The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Digest Authentication Scheme
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SIP Core
Digest Auth
This document updates RFC 3261 by updating the Digest Access
Authentication scheme used by the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) to add support
for more secure digest algorithms, e.g., SHA-256 and SHA-512-256, to replace the
broken MD5 algorithm.
The Session Initiation Protocol uses the same mechanism
that the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) uses for authenticating
users. This mechanism is called Digest Access Authentication, and
it is a simple challenge-response mechanism that allows a server
to challenge a client request and allows a client to provide
authentication information in response to that challenge. The
version of Digest Access Authentication that references
is specified in .
The default hash algorithm for Digest Access Authentication is MD5.
However, it has been demonstrated that the MD5 algorithm is not
collision resistant, and is now considered a bad choice for a hash function .
The HTTP Digest Access Authentication document obsoletes
[RFC2617] and adds stronger algorithms that can be used with
the Digest Authentication scheme, and establishes a registry for
these algorithms, known as the "Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest
Authentication" registry, so that algorithms can be added in the
future.
This document updates the Digest Access Authentication scheme used
by SIP to support the algorithms listed in the "Hash Algorithms
for HTTP Digest Authentication" registry defined by .
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 when,
and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
This section describes the modifications to the operation of the
Digest mechanism as specified in in order to support
the algorithms defined in the "Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Authentication"
registry described in .
It replaces the reference used in for Digest Access Authentication,
substituting for the obsolete , and describes
the modifications to the usage of the Digest mechanism in
resulting from that reference update. It adds support for the SHA-256 and SHA-512-256 algorithms .
It adds required support for the "qop" parameter. It provides additional User Agent Client (UAC)
and User Agent Server (UAS) procedures regarding usage of multiple SIP Authorization,
WWW-Authenticate and Proxy-Authenticate header fields, including in which order to insert
and process them. It provides guidance regarding forking. Finally, it updates the SIP BNF
as required by the updates.
The Digest scheme has an 'algorithm' parameter that specifies the
algorithm to be used to compute the digest of the response. The IANA
registry named the "Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Authentication" specifies
the algorithms that correspond to 'algorithm' values.
specifies only one algorithm, MD5, which is used by default.
This document extends to allow use of any algorithm listed in
the "Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Authentication" registry.
A UAS prioritizes which algorithm to use based on its policy,
which is specified in section 2.3 and parallels the process used in
HTTP specified by .
The size of the digest depends on the algorithm used. The bits in
the digest are converted from the most significant to the least
significant bit, four bits at a time to the ASCII representation as
follows. Each four bits is represented by its familiar hexadecimal
notation from the characters 0123456789abcdef, that is binary 0000 is
represented by the character '0', 0001 by '1' and so on up to the
representation of 1111 as 'f'. If the SHA-256 or SHA-512-256 algorithm is
used to calculate the digest, then the digest will be represented as 64
hexadecimal characters.
When a UAS receives a request from a UAC, and an acceptable
Authorization header field is not received, the UAS can challenge the
originator to provide credentials by rejecting the request with a
401/407 status code with the WWW-Authenticate/Proxy-Authenticate
header field respectively. The UAS MAY add multiple WWW-Authenticate/Proxy-Authenticate
header fields to allow the UAS to utilize the best available
algorithm supported by the client.
If the UAS challenges with multiple WWW-Authenticate/Proxy-Authenticate
header fields with the same realm, then each one of these
header fields MUST use a different digest algorithm. The UAS MUST add these
header fields to the response in the order that it would prefer to see them
used, starting with the most preferred algorithm at the top, followed
by the less preferred algorithms. The UAS cannot assume that the client
will use the algorithm specified at the topmost header field.
When the UAC receives a response with multiple WWW-Authenticate/Proxy-Authenticate
header fields with the same realm it SHOULD use the topmost
header field that it supports, unless a local policy dictates otherwise.
The client MUST ignore any challenge it does not understand.
When the UAC receives a 401 response with multiple WWW-Authenticate
header fields with different realms it SHOULD retry and add an
Authorization header field containing credentials that match the topmost
header field of any one of the realms, unless a local policy dictates otherwise.
If the UAC cannot respond to any of the challenges in the response,
then it SHOULD abandon attempts to send the request, unless a local
policy dictates otherwise, e.g. the policy might indicate the use of non-Digest mechanisms.
For example, if the UAC does not have credentials or has stale credentials for
any of the realms, the UAC will abandon the request.
Section 22.3 of discusses the operation of the proxy-to-user
authentication, which describes the operation of the proxy when it
forks a request. This section clarifies that operation.
If a request is forked, various proxy servers and/or UAs may wish to
challenge the UAC. In this case, the forking proxy server is
responsible for aggregating these challenges into a single response.
