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PKCS #1 Version 2.2: RSA Cryptography SpecificationsEMC Corporation176 South StreetHopkintonMA01748USkathleen.moriarty@emc.comVerisign12061 Bluemont WayRestonVA20190USbkaliski@verisign.comhttp://verisignlabs.comSubset ABMunkbrogtan 4SE-11127StockholmSE+46 8 428 687 43jakob.jonsson@subset.seRSA345 Queen StreetBrisbaneQLD4000AUAndreas.Rusch@rsa.com
General
Network Working GroupInternet-DraftXMLThis memo represents a republication of PKCS #1 v2.2 from RSA
Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series. By
publishing this RFC, change control is transferred to the IETF.This document provides recommendations for the implementation of public-key cryptography based on the RSA algorithm , covering the following aspects:Cryptographic primitivesEncryption schemesSignature schemes with appendixASN.1 syntax for representing keys and for identifying the schemesThe recommendations are intended for general application within computer and communications systems, and as such include a fair amount of flexibility. It is expected that application standards based on these specifications may include additional constraints. The recommendations are intended to be compatible with the standards IEEE 1363-2000 , IEEE 1363a-2004 , and ANSI X9.44-2007 .This document supersedes PKCS #1 version 2.1 but includes compatible techniques.The organization of this document is as follows:Section 1 is an introduction.Section 2 defines some notation used in this document.Section 3 defines the RSA public and private key types.Sections 4 and 5 define several primitives, or basic mathematical
operations. Data conversion primitives are in Section 4, and
cryptographic primitives (encryption-decryption, signature-
verification) are in Section 5.Sections 6, 7, and 8 deal with the encryption and signature
schemes in this document. Section 6 gives an overview. Along
with the methods found in PKCS #1 v1.5, Section 7 defines an
OAEP-based encryption scheme and Section 8 defines a PSS-based
signature scheme with appendix.Section 9 defines the encoding methods for the signature schemes
in Section 8.Appendix A defines the ASN.1 syntax for the keys defined in
Section 3 and the schemes in Sections 7 and 8.Appendix B defines the hash functions and the mask generation
function used in this document, including ASN.1 syntax for the
techniques.Appendix C gives an ASN.1 module.Appendices D, E, and F cover intellectual property issues,
outline the revision history of PKCS #1, and provide general information about
the Public-Key Cryptography Standards.The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in .The notation in this document includes:Two key types are employed in the primitives and schemes defined in this document: RSA public key and RSA private key. Together, an RSA public key and an RSA private key form an RSA key pair.This specification supports so-called "multi-prime" RSA where the modulus may have more than two prime factors. The benefit of multi-prime RSA is lower computational cost for the decryption and signature primitives, provided that the CRT (Chinese Remainder Theorem) is used. Better performance can be achieved on single processor platforms, but to a greater extent on multiprocessor platforms, where the modular exponentiations involved can be done in parallel.For a discussion on how multi-prime affects the security of the RSA cryptosystem, the reader is referred to .For the purposes of this document, an RSA public key consists of two
components:In a valid RSA public key, the RSA modulus n is a product of u
distinct odd primes r_i, i = 1, 2, ..., u, where u >= 2, and the RSA
public exponent e is an integer between 3 and n - 1 satisfying GCD(e,
\lambda(n)) = 1, where \lambda(n) = LCM(r_1 - 1, ..., r_u - 1). By
convention, the first two primes r_1 and r_2 may also be denoted p
and q respectively.A recommended syntax for interchanging RSA public keys between
implementations is given in Appendix A.1.1; an implementation's
internal representation may differ.For the purposes of this document, an RSA private key may have either of two representations.1. The first representation consists of the pair (n, d), where the
components have the following meanings:2. The second representation consists of a quintuple (p, q, dP, dQ,
qInv) and a (possibly empty) sequence of triplets (r_i, d_i, t_i),
i = 3, ..., u, one for each prime not in the quintuple, where the
components have the following meanings:
In a valid RSA private key with the first representation, the RSA
modulus n is the same as in the corresponding RSA public key and is
the product of u distinct odd primes r_i, i = 1, 2, ..., u, where u
>= 2. The RSA private exponent d is a positive integer less than n
satisfyinge * d == 1 (mod \lambda(n)),where e is the corresponding RSA public exponent and \lambda(n) is
defined as in Section 3.1.In a valid RSA private key with the second representation, the two
factors p and q are the first two prime factors of the RSA modulus n
(i.e., r_1 and r_2), the CRT exponents dP and dQ are positive
integers less than p and q respectively satisfyinge * dP == 1 (mod (p-1))e * dQ == 1 (mod (q-1)) ,and the CRT coefficient qInv is a positive integer less than p
satisfyingq * qInv == 1 (mod p).If u > 2, the representation will include one or more triplets (r_i,
d_i, t_i), i = 3, ..., u. The factors r_i are the additional prime
factors of the RSA modulus n. Each CRT exponent d_i (i = 3, ..., u)
satisfiese * d_i == 1 (mod (r_i - 1)).Each CRT coefficient t_i (i = 3, ..., u) is a positive integer less
than r_i satisfyingR_i * t_i == 1 (mod r_i) ,where R_i = r_1 * r_2 * ... * r_(i-1).A recommended syntax for interchanging RSA private keys between
implementations, which includes components from both representations,
is given in Appendix A.1.2; an implementation's internal
representation may differ.Notes.The definition of the CRT coefficients here and the formulas that
use them in the primitives in Section 5 generally follow Garner's
algorithm (see also Algorithm 14.71 in ). However, for
compatibility with the representations of RSA private keys in PKCS
#1 v2.0 and previous versions, the roles of p and q are reversed
compared to the rest of the primes. Thus, the first CRT
coefficient, qInv, is defined as the inverse of q mod p, rather
than as the inverse of R_1 mod r_2, i.e., of p mod q.Quisquater and Couvreur observed the benefit of applying the
Chinese Remainder Theorem to RSA operations.Two data conversion primitives are employed in the schemes defined in this document:I2OSP - Integer-to-Octet-String primitiveOS2IP - Octet-String-to-Integer primitiveFor the purposes of this document, and consistent with ASN.1 syntax, an octet string is an ordered sequence of octets (eight-bit bytes). The sequence is indexed from first (conventionally, leftmost) to last (rightmost). For purposes of conversion to and from integers, the first octet is considered the most significant in the following conversion primitives.I2OSP converts a nonnegative integer to an octet string of a specified length.I2OSP (x, xLen)
nonnegative integer to be convertedintended length of the resulting octet stringX corresponding octet string of length xLen"integer too large"If x >= 256^xLen, output "integer too large" and stop.Write the integer x in its unique xLen-digit representation in base 256:
x = x_(xLen-1) 256^(xLen-1) + x_(xLen-2) 256^(xLen-2) + ... + x_1 256 + x_0,
where 0 <= x_i < 256 (note that one or more leading digits will be zero if x is less than 256^(xLen-1)).
Let the octet X_i have the integer value x_(xLen-i) for 1 <= i <= xLen. Output the octet string
X = X_1 X_2 ... X_xLen.OS2IP converts an octet string to a nonnegative integer.OS2IP (X)
X octet string to be convertedx corresponding nonnegative integerLet X_1 X_2 ... X_xLen be the octets of X from first to last,
and let x_(xLen-i) be the integer value of the octet X_i for
1 <= i <= xLen.Let x = x_(xLen-1) 256^(xLen-1) + x_(xLen-2) 256^(xLen-2) + ...
+ x_1 256 + x_0.Output x.Cryptographic primitives are basic mathematical operations on which cryptographic schemes can be built. They are intended for implementation in hardware or as software modules, and are not intended to provide security apart from a scheme.Four types of primitive are specified in this document, organized in pairs: encryption and decryption; and signature and verification.The specifications of the primitives assume that certain conditions are met by the inputs, in particular that RSA public and private keys are valid.An encryption primitive produces a ciphertext representative from a message representative under the control of a public key, and a decryption primitive recovers the message representative from the ciphertext representative under the control of the corresponding private key.One pair of encryption and decryption primitives is employed in the encryption schemes defined in this document and is specified here: RSAEP/RSADP. RSAEP and RSADP involve the same mathematical operation, with different keys as input.
The primitives defined here are the same as IFEP-RSA/IFDP-RSA in IEEE 1363-2000 (except that support for multi-prime RSA has been added) and are compatible with PKCS #1 v1.5.The main mathematical operation in each primitive is exponentiation.RSAEP ((n, e), m)
(n, e) RSA public keym message representative, an integer between 0 and n - 1
c ciphertext representative, an integer between 0 and n - 1
"message representative out of range"RSA public key (n, e) is validIf the message representative m is not between 0 and n - 1, output
"message representative out of range" and stop.Let c = m^e mod n.Output c.RSADP (K, c)
K RSA private key, where K has one of the following forms:
a pair (n, d)a quintuple (p, q, dP, dQ, qInv) and a possibly empty sequence of triplets (r_i, d_i, t_i), i = 3, ..., uc ciphertext representative, an integer between 0 and n - 1
m message representative, an integer between 0 and n - 1
"ciphertext representative out of range"RSA private key K is validIf the ciphertext representative c is not between 0 and n - 1,
output "ciphertext representative out of range" and stop.The message representative m is computed as follows.
If the first form (n, d) of K is used, let m = c^d mod n.If the second form (p, q, dP, dQ, qInv) and (r_i, d_i, t_i)
of K is used, proceed as follows:
i. Let m_1 = c^dP mod p and m_2 = c^dQ mod q.ii. If u > 2, let m_i = c^(d_i) mod r_i, i = 3, ..., u.iii. Let h = (m_1 - m_2) * qInv mod p.iv. Let m = m_2 + q * h.v. If u > 2, let R = r_1 and for i = 3 to u do
Let R = R * r_(i-1).Let h = (m_i - m) * t_i mod r_i.Let m = m + R * h.Output m.Note. Step 2.b can be rewritten as a single loop, provided that one
reverses the order of p and q. For consistency with PKCS #1 v2.0,
however, the first two primes p and q are treated separately from
the additional primes.A signature primitive produces a signature representative from a message representative under the control of a private key, and a verification primitive recovers the message representative from the signature representative under the control of the corresponding public key. One pair of signature and verification primitives is employed in the signature schemes defined in this document and is specified here: RSASP1/RSAVP1.The primitives defined here are the same as IFSP-RSA1/IFVP-RSA1 in IEEE 1363-2000 (except that support for multi-prime RSA has been added) and are compatible with PKCS #1 v1.5.The main mathematical operation in each primitive is exponentiation, as in the encryption and decryption primitives of Section 5.1. RSASP1 and RSAVP1 are the same as RSADP and RSAEP except for the names of their input and output arguments; they are distinguished as they are intended for different purposes.RSASP1 (K, m)
"message representative out of range"RSA private key K is validIf the message representative m is not between 0 and n - 1,
output "message representative out of range" and stop.The signature representative s is computed as follows.
If the first form (n, d) of K is used, let s = m^d mod n.If the second form (p, q, dP, dQ, qInv) and (r_i, d_i, t_i)
of K is used, proceed as follows:
Let s_1 = m^dP mod p and s_2 = m^dQ mod q.If u > 2, let s_i = m^(d_i) mod r_i, i = 3, ..., u.Let h = (s_1 - s_2) * qInv mod p.Let s = s_2 + q * h.If u > 2, let R = r_1 and for i = 3 to u do
Let R = R * r_(i-1).Let h = (s_i - s) * t_i mod r_i.Let s = s + R * h.Output s.Note. Step 2.b can be rewritten as a single loop, provided that one
reverses the order of p and q. For consistency with PKCS #1 v2.0,
however, the first two primes p and q are treated separately from the
additional primes.RSAVP1 ((n, e), s)
(n, e) RSA public keys signature representative, an integer between 0 and n - 1m message representative, an integer between 0 and n - 1"signature representative out of range"RSA public key (n, e) is validIf the signature representative s is not between 0 and n - 1,
output "signature representative out of range" and stop.Let m = s^e mod n.Output m.A scheme combines cryptographic primitives and other techniques to achieve a particular security goal. Two types of scheme are specified in this document: encryption schemes and signature schemes with appendix.The schemes specified in this document are limited in scope in that their operations consist only of steps to process data with an RSA public or private key, and do not include steps for obtaining or validating the key. Thus, in addition to the scheme operations, an application will typically include key management operations by which parties may select RSA public and private keys for a scheme operation. The specific additional operations and other details are outside the scope of this document.As was the case for the cryptographic primitives (Section 5), the specifications of scheme operations assume that certain conditions are met by the inputs, in particular that RSA public and private keys are valid. The behavior of an implementation is thus unspecified when a key is invalid. The impact of such unspecified behavior depends on the application. Possible means of addressing key validation include explicit key validation by the application; key validation within the public-key infrastructure; and assignment of liability for operations performed with an invalid key to the party who generated the key.A generally good cryptographic practice is to employ a given RSA key pair in only one scheme. This avoids the risk that vulnerability in one scheme may compromise the security of the other, and may be essential to maintain provable security. While RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 (Section 7.2) and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (Section 8.2) have traditionally been employed together without any known bad interactions (indeed, this is the model introduced by PKCS #1 v1.5), such a combined use of an RSA key pair is NOT RECOMMENDED for new applications.To illustrate the risks related to the employment of an RSA key pair in more than one scheme, suppose an RSA key pair is employed in both RSAES-OAEP (Section 7.1) and RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5. Although RSAES-OAEP by itself would resist attack, an opponent might be able to exploit a weakness in the implementation of RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 to recover messages encrypted with either scheme. As another example, suppose an RSA key pair is employed in both RSASSA-PSS (Section 8.1) and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. Then the security proof for RSASSA-PSS would no longer be sufficient since the proof does not account for the possibility that signatures might be generated with a second scheme. Similar considerations may apply if an RSA key pair is employed in one of the schemes defined here and in a variant defined elsewhere.For the purposes of this document, an encryption scheme consists of
an encryption operation and a decryption operation, where the
encryption operation produces a ciphertext from a message with a
recipient's RSA public key, and the decryption operation recovers the
message from the ciphertext with the recipient's corresponding RSA
private key.An encryption scheme can be employed in a variety of applications. A typical application is a key establishment protocol, where the message contains key material to be delivered confidentially from one party to another. For instance, PKCS #7 employs such a protocol to deliver a content-encryption key from a sender to a recipient; the encryption schemes defined here would be suitable key-encryption algorithms in that context.Two encryption schemes are specified in this document: RSAES-OAEP and RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5. RSAES-OAEP is required to be supported for new applications; RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 is included only for compatibility with existing applications.The encryption schemes given here follow a general model similar to that employed in IEEE 1363-2000 , combining encryption and decryption primitives with an encoding method for encryption. The encryption operations apply a message encoding operation to a message to produce an encoded message, which is then converted to an integer message representative. An encryption primitive is applied to the message representative to produce the ciphertext. Reversing this, the decryption operations apply a decryption primitive to the ciphertext to recover a message representative, which is then converted to an octet string encoded message. A message decoding operation is applied to the encoded message to recover the message and verify the correctness of the decryption.To avoid implementation weaknesses related to the way errors are handled within the decoding operation (see and ), the encoding and decoding operations for RSAES-OAEP and RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 are embedded in the specifications of the respective encryption schemes rather than defined in separate specifications. Both encryption schemes are compatible with the corresponding schemes in PKCS #1 v2.1.RSAES-OAEP combines the RSAEP and RSADP primitives (Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2) with the EME-OAEP encoding method (step 2 in Section 7.1.1 and step 3 in Section 7.1.2). EME-OAEP is based on Bellare and Rogaway's Optimal Asymmetric Encryption scheme . (OAEP stands for "Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding"). It is compatible with the IFES scheme defined in IEEE 1363-2000 , where the encryption and decryption primitives are IFEP-RSA and IFDP-RSA and the message encoding method is EME-OAEP. RSAES-OAEP can operate on messages of length up to k - 2hLen -2 octets, where hLen is the length of the output from the underlying hash function and k is the length in octets of the recipient'sRSA modulus.Assuming that computing e-th roots modulo n is infeasible and the
mask generation function in RSAES-OAEP has appropriate properties,
RSAES-OAEP is semantically secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext
attacks. This assurance is provable in the sense that the difficulty
of breaking RSAES-OAEP can be directly related to the difficulty of
inverting the RSA function, provided that the mask generation
function is viewed as a black box or random oracle; see and the
note below for further discussion.Both the encryption and the decryption operations of RSAES-OAEP take
the value of a label L as input. In this version of PKCS #1, L is
the empty string; other uses of the label are outside the scope of
this document. See Appendix A.2.1 for the relevant ASN.1 syntax.RSAES-OAEP is parameterized by the choice of hash function and mask
generation function. This choice should be fixed for a given RSA
key. Suggested hash and mask generation functions are given in
Appendix B.Note. Past results have helpfully clarified the security properties of the OAEP encoding method (roughly the procedure described in step 2 in Section 7.1.1). The background is as follows. In 1994, Bellare and Rogaway introduced a security concept that they denoted plaintext awareness (PA94). They proved that if a deterministic public-key encryption primitive (e.g., RSAEP) is hard to invert without the private key, then the corresponding OAEP-based encryption scheme is plaintext-aware (in the random oracle model), meaning roughly that an adversary cannot produce a valid ciphertext without actually "knowing"the underlying plaintext. Plaintext awareness of an encryption scheme is closely related to the resistance of the scheme against chosen-ciphertext attacks. In such attacks, an adversary is given the opportunity to send queries to an oracle simulating the decryption primitive. Using the results of these queries, the adversary attempts to decrypt a challenge ciphertext.However, there are two flavors of chosen-ciphertext attacks, and PA94 implies security against only one of them. The difference relies on what the adversary is allowed to do after she is given the challenge ciphertext. The indifferent attack scenario (denoted CCA1) does not admit any queries to the decryption oracle after the adversary is given the challenge ciphertext, whereas the adaptive scenario (denoted CCA2) does (except that the decryption oracle refuses to decrypt the challenge ciphertext once it is published). In 1998, Bellare and Rogaway, together with Desai and Pointcheval , came up with a new, stronger notion of plaintext awareness (PA98) that does imply security against CCA2.To summarize, there have been two potential sources for misconception: that PA94 and PA98 are equivalent concepts; or that CCA1 and CCA2 are equivalent concepts. Either assumption leads to the conclusion that the Bellare-Rogaway paper implies security of OAEP against CCA2, which it does not.(Footnote: It might be fair to mention that PKCS #1 v2.0 cites
and claims that "a chosen ciphertext attack is ineffective against a
plaintext-aware encryption scheme such as RSAES-OAEP" without
specifying the kind of plaintext awareness or chosen ciphertext
attack considered.)OAEP has never been proven secure against CCA2; in fact, Victor Shoup has demonstrated that such a proof does not exist in the general case. Put briefly, Shoup showed that an adversary in the CCA2 scenario who knows how to partially invert the encryption primitive but does not know how to invert it completely may well be able to break the scheme. For example, one may imagine an attacker who is able to break RSAES-OAEP if she knows how to recover all but the first 20 bytes of a random integer encrypted with RSAEP. Such an attacker does not need to be able to fully invert RSAEP, because she does not use the first 20 octets in her attack.Still, RSAES-OAEP is secure against CCA2, which was proved by Fujisaki, Okamoto, Pointcheval, and Stern shortly after the announcement of Shoup's result. Using clever lattice reduction techniques, they managed to show how to invert RSAEP completely given a sufficiently large part of the pre-image. This observation, combined with a proof that OAEP is secure against CCA2 if the underlying encryption primitive is hard to partially invert, fills the gap between what Bellare and Rogaway proved about RSAES-OAEP and what some may have believed that they proved. Somewhat paradoxically, we are hence saved by an ostensible weakness in RSAEP (i.e., the whole inverse can be deduced from parts of it).Unfortunately however, the security reduction is not efficient for concrete parameters. While the proof successfully relates an adversary A against the CCA2 security of RSAES-OAEP to an algorithm I inverting RSA, the probability of success for I is only approximately \epsilon^2 / 2^18, where \epsilon is the probability of success for A.(Footnote: In the probability of success for the inverter was
\epsilon^2 / 4. The additional factor 1 / 2^16 is due to the eight
fixed zero bits at the beginning of the encoded message EM, which are
not present in the variant of OAEP considered in (Inv must apply
Adv twice to invert RSA, and each application corresponds to a factor
1 / 2^8).)In addition, the running time for I is approximately t^2, where t is the running time of the adversary. The consequence is that we cannot exclude the possibility that attacking RSAES-OAEP is considerably easier than inverting RSA for concrete parameters. Still, the existence of a security proof provides some assurance that the RSAES-OAEP construction is sounder than ad hoc constructions such as RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5. Hybrid encryption schemes based on the RSA-KEM key encapsulation paradigm offer tight proofs of security directly applicable to concrete parameters; see for discussion. Future versions of PKCS #1 may specify schemes based on this paradigm.RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT ((n, e), M, L)
"message too long"; "label too long"RSA public key (n, e) is validLength checking:
If the length of L is greater than the input limitation for the
hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output "label too
long" and stop.If mLen > k - 2hLen - 2, output "message too long" and stop.EME-OAEP encoding (see Figure 1 below):
If the label L is not provided, let L be the empty string. Let
lHash = Hash(L), an octet string of length hLen (see the note
below).Generate an octet string PS consisting of k - mLen - 2hLen - 2
zero octets. The length of PS may be zero.Concatenate lHash, PS, a single octet with hexadecimal value
0x01, and the message M to form a data block DB of length k -
hLen - 1 octets as
DB = lHash || PS || 0x01 || M.Generate a random octet string seed of length hLen.Let dbMask = MGF(seed, k - hLen - 1).Let maskedDB = DB \xor dbMask.Let seedMask = MGF(maskedDB, hLen).Let maskedSeed = seed \xor seedMask.Concatenate a single octet with hexadecimal value 0x00,
maskedSeed, and maskedDB to form an encoded message EM of
length k octets as
EM = 0x00 || maskedSeed || maskedDB.RSA encryption:
Convert the encoded message EM to an integer message
representative m (see Section 4.2):
m = OS2IP (EM).Apply the RSAEP encryption primitive (Section 5.1.1) to the RSA
public key (n, e) and the message representative m to produce
an integer ciphertext representative c:
c = RSAEP ((n, e), m).Convert the ciphertext representative c to a ciphertext C of
length k octets (see Section 4.1):
C = I2OSP (c, k).Output the ciphertext C.RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT (K, C, L)
"decryption error"Length checking:
If the length of L is greater than the input limitation for the
hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output "decryption
error" and stop.If the length of the ciphertext C is not k octets, output
"decryption error" and stop.If k < 2hLen + 2, output "decryption error" and stop.RSA decryption:
Convert the ciphertext C to an integer ciphertext representative c (see Section 4.2):
c = OS2IP (C).Apply the RSADP decryption primitive (Section 5.1.2) to the
RSA private key K and the ciphertext representative c to
produce an integer message representative m:
m = RSADP (K, c).
If RSADP outputs "ciphertext representative out of range"
(meaning that c >= n), output "decryption error" and stop.
Convert the message representative m to an encoded message EM
of length k octets (see Section 4.1):
EM = I2OSP (m, k).EME-OAEP decoding:
If the label L is not provided, let L be the empty string. Let
lHash = Hash(L), an octet string of length hLen (see the note
in Section 7.1.1).Separate the encoded message EM into a single octet Y, an octet
string maskedSeed of length hLen, and an octet string maskedDB
of length k - hLen - 1 as
EM = Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB.Let seedMask = MGF(maskedDB, hLen).Let seed = maskedSeed \xor seedMask.Let dbMask = MGF(seed, k - hLen - 1).Let DB = maskedDB \xor dbMask.Separate DB into an octet string lHash' of length hLen, a
(possibly empty) padding string PS consisting of octets with
hexadecimal value 0x00, and a message M as
DB = lHash' || PS || 0x01 || M.
If there is no octet with hexadecimal value 0x01 to separate PS
from M, if lHash does not equal lHash', or if Y is nonzero,
output "decryption error" and stop. (See the note below.)
Output the message M.
Note. Care must be taken to ensure that an opponent cannot
distinguish the different error conditions in Step 3.g, whether by
error message or timing, or, more generally, learn partial
information about the encoded message EM. Otherwise an opponent may
be able to obtain useful information about the decryption of the
ciphertext C, leading to a chosen-ciphertext attack such as the one
observed by Manger .
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 combines the RSAEP and RSADP primitives (Sections
5.1.1 and 5.1.2) with the EME-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method (step 1 in
Section 7.2.1 and step 3 in Section 7.2.2). It is mathematically
equivalent to the encryption scheme in PKCS #1 v1.5. RSAES-PKCS1-
v1_5 can operate on messages of length up to k - 11 octets (k is the
octet length of the RSA modulus), although care should be taken to
avoid certain attacks on low-exponent RSA due to Coppersmith,
Franklin, Patarin, and Reiter when long messages are encrypted (see
the third bullet in the notes below and ; contains an
improved attack). As a general rule, the use of this scheme for
encrypting an arbitrary message, as opposed to a randomly generated
key, is NOT RECOMMENDED.It is possible to generate valid RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 ciphertexts without
knowing the corresponding plaintexts, with a reasonable probability
of success. This ability can be exploited in a chosen- ciphertext
attack as shown in . Therefore, if RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 is to be
used, certain easily implemented countermeasures should be taken to
thwart the attack found in . Typical examples include the
addition of structure to the data to be encoded, rigorous checking of
PKCS #1 v1.5 conformance (and other redundancy) in decrypted
messages, and the consolidation of error messages in a client-server
protocol based on PKCS #1 v1.5. These can all be effective
countermeasures and do not involve changes to a PKCS #1 v1.5-based
protocol. See for a further discussion of these and other
countermeasures. It has recently been shown that the security of the
SSL/TLS handshake protocol , which uses RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 and
certain countermeasures, can be related to a variant of the RSA
problem; see for discussion.Note. The following passages describe some security recommendations
pertaining to the use of RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5. Recommendations from
version 1.5 of this document are included as well as new
recommendations motivated by cryptanalytic advances made in the
intervening years.
It is RECOMMENDED that the pseudorandom octets in step 2 in
Section 7.2.1 be generated independently for each encryption
process, especially if the same data is input to more than one
encryption process. Haastad's results are one motivation for
this recommendation.The padding string PS in step 2 in Section 7.2.1 is at least eight
octets long, which is a security condition for public-key
operations that makes it difficult for an attacker to recover data
by trying all possible encryption blocks.The pseudorandom octets can also help thwart an attack due to
Coppersmith et al. (see for an improvement of the
attack) when the size of the message to be encrypted is kept
small. The attack works on low-exponent RSA when similar messages
are encrypted with the same RSA public key. More specifically, in
one flavor of the attack, when two inputs to RSAEP agree on a
large fraction of bits (8/9) and low-exponent RSA (e = 3) is used
to encrypt both of them, it may be possible to recover both inputs
with the attack. Another flavor of the attack is successful in
decrypting a single ciphertext when a large fraction (2/3) of the
input to RSAEP is already known. For typical applications, the
message to be encrypted is short (e.g., a 128-bit symmetric key)
so not enough information will be known or common between two
messages to enable the attack. However, if a long message is
encrypted, or if part of a message is known, then the attack may
be a concern. In any case, the RSAES-OAEP scheme overcomes the
attack.RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT ((n, e), M)
"message too long"Length checking: If mLen > k - 11, output "message too long" and stop.EME-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding:
Generate an octet string PS of length k - mLen - 3 consisting
of pseudo-randomly generated nonzero octets. The length of PS
will be at least eight octets.Concatenate PS, the message M, and other padding to form an
encoded message EM of length k octets as
EM = 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 || M.RSA encryption:
Convert the encoded message EM to an integer message
representative m (see Section 4.2):
m = OS2IP (EM).Apply the RSAEP encryption primitive (Section 5.1.1) to the RSA
public key (n, e) and the message representative m to produce
an integer ciphertext representative c:
c = RSAEP ((n, e), m).Convert the ciphertext representative c to a ciphertext C of
length k octets (see Section 4.1):
C = I2OSP (c, k). Output the ciphertext C.RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT (K, C)
"decryption error"Length checking: If the length of the ciphertext C is not k octets
(or if k < 11), output "decryption error" and stop.RSA decryption:
Convert the ciphertext C to an integer ciphertext representative c (see Section 4.2):
c = OS2IP (C).Apply the RSADP decryption primitive (Section 5.1.2) to the RSA
private key (n, d) and the ciphertext representative c to
produce an integer message representative m:
m = RSADP ((n, d), c).
If RSADP outputs "ciphertext representative out of range"
(meaning that c >= n), output "decryption error" and stop.
Convert the message representative m to an encoded message EM of length k octets (see Section 4.1):
EM = I2OSP (m, k).EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding: Separate the encoded message EM into an
octet string PS consisting of nonzero octets and a message M as
EM = 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 || M.
If the first octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value 0x00, if
the second octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value 0x02, if
there is no octet with hexadecimal value 0x00 to separate PS from
M, or if the length of PS is less than 8 octets, output
"decryption error" and stop. (See the note below.)
Output M.
Note. Care shall be taken to ensure that an opponent cannot
distinguish the different error conditions in Step 3, whether by
error message or timing. Otherwise an opponent may be able to obtain
useful information about the decryption of the ciphertext C, leading
to a strengthened version of Bleichenbacher's attack ; compare to
Manger's attack .
For the purposes of this document, a signature scheme with appendix consists of a signature generation operation and a signature verification operation, where the signature generation operation produces a signature from a message with a signer's RSA private key, and the signature verification operation verifies the signature on the message with the signer's corresponding RSA public key. To verify a signature constructed with this type of scheme it is necessary to have the message itself. In this way, signature schemes with appendix are distinguished from signature schemes with message recovery, which are not supported in this document.A signature scheme with appendix can be employed in a variety of applications. For instance, the signature schemes with appendix defined here would be suitable signature algorithms for X.509 certificates . Related signature schemes could be employed in PKCS #7 , although for technical reasons the current version of PKCS #7 separates a hash function from a signature scheme, which is different than what is done here; see the note in Appendix A.2.3 for more discussion.Two signature schemes with appendix are specified in this document: RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. Although no attacks are known against RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, in the interest of increased robustness, RSASSA-PSS is required in new applications. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is included only for compatibility with existing applications.The signature schemes with appendix given here follow a general model similar to that employed in IEEE 1363-2000 , combining signature and verification primitives with an encoding method for signatures. The signature generation operations apply a message encoding operation to a message to produce an encoded message, which is then converted to an integer message representative. A signature primitive is applied to the message representative to produce the signature. Reversing this, the signature verification operations apply a signature verification primitive to the signature to recover a message representative, which is then converted to an octet string encoded message. A verification operation is applied to the message and the encoded message to determine whether they are consistent.If the encoding method is deterministic (e.g., EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5), the verification operation may apply the message encoding operation to the message and compare the resulting encoded message to the previously derived encoded message. If there is a match, the signature is considered valid. If the method is randomized (e.g., EMSA-PSS), the verification operation is typically more complicated. For example, the verification operation in EMSA-PSS extracts the random salt and a hash output from the encoded message and checks whether the hash output, the salt, and the message are consistent; the hash output is a deterministic function in terms of the message and the salt.
