S/MIME Working Group Jongwook Park (KISA)
Internet Draft Sungjae Lee (KISA)
Document: draft-ietf-smime-cms-seed-00.txt Jeeyeon Kim (KISA)
Expires: September 29, 2004 Jaeil Lee (KISA)
Target category : Standard Track March 29, 2004
Use of the SEED Encryption Algorithm in CMS
draft-ietf-smime-cms-seed-00.txt
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Abstract
This document specifies the conventions for using the SEED encryption
algorithm for encryption with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
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1. Introduction
This document specifies the conventions for usting the SEED
encryption algorithm [SEED] [TTASSEED] for encryption with the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)[CMS]. The relevant object
identifiers (OIDs) and processing steps are provided so that SEED may
be used in the CMS specification (RFC 3369, RFC 3370) for content and
key encryption.
1.1 SEED
SEED is a symmetric encryption algorithm that had been developed by
KISA (Korea Information Security Agency) and a group of experts since
1998. The input/output block size of SEED is 128-bit and the key
length is also 128-bit. SEED has the 16-round Feistel structure. A
128-bit input is divided into two 64-bit blocks and the right 64-bit
block is an input to the round function with a 64-bit subkey
generated from the key scheduling.
SEED is easily implemented in various software and hardware because
it is designed to increase the efficiency of memory storage and the
simplicity in generating keys without degrading the security of the
algorithm. In particular, it can be effectively adopted to a
computing environment with a restricted resources such as a mobile
devices, smart cards and so on.
SEED is robust against known attacks including DC (Differential
cryptanalysis), LC (Linear cryptanalysis) and related key attacks,
etc. SEED has gone through wide public scrutinizing procedures.
Especially, it has been evaluated and also considered
cryptographically secure by trustworhty organizations such as ISO/IEC
JTC 1/SC 27 and Japan CRYTEC (Cryptography Reasearch and Evaluation
Comittees) [ISOSEED][CRYPTEC].
SEED is a national industrial association standard [TTASSEED] and is
widely used in South Korea for electronic commerce and financial
services operated on wired & wireless PKI.
1.2 Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in uppercase,
as shown) are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. Object Identifiers for Content and Key Encryption
This section provides the OIDs and processing information necessary
for SEED to be used for content and key encryption in CMS. SEED is
added to the set of optional symmetric encryption algorithms in CMS
by providing two classes of unique object identifiers (OIDs). One
OID class defines the content encryption algorithms and the other
defines the key encryption algorithms. Thus a CMS agent can apply
SEED either for content or key encryption by selecting the
corresponding object identifier, supplying the required parameter,
and starting the program code.
2.1 OIDs for Content Encryption
SEED is added to the set of symmetric content encryption algorithms
defined in [CMSALG]. The SEED content-encryption algorithm in Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC) mode has the following object identifier:
id-seedCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004)
algorithm(1) seedCBC(4) }
The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be present, and the
parameters field MUST contain the value of IV:
SeedCBCParameter ::= SeedIV -- Initialization Vector
SeedIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
The plain text is padded according to Section 6.3 of [CMS].
2.2 OIDs for Key Encryption
The key-wrap/unwrap procedures used to encrypt/decrypt a SEED
content-encryption key (CEK) with a SEED key-encryption key
(KEK) are specified in Section 3. Generation and distribution of
key-encryption keys are beyond the scope of this document.
The SEED key-encryption algorithm has the following object
identifier:
id-npki-app-cmsSeed-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004) npki-app(7)
smime(1) alg(1) cmsSEED-wrap(1) }
The parameter associated with this object identifier MUST be absent,
because the key wrapping procedure itself defines how and when to
use an IV.
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3. Key Wrap Algorithm
SEED key wrapping and unwrapping is done in conformance with the
AES key wrap algorithm [AES-WRAP][RFC3394].
3.1 Notation and Defintions
The following notation is used in the description of the key
wrapping algorithms:
SEED(K, W) Encrypt W using the SEED codebook with key K
SEED-1(K, W) Decrypt W using the SEED codebook with key K
MSB(j, W) Return the most significant j bits of W
LSB(j, W) Return the least significant j bits of W
B1 ^ B2 The bitwise exclusive or (XOR) of B1 and B2
B1 | B2 Concatenate B1 and B2
K The key-encryption key K
n The number of 64-bit key data blocks
s The number of steps in the wrapping process,
s = 6n
P[i] The ith plaintext key data block
C[i] The ith ciphertext data block
A The 64-bit integrity check register
R[i] An array of 64-bit registers where
i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n
A[t], R[i][t] The contents of registers A and R[i] after
encryption step t.
IV The 64-bit initial value used during the
wrapping process.
In the key wrap algorithm, the concatenation function will be used to
concatenate 64-bit quantities to form the 128-bit input to the SEED
codebook. The extraction functions will be used to split the 128-bit
output from the SEED codebook into two 64-bit quantities.
3.2 SEED Key Wrap
Key wrapping with SEED is identical to Section 2.2.1 of [RFC3394]
with "AES" replaced by "SEED".
