XMPP M. Miller Internet-Draft Cisco Systems, Inc. Intended status: Standards Track June 13, 2013 Expires: December 15, 2013 End-to-End Object Encryption and Signatures for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) draft-miller-xmpp-e2e-06 Abstract This document defines two methods for securing objects (often referred to as stanzas) for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), which allows for efficient asynchronous communication between two entities, each with might have multiple devices operating simultaneously. One is a method to encrypt stanzas to provide confidentiality protection; another is a method to sign stanzas to provide authentication and integrity protection. This document also defines a related protocol for entities to request the ephemeral session keys in use. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on December 15, 2013. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 1] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. Determining Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. Encrypting XMPP Stanzas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2.1. Prerequisites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2.2. Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. Decrypting XMPP Stanzas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3.1. Protocol Not Understood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3.2. Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3.3. Insufficient Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3.4. Failed Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.3.5. Timestamp Not Acceptable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.3.6. Successful Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.4. Example - Securing a Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1. Determining Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.2. Signing XMPP Stanzas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2.1. Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.3. Verifying Signed XMPP Stanzas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.3.1. Protocol Not Understood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.3.2. Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.3.3. Insufficient Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.3.4. Failed Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.3.5. Timestamp Not Acceptable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.3.6. Successful Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.4. Example - Signing a Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5. Requesting Session Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.1. Request Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.2. Accept Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.3. Error Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.4. Example of Successful Key Request . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 6. Mulitple Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 7. Inclusion and Checking of Timestamps . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8. Interaction with Stanza Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 9. Interaction with Offline Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 10. Mandatory-to-Implement Cryptographic Algorithms . . . . . . . 32 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 11.1. Storage of Encrypted Stanzas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 11.2. Re-use of Session Master Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 2] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 12.1. XML Namespaces Name for e2e Data in XMPP . . . . . . . . 32 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Appendix A. Schema for urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6 . . . . 35 Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 1. Introduction End-to-end protection and authentication of traffic sent over the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol [RFC6120] is a desirable goal. Requirements and a threat analysis for XMPP encryption are provided in [E2E-REQ]. Many possible approaches to meet those (or similar) requirements have been proposed over the years, including methods based on PGP, S/MIME, SIGMA, and TLS. Most proposals have not been able to support multiple end-points for a given recipient. As more devices support XMPP, it becomes more desirable to allow an entity to communicate with another in a more secure manner, regardless of the number of agents the entity is employing. This document specifies an approach for encrypting and signing communications between two entities which each might have multiple end-points. Comments are solicited and should be addressed to 2. Terminology This document inherits XMPP-related terminology from [RFC6120], JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)-related terminology from [JOSE-JWA], JSON Web Encryption (JWE)-related terminology from [JOSE-JWE], and JSON Web Key (JWK)-related terminology from [JOSE-JWK]. Security-related terms are to be understood in the sense defined in [RFC4949]. The capitalized key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 3. Encryption Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 3] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 3.1. Determining Support If an agent supports receiving end-to-end object encryption, it MUST advertise that fact in its responses to [XEP-0030] information ("disco#info") requests by returning a feature of "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6:encryption". ... ... To facilitate discovery, an agent SHOULD also include [XEP-0115] information in any directed or broadcast presence updates. 3.2. Encrypting XMPP Stanzas The process that a sending agent follows for securing stanzas is the same regardless of the form of stanza (i.e., , , or ). 3.2.1. Prerequisites First, the sending agent prepares and retains the following: o The JID of the sender (i.e. its own JID). This SHOULD be the bare JID (localpart@domainpart). o The JID of the recipient. This SHOULD be the bare JID (localpart@domainpart). o A Session Master Key (SMK). The SMK MUST have a length at least equal to that required by the key wrapping algorithm in use and MUST be generated randomly. See [RFC4086] for considerations on generating random values. Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 4] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 o A SMK identifier (SID). The SID MUST be unique for a given (sender, recipient, SMK) tuple, and MUST NOT be derived from SMK itself. 3.2.2. Process For a given plaintext stanza (S), the sending agent performs the following: 1. Ensures the plaintext stanza is fully qualified, including the proper namespace declarations (e.g., contains the attribute 'xmlns' set to the value "jabber:client" for 'jabber:client' stanzas defined in [RFC6120]). 2. Notes the current UTC date and time (N) when this stanza is constructed, formatted as described under Section 7. 3. Constructs a forwarding envelope (M) using a element qualified by the "urn:xmpp:forward:0" namespace (as defined in [XEP-0297]) as follows: * The child element qualified by the "urn:xmpp:delay" namespace (as defined in [XEP-0203]) with the attribute 'stamp' set to the UTC date and time value N * The plaintext stanza S 4. Converts the forwarding envelope (M) to a UTF-8 encoded string (M'), optionallly removing line breaks and other insignificant whitespace between elements and attributes, i.e. M' = UTF8-encode(M). We call M' a "stanza-string" because for purposes of encryption and decryption it is treated not as XML but as an opaque string (this avoids the need for complex canonicalization of the XML input). 5. Generates a Content Master Key (CMK). The CMK MUST have a length at least equal to that required by the content encryption algorithm in use and MUST be generated randomly. See [RFC4086] for considerations on generating random values. Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 5] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 6. Generates any additional unprotected block cipher factors (IV); e.g., initialization vector/nonce. A sending agent MUST ensure that no two sets of factors are used with the same CMK, and SHOULD NOT reuse such factors for other stanzas. 7. Performs the message encryption steps from [JOSE-JWE] to generate the JWE Header (H), JWE Encrypted Key (E), JWE Ciphertext (C), and JWE Integrity Value (I); using the following inputs: * The 'alg' property is set to an appropriate key wrapping algorithm (e.g., "A256KW" or "A128KW"); recipients use the key request process in Section 5 to obtain the SMK. * The 'enc' property is set to the intended content encryption algorithm. * SMK as the key for CMK Encryption. * CMK as the JWE Content Master Key. * IV as the JWE Initialization Vector. * M' as the plaintext content to encrypt. 8. Constructs an element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace as follows: * The attribute 'type' set to the value "enc". * The attribute 'id' set to the identifier value SID. * The child element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML character data as H, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648]. Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 6] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 * The child element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML character as E, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648]. * The child element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML character as IV, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648]. * The child element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML character data as C, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648]. * The child element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML character data as I, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648]. 9. Sends the element as the payload of a stanza that SHOULD match the stanza from step 1 in kind (e.g., ), type (e.g., "chat"), and addressing (e.g., to="romeo@montague.net" from="juliet@capulet.net/balcony"). If the original stanza (S) has a value for the 'id' attribute, this stanza MUST NOT use the same value for its 'id' attribute. 3.3. Decrypting XMPP Stanzas 3.3.1. Protocol Not Understood If the receiving agent does not understand the protocol, it MUST do one and only one of the following: (1) ignore the extension, (2) ignore the entire stanza, or (3) return a error to the sender, as described in [RFC6120]. NOTE: If the inbound stanza is an , the receiving agent MUST return an error to the sending agent, to comply with the exchanging of IQ stanzas in [RFC6121]. 3.3.2. Process Upon receipt of an encrypted stanza, the receiving agent performs the following: 1. Determines if a valid SMK is available, associated with the SID specified by the 'id' attribute value of the element and Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 7] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 the sending agent JID specified by the 'from' attribute of the wrapping stanza. If the receiving agent does not already have the SMK, it requests it according to Section 5. 2. Performs the message decryption steps from [JOSE-JWE] to generate the plaintext forwarding envelope string M', using the following inputs: * The JWE Header (H) from the element's character data content. * The JWE Encrypted Key (E) from the element's character data content. * The JWE Initialization Vector/Nonce (I) from the element's character data content. * The JWE Ciphertext (C) from the element's character data content. * The JWE Integrity Value (I) from the element's character data content. 3. Converts the forwarding envelope UTF-8 encoded string M' into XML element (M). 4. Obtains the UTC date and time (N) from the child element, and verifies it is within the accepted range, as specified in Section 7. 5. Obtains the plaintext stanza (S), which is a child element node of M; the stanza MUST be fully qualified with proper namespace declarations for XMPP stanzas, to help distinguish it from other content within M. . 3.3.3. Insufficient Information Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 8] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 At step 1, if the receiving agent is unable to obtain the CMK, or the receiving agent could not otherwise determine the additional information, it MAY return a error to the sending agent (as described in [RFC6120]), optionally supplemented by an application-specific error condition element of : [XML character data] [XML character data] [XML character data] [XML character data] [XML character data] In addition to returning an error, the receiving agent SHOULD NOT present the stanza to the intended recipient (human or application) and SHOULD provide some explicit alternate processing of the stanza (which MAY be to display a message informing the recipient that it has received a stanza that cannot be decrypted). 3.3.4. Failed Decryption At step 2, if the receiving agent is unable to successfully decrypt the stanza, the receiving agent SHOULD return a error to the sending agent (as described in [RFC6120]), optionally supplemented by an application-specific error condition element of (previously defined in [RFC3923]): Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 9] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 [XML character data] [XML character data] [XML character data] [XML character data] [XML character data] In addition to returning an error, the receiving agent SHOULD NOT present the stanza to the intended recipient (human or application) and SHOULD provide some explicit alternate processing of the stanza (which MAY be to display a message informing the recipient that it has received a stanza that cannot be decrypted). 3.3.5. Timestamp Not Acceptable At step 4, if the stanza is successfully decrypted but the timestamp fails the checks outlined in Section 7, the receiving agent MAY return a error to the sender (as described in [RFC6120]), optionally supplemented by an application-specific error condition element of (previously defined in [RFC3923]): Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 10] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 [XML character data] [XML character data] [XML character data] [XML character data] [XML character data] 3.3.6. Successful Decryption If the receiving agent successfully decrypted the payload, it MUST NOT return a stanza error. If the payload is an of type "get" or "set", and the response to this is of type "error", the receiving agent MUST send the encrypted response wrapped in an of type "result", to prevent exposing information about the payload. 3.4. Example - Securing a Message NOTE: unless otherwise indicated, all line breaks are included for readability. The sending agent begins with the plaintext version of the stanza 'S': 35740be5-b5a4-4c4e-962a-a03b14ed92f4 But to be frank, and give it thee again. And yet I wish but for the thing I have. My bounty is as boundless as the sea, My love as deep; the more I give to thee, Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 11] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 The more I have, for both are infinite. and the following prerequisites: o Sender JID as "juliet@capulet.lit/balcony" o Recipient JID as "romeo@montegue.lit" o Session Master Key (SMK) as (base64 encoded) "xWtdjhYsH4Va_9SfYSefsJfZu03m5RrbXo_UavxxeU8" o SMK identifier (SID) as "835c92a8-94cd-4e96-b3f3-b2e75a438f92" The sending agent performs steps 1, 2, and 3 from Section 3.2.2 to generate the envelope: 35740be5-b5a4-4c4e-962a-a03b14ed92f4 But to be frank, and give it thee again. And yet I wish but for the thing I have. My bounty is as boundless as the sea, My love as deep; the more I give to thee, The more I have, for both are infinite. Then the sending agent performs steps 4 through 7 (with Content Master Key as "LViSXX0Jx-I3v1zY1-KcGeivmWKuq0QE_71ywQGU6OhlM2NoQo1zHi 77zI3ieIUh7Wb1S3kXmNily0_FZoIG7A", base64url encoded) to generate the [JOSE-JWE] outputs: Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 12] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 JWE Header { "alg":"A256KW", "enc":"A256CBC+HS512", "kid":"835c92a8-94cd-4e96-b3f3-b2e75a438f92" } JWE Encrypted Key 2tsmGH-WQdBxxJEs3d6LB2ovK6e1_9C1ogizJ9c6OvLmC6IeilHZ2Mimq2AElgI ploz0VQv5LOH9ST93WvvhVzMHSfx0Cwl0 JWE Initialization Vector ncOH4MsHT9HlJxnirx4qwg JWE Ciphertext FkFc4xGTVkjn7ojtS0SUY8IWfqsQKEIAlvLaBKieqVX1PAlq1ZjPp4TZC2I2eh7 01Lef3iRuNZd1nlgP2aREyHYCpE3FAelUoVG90B1FrJMnDUKAka7eb6GImamWPf 9onV-m5-GcUpejO9f1oPi-rwHzp475UPdAeKq5Z4zds8yXhQP-XyJbCPTtM-UQC 2-_q-3EKBHC4jM3qWDxVJ0JbIif3fCVRowzJh4AOB84YrfvkgUjMItqQPg2H6QB NqGUspLI634lM8R-mhGciDZX2Jh_nKoXLAf5GCnvL9PlI7OdFqocPBIIPpjNrgX _Z4PFjeq7ILx98GhVkryLYU9HVOFPCYci-lF9nfw1geliLfkoj5QZyi4J2SOtYa O_zPmQvCXaUREqPf5UDAlgvc50a4ByYnNbkWSbhZ5Z388s8ELzPSE9XypdgP-1c SyRke7V8iGe4eHNsm01TgWILYOFK4mYAM52OTitJxmQtmRp6izY5ZFdH9f_WdoB 1RXmGEZydvL-estcjx5ghsV3gktedIl0HA4R_M_N5TFIwv7hiisyRLi2aQtyFbE 7pZ6Oz-cYsLc4qFfXbb13U9a2-Byul8hm_E2b3m4GMhmsCiROm-uht9Ek4h9BIx FhDKPr-htOXc93-uQNZlAQfkITAKlJfQ JWE Integrity Value Aj8lKdPMDE4U82UAhDJBaRrl3USmuzS2hfFOe_OBEv8 Then the sending agent performs steps 8 and 9, and sends the following: Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 13] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 eyJhbGciOiJBMjU2S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2Q0JDK0hTNTEyIiwia2lkI joiODM1YzkyYTgtOTRjZC00ZTk2LWIzZjMtYjJlNzVhNDM4ZjkyIn0 2tsmGH-WQdBxxJEs3d6LB2ovK6e1_9C1ogizJ9c6OvLmC6IeilHZ2Mimq 2AElgIploz0VQv5LOH9ST93WvvhVzMHSfx0Cwl0 ncOH4MsHT9HlJxnirx4qwg FkFc4xGTVkjn7ojtS0SUY8IWfqsQKEIAlvLaBKieqVX1PAlq1ZjPp4TZC 2I2eh701Lef3iRuNZd1nlgP2aREyHYCpE3FAelUoVG90B1FrJMnDUKAka 7eb6GImamWPf9onV-m5-GcUpejO9f1oPi-rwHzp475UPdAeKq5Z4zds8y XhQP-XyJbCPTtM-UQC2-_q-3EKBHC4jM3qWDxVJ0JbIif3fCVRowzJh4A OB84YrfvkgUjMItqQPg2H6QBNqGUspLI634lM8R-mhGciDZX2Jh_nKoXL Af5GCnvL9PlI7OdFqocPBIIPpjNrgX_Z4PFjeq7ILx98GhVkryLYU9HVO FPCYci-lF9nfw1geliLfkoj5QZyi4J2SOtYaO_zPmQvCXaUREqPf5UDAl gvc50a4ByYnNbkWSbhZ5Z388s8ELzPSE9XypdgP-1cSyRke7V8iGe4eHN sm01TgWILYOFK4mYAM52OTitJxmQtmRp6izY5ZFdH9f_WdoB1RXmGEZyd vL-estcjx5ghsV3gktedIl0HA4R_M_N5TFIwv7hiisyRLi2aQtyFbE7pZ 6Oz-cYsLc4qFfXbb13U9a2-Byul8hm_E2b3m4GMhmsCiROm-uht9Ek4h9 BIxFhDKPr-htOXc93-uQNZlAQfkITAKlJfQ Aj8lKdPMDE4U82UAhDJBaRrl3USmuzS2hfFOe_OBEv8 4. Signatures 4.1. Determining Support If an agent supports receiving end-to-end object signatures, it MUST advertise that fact in its responses to [XEP-0030] information ("disco#info") requests by returning a feature of "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6:signatures". Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 14] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 ... ... To facilitate discovery, an agent SHOULD also include [XEP-0115] information in any directed or broadcast presence updates. 4.2. Signing XMPP Stanzas The basic process that a sending agent follows for authenticating stanzas is the same regardless of the kind of stanza (i.e., , , or ). 4.2.1. Process For a given plaintext stanza (S), the sending agent performs the following: 1. Ensures the plaintext stanza is fully qualified, including the proper namespace declarations (e.g., contains the attribute 'xmlns' set to the value "jabber:client" for 'jabber:client' stanzas defined in [RFC6120]). 2. Notes the current UTC date and time (N) when this stanza is constructed, formatted as described under Section 7. 3. Constructs a forwarding envelope (M) using a element qualified by the "urn:xmpp:forward:0" namespace (as defined in [XEP-0297]) as follows: * The child element qualified by the "urn:xmpp:delay" namespace (as defined in [XEP-0203]) with the attribute 'stamp' set to the UTC date and time value N * The plaintext stanza S 4. Converts the forwarding envelope (M) to a UTF-8 encoded string (M'), optionallly removing line breaks and other insignificant whitespace between elements and attributes, i.e. M' = Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 15] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 UTF8-encode(M). We call M' a "stanza-string" because for purposes of encryption and decryption it is treated not as XML but as an opaque string (this avoids the need for complex canonicalization of the XML input). 5. Chooses a private asymmetric key (PK) for which the sending agent has published the corresponding public key to the intended recipients. 6. Performs the message signatures steps from [JOSE-JWS] to generate the JWS Header (H) and JWS Signature (I); using the following inputs: * The 'alg' property is set to an appropriate signature algorithm for PK (e.g., "R256"). * M' as the JWS Payload. 7. Constructs an element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace as follows: * The attribute 'type' set to the value "sig" * The child element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML character data as H, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648]. * The child element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML character data as M', encoded base64url as per [RFC4648]. * The child element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML character data as I, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648]. 8. Sends the element as the payload of a stanza that SHOULD match the stanza from step 1 in kind (e.g., ), type (e.g., "chat"), and addressing (e.g., to="romeo@montegue.lit" from="juliet@capulet.lit/balcony"). If the original stanza (S) has a value for the 'id' attribute, this stanza SHOULD NOT use the same value for its "id" attribute. Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 16] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 4.3. Verifying Signed XMPP Stanzas 4.3.1. Protocol Not Understood If the receiving agent does not understand the protocol, it MUST do one and only one of the following: (1) ignore the extension, (2) ignore the entire stanza, or (3) return a error to the sender, as described in [RFC6120]. NOTE: If the inbound stanza is an , the receiving agent MUST return an error to the sending agent, to comply with the exchanging of IQ stanzas in [RFC6121]. 4.3.2. Process Upon receipt of a signed stanza, the receiving agent performs the following: 1. Ensures it has appropriate materials to verify the signature, which generally means ensuring that it possesses one or more public keys for the sending agent (if one is not provided as part of the JWS Header). 2. Performs the message validation steps from [JOSE-JWS], with the following inputs: * The JWS Header H from the element's character data content. * The JWS Playload M' from the element's character data content. * The JWS Signature from the element's character data content. 3. Converts the forwarding envelope UTF-encoded string M' into XML element M. 4. Obtains the UTC date and time N from the child element, and verifies it is within the accepted range, as specified in Section 7. Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 17] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 5. Obtains the plaintext stanza S, which is a child element node of M; the stanza MUST be fully qualified with the proper namespace declrations from XMPP stanzas, to help distinguish it from other content within M. 4.3.3. Insufficient Information At step 1, if the receiving agent does not have the key used to sign the stanza, or the receiving agent could not otherwise determine it, it MAY return a error to the sending agent (as described in [RFC6120]), optionally supplemented by an application- specific error condition element of : [XML character data] [XML character data] [XML character data] In addition to returning an error, the receiving agent SHOULD NOT present the stanza to the intended recipient (human or application) and SHOULD provide some explicit alternate processing of the stanza (which MAY be to display a message informing the recipient that it has received a stanza that cannot be verified). 