For both signature schemes with appendix defined in this document, the signature generation and signature verification operations are readily implemented as "single-pass" operations if the signature is placed after the message. See PKCS #7 for an example format in the case of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.RSASSA-PSS combines the RSASP1 and RSAVP1 primitives with the EMSA-PSS encoding method. It is compatible with the IFSSA scheme as amended in the IEEE 1363a-2004 , where the signature and verification primitives are IFSP-RSA1 and IFVP-RSA1 as defined in IEEE 1363-2000 and the message encoding method is EMSA4. EMSA4 is slightly more general than EMSA-PSS as it acts on bit strings rather than on octet strings. EMSA-PSS is equivalent to EMSA4 restricted to the case that the operands as well as the hash and salt values are octet strings.The length of messages on which RSASSA-PSS can operate is either unrestricted or constrained by a very large number, depending on the hash function underlying the EMSA-PSS encoding method.Assuming that computing e-th roots modulo n is infeasible and the hash and mask generation functions in EMSA-PSS have appropriate properties, RSASSA-PSS provides secure signatures. This assurance is provable in the sense that the difficulty of forging signatures can be directly related to the difficulty of inverting the RSA function, provided that the hash and mask generation functions are viewed as black boxes or random oracles. The bounds in the security proof are essentially "tight", meaning that the success probability and running time for the best forger against RSASSA-PSS are very close to the corresponding parameters for the best RSA inversion algorithm; see for further discussion.In contrast to the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme, a hash function identifier is not embedded in the EMSA-PSS encoded message, so in theory it is possible for an adversary to substitute a different (and potentially weaker) hash function than the one selected by the signer. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that the EMSA-PSS mask generation function be based on the same hash function. In this manner the entire encoded message will be dependent on the hash function and it will be difficult for an opponent to substitute a different hash function than the one intended by the signer. This matching of hash functions is only for the purpose of preventing hash function substitution, and is not necessary if hash function substitution is addressed by other means (e.g., the verifier accepts only a designated hash function). See for further discussion of these points. The provable security of RSASSA-PSS does not rely on the hash function in the mask generation function being the same as the hash function applied to the message.RSASSA-PSS is different from other RSA-based signature schemes in that it is probabilistic rather than deterministic, incorporating a randomly generated salt value. The salt value enhances the security of the scheme by affording a "tighter" security proof than deterministic alternatives such as Full Domain Hashing (FDH); see for discussion. However, the randomness is not critical to security. In situations where random generation is not possible, a fixed value or a sequence number could be employed instead, with the resulting provable security similar to that of FDH .RSASSA-PSS-SIGN (K, M)
"message too long;" "encoding error"EMSA-PSS encoding: Apply the EMSA-PSS encoding operation (Section
9.1.1) to the message M to produce an encoded message EM of length
\ceil ((modBits - 1)/8) octets such that the bit length of the
integer OS2IP (EM) (see Section 4.2) is at most modBits - 1, where
modBits is the length in bits of the RSA modulus n:
EM = EMSA-PSS-ENCODE (M, modBits - 1).
Note that the octet length of EM will be one less than k if
modBits - 1 is divisible by 8 and equal to k otherwise. If the
encoding operation outputs "message too long," output "message too
long" and stop. If the encoding operation outputs "encoding
error," output "encoding error" and stop.
RSA signature:
Convert the encoded message EM to an integer message representative m (see Section 4.2):
m = OS2IP (EM).Apply the RSASP1 signature primitive (Section 5.2.1) to the RSA
private key K and the message representative m to produce an
integer signature representative s:
s = RSASP1 (K, m).Convert the signature representative s to a signature S of length k octets (see Section 4.1):
S = I2OSP (s, k).Output the signature S.RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY ((n, e), M, S)
"valid signature" or "invalid signature"Length checking: If the length of the signature S is not k octets,
output "invalid signature" and stop.RSA verification:
Convert the signature S to an integer signature representative s (see Section 4.2):
s = OS2IP (S).Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive (Section 5.2.2) to the
RSA public key (n, e) and the signature representative s to
produce an integer message representative m:
m = RSAVP1 ((n, e), s).
If RSAVP1 output "signature representative out of range," output "invalid signature" and stop.
Convert the message representative m to an encoded message EM
of length emLen = \ceil ((modBits - 1)/8) octets, where modBits
is the length in bits of the RSA modulus n (see Section 4.1):
EM = I2OSP (m, emLen).
Note that emLen will be one less than k if modBits - 1 is
divisible by 8 and equal to k otherwise. If I2OSP outputs
"integer too large," output "invalid signature" and stop.