Each WWW-Authenticate and Proxy-Authenticate value received in
responses to the forked request MUST be placed into the single
response that is sent by the forking proxy to the UAC.
When the forking proxy places multiple WWW-Authenticate and Proxy-Authenticate header
fields received from one downstream proxy into a single response, it MUST maintain
the order of these header fields. The ordering of values received from different downstream
proxies is not significant.
This section describes the modifications and clarifications required
to apply the HTTP Digest authentication scheme to SIP. The SIP scheme
usage is similar to that for HTTP. For completeness, the bullets specified
below are mostly copied from section 22.4 of ; the
only semantic changes are specified in bullets 1, 7, and 8 below.
SIP clients and servers MUST NOT accept or request Basic
authentication.
The rules for Digest authentication follow those defined in HTTP,
with "HTTP/1.1" replaced by "SIP/2.0" in addition to the following
differences:
1. The URI included in the challenge has the following BNF :
URI = Request-URI ; as defined in , Section 25
2. The 'uri' parameter of the Authorization header field MUST be
enclosed in quotation marks.
3. The BNF for digest-uri-value is:
digest-uri-value = Request-URI
4. The example procedure for choosing a nonce based on Etag does not
work for SIP.
5. The text in regarding cache operation does not
apply to SIP.
6. requires that a server check that the URI in the
request line and the URI included in the Authorization header
field point to the same resource. In a SIP context, these two
URIs may refer to different users, due to forwarding at some
proxy. Therefore, in SIP, a UAS MUST check if the Request-URI in the
Authorization/Proxy-Authorization header field value corresponds to a
user for whom the UAS is willing to accept forwarded or direct
requests, but MAY still accept it if the two fields are not equivalent.
7. As a clarification to the calculation of the A2 value for
message integrity assurance in the Digest authentication
scheme, implementers should assume, when the entity-body is
empty (that is, when SIP messages have no body) that the hash
of the entity-body resolves to the hash of an empty
string:
H(entity-body) = <algorithm>("")
For example, when the chosen algorithm is SHA-256, then:
H(entity-body) = SHA-256("") =
"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855"
8. A UAS MUST be able to properly handle "qop" parameter received
in an Authorization/Proxy-Authorization header field, and a UAC MUST be able to
properly handle "qop" parameter received in WWW-Authenticate and
Proxy-Authenticate header fields. However, for backward compatibility
reasons, the "qop" parameter is optional for RFC3261-based clients and
servers to receive. If the "qop" parameter is not specified, then the default
value is "auth".
A UAS MUST always send a "qop" parameter in WWW-Authenticate
and Proxy-Authenticate header field values, and a UAC MUST
send the "qop" parameter in any resulting authorization header
field.
The usage of the Authentication-Info header field continues to be
allowed, since it provides integrity checks over the bodies and
provides mutual authentication.
This document updates the Augmented BNF for SIP as
follows.
It extends the request-digest as follows to allow for different
digest sizes:
request-digest = LDQUOT *LHEX RDQUOT
The number of hex digits is implied by the length of the value of the
algorithm used.
It extends the algorithm parameter as follows to allow for any algorithm
in the registry to be used:
algorithm = "algorithm" EQUAL ( "MD5" / "MD5-sess" / "SHA-256" / "SHA-256-sess" /
"SHA-512-256" / "SHA-512-256-sess" / token )
This specification adds new secure algorithms to be used with the
Digest mechanism to authenticate users. The broken MD5 algorithm
remains only for backward compatibility with but its use is
NOT RECOMMENDED.
This opens the system to the potential of a downgrade attack by an on-path attacker.
The most effective way of dealing with this type of attack is to either validate the
client and challenge it accordingly, or remove the support for backward compatibility
by not supporting MD5.
See section 5 of for a detailed security discussion of
the Digest scheme.
defines an IANA registry named "Hash Algorithms
for HTTP Digest Authentication" to simplify the introduction of new
algorithms in the future. This document specifies that algorithms defined in
that registry may be used in SIP digest authentication.
This document has no actions for IANA.
The author would like to thank the following individuals
for their careful reviews, comments, and suggestions: Paul Kyzivat,
Olle Johansson, Dale Worley, Michael Procter, Iñaki Baz Castillo,
Tolga Asveren, Christer Holmberg, Brian Rosen, Jean Mahoney, Adam Roach,
Barry Leiba, Roni Even, Éric Vyncke, Benjamin Kaduk, Alissa Cooper, Roman Danyliw,
and Alexey Melnikov.
.
SIP: Session Initiation Protocol
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching
HTTP Digest Access Authentication
SHA: SECURE HASH STANDARD, FIPS 180-2
HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication