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<rfc docName="draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-05" category="std">

  <front>
    <title abbrev="TLS Certificate Compression">TLS Certificate Compression</title>

    <author initials="A." surname="Ghedini" fullname="Alessandro Ghedini">
      <organization>Cloudflare, Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <email>alessandro@cloudflare.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="V." surname="Vasiliev" fullname="Victor Vasiliev">
      <organization>Google</organization>
      <address>
        <email>vasilvv@google.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2019" month="April" day="05"/>

    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>TLS</workgroup>
    

    <abstract>


<t>In TLS handshakes, certificate chains often take up
the majority of the bytes transmitted.</t>

<t>This document describes how certificate chains can be compressed to reduce the
amount of data transmitted and avoid some round trips.</t>



    </abstract>


  </front>

  <middle>


<section anchor="introduction" title="Introduction">

<t>In order to reduce latency and improve performance it can be useful to reduce
the amount of data exchanged during a TLS handshake.</t>

<t><xref target="RFC7924"></xref> describes a mechanism that allows a client and a server to avoid
transmitting certificates already shared in an earlier handshake, but it
doesn’t help when the client connects to a server for the first time and
doesn’t already have knowledge of the server’s certificate chain.</t>

<t>This document describes a mechanism that would allow certificates to be
compressed during full handshakes.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="notational-conventions" title="Notational Conventions">

<t>The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”,
“SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “NOT RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/>
when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="negotiating-certificate-compression" title="Negotiating Certificate Compression">

<t>This extension is only supported with TLS 1.3 and newer; if TLS 1.2 or earlier
is negotiated, the peers MUST ignore this extension.</t>

<t>This document defines a new extension type (compress_certificate(27)), which
can be used to signal the supported compression formats for the Certificate
message to the peer.  Whenever it is sent by the client as a ClientHello message
extension (<xref target="RFC8446"></xref>, Section 4.1.2), it indicates the support for
compressed server certificates.  Whenever it is sent by the server as a
CertificateRequest extension (<xref target="RFC8446"></xref>, Section 4.3.2), it indicates
the support for compressed client certificates.</t>

<t>By sending a compress_certificate extension, the sender indicates to the peer
the certificate compression algorithms it is willing to use for decompression.
The “extension_data” field of this extension SHALL contain a
CertificateCompressionAlgorithms value:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
    enum {
        zlib(1),
        brotli(2),
        zstd(3),
        (65535)
    } CertificateCompressionAlgorithm;

    struct {
        CertificateCompressionAlgorithm algorithms<2..2^8-2>;
    } CertificateCompressionAlgorithms;
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>There is no ServerHello extension that the server is required to echo back.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="compressed-certificate-message" title="Compressed Certificate Message">

<t>If the peer has indicated that it supports compression, server and client MAY
compress their corresponding Certificate messages and send them in the form of
the CompressedCertificate message (replacing the Certificate message).</t>

<t>The CompressedCertificate message is formed as follows:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
    struct {
         CertificateCompressionAlgorithm algorithm;
         uint24 uncompressed_length;
         opaque compressed_certificate_message<1..2^24-1>;
    } CompressedCertificate;
]]></artwork></figure>

<t><list style="hanging">
  <t hangText='algorithm'>
  The algorithm used to compress the certificate.  The algorithm MUST be one of
the algorithms listed in the peer’s compress_certificate extension.</t>
  <t hangText='uncompressed_length'>
  The length of the Certificate message once it is uncompressed.  If after
decompression the specified length does not match the actual length, the
party receiving the invalid message MUST abort the connection with the
“bad_certificate” alert.  The presence of this field allows the receiver to
pre-allocate the buffer for the uncompressed Certificate message and to
enforce limits on the message size before performing decompression.</t>
  <t hangText='compressed_certificate_message'>
  The compressed body of the Certificate message, in the same format as it
would normally be expressed in. The compression algorithm defines how the
bytes in the compressed_certificate_message field are converted into the
Certificate message.</t>
</list></t>

<t>If the specified compression algorithm is zlib, then the Certificate message
MUST be compressed with the ZLIB compression algorithm, as defined in <xref target="RFC1950"></xref>.
If the specified compression algorithm is brotli, the Certificate message MUST
be compressed with the Brotli compression algorithm as defined in <xref target="RFC7932"></xref>.  If
the specified compression algorithm is zstd, the Certificate message MUST be
compressed with the Zstandard compression algorithm as defined in <xref target="RFC8478"></xref>.</t>

<t>It is possible to define a certificate compression algorithm that uses a
pre-shared dictionary to achieve higher compression ratio.  This document does
not define any such algorithms.</t>

<t>If the received CompressedCertificate message cannot be decompressed, the
connection MUST be torn down with the “bad_certificate” alert.</t>