EMSA-PSS verification: Apply the EMSA-PSS verification operation
(Section 9.1.2) to the message M and the encoded message EM to
determine whether they are consistent:
Result = EMSA-PSS-VERIFY (M, EM, modBits - 1).If Result = "consistent," output "valid signature." Otherwise, output "invalid signature."RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 combines the RSASP1 and RSAVP1 primitives with the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method. It is compatible with the IFSSA scheme defined in IEEE 1363-2000 , where the signature and verification primitives are IFSP-RSA1 and IFVP-RSA1 and the message encoding method is EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (which is not defined in IEEE 1363-2000, but is in the IEEE 1363a-2004 ).The length of messages on which RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 can operate is either unrestricted or constrained by a very large number, depending on the hash function underlying the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 method.Assuming that computing e-th roots modulo n is infeasible and the hash function in EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 has appropriate properties, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is conjectured to provide secure signatures. More precisely, forging signatures without knowing the RSA private key is conjectured to be computationally infeasible. Also, in the encoding method EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5, a hash function identifier is embedded in the encoding. Because of this feature, an adversary trying to find a message with the same signature as a previously signed message must find collisions of the particular hash function being used; attacking a different hash function than the one selected by the signer is not useful to the adversary. See for further discussion.Note: As noted in PKCS #1 v1.5, the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method has the property that the encoded message, converted to an integer message representative, is guaranteed to be large and at least somewhat "random". This prevents attacks of the kind proposed by Desmedt and Odlyzko where multiplicative relationships between message representatives are developed by factoring the message representatives into a set of small values (e.g., a set of small primes). Coron, Naccache, and Stern showed that a stronger form of this type of attack could be quite effective against some instances of the ISO/IEC 9796-2 signature scheme. They also analyzed the complexity of this type of attack against the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method and concluded that an attack would be impractical, requiring more operations than a collision search on the underlying hash function (i.e., more than 2^80 operations). Coppersmith, Halevi, and Jutla subsequently extended Coron et al.'s attack to break the ISO/IEC 9796-1 signature scheme with message recovery. The various attacks illustrate the importance of carefully constructing the input to the RSA signature primitive, particularly in a signature scheme with message recovery. Accordingly, the EMSA-PKCS-v1_5 encoding method explicitly includes a hash operation and is not intended for signature schemes with message recovery. Moreover, while no attack is known against the EMSA-PKCS-v1_5 encoding method, a gradual transition to EMSA-PSS is recommended as a precaution against future developments.RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN (K, M)
"message too long"; "RSA modulus too short"EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding: Apply the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding
operation (Section 9.2) to the message M to produce an encoded
message EM of length k octets:
EM = EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE (M, k).
If the encoding operation outputs "message too long," output
"message too long" and stop. If the encoding operation outputs
"intended encoded message length too short," output "RSA modulus
too short" and stop.
RSA signature:
Convert the encoded message EM to an integer message representative m (see Section 4.2):
m = OS2IP (EM).Apply the RSASP1 signature primitive (Section 5.2.1) to the RSA
private key K and the message representative m to produce an
integer signature representative s:
s = RSASP1 (K, m).Convert the signature representative s to a signature S of length k octets (see Section 4.1):
S = I2OSP (s, k).Output the signature S.RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY ((n, e), M, S)
"valid signature" or "invalid signature""message too long"; "RSA modulus too short"Length checking: If the length of the signature S is not k octets, output "invalid signature" and stop.RSA verification:
Convert the signature S to an integer signature representative s (see Section 4.2):
s = OS2IP (S).Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive (Section 5.2.2) to the
RSA public key (n, e) and the signature representative s to
produce an integer message representative m:
m = RSAVP1 ((n, e), s).
If RSAVP1 outputs "signature representative out of range," output "invalid signature" and stop.
Convert the message representative m to an encoded message EM of length k octets (see Section 4.1):
EM' = I2OSP (m, k).
If I2OSP outputs "integer too large," output "invalid signature" and stop.
EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding: Apply the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding
operation (Section 9.2) to the message M to produce a second
encoded message EM' of length k octets:
EM' = EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE (M, k).
If the encoding operation outputs "message too long," output
"message too long" and stop. If the encoding operation outputs
"intended encoded message length too short," output "RSA modulus
too short" and stop.
Compare the encoded message EM and the second encoded message EM'.
If they are the same, output "valid signature"; otherwise, output
"invalid signature."
Note. Another way to implement the signature verification operation
is to apply a "decoding" operation (not specified in this document)
to the encoded message to recover the underlying hash value, and then
to compare it to a newly computed hash value. This has the advantage
that it requires less intermediate storage (two hash values rather
than two encoded messages), but the disadvantage that it requires
additional code.
Encoding methods consist of operations that map between octet string messages and octet string encoded messages, which are converted to and from integer message representatives in the schemes. The integer message representatives are processed via the primitives. The encoding methods thus provide the connection between the schemes, which process messages, and the primitives.An encoding method for signatures with appendix, for the purposes of this document, consists of an encoding operation and optionally a verification operation. An encoding operation maps a message M to an encoded message EM of a specified length. A verification operation determines whether a message M and an encoded message EM are consistent, i.e., whether the encoded message EM is a valid encoding of the message M.The encoding operation may introduce some randomness, so that different applications of the encoding operation to the same message will produce different encoded messages, which has benefits for provable security. For such an encoding method, both an encoding and a verification operation are needed unless the verifier can reproduce the randomness (e.g., by obtaining the salt value from the signer). For a deterministic encoding method only an encoding operation is needed.Two encoding methods for signatures with appendix are employed in the signature schemes and are specified here: EMSA-PSS and EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5.This encoding method is parameterized by the choice of hash function, mask generation function, and salt length. These options should be fixed for a given RSA key, except that the salt length can be variable (see for discussion). Suggested hash and mask generation functions are given in Appendix B. The encoding method is based on Bellare and Rogaway's Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS) . It is randomized and has an encoding operation and a verification operation.Figure 2 illustrates the encoding operation.Notes.
The encoding method defined here differs from the one in Bellare and Rogaway's submission to IEEE 1363a-2004 in three respects:
It applies a hash function rather than a mask generation function to the
message. Even though the mask generation function is based on a hash function,
it seems more natural to apply a hash function directly.The value that is hashed together with the salt value is the string
(0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash rather than the message M itself. Here,
mHash is the hash of M. Note that the hash function is the same in both steps.
