Network Working Group R. Sparks, Ed. Internet-Draft Estacado Systems Expires: October 3, 2005 A. Hawrylyshen Jasomi Networks A. Johnston MCI J. Rosenberg Cisco Systems H. Schulzrinne Columbia University April 2005 Session Initiation Protocol Torture Test Messages draft-ietf-sipping-torture-tests-07 Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 3, 2005. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). Abstract This informational document gives examples of Session Initiation Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 1] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Protocol (SIP) test messages designed to exercise and "torture" a SIP implementation. Table of Contents 1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Document Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 Representing Long Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Representing Non-printable Characters . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3 Representing Long Repeating Strings . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. SIP Test Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1 Parser tests (syntax) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.1 Valid messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.1.1 A short tortuous INVITE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.1.2 Wide range of valid characters . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.1.3 Valid use of the % escaping mechanism . . . . . . 9 3.1.1.4 Escaped nulls in URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1.1.5 Use of % when it is not an escape . . . . . . . . 11 3.1.1.6 Message with no LWS between display name and < . . 11 3.1.1.7 Long values in header fields . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.1.1.8 Extra trailing octets in a UDP datagram . . . . . 14 3.1.1.9 Semicolon separated parameters in URI user part . 15 3.1.1.10 Varied and unknown transport types . . . . . . . 16 3.1.1.11 S/MIME signed message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.1.1.12 Unusual reason phrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.1.1.13 Empty reason phrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.1.2 Invalid messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.1.2.1 Extraneous header field separators . . . . . . . . 20 3.1.2.2 Content length larger than message . . . . . . . . 20 3.1.2.3 Negative Content-Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.1.2.4 Request scalar fields with overlarge values . . . 22 3.1.2.5 Response scalar fields with overlarge values . . . 23 3.1.2.6 Unterminated quoted string in display-name . . . . 23 3.1.2.7 <> enclosing Request-URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.1.2.8 Malformed SIP Request-URI (embedded LWS) . . . . . 25 3.1.2.9 Multiple SP separating Request-Line elements . . . 26 3.1.2.10 SP characters at end of Request-Line . . . . . . 27 3.1.2.11 Escaped headers in SIP Request-URI . . . . . . . 28 3.1.2.12 Invalid timezone in Date header field . . . . . 28 3.1.2.13 Failure to enclose name-addr URI in <> . . . . . 29 3.1.2.14 Spaces within addr-spec . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.1.2.15 Non-token characters in display-name . . . . . . 30 3.1.2.16 Unknown protocol version . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.1.2.17 Start line and CSeq method mismatch . . . . . . 31 3.1.2.18 Unknown Method with CSeq method mismatch . . . . 32 3.1.2.19 Overlarge response code . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.2 Transaction layer semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.2.1 Missing transaction identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 2] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 3.3 Application layer semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.3.1 Missing Required Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.3.2 Request-URI with unknown scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.3.3 Request-URI with known but atypical scheme . . . . . . 35 3.3.4 Unknown URI schemes in header fields . . . . . . . . . 35 3.3.5 Proxy-Require and Require . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3.3.6 Unknown Content-Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3.3.7 Unknown authorization scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 3.3.8 Multiple values in single value required fields . . . 38 3.3.9 Multiple Content-Length values . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3.3.10 200 OK Response with broadcast Via header field value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.3.11 Max-Forwards of zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3.3.12 REGISTER with a contact header parameter . . . . . . 40 3.3.13 REGISTER with a url parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 41 3.3.14 REGISTER with a url escaped header . . . . . . . . . 42 3.3.15 Unacceptable Accept offering . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.4 Backward compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 3.4.1 INVITE with RFC2543 syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 A. Bit-exact archive of each test message . . . . . . . . . . . 46 A.1 Encoded Reference Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 52 Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 3] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 1. Overview This document is informational, and is NOT NORMATIVE on any aspect of SIP. This document contains test messages based on the current version (2.0) of the Session Initiation Protocol as defined in [RFC3261]. Some messages exercise SIP's use of SDP as described in [RFC3264]. These messages were developed and refined at the SIPIt interoperability test events. The test messages are organized into several sections. Some stress only a SIP parser and others stress both the parser and the application above it. Some messages are valid, and some are not. Each example clearly calls out what makes any invalid messages incorrect. This document does not attempt to catalog every way to make an invalid message, nor does it attempt to be comprehensive in exploring unusual, but valid, messages. Instead, it tries to focus on areas that have caused interoperability problems or have particularly unfavorable characteristics if they are handled improperly. This document is a seed for a test plan, not a test plan in itself. The messages are presented in the text using a set of markup conventions to avoid ambiguity and meet Internet-Draft layout requirements. To resolve any remaining ambiguity, a bit-accurate version of each message is encapsulated in an appendix. 2. Document Conventions This document contains many example SIP messages. Although SIP is a text-based protocol, many of these examples cannot be unambiguously rendered without additional markup due to the constraints placed on the formatting of RFCs. This document defines and uses the markup defined in this section to remove that ambiguity. This markup uses the start and end tag conventions of XML, but does not define any XML document type. The appendix contains an encoded binary form of all the messages and the algorithm needed to decode them into files. 2.1 Representing Long Lines Several of these examples contain unfolded lines longer than 72 characters. These are captured between tags. The single unfolded line is reconstructed by directly concatenating all Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 4] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 lines appearing between the tags (discarding any line-feeds or carriage returns). There will be no whitespace at the end of lines. Any whitespace appearing at a fold-point will appear at the beginning of a line. The following represent the same string of bits: Header-name: first value, reallylongsecondvalue, third value Header-name: first value, reallylongsecondvalue , third value Header-name: first value, reallylong second value, third value Note that this is NOT SIP header line folding where different strings of bits have equivalent meaning. 