<t>If the format of the Certificate message is altered using the
server_certificate_type or client_certificate_type extensions <xref target="RFC7250"></xref>, the
resulting altered message is compressed instead.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations" title="Security Considerations">

<t>After decompression, the Certificate message MUST be processed as if it were
encoded without being compressed.  This way, the parsing and the verification
have the same security properties as they would have in TLS normally.</t>

<t>In order for certificate compression to function correctly, the underlying
compression algorithm MUST be deterministic and it MUST output the same data
that was provided as input by the peer.</t>

<t>Since certificate chains are typically presented on a per-server name or
per-user basis, the attacker does not have control over any individual fragments
in the Certificate message, meaning that they cannot leak information about the
certificate by modifying the plaintext.</t>

<t>The implementations SHOULD bound the memory usage when decompressing the
CompressedCertificate message.</t>

<t>The implementations MUST limit the size of the resulting decompressed chain to
the specified uncompressed length, and they MUST abort the connection if the
size exceeds that limit.  TLS framing imposes 16777216 byte limit on the
certificate message size, and the implementations MAY impose a limit that is
lower than that; in both cases, they MUST apply the same limit as if no
compression were used.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="middlebox-compatibility" title="Middlebox Compatibility">

<t>It’s been observed that a significant number of middleboxes intercept and try
to validate the Certificate message exchanged during a TLS handshake. This
means that middleboxes that don’t understand the CompressedCertificate message
might misbehave and drop connections that adopt certificate compression.
Because of that, the extension is only supported in the versions of TLS where
the certificate message is encrypted in a way that prevents middleboxes from
intercepting it, that is, TLS version 1.3 <xref target="RFC8446"></xref> and higher.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations" title="IANA Considerations">

<section anchor="update-of-the-tls-extensiontype-registry" title="Update of the TLS ExtensionType Registry">

<t>Create an entry, compress_certificate(27), in the existing registry for
ExtensionType (defined in <xref target="RFC8446"></xref>), with “TLS 1.3” column values
being set to “CH, CR”, and “Recommended” column being set to “Yes”.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="update-of-the-tls-handshaketype-registry" title="Update of the TLS HandshakeType Registry">

<t>Create an entry, compressed_certificate(25), in the existing registry for
HandshakeType (defined in <xref target="RFC8446"></xref>).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="registry-for-compression-algorithms" title="Registry for Compression Algorithms">

<t>This document establishes a registry of compression algorithms supported for
compressing the Certificate message, titled “Certificate Compression Algorithm
IDs”, under the existing “Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions” heading.</t>

<t>The entries in the registry are:</t>

<texttable>
      <ttcol align='left'>Algorithm Number</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Description</ttcol>
      <c>0</c>
      <c>Reserved</c>
      <c>1</c>
      <c>zlib</c>
      <c>2</c>
      <c>brotli</c>
      <c>3</c>
      <c>zstd</c>
      <c>16384 to 65535</c>
      <c>Reserved for Experimental Use</c>
</texttable>

<t>The values in this registry shall be allocated under “IETF Review” policy for
values strictly smaller than 256, under “Specification Required” policy for
values 256-16383, and under “Experimental Use” otherwise (see <xref target="RFC8126"></xref> for the
definition of relevant policies).  Experimental Use extensions can be used both
on private networks and over the open Internet.</t>

<t>The procedures for requesting values in the Specification Required space are
specified in <xref target="RFC8447"></xref>.</t>

</section>
</section>


  </middle>

  <back>

    <references title='Normative References'>





<reference  anchor="RFC1950" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1950'>
<front>
<title>ZLIB Compressed Data Format Specification version 3.3</title>
<author initials='P.' surname='Deutsch' fullname='P. Deutsch'><organization /></author>
<author initials='J-L.' surname='Gailly' fullname='J-L. Gailly'><organization /></author>
<date year='1996' month='May' />
<abstract><t>This specification defines a lossless compressed data format.  This memo provides information for the Internet community.  This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='1950'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC1950'/>
</reference>



<reference  anchor="RFC2119" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119'>
<front>
<title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
<author initials='S.' surname='Bradner' fullname='S. Bradner'><organization /></author>
<date year='1997' month='March' />
<abstract><t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification.  These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents.  This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='BCP' value='14'/>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='2119'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC2119'/>
</reference>



<reference  anchor="RFC7250" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250'>
<front>
<title>Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</title>
<author initials='P.' surname='Wouters' fullname='P. Wouters' role='editor'><organization /></author>
<author initials='H.' surname='Tschofenig' fullname='H. Tschofenig' role='editor'><organization /></author>
<author initials='J.' surname='Gilmore' fullname='J. Gilmore'><organization /></author>
<author initials='S.' surname='Weiler' fullname='S. Weiler'><organization /></author>
<author initials='T.' surname='Kivinen' fullname='T. Kivinen'><organization /></author>
<date year='2014' month='June' />
<abstract><t>This document specifies a new certificate type and two TLS extensions for exchanging raw public keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS).  The new certificate type allows raw public keys to be used for authentication.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='7250'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC7250'/>
</reference>



