ZP+JQnVn q8SzZgkekn5pvsPWff5eB5ZvUe8Sn3XwfDSG4WgQP7Q0CX1l4X+g0fx7dEX7lmZbZwIDAQAB o4IBxjCCAcIwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQWNJ/mFfUaYaEoy70AbtZUiXyb UzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTKqAXbrDZHSbmxFVkKtu8Plwzb2DAYBgNVHSABAf8EDjAMMAoGCCsG AQUFBw4CMBkGCCsGAQUFBwEIAQH/BAowCKAGMAQCAjzKMGQGCCsGAQUFBwEBBFgwVjBUBggr BgEFBQcwAoZIcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLnJpcGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvREVGQVVMVC95cWdG MjZ3MlIwbTVzUlZaQ3JidkQ1Y00yOWcuY2VyMGQGA1UdHwRdMFswWaBXoFWGU3JzeW5jOi8v Y2hsb2Uuc29ib3Jub3N0Lm5ldC9ycGtpL1JJUEUtbmxqb2JzbmlqZGVycy95cWdGMjZ3MlIw bTVzUlZaQ3JidkQ1Y00yOWcuY3JsMG8GCCsGAQUFBwELBGMwYTBfBggrBgEFBQcwC4ZTcnN5 bmM6Ly9jaGxvZS5zb2Jvcm5vc3QubmV0L3Jwa2kvUklQRS1ubGpvYnNuaWpkZXJzL0ZqU2Y1 aFgxR21HaEtNdTlBRzdXVklsOG0xTS5hc2EwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAHdOVNM2GrQc TBQebdi2iKgC92XlGF9AlZcX4ZCQBL7gfQLfGEm6cIT73/Qo5PPsZ6kldQrPrERGeTntSEcV LceFPihm54aAAbmQ0YQ3aZMdwvsbsLFMWBhbNiGwH6HdxyX63q94Did8IxE0HwOjJGfg02uN xO9DseGSRGNzc9iZmLDFIn2wP1cmTKqntfxjNqc9T3zFWZT/m1BmXKylwpCIxxHbYYaOBnQi xtJJ8HZlular3fwFQuVDuMxQ6Wg1jW3k6UBm06YwnyD3Nzck+4cIcGRnbQYDKBH/n3AyDGWr UNnLSgFQzVV/Eu8rP2BXKHeLUCMw0/tB7f6vj+9LZS4xggGqMIIBpgIBA4AUFjSf5hX1GmGh KMu9AG7WVIl8m1MwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGswGgYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQ0GCyqGSIb3DQEJEAEx MBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMjEyMTYxMjMwMDJaMC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCDncgAuReFz 5lNB3nCNIY9N+TPcUjXeL3A8kGdpwI1JwTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQCaB43YGSkCOO/I X26d9xC5vqGcZYNjAQe76VHDFJqa5x7RpthJC1cPe3fdKLazu6ywcuo6vvElT2OH0s/K0mCa xFwfnZOn3cNUDJPtFYUynfQKyVGZjtyP8HLzxmgy2mSUzdcfEWVPSHc/u9CaIHdSNbeW7rBD lWnf3j4MOVr5z4yf9BU2oBodpongR7dR1fvl7N/RymOdaLdqFYaj82plECZh9XqWqmHReBQG c+EfXh7mw9aGQdFhBnprjRKd/oiBI1PVmystPv+XvunT8y8AxQ3XG1GL6Nca7OnfxNqGuyhs 0nbcbcd92GJwF3SBkdestmXZgxkl0HV7ZPH1xlvh The above should decode as following: Azimov, et al. Expires 2 August 2023 [Page 13] Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile January 2023 Object SHA256 hash: wsCvp2J+eZeizU8nrXHkLPhcjyqZ5euDlwLssA/nlwg= EE Subject key identifier: 16:34:9F:E6:15:F5:1A:61:A1:28:CB:BD:00:6E:D6:54:89:7C:9B:53 EE Certificate issuer: /CN=caa805dbac364749b9b115590ab6ef0f970cdbd8 EE Certificate serial: A1C7752FF8B1D2E01D EE Authority key identifier: CA:A8:05:DB:AC:36:47:49:B9:B1:15:59:0A:B6:EF:0F:97:0C:DB:D8 EE Authority info access: rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/DEFAULT/yqgF26w2R0m5sRVZCrbvD5cM29g.cer EE Subject info access: rsync://chloe.sobornost.net/rpki/RIPE-nljobsnijders/FjSf5hX1GmGhKMu9AG7WVIl8m1M.asa EE NotAfter: Sat 16 Dec 2023 12:29:57 +0000 ASPA eContent: Customer AS: 15562 Provider Set: 1: AS: 2914 2: AS: 8283 3: AS: 51088 4: AS: 206238 Authors' Addresses Alexander Azimov Yandex Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com Eugene Uskov JetLend Email: eu@jetlend.ru Randy Bush Internet Initiative Japan Email: randy@psg.com Job Snijders Fastly Amsterdam Netherlands Email: job@fastly.com Russ Housley Vigil Security, LLC 918 Spring Knoll Drive Herndon, VA 20170 United States of America Email: housley@vigilsec.com Azimov, et al. Expires 2 August 2023 [Page 14] Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile January 2023 Ben Maddison Workonline Cape Town South Africa Email: benm@workonline.africa Azimov, et al. Expires 2 August 2023 [Page 15]