The inputs to the key wrapping process are the KEK and the plaintext
to be wrapped. The plaintext consists of n 64-bit blocks, containing
the key data being wrapped. The key wrapping process is described
below.
Inputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P1, P2, ..., Pn}, and
Key, K (the KEK).
Outputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C0, C1, ..., Cn}.
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1) Initialize variables.
Set A[0] to an initial value (see Section 3.4)
For i = 1 to n
R[0][i] = P[i]
2) Calculate intermediate values.
For t = 1 to s, where s = 6n
A[t] = MSB(64, SEED(K, A[t-1] | R[t-1][1])) ^ t
For i = 1 to n-1
R[t][i] = R[t-1][i+1]
R[t][n] = LSB(64, SEED(K, A[t-1] | R[t-1][1]))
3) Output the results.
Set C[0] = A[t]
For i = 1 to n
C[i] = R[t][i]
An alternative description of the key wrap algorithm involves
indexing rather than shifting. This approach allows one to
calculate the wrapped key in place, avoiding the rotation in the
previous description. This produces identical results and is more
easily implemented in software.
Inputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P1, P2, ..., Pn}, and
Key, K (the KEK).
Outputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C0, C1, ..., Cn}.
1) Initialize variables.
Set A = IV, an initial value (see Section 3.4)
For i = 1 to n
R[i] = P[i]
2) Calculate intermediate values.
For j = 0 to 5
For i=1 to n
B = SEED(K, A | R[i])
A = MSB(64, B) ^ t where t = (n*j)+i
R[i] = LSB(64, B)
3) Output the results.
Set C[0] = A
For i = 1 to n
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C[i] = R[i]
3.3 SEED Key Unwrap
Key unwrapping with SEED is identical to Section 2.2.2 of
[RFC3394], with "AES" replaced by "SEED".
The inputs to the unwrap process are the KEK and (n+1) 64-bit blocks
of ciphertext consisting of previously wrapped key. It returns n
blocks of plaintext consisting of the n 64-bit blocks of the
decrypted key data.
Inputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C0, C1, ..., Cn}, and
Key, K (the KEK).
Outputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P1, P2, ..., Pn}.
1) Initialize variables.
Set A[s] = C[0] where s = 6n
For i = 1 to n
R[s][i] = C[i]
2) Calculate the intermediate values.
For t = s to 1
A[t-1] = MSB(64, SEED-1(K, ((A[t] ^ t) | R[t][n]))
R[t-1][1] = LSB(64, SEED-1(K, ((A[t]^t) | R[t][n]))
For i = 2 to n
R[t-1][i] = R[t][i-1]
3) Output the results.
If A[0] is an appropriate initial value (see Section 3.4),
Then
For i = 1 to n
P[i] = R[0][i]
Else
Return an error
The unwrap algorithm can also be specified as an index based
operation, allowing the calculations to be carried out in place.
Again, this produces the same results as the register shifting
approach.
Inputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C0, C1, ..., Cn}, and
Key, K (the KEK).
Outputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P0, P1, K, Pn}.
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1) Initialize variables.
Set A = C[0]
For i = 1 to n
R[i] = C[i]
2) Compute intermediate values.
For j = 5 to 0
For i = n to 1
B = SEED-1(K, (A ^ t) | R[i]) where t = n*j+i
A = MSB(64, B)
R[i] = LSB(64, B)
3) Output results.
If A is an appropriate initial value (see Section 3.4),
Then
For i = 1 to n
P[i] = R[i]
Else
Return an error
3.4 Key Data Integrity -- the Initial Value
The initial value (IV) refers to the value assigned to A[0] in the
first step of the wrapping process. This value is used to obtain an
integrity check on the key data. In the final step of the
unwrapping process, the recovered value of A[0] is compared to the
expected value of A[0]. If there is a match, the key is accepted as
valid, and the unwrapping algorithm returns it. If there is not a
match, then the key is rejected, and the unwrapping algorithm
returns an error.
The exact properties achieved by this integrity check depend on the
definition of the initial value. Different applications may call
for somewhat different properties; for example, whether there is
need to determine the integrity of key data throughout its lifecycle
or just when it is unwrapped. This specification defines a default
initial value that supports integrity of the key data during the
period it is wrapped (in Section 3.4.1). Provision is also made to
support alternative initial values (in Section 3.4.2).
3.4.1 Default Initial Value
The default initial value (IV) is defined to be the hexadecimal
constant:
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A[0] = IV = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6
The use of a constant as the IV supports a strong integrity check on
the key data during the period that it is wrapped. If unwrapping
produces A[0] = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6, then the chance that the key data
is corrupt is 2^-64. If unwrapping produces A[0] any other value,
then the unwrap must return an error and not return any key data.
3.4.2 Alternative Initial Values
When the key wrap is used as part of a larger key management
protocol or system, the desired scope for data integrity may be more
than just the key data or the desired duration for more than just
the period that it is wrapped. Also, if the key data is not just an
SEED key, it may not always be a multiple of 64 bits.