<reference  anchor="RFC7932" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7932'>
<front>
<title>Brotli Compressed Data Format</title>
<author initials='J.' surname='Alakuijala' fullname='J. Alakuijala'><organization /></author>
<author initials='Z.' surname='Szabadka' fullname='Z. Szabadka'><organization /></author>
<date year='2016' month='July' />
<abstract><t>This specification defines a lossless compressed data format that compresses data using a combination of the LZ77 algorithm and Huffman coding, with efficiency comparable to the best currently available general-purpose compression methods.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='7932'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC7932'/>
</reference>



<reference  anchor="RFC7924" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7924'>
<front>
<title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) Cached Information Extension</title>
<author initials='S.' surname='Santesson' fullname='S. Santesson'><organization /></author>
<author initials='H.' surname='Tschofenig' fullname='H. Tschofenig'><organization /></author>
<date year='2016' month='July' />
<abstract><t>Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshakes often include fairly static information, such as the server certificate and a list of trusted certification authorities (CAs).  This information can be of considerable size, particularly if the server certificate is bundled with a complete certificate chain (i.e., the certificates of intermediate CAs up to the root CA).</t><t>This document defines an extension that allows a TLS client to inform a server of cached information, thereby enabling the server to omit already available information.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='7924'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC7924'/>
</reference>



<reference  anchor="RFC8126" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126'>
<front>
<title>Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title>
<author initials='M.' surname='Cotton' fullname='M. Cotton'><organization /></author>
<author initials='B.' surname='Leiba' fullname='B. Leiba'><organization /></author>
<author initials='T.' surname='Narten' fullname='T. Narten'><organization /></author>
<date year='2017' month='June' />
<abstract><t>Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters.  To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper.  For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</t><t>To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed.  This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry.</t><t>This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='BCP' value='26'/>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='8126'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC8126'/>
</reference>



<reference  anchor="RFC8174" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174'>
<front>
<title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
<author initials='B.' surname='Leiba' fullname='B. Leiba'><organization /></author>
<date year='2017' month='May' />
<abstract><t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol  specifications.  This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the  defined special meanings.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='BCP' value='14'/>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='8174'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC8174'/>
</reference>



<reference  anchor="RFC8446" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446'>
<front>
<title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
<author initials='E.' surname='Rescorla' fullname='E. Rescorla'><organization /></author>
<date year='2018' month='August' />
<abstract><t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol.  TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t><t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961.  This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='8446'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC8446'/>
</reference>



<reference  anchor="RFC8447" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8447'>
<front>
<title>IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS</title>
<author initials='J.' surname='Salowey' fullname='J. Salowey'><organization /></author>
<author initials='S.' surname='Turner' fullname='S. Turner'><organization /></author>
<date year='2018' month='August' />
<abstract><t>This document describes a number of changes to TLS and DTLS IANA registries that range from adding notes to the registry all the way to changing the registration policy.  These changes were mostly motivated by WG review of the TLS- and DTLS-related registries undertaken as part of the TLS 1.3 development process.</t><t>This document updates the following RFCs: 3749, 5077, 4680, 5246, 5705, 5878, 6520, and 7301.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='8447'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC8447'/>
</reference>



<reference  anchor="RFC8478" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8478'>
<front>
<title>Zstandard Compression and the application/zstd Media Type</title>
<author initials='Y.' surname='Collet' fullname='Y. Collet'><organization /></author>
<author initials='M.' surname='Kucherawy' fullname='M. Kucherawy' role='editor'><organization /></author>
<date year='2018' month='October' />
<abstract><t>Zstandard, or &quot;zstd&quot; (pronounced &quot;zee standard&quot;), is a data compression mechanism.  This document describes the mechanism and registers a media type and content encoding to be used when transporting zstd-compressed content via Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME).</t><t>Despite use of the word &quot;standard&quot; as part of its name, readers are advised that this document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is being published for informational purposes only.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='8478'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC8478'/>
</reference>




    </references>



<section anchor="acknowledgements" title="Acknowledgements">

<t>Certificate compression was originally introduced in the QUIC Crypto protocol,
designed by Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang.</t>

<t>This document has benefited from contributions and suggestions from David
Benjamin, Ryan Hamilton, Ilari Liusvaara, Piotr Sikora, Ian Swett, Martin
Thomson, Sean Turner and many others.</t>

</section>


  </back>

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