2.2 Representing Non-printable Characters Several examples contain binary message bodies or header field values containing non-ascii range UTF-8 encoded characters. These are rendered here as a pair of hexadecimal digits per octet between tags. This rendering applies even inside quoted-strings. The following represent the same string of bits: Header-name: value one Header-name: value206F6Ee The following is a Subject header field containing the euro symbol: Subject: E282AC 2.3 Representing Long Repeating Strings Several examples contain very large data values created with Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 5] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 repeating bit strings. Those will be rendered here using value. As with this rendering applies even inside quoted-strings. For example, the value "abcabcabc" can be rendered as abc. A display name of "1000000 bottles of beer" could be rendered as To: "130 bottles of beer" and a Max-Forwards header field with a value of one google will be rendered here as Max-Forwards: 10 3. SIP Test Messages 3.1 Parser tests (syntax) 3.1.1 Valid messages 3.1.1.1 A short tortuous INVITE This short, relatively human-readable message contains: o line folding all over o escaped characters within quotes o an empty subject o LWS between colons, semicolons, header field values, and other fields o both comma separated and separate listing of header field values o mix of short and long form for the same header field name o unkown Request-URI parameter o unknown header fields o unknown header field with a value that would be syntactically invalid if it were defined in terms of generic-param o unusual header field ordering o unusual header field name character case o unknown parameters of a known header field o uri parameter with no value o header parameter with no value o integer fields (Max-Forwards and CSeq) with leading zeros All elements should treat this as a well-formed request. The UnknownHeaderWithUnusualValue header field deserves special attention. If this header field were defined in terms of comma separated values with semicolon separated parameters (as many of the Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 6] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 existing defined header fields), this would be invalid. However, since the receiving element does not know the definition of the syntax for this field, it must parse it as a header-value. Proxies would forward this header field unchanged. Endpoints would ignore the header field. Message Details : wsinv INVITE sip:vivekg@chair-dnrc.example.com;unknownparam SIP/2.0 TO : sip:vivekg@chair-dnrc.example.com ; tag = 1918181833n from : "J Rosenberg \\\"" ; tag = 98asjd8 MaX-fOrWaRdS: 0068 Call-ID: wsinv.ndaksdj@192.0.2.1 Content-Length : 150 cseq: 0009 INVITE Via : SIP / 2.0 /UDP 192.0.2.2;branch=390skdjuw s : NewFangledHeader: newfangled value continued newfangled value UnknownHeaderWithUnusualValue: ;;,,;;,; Content-Type: application/sdp Route: v: SIP / 2.0 / TCP spindle.example.com ; branch = z9hG4bK9ikj8 , SIP / 2.0 / UDP 192.168.255.111 ; branch= z9hG4bK30239 m:"Quoted string \"\"" ; newparam = newvalue ; secondparam ; q = 0.33 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.3 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.4 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 7] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 3.1.1.2 Wide range of valid characters This message exercises a wider range of characters in several key syntactic elements than implementations usually see. Of particular note: o The Method contains non-alpha characters from token. Note that % is not an escape character for this field. A method of IN%56ITE is an unknown method. It is not the same as a method of INVITE o The Request-URI contain unusual, but legal, characters o A branch parameter contains all non-alphanum characters from token o The To header field value's quoted-string contains quoted-pair expansions, including a quoted NULL character o The name part of name-addr in the From header field value contains multiple tokens (instead of a quoted string) with all non-alphanum characters from the token production rule. That value also has an unknown header parameter whose name contains the non-alphanum token characters and whose value is a non-ascii range UTF-8 encoded string. The tag parameter on this value contains the non- alphanum token characters o The Call-ID header field value contains the non-alphanum characters from word. Notice that in this production: * % is not an escape character. (It is only an escape character in productions matching the rule "escaped") * " does not start a quoted-string. None of ',` or " imply that there will be a matching symbol later in the string * The characters []{}()<> do not have any grouping semantics. They are not required to appear in balanced pairs o There is an unknown header field (matching extension-header) with non-alphanum token characters in its name and a UTF8-NONASCII value If this unusual URI has been defined at a proxy, the proxy will forward this request normally. Otherwise a proxy will generate a 404. Endpoints will generate a 501 listing the methods they understand in an Allow header field. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 8] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : intmeth !interesting-Method0123456789_*+`.%indeed'~ sip:1_unusual.URI~(to-be!sure)&isn't+it$/crazy?,/;;* :&it+has=1,weird!*pas$wo~d_too.(doesn't-it) @example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-.!%66*_+`'~ To: "BEL:\07 NUL:\00 DEL:\7F" From: token1~` token2'+_ token3*%!.- ;fromParam''~+*_!.-%= "D180D0B0D0B1D0BED182D0B0D18ED189D0B8D0B9" ;tag=_token~1'+`*%!-. Call-ID: intmeth.word%ZK-!.*_+'@word`~)(><:\/"][?}{ CSeq: 139122385 !interesting-Method0123456789_*+`.%indeed'~ Max-Forwards: 255 extensionHeader-!.%*+_`'~: EFBBBFE5A4A7E5819CE99BBB Content-Length: 0 3.1.1.3 Valid use of the % escaping mechanism This INVITE exercises the % HEX HEX escaping mechanism in several places. The request is syntactically valid. Interesting features include: o The request-URI has sips:user@example.com embedded in its userpart. What that might mean to example.net is beyond the scope of this document. o The From and To URIs have escaped characters in their userparts. o The Contact URI has escaped characters in the URI parameters. Note that the "name" uri-parameter has a value of "value%41" which is NOT equivalent to "valueA". Per [RFC2396], unescaping URI components is never performed recursively. A parser must accept this as a well-formed message. The application using the message must treat the % HEX HEX expansions as equivalent to the character being encoded. The application must not try to Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 9] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 interpret % as an escape character in those places where % HEX HEX ("escaped" in the grammar) is not a valid part of the construction. In [RFC3261], "escaped" only occurs in the expansions of SIP-URI, SIPS-URI, and Reason-Phrase. Message Details : esc01 INVITE sip:sips%3Auser%40example.com@example.net SIP/2.0 To: sip:%75se%72@example.com From: ;tag=938 Max-Forwards: 87 i: esc01.239409asdfakjkn23onasd0-3234 CSeq: 234234 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.net;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw C: application/sdp Contact: Content-Length: 150 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.1.4 Escaped nulls in URIs This register request contains several URIs with nulls in the userpart. The message is well formed - parsers must accept this message. Implementations must take special care when unescaping the Address-of-Record (AOR) in this request to not prematurely shorten the username. This request registers two distinct contact URIs. Message Details : escnull REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:null-%00-null@example.com From: sip:null-%00-null@example.com;tag=839923423 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: escnull.39203ndfvkjdasfkq3w4otrq0adsfdfnavd CSeq: 14398234 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: Contact: Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 10] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 L:0 3.1.1.5 Use of % when it is not an escape Most of the places % can appear in a SIP message, it is not an escape character. This can surprise the unwary implementor. The following well-formed request has these properties: o The request method is unknown. It is NOT equivalent to REGISTER o The display-name portion of the To and From header fields is "%Z%45". Note that this is not the same as %ZE o This message has two Contact header field values, not three. is a C%6Fntact header field value A parser should accept this message as well formed. A proxy would forward or reject the message depending on what the Request-URI meant to it. An endpoint would reject this message with a 501. Message Details : esc02 RE%47IST%45R sip:registrar.example.com SIP/2.0 To: "%Z%45" From: "%Z%45" ;tag=f232jadfj23 Call-ID: esc02.asdfnqwo34rq23i34jrjasdcnl23nrlknsdf Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK209%fzsnel234 CSeq: 29344 RE%47IST%45R Max-Forwards: 70 Contact: C%6Fntact: Contact: l: 0 3.1.1.6 Message with no LWS between display name and < This OPTIONS request is not valid per the grammar in RFC 3261 since there is no LWS between the quoted string in the display name and < in the From header field value. This has been identified as a specification bug that will be removed when RFC 3261 is revised. Elements should accept this request as well formed. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 11] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : lwsdisp OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: "caller";tag=323 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: lwsdisp.1234abcd@funky.example.com CSeq: 60 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/UDP funky.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw l: 0 3.1.1.7 Long values in header fields This well-formed request contains header fields with many values and values that are very long. Features include: o The To header field has a long display name, and long uri parameter names and values o The From header field has long header parameter names and values, in particular a very long tag o The Call-ID is one long token Message Details : longreq INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: "I have a user name of extreme proportion" longvalue; longparamname=shortvalue; verylongParameterNameWithNoValue> F: sip: amazinglylongcallername@example.net ;tag=12982424 ;unknownheaderparamname= unknowheaderparamvalue ;unknownValuelessparamname Call-ID: longreq.onereallylongcallid CSeq: 3882340 INVITE Unknown-Long-Name: unknown-long-value; unknown-long-parameter-name = Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 12] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 unknown-long-parameter-value Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip33.example.com v: SIP/2.0/TCP sip32.example.com V: SIP/2.0/TCP sip31.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip30.example.com ViA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip29.example.com VIa: SIP/2.0/TCP sip28.example.com VIA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip27.example.com via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip26.example.com viA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip25.example.com vIa: SIP/2.0/TCP sip24.example.com vIA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip23.example.com V : SIP/2.0/TCP sip22.example.com v : SIP/2.0/TCP sip21.example.com V : SIP/2.0/TCP sip20.example.com v : SIP/2.0/TCP sip19.example.com Via : SIP/2.0/TCP sip18.example.com Via : SIP/2.0/TCP sip17.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip16.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip15.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip14.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip13.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip12.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip11.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip10.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip9.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip8.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip7.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip6.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip5.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip4.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip3.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip2.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip1.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host.example.com;received=192.0.2.5; branch=verylongbranchvalue Max-Forwards: 70 Contact: amazinglylongcallername @host5.example.net> Content-Type: application/sdp l: 150 Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 13] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.1.8 Extra trailing octets in a UDP datagram This message contains a single SIP REGISTER request, which ostensibly arrived over UDP in a single datagram. The packet contains extra octets after the body (which in this case has zero length). The extra octets happen to look like a SIP INVITE request, but (per section 18.3 of [RFC3261]) they are just spurious noise that must be ignored. A SIP element receiving this datagram would handle the REGISTER request normally and ignore the extra bits that look like an INVITE request. If the element is a proxy choosing to forward the REGISTER, the INVITE octets would not appear in the forwarded request. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 14] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : dblreq REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:j.user@example.com;tag=43251j3j324 Max-Forwards: 8 I: dblreq.0ha0isndaksdj99sdfafnl3lk233412 Contact: sip:j.user@host.example.com CSeq: 8 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.125;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw23492 Content-Length: 0 INVITE sip:joe@example.com SIP/2.0 t: sip:joe@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=141334 Max-Forwards: 8 Call-ID: dblreq.0ha0isnda977644900765@192.0.2.15 CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw380234 Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 150 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m =video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.1.9 Semicolon separated parameters in URI user part This request has a semicolon-separated parameter contained in the "user" part of the Request-URI (whose value contains an escaped @ symbol). Receiving elements will accept this as a well formed message. The Request-URI will parse such that the user part is "user;par=u@example.net". Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 15] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : semiuri OPTIONS sip:user;par=u%40example.net@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j_user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.org;tag=33242 Max-Forwards: 3 Call-ID: semiuri.0ha0isndaksdj CSeq: 8 OPTIONS Accept: application/sdp, application/pkcs7-mime, multipart/mixed, multipart/signed, message/sip, message/sipfrag Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw l: 0 3.1.1.10 Varied and unknown transport types This request contains Via header field values with all known transport types and exercises the transport extension mechanism. Parsers must accept this message as well formed. Elements receiving this message would process it exactly as if the 2nd and subsequent header field values specified UDP (or other transport). Message Details : transports OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: ;tag=323 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: transports.kijh4akdnaqjkwendsasfdj Accept: application/sdp CSeq: 60 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/UDP t1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Via: SIP/2.0/SCTP t2.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKklasjdhf Via: SIP/2.0/TLS t3.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK2980unddj Via: SIP/2.0/UNKNOWN t4.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKasd0f3en Via: SIP/2.0/TCP t5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK0a9idfnee l: 0 3.1.1.11 S/MIME signed message This is a signed MESSAGE request. The signature is binary encoded. The body contains null (0x00) characters. Receivers must take care to properly frame the received message. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 16] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Parsers must accept this message as well formed, even if the application above the parser does not support multipart/signed. Message Details : smime01 MESSAGE sip:kumiko@example.com SIP/2.0 To: From: ;tag=2929017b Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 127.0.0.1:5060 ;branch=z9hG4bK-d87543-5032442a6f48352f-1--d87543-;rport Call-ID: 74dd6bf53ebdf741@Y2ouY2lzY28uc2lwaXQubmV0 CSeq: 1 MESSAGE Route: Contact: Max-Forwards: 70 Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary Content-Type: multipart/signed ;boundary=4d7f63e86a96c361;micalg=sha1 ;protocol=application/pkcs7-signature Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2005 17:30:54 GMT User-Agent: SIPimp.org/0.2.5 (curses) Content-Length: 1567 --4d7f63e86a96c361 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary This has a null in the body. --4d7f63e86a96c361 Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime;name=smime.p7s Content-Disposition: attachment;handling=required ;filename=smime.p7s Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary 308204E006092A864886F70D010702A08204D1308204CD020101310B3009 06052B0E03021A0500300B06092A864886F70D010701A08202D2308202CE 30820237A00302010202080195007102330113300D06092A864886F70D01 010505003070310B3009060355040613025553311330110603550408130A 43616C69666F726E69613111300F0603550407130853616E204A6F736531 0E300C060355040A1305736970697431293027060355040B132053697069 74205465737420436572746966696361746520417574686F72697479301E Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 17] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April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d7f63e86a96c361-- 3.1.1.12 Unusual reason phrase This 200 response contains a reason phrase other than "OK". The reason phrase is intended for human consumption, and may contain any string produced by Reason-Phrase = *(reserved / unreserved / escaped / UTF8-NONASCII / UTF8-CONT / SP / HTAB) This particular response contains unreserved and non-ASCII UTF-8 characters.This response is well formed. A parser must accept this Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 18] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 message. Message Details : unreason SIP/2.0 200 = 2**3 * 5**2 D0BDD0BE20D181D182 D0BE20D0B4D0B5D0B2D18FD0BDD0BED181D182D0BE20D0B4 D0B5D0B2D18FD182D18C202D20D0BFD180D0BED181D182D0 BED0B5 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.198;branch=z9hG4bK1324923 Call-ID: unreason.1234ksdfak3j2erwedfsASdf CSeq: 35 INVITE From: sip:user@example.com;tag=11141343 To: sip:user@example.edu;tag=2229 Content-Length: 154 Content-Type: application/sdp Contact: v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.198 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.198 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.1.13 Empty reason phrase This well formed response contains no reason phrase. A parser must accept this message. The space character after the reason code is required. If it were not present, this message could be rejected as invalid (a liberal receiver would accept it anyway). Message Details : noreason SIP/2.0 10020 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.105;branch=z9hG4bK2398ndaoe Call-ID: noreason.asndj203insdf99223ndf CSeq: 35 INVITE From: ;tag=39ansfi3 To: ;tag=902jndnke3 Content-Length: 0 Contact: Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 19] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 3.1.2 Invalid messages This section contains several invalid messages reflecting errors seen at interoperability events and exploring important edge conditions that can be induced through malformed messages. This section does not attempt to be a comprehensive list of all types of invalid messages. 