| Internet-Draft | MTI SUIT Algorithms | March 2023 |
| Moran, et al. | Expires 14 September 2023 | [Page] |
This document specifies algorithm profiles for SUIT manifest parsers and authors to ensure better interoperability. These profiles apply specifically to a constrained node software update use case.¶
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Mandatory algorithms may change over time due to an evolving threat landscape. Algorithms are grouped into algorithm profiles to account for this. Profiles may be deprecated over time. SUIT will define four choices of MTI profile specifically for constrained node software update. These profiles are:¶
At least one MTI algorithm in each category MUST be FIPS qualified.¶
Because SUIT presents an asymmetric communication profile, with powerful/complex manifest authors and constrained manifest recipients, the requirements for Recipients and Authors are different.¶
Recipients MAY choose which MTI profile they wish to implement. It is RECOMMENDED that they implement the "Future" Asymmetric MTI profile. Recipients MAY implement any number of other profiles.¶
Authors MUST implement all MTI profiles. Authors MAY implement any number of other profiles.¶
Other use-cases of SUIT MAY define their own MTI algorithms.¶
The algorithms that form a part of the profiles defined in this document are grouped into:¶
The COSE algorithm ID [IANA-COSE] for each algorithm is given in parentheses.¶
Authentication Algorithms are divided into three groups: Symmetric, Asymmetric Classical, and Asymmetric Post-Quantum¶
Key Exchange Algorithms are divided into two groups: Symmetric, and Asymmetric Classical¶
Recognized profiles are defined below.¶
This profile requires the following algorithms:¶
This profile requires the following algorithms:¶
This profile requires the following algorithms:¶
This profile requires the following algorithms:¶
Optional classical and PQC profiles are defined below.¶
For the avoidance of doubt, there are scenarios where payload or manifest encryption are not required. In these scenarios, the encryption element of the selected profile is simply not used.¶
TODO¶
-- back¶
The following CDDL creates a subset of COSE for use with SUIT. Both tagged and untagged messages are defined. SUIT only uses tagged COSE messages, but untagged messages are also defined for use in protocols that share a ciphersuite with SUIT.¶
To be valid, the following CDDL MUST have the COSE CDDL appended to it. The COSE CDDL can be obtained by following the directions in [RFC9052], Section 1.4.¶
SUIT_COSE_tool_tweak /= suit-sha256-hmac-a128-ccm
SUIT_COSE_tool_tweak /= suit-sha256-es256-ecdh-a128gcm
SUIT_COSE_tool_tweak /= suit-sha256-eddsa-ecdh-a128gcm
SUIT_COSE_tool_tweak /= suit-sha256-hsslms-hpke-a128gcm
SUIT_COSE_tool_tweak /= SUIT_COSE_Profile_HMAC_A128CCM
SUIT_COSE_tool_tweak /= SUIT_COSE_Profile_ES256_ECDH_A128GCM
SUIT_COSE_tool_tweak /= SUIT_COSE_Profile_EDDSA_ECDH_A128GCM
SUIT_COSE_tool_tweak /= SUIT_COSE_Profile_HSSLMS_HPKE_A128GCM
suit-sha256-hmac-a128-ccm = [5, 12]
suit-sha256-es256-ecdh-a128gcm = [-7, 1]
suit-sha256-eddsa-ecdh-a128gcm = [-8, 1]
suit-sha256-hsslms-hpke-a128gcm = [-46, 1]
SUIT_COSE_Profile_HMAC_A128CCM = SUIT_COSE_Profile<5,12> .and COSE_Messages
SUIT_COSE_Profile_ES256_ECDH_A128GCM = SUIT_COSE_Profile<-7,1> .and COSE_Messages
SUIT_COSE_Profile_EDDSA_ECDH_A128GCM = SUIT_COSE_Profile<-8,1> .and COSE_Messages
SUIT_COSE_Profile_HSSLMS_HPKE_A128GCM = SUIT_COSE_Profile<-46,1> .and COSE_Messages
SUIT_COSE_Profile<authid, encid> = SUIT_COSE_Messages<authid,encid>
SUIT_COSE_Messages<authid, encid> = SUIT_COSE_Untagged_Message<authid, encid> /
SUIT_COSE_Tagged_Message<authid, encid>
SUIT_COSE_Untagged_Message<authid, encid> = SUIT_COSE_Sign<authid> /
SUIT_COSE_Sign1<authid> / SUIT_COSE_Encrypt<encid> /
SUIT_COSE_Encrypt0<encid> / SUIT_COSE_Mac<authid> /
SUIT_COSE_Mac0<authid>
SUIT_COSE_Tagged_Message<authid, encid> = SUIT_COSE_Sign_Tagged<authid> /
SUIT_COSE_Sign1_Tagged<authid> / SUIT_COSE_Encrypt_Tagged<encid> /
SUIT_COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged<encid> / SUIT_COSE_Mac_Tagged<authid> /
SUIT_COSE_Mac0_Tagged<authid>
; Note: This is not the same definition as is used in COSE.
; It restricts a COSE header definition further without
; repeating the COSE definition. It should be merged
; with COSE by using the CDDL .and operator.
SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers<algid> = (
protected : bstr .cbor SUIT_COSE_alg_map<algid>,
unprotected : SUIT_COSE_header_map
)
SUIT_COSE_alg_map<algid> = {
1 => algid,
* int => any
}
SUIT_COSE_header_map = {
* int => any
}
SUIT_COSE_Sign_Tagged<authid> = #6.98(SUIT_COSE_Sign<authid>)
SUIT_COSE_Sign<authid> = [
SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers<authid>,
payload : bstr / nil,
signatures : [+ SUIT_COSE_Signature<authid>]
]
SUIT_COSE_Signature<authid> = [
SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers<authid>,
signature : bstr
]
SUIT_COSE_Sign1_Tagged<authid> = #6.18(SUIT_COSE_Sign1<authid>)
SUIT_COSE_Sign1<authid> = [
SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers<authid>,
payload : bstr / nil,
signature : bstr
]
SUIT_COSE_Encrypt_Tagged<encid> = #6.96(SUIT_COSE_Encrypt<encid>)
SUIT_COSE_Encrypt<encid> = [
SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers<encid>,
ciphertext : bstr / nil,
recipients : [+SUIT_COSE_recipient<encid>]
]
SUIT_COSE_recipient<encid> = [
SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers<encid>,
ciphertext : bstr / nil,
? recipients : [+SUIT_COSE_recipient<encid>]
]
SUIT_COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged<encid> = #6.16(SUIT_COSE_Encrypt0<encid>)
SUIT_COSE_Encrypt0<encid> = [
SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers<encid>,
ciphertext : bstr / nil,
]
SUIT_COSE_Mac_Tagged<authid> = #6.97(SUIT_COSE_Mac<authid>)
SUIT_COSE_Mac<authid> = [
SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers<authid>,
payload : bstr / nil,
tag : bstr,
recipients :[+SUIT_COSE_recipient<authid>]
]
SUIT_COSE_Mac0_Tagged<authid> = #6.17(SUIT_COSE_Mac0<authid>)
SUIT_COSE_Mac0<authid> = [
SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers<authid>,
payload : bstr / nil,
tag : bstr,
]
¶