Alternative definitions of the initial value can be used to address
such problems. According to [RFC3394], NIST will define alternative
initial values in future key management publications as needed. In
order to accommodate a set of alternatives that may evolve over
time, key wrap implementations that are not application-specific
will require some flexibility in the way that the initial value is
set and tested.
4. SMIMECapabilities Attribute
An S/MIME client SHOULD announce the set of cryptographic functions
it supports by using the S/MIME capabilities attribute. This
attribute provides a partial list of OIDs of cryptographic functions
and MUST be signed by the client. The functions' OIDs SHOULD be
logically separated in functional categories and MUST be ordered
with respect to their preference.
RFC 2633 [RFC2633], Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities
signed attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability
SEQUENCEs) to be used to specify a partial list of algorithms that
the software announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support.
If an S/MIME client is required to support symmetric encryption with
SEED, the capabilities attribute MUST contain the SEED OID
specified above in the category of symmetric algorithms. The
parameter associated with this OID MUST be SeedSMimeCapability.
SeedSMimeCapabilty ::= NULL
The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing SEED MUST be
DER-encoded as the following hexadecimal strings:
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30 0A 06 08 2A 83 1A 8C 9A 44 01 04
When a sending agent creates an encrypted message, it has to decide
which type of encryption algorithm to use. In general the decision
process involves information obtained from the capabilities lists
included in messages received from the recipient, as well as other
information such as private agreements, user preferences, legal
restrictions, and so on. If users require SEED for symmetric
encryption, it MUST be supported by the S/MIME clients on both the
sending and receiving side, and it MUST be set in the user
preferences.
5. Security Considerations
This document specifies the use of SEED for encrypting the
content of a CMS message and for encrypting the symmetric key used
to encrypt the content of a CMS message, and the other mechanisms
are the same as the existing ones. Therefore, the security
considerations described in the CMS specifications [CMS][CMSALG] and
the AES key wrap algorithm [AES-WRAP][RFC3394] can be applied to
this document. No security problem has been found on SEED
[CRYPTREC].
6. Intellectual Property Statement
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described
in this document or the extent to which any license under such
rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent
that it has made any effort to identify any such rights.
Information on the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in
standards-track and standards-related documentation can be found
in BCP-11. Copies of claims of rights made available for
publication and any assurances of licenses to be made available,
or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or
permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementors
or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF
Secretariat.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention
any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other
proprietary rights which may cover technology that may be required
to practice this standard. Please address the information to the
IETF Executive Director.
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7. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished
to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise
explain it or assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied,
published and distributed, in whole or in part, without
restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice
and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative
works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any
way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the
Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed
for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the
procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards
process must be followed, or as required to translate it into
languages other than English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not
be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on
an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE."
8. References
8.1 Normative Reference
[CMS] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 3369,
August 2002.
[CMSALG] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2633] Ramsdell, B., Editor. S/MIME Version 3 Message
Specification. RFC 2633. June 1999.
[RFC3394] J. Schaad and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.
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[AES-WRAP] National Institute of Standards and Technology. AES Key
Wrap Specification. 17 November 2001.
http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/kms/key-wrap.pdf
8.2 Informative Reference
[SEED] KISA, "SEED Algorithm Specification",
http://www.kisa.or.kr/seed/seed_eng.html"
[TTASSEED] Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA),
South Korea, "128-bit Symmetric Block Cipher (SEED)",
TTAS.KO-12.0004, September, 1998 (In Korean)
http://www.tta.or.kr/English/new/main/index.htm
[ISOSEED] ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC JTC1/SC 27 N 256r1, "National Body
contributions on NP 18033 Encryption algorithms in
response to document SC 27 N 2563", October, 2000
[CRYPTREC] Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), Japan,
CRYPTREC. "SEED Evaluation Report", February, 2002
http://www.kisa.or.kr
9. Authors' Address
Jongwook Park
Korea Information Security Agency
Phone: +82-2-405-5432
FAX : +82-2-405-5499
Email: khopri@kisa.or.kr
Sungjae Lee
Korea Information Security Agency
Phone: +82-2-405-5243
FAX : +82-2-405-5499
Email: sjlee@kisa.or.kr
Jeeyeon Kim
Korea Information Security Agency
Phone: +82-2-405-5238
FAX : +82-2-405-5499
Email: jykim@kisa.or.kr
Jaeil Lee
Korea Information Security Agency
Phone: +82-2-405-5300
FAX : +82-2-405-5499
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Email: jilee@kisa.or.kr
Appendix A ASN.1 Module
SeedEncryptionAlgorithmInCMS
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-seed(?) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
id-seedCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004)
algorithm(1) seedCBC(4) }
-- Initialization Vector
SeedCBCParameter ::= SeedIV
SeedIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
-- SEED Key Wrap Algorithm identifiers - Parameter is absent.
id-npki-app-cmsSeed-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(200004) npki-app(7)
smime(1) alg(1) cmsSEED-wrap(1) }
-- SEED S/MIME Capabilty parameter
SeedSMimeCapability ::= NULL
END
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