3.1.2.1 Extraneous header field separators The Via header field of this request contains additional semicolons and commas without parameters or values. The Contact header field contains additional semicolons without parameters. This message is syntactically invalid. An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad Request error. Message Details : badinv01 INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=134161461246 Max-Forwards: 7 Call-ID: badinv01.0ha0isndaksdjasdf3234nas CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;;,;,, Contact: "Joe" ;;;; Content-Length: 152 Content-Type: application/sdp v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.2 Content length larger than message This is a request message with a Content Length that is larger than the actual length of the body. When sent over UDP (as this message ostensibly was), the receiving element should respond with a 400 Bad Request error. If this message Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 20] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 arrived over a stream-based transport such as TCP, there's not much the receiving could do but wait for more data on the stream and close the connection if none is forthcoming in a reasonable period of time. Message Details : clerr INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Max-Forwards: 80 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=93942939o2 Contact: Call-ID: clerr.0ha0isndaksdjweiafasdk3 CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-39234-23523 Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 9999 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.155 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.155 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.3 Negative Content-Length This request has a negative value for Content-Length. An element receiving this message should respond with an error. This request appeared over UDP, so the remainder of the datagram can simply be discarded. If a request like this arrives over TCP, the framing error is not recoverable and the connection should be closed. The same behavior is appropriate for messages that arrive without a numeric value in the Content-Length header field such as: Content-Length: five Implementors should take extra precautions if the technique they choose for converting this ascii field into an integral form can return a negative value. In particular, the result must not be used as a counter or array index. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 21] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : ncl INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Max-Forwards: 254 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=32394234 Call-ID: ncl.0ha0isndaksdj2193423r542w35 CSeq: 0 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.53;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: -999 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.53 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.53 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.4 Request scalar fields with overlarge values This request contains several scalar header field values outside their legal range. o the CSeq sequence number is >2**32-1. o the Max-Forwards value is >255. o the Expires value is >2**32-1. o the Contact expires parameter value is >2**32-1. An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad Request due to the CSeq error. If only the Max-Forwards field were in error, the element could choose process the request as if the field were absent. If only the expiry values were in error, the element could treat them as if they contained the default values for expiration (3600 in this case). Other scalar request fields that may contain aberrant values include, but are not limited to, the Contact q value, the Timestamp value, and the Via ttl parameter. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 22] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : scalar02 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host129.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK342sdfoi3 To: From: ;tag=239232jh3 CSeq: 36893488147419103232 REGISTER Call-ID: scalar02.23o0pd9vanlq3wnrlnewofjas9ui32 Max-Forwards: 300 Expires: 10 Contact: ;expires=280297596632815 Content-Length: 0 3.1.2.5 Response scalar fields with overlarge values This response contains several scalar header field values outside their legal range. o the CSeq sequence number is >2**32-1. o The Retry-After field is unreasonably large (note that RFC 3261 does not define a legal range for this field). o The Warning field has a warning-value with more than 3 digits An element receiving this response will simply discard it. Message Details : scalarlg SIP/2.0 503 Service Unavailable Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host129.example.com ;branch=z9hG4bKzzxdiwo34sw ;received=192.0.2.129 To: From: ;tag=2easdjfejw CSeq: 9292394834772304023312 OPTIONS Call-ID: scalarlg.noase0of0234hn2qofoaf0232aewf2394r Retry-After: 949302838503028349304023988 Warning: 1812 overture "In Progress" Content-Length: 0 3.1.2.6 Unterminated quoted string in display-name This is a request with an unterminated quote in the display name of Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 23] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 the To field. An element receiving this request should return an 400 Bad Request error. An element could attempt to infer a terminating quote and accept the message. Such an element needs to take care that it makes a reasonable inference when it encounters To: "Mr J. User Message Details : quotbal INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: "Mr. J. User From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=93334 Max-Forwards: 10 Call-ID: quotbal.aksdj Contact: CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.59:5050;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234 Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 152 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.7 <> enclosing Request-URI This INVITE request is invalid because the Request-URI has been enclosed within in "<>". It is reasonable to always reject a request with this error with a 400 Bad Request. Elements attempting to be liberal with what they accept may choose to ignore the brackets. If the element forwards the request, it must not include the brackets in the messages it sends. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 24] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : ltgtruri INVITE SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=39291 Max-Forwards: 23 Call-ID: ltgtruri.1@192.0.2.5 CSeq: 1 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.5 Contact: Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 159 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=3149328700 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.8 Malformed SIP Request-URI (embedded LWS) This INVITE has illegal LWS within the Request-URI. An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad Request. An element could attempt to ignore the embedded LWS for those schemes (like sip) where that would not introduce ambiguity. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 25] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : lwsruri INVITE sip:user@example.com; lr SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com;tag=3xfe-9921883-z9f From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=231413434 Max-Forwards: 5 Call-ID: lwsruri.asdfasdoeoi2323-asdfwrn23-asd834rk423 CSeq: 2130706432 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw2395 Contact: Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 159 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=3149328700 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.9 Multiple SP separating Request-Line elements This INVITE has illegal multiple SP characters between elements of the start line. It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed. An element that is liberal in what it accepts may ignore these extra SP characters while processing the request. If the element forwards the request, it must not include these extra SP characters in the messages it sends. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 26] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : lwsstart INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Max-Forwards: 8 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=8814 Call-ID: lwsstart.dfknq234oi243099adsdfnawe3@example.com CSeq: 1893884 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw3923 Contact: Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 150 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.10 SP characters at end of Request-Line This OPTIONS request contains SP characters between the SIP-Version field and the CRLF terminating the Request-Line. It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed. An element that is liberal in what it accepts may ignore these extra SP characters while processing the request. If the element forwards the request, it must not include these extra SP characters in the messages it sends. Message Details : trws OPTIONS sip:remote-target@example.com SIP/2.02020 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host1.examle.com;branch=z9hG4bK299342093 To: From: ;tag=329429089 Call-ID: trws.oicu34958239neffasdhr2345r Accept: application/sdp CSeq: 238923 OPTIONS Max-Forwards: 70 Content-Length: 0 Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 27] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 3.1.2.11 Escaped headers in SIP Request-URI This INVITE is malformed as the SIP Request-URI contains escaped headers. It is acceptable for an element to reject this request with a 400 Bad Request. An element could choose to be liberal in what it accepts and ignore the escaped headers. If the element is a proxy, the escaped headers must not appear in the Request-URI of forwarded request (and most certainly must not be translated into the actual header of the forwarded request). Message Details : escruri INVITE sip:user@example.com?Route=%3Csip:example.com%3E SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=341518 Max-Forwards: 7 Contact: Call-ID: escruri.23940-asdfhj-aje3br-234q098w-fawerh2q-h4n5 CSeq: 149209342 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host-of-the-hour.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 150 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.12 Invalid timezone in Date header field This INVITE is invalid as it contains a non GMT time zone in the SIP Date header field. It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed (though an element shouldn't do that unless the contents of the Date header field were actually important to its processing). An element wishing to be liberal in what it accepts could ignore this value altogether if it wasn't going to use the Date header field anyhow. Otherwise, it could attempt to interpret this date and adjust it to GMT. RFC 3261 explicitly defines the only acceptable timezone designation Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 28] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 as "GMT". "UT", while synonymous with GMT per [RFC2822], is not valid. "UTC" and "UCT" are also invalid. Message Details : baddate INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=2234923 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: baddate.239423mnsadf3j23lj42--sedfnm234 CSeq: 1392934 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Date: Fri, 01 Jan 2010 16:00:00 EST Contact: Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 150 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.13 Failure to enclose name-addr URI in <> This REGISTER request is malformed. The SIP URI contained in the Contact Header field has an escaped header, so the field must be in name-addr form (which implies the URI must be enclosed in <>). It is reasonable for an element receiving this request to respond with a 400 Bad Request. An element choosing to be liberal in what it accepts could infer the angle brackets since there is no ambiguity in this example. In general, that won't be possible. Message Details : regbadct REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:user@example.com;tag=998332 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: regbadct.k345asrl3fdbv@10.0.0.1 CSeq: 1 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 135.180.130.133:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: sip:user@example.com?Route=%3Csip:sip.example.com%3E Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 29] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 l: 0 3.1.2.14 Spaces within addr-spec This request is malformed since the addr-spec in the To header field contains spaces. Parsers receiving this request must not break. It is reasonable to reject this request with a 400 Bad Request response. Elements attempting to be liberal may ignore the spaces. Message Details : badaspec OPTIONS sip:user@example.org SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host4.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdju43234 Max-Forwards: 70 From: "Bell, Alexander" ;tag=433423 To: "Watson, Thomas" < sip:t.watson@example.org > Call-ID: badaspec.sdf0234n2nds0a099u23h3hnnw009cdkne3 Accept: application/sdp CSeq: 3923239 OPTIONS l: 0 3.1.2.15 Non-token characters in display-name This OPTIONS request is malformed since the display names in the To and From header fields contain non-token characters but are unquoted. It is reasonable to always reject this kind of error with a 400 Bad Request response. An element may attempt to be liberal in what it receives and infer the missing quotes. If this element were a proxy, it must not propagate the error into the request it forwards. As a consequence, if the fields are covered by a signature, there's not much point in trying to be liberal - the message should be simply rejected. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 30] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : baddn OPTIONS sip:t.watson@example.org SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP c.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: Bell, Alexander ;tag=43 To: Watson, Thomas Call-ID: baddn.31415@c.example.com Accept: application/sdp CSeq: 3923239 OPTIONS l: 0 3.1.2.16 Unknown protocol version To an element implementing [RFC3261], this request is malformed due to its high version number. The element should respond to the request with a 505 Version Not Supported error. Message Details : badvers OPTIONS sip:t.watson@example.org SIP/7.0 Via: SIP/7.0/UDP c.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: A. Bell ;tag=qweoiqpe To: T. Watson Call-ID: badvers.31417@c.example.com CSeq: 1 OPTIONS l: 0 3.1.2.17 Start line and CSeq method mismatch This request has mismatching values for the method in the start line and the CSeq header field. Any element receiving this request will respond with a 400 Bad Request. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 31] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : mismatch01 OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=34525 Max-Forwards: 6 Call-ID: mismatch01.dj0234sxdfl3 CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw l: 0 3.1.2.18 Unknown Method with CSeq method mismatch This message has an unknown method in the start line, and a CSeq method tag which does not match. Any element receiving this response should respond with a 501 Not Implemented. A 400 Bad Request is also acceptable, but choosing a 501 (particularly at proxies) has better future-proof characteristics. Message Details : mismatch02 NEWMETHOD sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=34525 Max-Forwards: 6 Call-ID: mismatch02.dj0234sxdfl3 CSeq: 8 INVITE Contact: Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.net;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Type: application/sdp l: 138 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.19 Overlarge response code This response has a response code larger than 699. An element receiving this response should simply drop it. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 32] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : bigcode SIP/2.0 4294967301 better not break the receiver Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.105;branch=z9hG4bK2398ndaoe Call-ID: bigcode.asdof3uj203asdnf3429uasdhfas3ehjasdfas9i CSeq: 353494 INVITE From: ;tag=39ansfi3 To: ;tag=902jndnke3 Content-Length: 0 Contact: 3.2 Transaction layer semantics This section contains tests that exercise an implementation's parser and transaction layer logic. 