4.3.4. Failed Verification At step 2, if the receiving agent is unable to successfully verify the stanza, the receiving agent SHOULD return a error to the sending agent (as described in [RFC6120]), optionally supplemented by an application-specific error condition element of : Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 18] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 [XML character data] [XML character data] [XML character data] In addition to returning an error, the receiving agent SHOULD NOT present the stanza to the intended recipient (human or application) and SHOULD provide some explicit alternate processing of the stanza (which MAY be to display a message informing the recipient that it has received a stanza that cannot be verified). 4.3.5. Timestamp Not Acceptable At step 4, if the stanza is successfully verified but the timestamp fails the checks outlined in Section 7, the receiving agent MAY return a error to the sender (as described in [RFC6120]), optionally supplemented by an application-specific error condition element of (previously defined in [RFC3923]): [XML character data] [XML character data] [XML character data] 4.3.6. Successful Verification If the receiving agent successfully verified the payload, it SHOULD NOT return a stanza error. However, if the signed stanza is an of type "get" or "set", the response MAY be sent unsigned if the receiving agent does not have an appropriate public-private key-pair. Otherwise, the receiving agent SHOULD send the response signed as per Section 4.2.1, with the 'type' attribute set to the value "result", even if the response to the signed stanza is of type "error". The error applies to the signed stanza, not the wrapping stanza. 4.4. Example - Signing a Message NOTE: unless otherwise indicated, all line breaks are included for readability. The sending agent beings with the plaintext version of stanza 'S': 35740be5-b5a4-4c4e-962a-a03b14ed92f4 But to be frank, and give it thee again. And yet I wish but for the thing I have. My bounty is as boundless as the sea, My love as deep; the more I give to thee, The more I have, for both are infinite. Then the sending agent performs steps 1, 2, and 3 from Section 4.2.1 generate the envelope M: 35740be5-b5a4-4c4e-962a-a03b14ed92f4 But to be frank, and give it thee again. And yet I wish but for the thing I have. My bounty is as boundless as the sea, My love as deep; the more I give to thee, The more I have, for both are infinite. Then the sending agent performs steps 4, 5, and 6 to generate the [JOSE-JWS] outputs: JWS Header (before base64url encoding) { "alg":"RS512", "kid":"juliet@capulet.lit" } JWS Payload PGZvcndhcmRlZCB4bWxucz0idXJuOnhtcHA6Zm9yd2FyZDowIj48ZGVsYXkgeG1 sbnM9InVybjp4bXBwOmRlbGF5IiBzdGFtcD0iMTQ5Mi0wNS0xMlQyMDowNzozNy 4wMTJaIi8-PG1lc3NhZ2UgeG1sbnM9ImphYmJlcjpjbGllbnQiIGZyb209Imp1b GlldEBjYXB1bGV0LmxpdC9iYWxjb255IiB0bz0icm9tZW9AbW9udGVndWUubGl0 IiB0eXBlPSJjaGF0Ij48dGhyZWFkPjM1NzQwYmU1LWI1YTQtNGM0ZS05NjJhLWE wM2IxNGVkOTJmNDwvdGhyZWFkPjxib2R5PkJ1dCB0byBiZSBmcmFuaywgYW5kIG dpdmUgaXQgdGhlZSBhZ2Fpbi4gQW5kIHlldCBJIHdpc2ggYnV0IGZvciB0aGUgd GhpbmcgSSBoYXZlLiBNeSBib3VudHkgaXMgYXMgYm91bmRsZXNzIGFzIHRoZSBz ZWEsIE15IGxvdmUgYXMgZGVlcDsgdGhlIG1vcmUgSSBnaXZlIHRvIHRoZWUsIFR oZSBtb3JlIEkgaGF2ZSwgZm9yIGJvdGggYXJlIGluZmluaXRlLjwvYm9keT48L2 1lc3NhZ2U-PC9mb3J3YXJkZWQ- JWS Signature Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 21] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 YPfGouD50j0C_C-RneawG0jxXWDXgBkN3FJz6eaBFIPCh3hopiwtwKir7Yamvgt OrqhXx2pcu-70caGi6mKKLWvpdwdJ3nEnhdjPOd3CmLdaK_PBAMtIt8d3155hdl qNxSMsJN7PxmNLNwJhbksAsI-2TcCQsuxdIPXh6hcqBm44BpVio6AoRPqwF06XZ MMBMOMnEFcV6Ht20wCK1BEGgOmN3KYPbwKeTctG8HKPAh25_K66aEXT66lI19uW j1fGFJ79QQHUhc5y9pSKmpK7HKruPMRyrvpzBSfUhcb62nLXhM-LzY5taaDECzi fCi-IxySBtJJtPCqYAYW_IbrRFg Then the sending agent performs steps 7 and 8 and sends the following: eyJhbGciOiJSUzUxMiIsImtpZCI6Imp1bGlldEBjYXB1bGV0LmxpdCJ9 PGZvcndhcmRlZCB4bWxucz0idXJuOnhtcHA6Zm9yd2FyZDowIj48ZGVsY XkgeG1sbnM9InVybjp4bXBwOmRlbGF5IiBzdGFtcD0iMTQ5Mi0wNS0xMl QyMDowNzozNy4wMTJaIi8-PG1lc3NhZ2UgeG1sbnM9ImphYmJlcjpjbGl lbnQiIGZyb209Imp1bGlldEBjYXB1bGV0LmxpdC9iYWxjb255IiB0bz0i cm9tZW9AbW9udGVndWUubGl0IiB0eXBlPSJjaGF0Ij48dGhyZWFkPjM1N zQwYmU1LWI1YTQtNGM0ZS05NjJhLWEwM2IxNGVkOTJmNDwvdGhyZWFkPj xib2R5PkJ1dCB0byBiZSBmcmFuaywgYW5kIGdpdmUgaXQgdGhlZSBhZ2F pbi4gQW5kIHlldCBJIHdpc2ggYnV0IGZvciB0aGUgdGhpbmcgSSBoYXZl LiBNeSBib3VudHkgaXMgYXMgYm91bmRsZXNzIGFzIHRoZSBzZWEsIE15I GxvdmUgYXMgZGVlcDsgdGhlIG1vcmUgSSBnaXZlIHRvIHRoZWUsIFRoZS Btb3JlIEkgaGF2ZSwgZm9yIGJvdGggYXJlIGluZmluaXRlLjwvYm9keT4 8L21lc3NhZ2U-PC9mb3J3YXJkZWQ- YPfGouD50j0C_C-RneawG0jxXWDXgBkN3FJz6eaBFIPCh3hopiwtwKir7 YamvgtOrqhXx2pcu-70caGi6mKKLWvpdwdJ3nEnhdjPOd3CmLdaK_PBAM tIt8d3155hdlqNxSMsJN7PxmNLNwJhbksAsI-2TcCQsuxdIPXh6hcqBm4 4BpVio6AoRPqwF06XZMMBMOMnEFcV6Ht20wCK1BEGgOmN3KYPbwKeTctG 8HKPAh25_K66aEXT66lI19uWj1fGFJ79QQHUhc5y9pSKmpK7HKruPMRyr vpzBSfUhcb62nLXhM-LzY5taaDECzifCi-IxySBtJJtPCqYAYW_IbrRFg Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 22] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 5. Requesting Session Keys Because of the dynamic nature of XMPP stanza routing, the protocol does not exchange session keys as part of the encrypted stanza. Instead, a separate protocol is used by receiving agents to request a particular session key from the sending agent. 5.1. Request Process Before a SMK can be requested, the receiving agent MUST have at least one public key for which it also has the private key. The public key(s) are provided to the sending agent as part of this process. To request a SMK, the receiving agent performs the following: 1. Constructs a [JOSE-JWK] JWK Set (KS), containing information about each public key the requesting agent wishes to use. Each key SHOULD include a value for the property 'kid' which uniquely identifies it within the context of all provided keys. Each key MUST include a value for the property 'kid' if any two keys use the same algorithm. 