3.2.1 Missing transaction identifier This request indicates support for RFC 3261-style transaction identifiers by providing the z9hG4bK prefix to the branch parameter, but it provides no identifier. A parser must not break when receiving this message. An element receiving this request could reject the request with a 400 Response (preferably statelessly, as other requests from the source are likely to also have a malformed branch parameter), or it could fall back to the RFC 2543 style transaction identifier. Message Details : badbranch OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.org;tag=33242 Max-Forwards: 3 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1;branch=z9hG4bK Accept: application/sdp Call-ID: badbranch.sadonfo23i420jv0as0derf3j3n CSeq: 8 OPTIONS l: 0 3.3 Application layer semantics This section contains tests that exercise an implementation's parser and application layer logic. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 33] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 3.3.1 Missing Required Header Fields This request contains no Call-ID, From, or To header fields. An element receiving this message must not break because of the missing information. Ideally, it will respond with a 400 Bad Request error. Message Details : insuf INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 CSeq: 193942 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.95;branch=z9hG4bKkdj.insuf Content-Type: application/sdp l: 152 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.95 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.95 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.3.2 Request-URI with unknown scheme This OPTIONS contains an unknown URI scheme in the Request-URI. A parser must accept this as a well-formed SIP request. An element receiving this request will reject it with a 416 Unsupported URI Scheme response. Some early implementations attempt to look at the contents of the To header field to determine how to route this kind of request. That is an error. Despite the fact that the To header field and the Request URI frequently look alike in simplistic first-hop messages, the To header field contains no routing information. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 34] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : unkscm OPTIONS nobodyKnowsThisScheme:totallyopaquecontent SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=384 Max-Forwards: 3 Call-ID: unkscm.nasdfasser0q239nwsdfasdkl34 CSeq: 3923423 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host9.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234 Content-Length: 0 3.3.3 Request-URI with known but atypical scheme This OPTIONS contains an Request-URI with an IANA registered scheme that does not commonly appear Request-URIs of SIP requests. A parser must accept this as a well-formed SIP request. If an element will never accept this scheme as meaningful in a request-URI, it is appropriate to treat it as unknown and return a 416 Unsupported URI Scheme response. If the element might accept some URIs with this scheme, then a 404 Not Found is appropriate for those URIs it doesn't accept. Message Details : novelsc OPTIONS soap.beep://192.0.2.103:3002 SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=384 Max-Forwards: 3 Call-ID: novelsc.asdfasser0q239nwsdfasdkl34 CSeq: 3923423 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host9.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234 Content-Length: 0 3.3.4 Unknown URI schemes in header fields This message contains registered schemes in the To, From and Contact header fields of a request. The message is syntactically valid. Parsers must not fail when receiving this message. Proxies should treat this message as they would any other request for this URI. A registrar would reject this request with a 400 Bad Request response since the To: header field is required to contain a SIP or SIPS URI as an AOR. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 35] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : unksm2 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: isbn:2983792873 From: ;tag=3234233 Call-ID: unksm2.daksdj@hyphenated-host.example.com CSeq: 234902 REGISTER Max-Forwards: 70 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.21:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: l: 0 3.3.5 Proxy-Require and Require This request tests proper implementation of SIP's Proxy-Require and Require extension mechanisms. Any element receiving this request will respond with a 420 Bad Extension response containing an Unsupported header field listing these features from either the Require or Proxy-Require header field depending on the role in which the element is responding. Message Details : bext01 OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j_user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=242etr Max-Forwards: 6 Call-ID: bext01.0ha0isndaksdj Require: nothingSupportsThis, nothingSupportsThisEither Proxy-Require: noProxiesSupportThis, norDoAnyProxiesSupportThis CSeq: 8 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/TLS fold-and-staple.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Length: 0 3.3.6 Unknown Content-Type This INVITE request contains a body of unknown type. It is syntactically valid. A parser must not fail when receiving it. A proxy receiving this request would process it just like any other INVITE. An endpoint receiving this request would reject it with a 415 Unsupported Media Type error. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 36] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : invut INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Contact: To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=8392034 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: invut.0ha0isndaksdjadsfij34n23d CSeq: 235448 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP somehost.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Type: application/unknownformat Content-Length: 40 3.3.7 Unknown authorization scheme This REGISTER request contains an Authorization header field with an unknown scheme. The request is well-formed. A parser must not fail when receiving it. A proxy will treat this request as any other REGISTER. If it forwards the request, it will include this Authorization header field unmodified in the forwarded messages. A registrar that does not care about challenge-response authentication will simply ignore the Authorization header field, processing this registration as if the field were not present. A registrar that does care about challenge-response authentication will reject this request with a 401, issuing a new challenge with a scheme it understands. Endpoints choosing not to act as registrars will simply reject the request. A 405 Method Not Allowed is appropriate. Message Details : regaut01 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:j.user@example.com;tag=87321hj23128 Max-Forwards: 8 Call-ID: regaut01.0ha0isndaksdj CSeq: 9338 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.0.2.253;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Authorization: NoOneKnowsThisScheme opaque-data=here Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 37] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Content-Length:0 3.3.8 Multiple values in single value required fields The message contains a request with multiple Call-ID, To, From, Max- Forwards and CSeq values. An element receiving this request must not break. An element receiving this request would respond with a 400 Bad Request error. Message Details : multi01 INVITE sip:user@company.com SIP/2.0 Contact: Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.25;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 CSeq: 5 INVITE Call-ID: multi01.98asdh@192.0.2.1 CSeq: 59 INVITE Call-ID: multi01.98asdh@192.0.2.2 From: sip:caller@example.com;tag=3413415 To: sip:user@example.com To: sip:other@example.net From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=2923420123 Content-Type: application/sdp l: 154 Contact: Max-Forwards: 5 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.25 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.25 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.3.9 Multiple Content-Length values Multiple conflicting Content-Length header field values appear in this request. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 38] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 From a framing perspective, this situation is equivalent to an invalid Content-Length value (or no value at all). An element receiving this message should respond with an error. This request appeared over UDP, so the remainder of the datagram can simply be discarded. If a request like this arrives over TCP, the framing error is not recoverable and the connection should be closed. Message Details : mcl01 OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.net;branch=z9hG4bK293423 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:other@example.net;tag=3923942 Call-ID: mcl01.fhn2323orihawfdoa3o4r52o3irsdf CSeq: 15932 OPTIONS Content-Length: 13 Max-Forwards: 60 Content-Length: 5 Content-Type: text/plain There's no way to know how many octets are supposed to be here. 3.3.10 200 OK Response with broadcast Via header field value This message is a response with a 2nd Via header field value's sent-by containing 255.255.255.255. The message is well formed - parsers must not fail when receiving it. Per [RFC3261] an endpoint receiving this message should simply discard it. If a proxy followed normal response processing rules blindly, it would forward this response to the broadcast address. To protect against this being used as an avenue of attack, proxies should drop such responses. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 39] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : bcast SIP/2.0 200 OK Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.198;branch=z9hG4bK1324923 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 255.255.255.255;branch=z9hG4bK1saber23 Call-ID: bcast.0384840201234ksdfak3j2erwedfsASdf CSeq: 35 INVITE From: sip:user@example.com;tag=11141343 To: sip:user@example.edu;tag=2229 Content-Length: 154 Content-Type: application/sdp Contact: v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.198 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.198 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.3.11 Max-Forwards of zero This is a legal SIP request with the Max-Forwards header field value set to zero. A proxy should not forward the request and respond 483 (Too Many Hops). An endpoint should process the request as if the Max-Forwards field value were still positive. Message Details : zeromf OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=3ghsd41 Call-ID: zeromf.jfasdlfnm2o2l43r5u0asdfas CSeq: 39234321 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw2349i Max-Forwards: 0 Content-Length: 0 3.3.12 REGISTER with a contact header parameter This register request contains a contact where the 'unknownparam' Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 40] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 parameter must be interpreted as being a contact-param and not a url- param. This REGISTER should succeed. The response must not include "unknownparam" as a url-parameter for this binding. Likewise, "unknownparam" must not appear as a url-parameter in any binding during subsequent fetches. Behavior is the same, of course, for any known contact-param parameter names. Message Details : cparam01 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP saturn.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: sip:watson@example.com;tag=DkfVgjkrtMwaerKKpe To: sip:watson@example.com Call-ID: cparam01.70710@saturn.example.com CSeq: 2 REGISTER Contact: sip:+19725552222@gw1.example.net;unknownparam l: 0 3.3.13 REGISTER with a url parameter This register request contains a contact where the URI has an unknown parameter. The register should succeed and a subsequent retrieval of the registration must include "unknownparam" as a url-parameter. Behavior is the same, of course, for any known url-parameter names. Message Details : cparam02 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP saturn.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: sip:watson@example.com;tag=838293 To: sip:watson@example.com Call-ID: cparam02.70710@saturn.example.com CSeq: 3 REGISTER Contact: l: 0 Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 41] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 3.3.14 REGISTER with a url escaped header This register request contains a contact where the URI has an escaped header. The register should succeed and a subsequent retrieval of the registration must include the escaped Route header in the contact URI for this binding. Message Details : regescrt REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:user@example.com;tag=8 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: regescrt.k345asrl3fdbv@192.0.2.1 CSeq: 14398234 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw M: L:0 3.3.15 Unacceptable Accept offering This request indicates the response must contain a body in an unknown type. In particular, since the Accept header field does not contain application/sdp, the response may not contain an SDP body. The recipient of this request could respond with a 406 Not Acceptable with a Warning/399 indicating that a response cannot be formulated in the formats offered in the Accept header field. It is also appropriate to respond with a 400 Bad Request since all SIP User- Agents (UAs) supporting INVITE are required to support application/ sdp. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 42] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : sdp01 INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j_user@example.com Contact: From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=234 Max-Forwards: 5 Call-ID: sdp01.ndaksdj9342dasdd Accept: text/nobodyKnowsThis CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Length: 150 Content-Type: application/sdp v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.4 Backward compatibility 3.4.1 INVITE with RFC2543 syntax This is a legal message per RFC 2543 (and several bis versions) which should be accepted by RFC 3261 elements which want to maintain backwards compatibility. o There is no branch parameter at all on the Via header field value o There is no From tag o There is no explicit Content-Length (The body is assumed to be all octets in the datagram after the null-line) o There is no Max-Forwards header field Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 43] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Message Details : inv2543 INVITE sip:UserB@example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP iftgw.example.com From: Record-Route: To: sip:+16505552222@ss1.example.net;user=phone Call-ID: inv2543.1717@ift.client.example.com CSeq: 56 INVITE Content-Type: application/sdp v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 4. Security Considerations This document presents NON NORMATIVE examples of SIP session establishment. The security considerations in [RFC3261] apply. Parsers must carefully consider edge conditions and malicious input as part of their design. Attacks on many Internet systems use crafted input to cause implementations to behave in undesirable ways. Many of the messages in this draft are designed to stress a parser implementation at points traditionally used for such attacks. This document does not, however, attempt to be comprehensive. It should be considered a seed to stimulate thinking and planning, not simply a set of tests to be passed. 5. IANA Considerations This document has no actions for IANA. 6. Acknowledgments The final detailed review of this document was performed by: Diego Besprosvan, Vijay Gurbani, Shashi Kumar, Derek MacDonald, Gautham Narasimhan, Nils Ohlmeier, Bob Penfield, Reinaldo Penno, Marc Petit- Huguenin, Richard Sugarman, and Venkatesh Venkataramanan. Earlier versions of this document were reviewed by: Aseem Agarwal, Rafi Assadi, Gonzalo Camarillo, Ben Campbell, Cullen Jennings, Vijay Gurbani, Sunitha Kumar, Rohan Mahy, Jon Peterson, Marc Petit- Huguenin, Vidhi Rastogi, Adam Roach, Bodgey Yin Shaohua and Tom Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 44] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Taylor. Thanks to Cullen Jennings for contributing the S/MIME message. Thanks to Neil Deason for contributing several messages and Kundan Singh for performing parser validation of messages in earlier versions. The following individuals provided significant comments during the early phases of the development of this document: Jean-Francois Mule, Hemant Agrawal, Henry Sinnreich, David Devanatham, Joe Pizzimenti, Matt Cannon, John Hearty, the whole MCI IPOP Design team, Scott Orton, Greg Osterhout, Pat Sollee, Doug Weisenberg, Danny Mistry, Steve McKinnon, and Denise Ingram, Denise Caballero, Tom Redman, Ilya Slain, Pat Sollee, John Truetken, and others from MCI, 3Com, Cisco, Lucent and Nortel. 7. Informative References [RFC2396] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 2396, August 1998. [RFC2822] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822, April 2001. [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002. [RFC3264] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264, June 2002. Authors' Addresses Robert J. Sparks (editor) Estacado Systems Email: RjS@estacado.net Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 45] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Alan Hawrylyshen Jasomi Networks 2033 Gateway Place Suite 500 San Jose, CA 95110 Email: alan@jasomi.com Alan Johnston MCI 100 South 4th Street St. Louis, MO 63102 Email: alan.johnston@mci.com Jonathan Rosenberg Cisco Systems 600 Lanidex Plaza Parsippany, NJ 07052 Phone: +1 973 952 5000 Email: jdrosen@cisco.com URI: http://www.jdrosen.net Henning Schulzrinne Columbia University Department of Computer Science 450 Computer Science Building New York, NY 10027 US Phone: +1 212 939 7042 Email: hgs@cs.columbia.edu URI: http://www.cs.columbia.edu Appendix A. Bit-exact archive of each test message The following text block is an encoded, gzip compressed TAR archive of files that represent each of the example messages discussed in Section 3. To recover the compressed archive file intact, the text of this document may be passed as input to the following Perl script (the output should be redirected to a file or piped to "tar -xzvf -"). Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 46] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 #!/usr/bin/perl use strict; my $bdata = ""; use MIME::Base64; while(<>) { if (/-- BEGIN MESSAGE ARCHIVE --/ .. /-- END MESSAGE ARCHIVE --/) { if ( m/^\s*[^\s]+\s*$/) { $bdata = $bdata . $_; } } } print decode_base64($bdata); Figure 58 Alternatively, the base-64 encoded block can be edited by hand to remove document structure lines and fed as input to any base-64 decoding utility. A.1 Encoded Reference Messages -- BEGIN MESSAGE ARCHIVE -- H4sIAAAAAAACA+xdS3PbSH73IZVUVKXvAKuW6xlLoIDuxosyNdLYmhmNH+NY siezuylPk2iQIEGAQoOi5FScZA9blUu+QHJMVa6bW1JblXwFzzfIZQ855Zhr ugE+8CIJ2eLDY/QMTYpoPLrZv3///o/+dwObmPZJs2ri4M6SisSKilD4rqlK 4p0XBYI7MvtKgTJSFFZPViRFuiNId1ZQBjTAviDc8Tu0j/0unVVv0fFRWybv H0n57vn56XfPzgRq92sDSvwjcoV7fYdUPb8lnJ0+3wdVaXvrlY1r47/2Xz56 LrQ9GqDquG7T69UUSZUOGj52m+36G6P9NWo87pqdAYIAou2tp/hK/Mrzh9g3 aU3Q2CW/8tlJws6XxHH2hGOHXco1ib8jPOBPgqutaoMdOYrd4fAgwK06ghAB uL117rGTv8cB9dw94bzt9TBl54bNCKrD8PtEUw63tx5ixxFPH9WExnjMU9OS 2OO5wDWphCXDGADYhm3XHUqS0TS7LmF3Om42ST+oCbjfd+wmDmzP3admn13v jFzUBGgA1kRDGHXk9pZTE1jztrc+jt+f9UX0oy1RACzCP5LUNP6BDEr8rxX/ DHFT/HO05dUYw5gfazJ4JeVHCFgIAQJpAQBzRIpssE9VUJVTUmQeAmOIHo1i ik3PtTwAbQSkzqWEqcTEigU70B0jVv9Ysbok/DPgk2VO/4vwL0sA3eH/ICTJ UIUM/0hVy/l/JeX02avT85Pbh79LghD+gM2vBp+wswwgjt5wDLJplM3tPZdh mAEWQKeDgChSYlpuL2QREX5lNuUaEAnRo88gJ3FukkNLhttbj9gta8JXvr0n SLLwLXYFwIaiIKs1SWL/Cydn5+yOnhvgJpM9D2Jt5NdXqrGWHkYViRuI59d9 kiepRoefELcVtFkblFDuXNbZm1fvtRn5cci1AAyNUQkNaKyBBmugcPocTQSj sr1F6+L2VrOePRDUJS7JenU8MG1PYF0ua8KL8+f7x6+eC6xRgB+7tE3iCRCA 6SEob2/huh/0e7hfg7Lw5PnDT1kafpry312q9C+g/8kwxf8QVJRS/q+a/+Uq TkkdkJe4qG0W0QGHaekflqkSyEpKDVysBUaTUliSWmB0al5TUiogG/ZsvMnK UaINC/U9VmaofB8r/m33UpLXaf/RoJTmf5oES/xvHP/rVN+DAcoQySpj9DJA aoYGJiEZjUSpjSWbuibuUrODKeOC3EaD6VR/m8n8JjqkcnCwd7C3FyNwO996 ZGRd6ngkIRcOWMmjaGAhrbshg5NnUjh5XRyO9fol8ek69T8Jofj8r4T4h2qJ /42Z/7XM/K/lzf9Fp/7EzH9cDSf/RTP+xZB49kWfxOb98+po6i885YcjnU/6 Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 47] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 WnrSn8zt8idmHGo0MVOW18r/GfQz9h+olvhfSRnNngKQJOG7x/OmVENP4VuG IDLtZM4BilKNvdLnUdwgPj9xis1wFEpQRzqSgCSzCZ9N/hbuwg4g/pCYFj0+ M62Jz0WZUIAp/UhTk4h8yAztcKwuZKoRczCyUgEjjwGgQoadqYEovDg3DwE9 Ll8Ob84UDH0mVeCHSntPWW5H/pOrYLnaXwH7j6ak+R8Ccin/N8//13n9Pi4A BEjgp4mgGhf/0SBMKH7bWy/IxcD2mdB1vaBtu62zQb/v+QE9b9t0L+/LEzto E3aj5753dS3GTudf2ISO6o7P9x95x+519liOnzAxw50/ORMszzFFJshFNnrC iWQRC07PLZvCLBt2q+mZa/X/SYqMMvpfaf9ZLf9DwECGqkFJZmgMAuJzgAkN n+CuwFAl+KRJ7EuOrtkMUUozPQANncHZI3GsjwYcpqZnwUEHSJB9dC3InmDA PrUtTCFph4YfTA17yvkgMlCK9z3IE1uRwggN7FLLHjG/B3nUL6poSKDjmm6X x/rkoHQGwWONzTC8j3H+bzKJ7a/Z/6OpIK3/MdJe4n9j7L/JmVv/UIuwwf38 7B8PzHKwD9yWf532sI8lSDRkE2RhSGzMpIXZhQWMxEn3fXbGFrl/B4kAKgDe 2LFvsPIeduE5huHlWoabbFDj3nr9P4okZ+d/rcT/KsqLk69Pz85PXoR4zQV/ Bj8UBwPffS/H79Tyy2+XsteObTaPutarVqfrB0+HmPiPH4+NvvmnxAXDeCyz 0SNLR9nnHAsHIIybHRNA/PK7sqEBNgQBK0etoRwXQQcDt+t6Qze8yc/GOjzq M7BO/CNVy+AflPP/p4p/HepskrwZ5sFCzMM8zD+4EegPf4Y+IbPh+ORirfY/ GSpqmv8rZfzXpuC/GNXPHh0FagFF7sAOBJlFQPr21mlNGI2/BJs3DK77W64D nS6AEMkgNU2PbpaO851y/ynUZ1srgJInscJw5RnmOvbAU20pHkSS6K/xMyaP FwmUYUovzOumibBLd5ahaQxXRoimo3goyU0CZXI6AepSFG+9/KDmDw+JEQpr PqWnK1sIbS7b/bPY/w+1tPwHpf1n5fYf9qIVeMxFawVJMdkVl1TZeaGiKZRU NJAn7UJ+dVoBTGJdEvbGurBJaPx6Ixss1DNyT9vesmtCND75yhDJCE3C3U7X BdBz2R+SCGPLQgBfGIqKmn240M131Mxx8m9vCRM7VUV9mLcU5IB9zzrjwK2o co/UL9mbM2BNVyoQVaB8eEtSc6bQLEMDynJT+Q/WbP9Xs/o/Q3Ip/1fD/ytI Y1y5gpRIB/BJy6aBj/3qTG1gp/IrVn0UTO0T6g38ZoLsHk6W9y+sGYp/C0DQ wabVSQSFRUOTC333YuhB5F8AaEPU8blvsOk6ALq+03UpjwtLOugfLlwDCCSj Yr2hLnHiM4gBERLiPZK7bDFhPMCOjakcuQRTDsGHFfWrTFUQhYelq2avCcOK MFXx1u0PrJPdgeOs1/+PsvY/tVz/v2H6Px8mYkWSRP5hlmo7s9LIsmcYIMrf MWc58HhIQgNI0DWty27HxNTqXsAh8gL/QsImtZhQwJfmZEkwgobO2d8cxX+R 2y8WqDOFImvKUebEw5xasyo+qW22vZB1tj/w7fWu/0cZ+5+mlPP/qvW/tAHv ixfeICD1CnyYkg0VeHIruQEgkhVZz1sTNmvVfSg/ZsUFjIdyqCyKnDe0OyLu ENjwRSYbLiRDH4oWHhK/DS7ENnKVqfhgooZN/mC+9ih6lhi0idhmNKZ4xN8y jWelGliWDyu2SwfWmvU/pGbW/6LS/7t2+T+V8SMpGcZtLfYpGDk+hWo4zhYK RWe07PaGctCY6UQwytwoi/Af9EjQXiv/A4n4LzXif6X+t5Jylw0A4hMa2G5L fMpGgmeGy+8UVdON1/d3f6xWbNckxLz3NhQS8uuBO6AD7FRfvjh9+1ngiQ1y lw588vkvbereC3bt4Bf7TR+/uf5ib//g4H7tl3aw28a0Lu8Nie2bd+/3Mf3F 0Htrvg48r/qZ6RF+mmgHnx8tDj8ZW3bkeeGb1bsVVb3/evfHe29H9qovT57U fvNnwrOX7O2O8Ij/9bcjo9RN25Nr5gq8LnHltz9GH8C93dfRJ3i/crcqRjfq DVwTuynjl8VOf85DS+7de7t7/zWrXKnv/PR3737/7t/e/edPv333+5/+8ad/ ePfv7/5jJyTMr8OrvpXv7f7IrixWY+R3jOOh55uVXz0W71ZZD9w74n/++Pbz zw4f1H6zv/NXv/7ib/46lkZLBgDqinCDMZAm64CHp5IrJtMpE+LfEGwSn927 cn/3Nev+2v/+4b/++C//+se//+f/+ac/bO4amE+b/10CBcG12v/UcP1fiv+V 6/9Wzf9eMv735VGxGEDbClrD6iyP764MJagoiszKEatabTo2A34ysI7drd5v ey455Ev9mkxQiaHBYXSNzNMc9LBp+nVK03b2sQViV1YVaRzHF6+WvF1CaEaD X9ZkLe85YzFFijohvrebE+b9s/rdiuxkXTAI1u3/k7Q0/0Nl/s9N0v+KZsH8 oGVBemjwR3N9A9FwTWaIMqlld3gWb2hOY0EUhOaEv1GvR4plCZ0N9lFksOX5 PRxkyQ0K2c2DELmsZ4QH/WZvIPA1xvUdhODOPvvywf748Np+f8dzW8sOAF6A f1XVYMb+X/r/Ngj/oRJ1KvAgLgELvJ7g4h4RPEtg3N8nPfKBb0Lf9zg0GK52 ctf01lTWp4lgfLl+SfxrPnxv83WJnQE54J/Cm/BWLvtVp23W8ujGy2hS3ivU OQlT+p6xt+/toP3Me8UfgGu0kYzGPfyGqYNO+DiRwOYPu8yvswHRwNA38X8E Sparks, et al. 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Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 49] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 D4z0x/YgmjxYZsfvUSuTT344K/VpyBR8HslIfPHEbXpmqCw0bBf712kykRZD Bw2Pbx3nX9eRqVkqJLqKDbUJVfmgxwSc06rTNpYP+r4XeE3PqWcFH78O5grJ 9tYjzBt3PiB7rNeF474vADb/CrJWg1JNQcLXT8+3t3iIh3jcYo8U/k52r8/l 9n5ISITPmgOfEvp5HjFSNS7WRDH9oPPW0RfoH77U3qZCG1MBC3xreMF2BaYa CpzqVYvcMH8yOIi2X+Afq32NTk96ZNO+R+3IWYwD9ru3e+z7g5DMsUer++Ri YPvst7Fsh8y6ytwWSb/9k//+0z+//7tvfvd//9/e1QA3cVxh/dkmprbriAQK NrMxbUxsRPbuJFsnR2Bgkrqm2LVlx8SQkrPuZJ0kn+S7k1UDAcsUd5qQIfGU 0mlK8EzbgZAUmh+GzFCg6aQZUlrXpqEwkyZMpzOdCcwwhfy0+aF0VyfbkizZ TtvIIdnPlq3duz2d9t7bfe/te28L9HmGoX7TKKr6g0Gvp+bCW3JzKguNhoU5 Ojh34iT9UL/hLOw3DKNX9ZDRoDcY5uj36LoNjN4MC8bP0+egZqHYVYytplyz odVFmWExLswxYx4RPUGkrXJUMSzClXnmOS5OAvVBRaAK4ZdwVb45BxG5qFJ3 wXJcnmsGLlwGLYKigjVIuxU9uDsFEF9YV3vh4vkF0IbGciSeUixjb0dFOypS 8SLs+P/c0SL4FVw2zrt18kADo/sT+0GfozNGH9PB6PcN0ahu76PPHTy86oF2 Tina98Ydj2x75Z0i5vT6hg1bclf+8Znju/ecKlnZ49x5oKjkbZc63FdyYB2z 8lKvueXRC79r8N5j2vP+rVuqNuRufcR05Z3SxevOP/2DQcvVTfcNlL34pPNP h4bfG666eKTp+knvoY8uHjWoVS3fujhve8vao9dO1gx/9LfBJ47xlw1GvU7/ 0+3wYdiEvkBpsake1g3cnn7EHLhN7EpXPT+EDZNpvjju2FKzyYCmn1L8ttB0 u2meNHSXfGTLe9+59t2Dyj/37nvhFw9cejyFToyoY7582V32xOWdD/3+zOkb T71Ut6hvx4FnvwaO9P5s57K39w6dipZXPnbi28+fkff+qPL9IDjTtv7Cxp88 vlrovnPfvUs+7DztP1/5QX2JFbQ07x98ITT62/aF4Xd/NX91TeVx1/DSH186 lzO4qXpA/fmJZ4Vd1+suvKq7tuiph99qL7b99d/lNQdcgxcPU/36P8N+/VlE +nBr9gk3gYcm2G4o+hxcMN5TtxipRDaEJRNHcqiiCbpnoI1ph0smjpoo9BgK m5a8yr++zf/kyTvhm3ec/YbQV/xL2DxxUhF1L1wD83PnaBXGPFg4/t5gMOj6 0DObKOtrYZ52m3nJ9UtTSN8U7Vtw5ZDtX3k3tm7/4bGvy0s6X9skf3x+Va28 qOqUe0f43BtXV7z7j/zuv2xbMSCVNr289rWFv7mxQ7xx/7WrHmPottDT5Uzr wXPfa1sAGp858uCxuvzunQ+9tH/x0g8W8NTxyq82v/7gx95fX1n9Zt+ukG3D 2pd397a8dUE6m3+9rbzdV/rh4b/nvdKfbmS2WHQEnyGoiDE+7QDAadf/E/M/ afo/0gWI/J9l+x8X4KRaH6cEu8R4eHMjQOJPaq0m68tcIORNVvrXcestnka5 jWvmXUjDhVWJDn4xOktS5hOX+tf3bt7ca6HRaVjQQ79YupPCXR2CjFpKQPMQ 1s5iHOO2vFhF0kIduguB00zxnmAQdKBHix4bvutgEBfk2L80sqt9pjY9Vdsn 2RkL3P4c8D8WUrH6pMxi/peq6hT+t9mI/8/s2P/+u/zf/1Peb5BAg37R57Vy fl7iun3+iCDxCqd4sOEvg51vRhnBp08DmdLItaYFtaKnahXgFB/v9aSuj37T BVRminY0a4dIm8ffKPk2G9Y2NLY1ANU6RWNO4aGHEaQ0i7JTuj9BjhV5jyQI aUyPqhxRZnv+t8FU/rcykPB/1vlfFrqCqmBB/dGZ3ugPQCZ/gBj1ZaB4vFQH 2URfoIwflGxKDATRkGJBKm8wLLuFdAMLa6VZaGcT5QxMz0HRHWasrM2OQwgF D44g9Mo0Y7XJ0w4kNGNnE4MLMxv0Ph8Rg2HJr7i7Pt0RYFr538qk8n8V4f/s 8n/KurkWE+NQgyreNFMLjXFrhJ+NaOA4VUokGjgb/N9FzzL/M3Qq/9toov9n BTPz/xeVDsmBZFemmqXt1cz4LO1VVZwwIBKJLE8n9iPGTOXqGK3F1H9vb8gr SJwq8JbUNK4Tk7GVhYkOvpNn48wJ56iZRALdgxdvHPVBr7TJ1SWq3hVftGyx YWnW8/9QkEr1/7NRDMn/nBWMSfY0hMAJ6IoKBlQAW0UFDUZOjJwEo9HRfvRv 5MWRoyPPj+7GdSlVo/2ju4AFjJwa7Rs7NnJ0Kp8Y1p7CkxRDW1k6eaCIEyXe CsyPJ30/46MFOSLwHmWVa4pUQhmDkShK224og9Qi8GHNS4HG7smTV7ZnlhIg nRs/a5+UYeiTpQlg7RnzBOBDn70tRQluIkQUUeqZXf9vqtpGpfp/IwGQjP9Z Xv/pEXsEf2et28uJsoWXZHeS0oSEN6QcSqgPuEThsBE4CvKnbw5qAABogMXO lE40gFF2/MMwUkG+R8Y7DQEHKKsHzUFFkDoEuRNs3LixrCzufallm+FlfLB2 UkwU/oOv7AQ4ya+Pt0+zEqVRfJpFqORRP3ZLMV9vtxLLPAkhiz8qwY88vq08 AHejk2PdAfBUp7mNjsuhY7Mdw0IlLn4quNMahMh9nNQZEPg6geNxiAkAkhDx aHUgvpc2wFq3KIVRzeSDrdoz0dq3IfG1VQorYS5wPz7sADU1y5ahV820c5fm Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 50] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 84Y+LNbTihYGpCQ9/oA8RgER9DnO2A2M1VikoCVWgR5IjwOM9UnMYHg3wDo4 hhIS8XSXRBXxx6f1EKYMAOJCASv6fXYAsA/ueBdrV0RvsTwR62Cqyr6cttmW o9kdXyt+ISdqNBaJiCN00AzoKGsKB5GqARRVFiVEXmWYvDISFroU6m2N1p1j bsCoJvYttXtWsD2E106pAd3o3uFyrO18wuk9Yw5Qa3am9s0CYj/PLOv/NJxs /yP6/020/jeVpa/Tq/BWKmEAjpOcD5vyAh6piw7SASsj28JQM/clmfYYmppi ZW9Ge7xhK4KYajuAJPUfAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEB AQEBAQEBAQHBTYr/AD4op6MAGAEA -- END MESSAGE ARCHIVE -- Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 51] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests April 2005 Intellectual Property Statement The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. Disclaimer of Validity This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. Acknowledgment Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society. Sparks, et al. Expires October 3, 2005 [Page 52]