2. Constructs a element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace as follows: * The attribute 'id' set to the SMK identifier value SID. * The child element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML character data as KS, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648]. 3. Sends the element as the payload of an stanza with the attribute 'type' set to "get", the attribute 'to' set to the full JID of the original encrypted stanza's sender, and the attribute 'id' set to an opaque string value the receiving agent uses to track the response. Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 23] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 5.2. Accept Process If the sending agent approves the request, it performs the following steps: 1. Generate a JSON Web Key (JWK) representing the symmetric SMK (according to [JOSE-JWK]): * The "kty" parameter MUST be "oct". * The "kid" parameter MUST be the SID. * The "k" parameter MUST be the SMK, encoded as base64url. * The "use" parameter, if present, MUST be set to the algorithm in use for encrypting messages from Section 3.2. * The "use" parameter, if present, MUST be set to "enc". 2. Chooses a key (PK) from the keys provided via KS, and notes its identifier value 'kid'. 3. Protects the SMK using the process outlined in [JOSE-KEYPROTECT] to generate the JWE Header (H), JWE Encrypted Key (E), JWE Initialization Vector (IV), JWE Ciphertext (C), and JWE Integrity Value (I); using the following inputs: * The 'alg' property is set to an algorithm appropriate for the chosen PK (e.g., "RSA-OAEP" for a "RSA" key). * The 'enc' property is set to the intended content encryption algorithm. * A randomly generated CMK. See [RFC4086] for considerations on generating random values. Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 24] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 * A randomly generated initialization vector. See [RFC4086] for considerations on generating random values. * SMK, formatted as a JWK as above. 4. Constructs a element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace as follows: * The attribute 'id' set to the SMK Identifier (SID). * The child element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML character data as H, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648]. * The child element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML character data as E, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648]. * The child element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML character data as IV, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648]. * The child element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML character data as C, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648]. * The child element qualified by the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML character data as I, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648]. 5. Sends the element as the payload of an stanza with the attribute 'type' set to "result", the attribute 'to' set to the full JID from the request 's 'from' attribute, and the attribute 'id' set to the value of the request 's 'id' attribute. 5.3. Error Conditions Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 25] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 If the sending agent does not approve the request, it sends an stanza of type "error" and containing the reason for denying the request: o : the key request is made by an entity that is not authorized to decrypt stanzas from the sending agent and/or for the indicated SID. o : the requested SID is no longer valid. o : the key request did not contain any keys the sending agent understands. 5.4. Example of Successful Key Request NOTE: unless otherwise indicated, all line breaks are included for readability. To begin a key request, the receiving agent performs step 1 from Section 5.1 to generate the [JOSE-JWK]: { "keys": [{ "kty":"RSA", "kid":"romeo@montegue.lit/garden", "n":"vtqejkMF01h8oKEaHfHEYO0C2jM7eISbbSvNs0SNItYWO6GbjpJf N4ldXw2vpVRdysnwU3zk6o2_SD0YCH1WgeuI0QK1knMTDdNSXx52e1c4BTw hlA8iHuutTWmpBqesn1GNZmqB3jYsJOkVBYwCJtkB9APaBvk0itlRtizjCf 1HHnau7nGStyshgu8-srxi_d8rC5TTLSB_zT1i6fP8fwDloemXOtC0U65by 5P-1ZHxaf_bD8fpjps6gwSgdkZKMJAI0bOWZWuMpp2ntqa0wLB7Ndxb2Ijr eog_s5ssAoSiXDVdoswSbp36ZP-1lnCk2j-vZ4qbhaFg5bZtgt-gwQ", "e":"AQAB" }] } Then the receiving agent performs step 2 to generate the : eyJrZXlzIjpbeyJrdHkiOiJSU0EiLCJraWQiOiJyb21lb0Btb250ZWd1ZS5 saXQvZ2FyZGVuIiwibiI6InZ0cWVqa01GMDFoOG9LRWFIZkhFWU8wQzJqTT dlSVNiYlN2TnMwU05JdFlXTzZHYmpwSmZONGxkWHcydnBWUmR5c253VTN6a Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 26] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 zZvMl9TRDBZQ0gxV2dldUkwUUsxa25NVERkTlNYeDUyZTFjNEJUd2hsQThp SHV1dFRXbXBCcWVzbjFHTlptcUIzallzSk9rVkJZd0NKdGtCOUFQYUJ2azB pdGxSdGl6akNmMUhIbmF1N25HU3R5c2hndTgtc3J4aV9kOHJDNVRUTFNCX3 pUMWk2ZlA4ZndEbG9lbVhPdEMwVTY1Ynk1UC0xWkh4YWZfYkQ4ZnBqcHM2Z 3dTZ2RrWktNSkFJMGJPV1pXdU1wcDJudHFhMHdMQjdOZHhiMklqcmVvZ19z NXNzQW9TaVhEVmRvc3dTYnAzNlpQLTFsbkNrMmotdlo0cWJoYUZnNWJadGd 0LWd3USIsImUiOiJBUUFCIn1dfQ Then the receiving agent performs step 3 and sends the following: eyJrZXlzIjpbeyJrdHkiOiJSU0EiLCJraWQiOiJyb21lb0Btb250ZWd1Z S5saXQvZ2FyZGVuIiwibiI6InZ0cWVqa01GMDFoOG9LRWFIZkhFWU8wQz JqTTdlSVNiYlN2TnMwU05JdFlXTzZHYmpwSmZONGxkWHcydnBWUmR5c25 3VTN6azZvMl9TRDBZQ0gxV2dldUkwUUsxa25NVERkTlNYeDUyZTFjNEJU d2hsQThpSHV1dFRXbXBCcWVzbjFHTlptcUIzallzSk9rVkJZd0NKdGtCO UFQYUJ2azBpdGxSdGl6akNmMUhIbmF1N25HU3R5c2hndTgtc3J4aV9kOH JDNVRUTFNCX3pUMWk2ZlA4ZndEbG9lbVhPdEMwVTY1Ynk1UC0xWkh4YWZ fYkQ4ZnBqcHM2Z3dTZ2RrWktNSkFJMGJPV1pXdU1wcDJudHFhMHdMQjdO ZHhiMklqcmVvZ19zNXNzQW9TaVhEVmRvc3dTYnAzNlpQLTFsbkNrMmotd lo0cWJoYUZnNWJadGd0LWd3USIsImUiOiJBUUFCIn1dfQ If the sending agent accepts this key request, it performs step 1 from Section 5.2 to generate JWK representation of the SMK: { "kty":"oct", "kid":"835c92a8-94cd-4e96-b3f3-b2e75a438f92", "k":"xWtdjhYsH4Va_9SfYSefsJfZu03m5RrbXo_UavxxeU8" } Then the sending agent performs steps 2 and 3 to generate the protected SMK: Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 27] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 JWE Header (before base64url encoding) { "alg":"RSA-OAEP", "kid":"romeo@montegue.lit/garden", "enc":"A256CBC+HS512", "cty":"application/jwk+json" } JWE Encrypted Key hKUOpAif76c-hmRwEphVB9wXjloLpwu75x98MSWyCBtfUgmopk93ttUXoZ4AAIk rZJOtrPUqPZwYHjay3ggfgjVljJ_KGhgqI5cScIzaAQs0Pxep6FnrsnUrw09Sjv 2VRXOay4guMQnbQo0ibpifBxeuL9MJ_vdeb_BdSE8YZ4iTfMb7GT35gZC9NgweX 3fiTEo2LjY8hEV3DHud5LlNZzYp9kLmAUZNIwGu7LtYyI4F7NnOv9oLx1HtmfE3 _skkYtQoKMvMewLkIO88h325qCpWFdrLwPp63betCmewDJPaBdrp91rLchkXVo- d2ueKkb59TxWjMx7esBdaxCAcDQ JWE Initialization Vector Ggiego8UiSsj7GgY94qOng JWE Ciphertext 4vIGDz9Hm6X4lSo9JoA6ZzS0KitztLGAiMUs3RTviFO09choPhxJNlOj8KX8QIL u4zZ-ytCnG-yzNx5SsT8KEQJhIf6_9yWplxpX173k6ZJV-sXGd4Mj9u7N0IqWQL K5DMytv7XopsZsR9QFCDNGew JWE Integrity Value 3GuaasWV0XGTBbRtNP6OQ14_cHL-ZJC1naDtU6EIecw Then the sending agent performs step 4 to generate the response: eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImtpZCI6InJvbWVvQG1vbnRlZ3VlLmxpdC9 nYXJkZW4iLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2Q0JDK0hTNTEyIiwiY3R5IjoiYXBwbGljYX Rpb24vandrK2pzb24ifQ Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 28] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 hKUOpAif76c-hmRwEphVB9wXjloLpwu75x98MSWyCBtfUgmopk93ttUXoZ4 AAIkrZJOtrPUqPZwYHjay3ggfgjVljJ_KGhgqI5cScIzaAQs0Pxep6Fnrsn Urw09Sjv2VRXOay4guMQnbQo0ibpifBxeuL9MJ_vdeb_BdSE8YZ4iTfMb7G T35gZC9NgweX3fiTEo2LjY8hEV3DHud5LlNZzYp9kLmAUZNIwGu7LtYyI4F 7NnOv9oLx1HtmfE3_skkYtQoKMvMewLkIO88h325qCpWFdrLwPp63betCme wDJPaBdrp91rLchkXVo-d2ueKkb59TxWjMx7esBdaxCAcDQ Ggiego8UiSsj7GgY94qOng 4vIGDz9Hm6X4lSo9JoA6ZzS0KitztLGAiMUs3RTviFO09choPhxJNlOj8KX 8QILu4zZ-ytCnG-yzNx5SsT8KEQJhIf6_9yWplxpX173k6ZJV-sXGd4Mj9u 7N0IqWQLK5DMytv7XopsZsR9QFCDNGew 3GuaasWV0XGTBbRtNP6OQ14_cHL-ZJC1naDtU6EIecw Then the sending agent performs step 5 and sends the following: eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImtpZCI6InJvbWVvQG1vbnRlZ3VlLmxpdC9 nYXJkZW4iLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2Q0JDK0hTNTEyIiwiY3R5IjoiYXBwbGljYX Rpb24vandrK2pzb24ifQ hKUOpAif76c-hmRwEphVB9wXjloLpwu75x98MSWyCBtfUgmopk93ttUXoZ4 AAIkrZJOtrPUqPZwYHjay3ggfgjVljJ_KGhgqI5cScIzaAQs0Pxep6Fnrsn Urw09Sjv2VRXOay4guMQnbQo0ibpifBxeuL9MJ_vdeb_BdSE8YZ4iTfMb7G T35gZC9NgweX3fiTEo2LjY8hEV3DHud5LlNZzYp9kLmAUZNIwGu7LtYyI4F 7NnOv9oLx1HtmfE3_skkYtQoKMvMewLkIO88h325qCpWFdrLwPp63betCme wDJPaBdrp91rLchkXVo-d2ueKkb59TxWjMx7esBdaxCAcDQ Ggiego8UiSsj7GgY94qOng 4vIGDz9Hm6X4lSo9JoA6ZzS0KitztLGAiMUs3RTviFO09choPhxJNlOj8KX Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 29] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 8QILu4zZ-ytCnG-yzNx5SsT8KEQJhIf6_9yWplxpX173k6ZJV-sXGd4Mj9u 7N0IqWQLK5DMytv7XopsZsR9QFCDNGew 3GuaasWV0XGTBbRtNP6OQ14_cHL-ZJC1naDtU6EIecw 6. Mulitple Operations The individual processes for encrypting and signing can be nested; the output of each process a complete stanza that could then be performed with the other. An implementation MUST be able to process one level of nesting (e.g., an encrypted stanza nested within a signed stanza), and SHOULD handle multiple levels within reasonable limits for the receiving agent. 7. Inclusion and Checking of Timestamps Timestamps are included to help prevent replay attacks. All timestamps MUST conform to [XEP-0082] and be presented as UTC with no offset, and SHOULD include the seconds and fractions of a second to three digits. Absent a local adjustment to the sending agent's perceived time or the underlying clock time, the sending agent MUST ensure that the timestamps it sends to the receiver increase monotonically (if necessary by incrementing the seconds fraction in the timestamp if the clock returns the same time for multiple requests). The following rules apply to the receiving agent: o It MUST verify that the timestamp received is within an acceptable range of the current time. It is RECOMMENDED that implementations use an acceptable range of five minutes, although implementations MAY use a smaller acceptable range. o It SHOULD verify that the timestamp received is greater than any timestamp received in the last 10 minutes which passed the previous check. o If any of the foregoing checks fails, the timestamp SHOULD be presented to the receiving entity (human or application) marked as "old timestamp", "future timestamp", or "decreasing timestamp", and the receiving entity MAY return a stanza error to the sender. Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 30] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 Note the foregoing assumes the stanza is received while the receiving agent is online; see Section 9 for offline storage considerations. 8. Interaction with Stanza Semantics The following limitations and caveats apply: o Undirected stanzas SHOULD NOT be encrypted. Such stanzas are delivered to anyone the sender has authorized, and can generate a large volume of key requests. o Undirected stanzas MAY be signed. However, note that signatures significantly increase the size of a stanza kind that is often multiplexed across to many XMPP entities; this could have large impacts on bandwidth and latency. o Stanzas directed to multiplexing services (e.g., multi-user chat) SHOULD NOT be encrypted, unless the sender has established an acceptable trust relationship with the multiplexing service. 9. Interaction with Offline Storage The server makes its best effort to deliver stanzas. When the receiving agent is offline at the time of delivery, the server might store the message until the recipient is next online (offline storage does not apply to or stanzas, only stanzas). The following need to be considered: o If the sending agent is not also online when the message is delivered to the receiving agent from offline storage, then the decryption process fails for insufficient information as described in Section 3.3.3. o When performing the timestamp checks in Section 7, if the server includes delayed delivery data as specified in [XEP-0203] for when the server received the message, then the receiving agent SHOULD use the delayed delivery timestmap rather than the current time. Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 31] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 10. Mandatory-to-Implement Cryptographic Algorithms All algorithms that MUST be implemented for [JOSE-JWE] and [JOSE-JWS] also MUST be implemented for this specification. However, this specification further mandates the use of the following: o MUST implement the "RSA1_5" JWE algorithm. o MUST implement the "RS256" JWS algorithm. 11. Security Considerations 11.1. Storage of Encrypted Stanzas The recipient's server might store any stanzas received until the recipient is next available; this duration could be anywhere from a few minutes to several months. 11.2. Re-use of Session Master Keys A sender SHOULD NOT use the same SMK for stanzas intended for different recipients, as determined by the localpart and domainpart of the recipient's JID. A sender MAY re-use a SMK for several stanzas to the same recipient. In this case, the SID remains the same, but the sending agent MUST generate a new CMK and IV for each encrypted stanza. The sender SHOULD periodically generate a new SMK (and its associated SID); however, this specification does not mandate any specific algorithms or processes. In the case of stanzas, a sending agent might generate a new SMK each time it generates a new ThreadID, as outlined in [XEP-0201]. 12. IANA Considerations 12.1. XML Namespaces Name for e2e Data in XMPP A number of URN sub-namespaces of encrypted and/or signed content for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is defined as follows. URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6 Specification: RFC XXXX Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 32] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 Description: This is an XML namespace name of encrypted and/or signed content for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol as defined [[ this document ]]. Registrant Contact: IESG, URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6:encryption Specification: RFC XXXX Description: This is an XML namespace name signalling support for encrypted content for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol as defined [[ this document ]]. Registrant Contact: IESG, URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6:signatures Specification: RFC XXXX Description: This is an XML namespace name signalling support for signed content for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol as defined [[ this document ]]. Registrant Contact: IESG, 13. References 13.1. Normative References [E2E-REQ] Saint-Andre, P., "Requirements for End-to-End Encryption in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)", draft-saintandre-xmpp-e2e-requirements-01 (work in progress), March 2010. [JOSE-JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", draft-ietf-jose- json-web-algorithms-11 (work in progress), May 2013. [JOSE-JWE] Jones, M., Rescola, E., and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-11 (work in progress), May 2013. [JOSE-JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web- key-11 (work in progress), December 2012. Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 33] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 [JOSE-JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-11 (work in progress), May 2013. [JOSE-KEYPROTECT] Miller, M., "Using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) for Protecting JSON Web Key (JWK) Objects", draft-miller-jose- jwe-protected-jwk-00 (work in progress), February 2013. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006. [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC 4949, August 2007. [RFC6120] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, March 2011. [RFC6121] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Instant Messaging and Presence", RFC 6121, March 2011. [XEP-0030] Eatmon, R., Hildebrand, J., Millard, P., and P. Saint- Andre, "Service Discovery", XSF XEP 0030, June 2006. [XEP-0082] Saint-Andre, P., "XMPP Date and Time Profiles", XSF XEP 0082, May 2003. [XEP-0115] Hildebrand, J., Troncon, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Entity Capabilities", XSF XEP 0115, February 2008. [XEP-0203] Saint-Andre, P., "Delayed Delivery", XSF XEP 0203, September 2009. [XEP-0297] Wild, M. and K. Smith, "Stanza Forwarding", XSF XEP 0297, July 2012. 13.2. Informative References Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 34] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 [RFC3610] Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)", RFC 3923, September 2003. [RFC3923] Saint-Andre, P., "End-to-End Signing and Object Encryption for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)", RFC 3923, October 2004. [RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for Security", RFC 4086, June 2005. [XEP-0160] Saint-Andre, P., "Best Practices for Handling Offline Messages", XSF XEP 0160, January 2006. [XEP-0201] Saint-Andre, P., Paterson, I., and K. Smith, "Best Practices for Message Threads", XSF XEP 0203, November 2010. Appendix A. Schema for urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6 The following XML schema is descriptive, not normative. Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 35] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 36] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 37] Internet-Draft XMPP E2E June 2013 Appendix B. Acknowledgements Thanks to Richard Barnes, Andrew Biggs, and Ben Schumacher for their feedback. Author's Address Matthew Miller Cisco Systems, Inc. 1899 Wynkoop Street, Suite 600 Denver, CO 80202 USA Phone: +1-303-308-3204 Email: mamille2@cisco.com Miller Expires December 15, 2013 [Page 38]