See Note 3 below for further discussion. (Also, the name "salt" is used instead
of "seed", as it is more reflective of the value's role.)The encoded message in EMSA-PSS has nine fixed bits; the first bit is 0 and
the last eight bits form a "trailer field", the octet 0xbc. In the original
scheme, only the first bit is fixed. The rationale for the trailer field is
for compatibility with the Rabin-Williams IFSP-RW signature primitive in
IEEE 1363-2000 and the corresponding primitive in ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010
.Assuming that the mask generation function is based on a hash function, it is RECOMMENDED that the hash function be the same as the one that is applied to the message; see Section 8.1 for further discussion.Without compromising the security proof for RSASSA-PSS, one may perform steps 1 and 2 of EMSA-PSS-ENCODE and EMSA-PSS-VERIFY (the application of the hash function to the message) outside the module that computes the rest of the signature operation, so that mHash rather than the message M itself is input to the module. In other words, the security proof for RSASSA-PSS still holds even if an opponent can control the value of mHash. This is convenient if the module has limited I/O bandwidth, e.g., a smart card. Note that previous versions of PSS did not have this property. Of course, it may be desirable for other security reasons to have the module process the full message. For instance, the module may need to "see" what it is signing if it does not trust the component that computes the hash value.Typical salt lengths in octets are hLen (the length of the output of the hash function Hash) and 0. In both cases the security of RSASSA-PSS can be closely related to the hardness of inverting RSAVP1. Bellare and Rogaway give a tight lower bound for the security of the original RSA-PSS scheme, which corresponds roughly to the former case, while Coron gives a lower bound for the related Full Domain Hashing scheme, which corresponds roughly to the latter case. In Coron provides a general treatment with various salt lengths ranging from 0 to hLen; see for discussion. See also , which adapts the security proofs in to address the differences between the original and the present version of RSA-PSS as listed in Note 1 above. As noted in IEEE 1363a-2004 , the use of randomization in signature schemes -- such as the salt value in EMSA-PSS -- may provide a "covert channel" for transmitting information other than the message being signed. For more on covert channels, see .EMSA-PSS-ENCODE (M, emBits)
"Encoding error"; "message too long" If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for the
hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output "message too
long" and stop. Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen. If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "encoding error" and stop. Generate a random octet string salt of length sLen; if sLen = 0, then salt is the empty string. Let
M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt;
M' is an octet string of length 8 + hLen + sLen with eight initial zero octets.
Let H = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen. Generate an octet string PS consisting of emLen - sLen - hLen - 2 zero octets. The length of PS may be 0. Let DB = PS || 0x01 || salt; DB is an octet string of length emLen - hLen - 1. Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1). Let maskedDB = DB \xor dbMask. Set the leftmost 8emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in maskedDB to zero. Let EM = maskedDB || H || 0xbc. Output EM.EMSA-PSS-VERIFY (M, EM, emBits)
"consistent" or "inconsistent" If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for the
hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output "inconsistent"
and stop. Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen. If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "inconsistent" and stop. If the rightmost octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value
0xbc, output "inconsistent" and stop. Let maskedDB be the leftmost emLen - hLen - 1 octets of EM, and
let H be the next hLen octets. If the leftmost 8emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
maskedDB are not all equal to zero, output "inconsistent" and stop. Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1). Let DB = maskedDB \xor dbMask. Set the leftmost 8emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in DB to zero. If the emLen - hLen - sLen - 2 leftmost octets of DB are not zero
or if the octet at position emLen - hLen - sLen - 1 (the leftmost
position is "position 1") does not have hexadecimal value 0x01,
output "inconsistent" and stop. Let salt be the last sLen octets of DB. Let
M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt ;
M' is an octet string of length 8 + hLen + sLen with eight initial zero octets.
Let H' = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen. If H = H', output "consistent." Otherwise, output "inconsistent."This encoding method is deterministic and only has an encoding operation.EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE (M, emLen)
"message too long"; "intended encoded message length too short" Apply the hash function to the message M to produce a hash value H:
H = Hash(M).
If the hash function outputs "message too long," output "message too long" and stop.
Encode the algorithm ID for the hash function and the hash value
into an ASN.1 value of type DigestInfo (see Appendix A.2.4) with
the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), where the type DigestInfo
has the syntax
The first field identifies the hash function and the second
contains the hash value. Let T be the DER encoding of the
DigestInfo value (see the notes below) and let tLen be the length
in octets of T.
If emLen < tLen + 11, output "intended encoded message length too short" and stop. Generate an octet string PS consisting of emLen - tLen - 3 octets
with hexadecimal value 0xff. The length of PS will be at least 8 octets. Concatenate PS, the DER encoding T, and other padding to form the encoded message EM as
EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T. Output EM.
Notes.
For the six hash functions mentioned in Appendix B.1, the DER
encoding T of the DigestInfo value is equal to the following:
In version 1.5 of this document, T was defined as the BER
encoding, rather than the DER encoding, of the DigestInfo value.
In particular, it is possible - at least in theory - that the
verification operation defined in this document (as well as in
version 2.0) rejects a signature that is valid with respect to the
specification given in PKCS #1 v1.5. This occurs if other rules
than DER are applied to DigestInfo (e.g., an indefinite length
encoding of the underlying SEQUENCE type). While this is unlikely
to be a concern in practice, a cautious implementer may choose to
employ a verification operation based on a BER decoding operation
as specified in PKCS #1 v1.5. In this manner, compatibility with
any valid implementation based on PKCS #1 v1.5 is obtained. Such
a verification operation should indicate whether the underlying
BER encoding is a DER encoding and hence whether the signature is
valid with respect to the specification given in this document.This memo includes no request to IANA.
Security considerations are discussed throughout this memo.
&RFC2119;
The Residue Number SystemA Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems
&RFC1319;
&RFC1321;
&RFC2315;
&RFC2437;
&RFC5208;
&RFC5246;
&RFC5652;
&RFC7292;
Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1Recent Results on PKCS #1: RSA Encryption StandardPKCS #1v2.1: RSA Encryption StandardRSA LaboratoriesANSI X9.44-2007: Key Extablishment Using Integer Factorization CryptographyANSIA Chosen Text Attack on the RSA Cryptosystem and Some Discrete Logarithm schemesNotes on the Wang et al. 2^63 SHA-1 Differential PathFast Decipherment Algorithm for RSA Public-Key CryptosystemOn the Exact Security of Full Domain HashingISO 9796-1 and the New Forgery StrategyRSA-OAEP is Secure under the RSA AssumptionRe: Encoding Methods PSS/PSS-RSolving Simultaneous Modular Equations of Low DegreeHandbook of Applied CryptographyOn Hash Function Identification in Signature SchemesIEEE Std 1363-2000: Standard Specifications for Public Key CryptographyIEEEIEEE Std P1363a-2004: Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography: Additional TechniquesIEEEISO/IEC 18033-2:2006: Information Technology - Security Techniques - Encryption Algorithms - Part 2: Asymmetric CiphersISO/IECISO/IEC 9594-8:2008: Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication FrameworkISO/IECISO/IEC 9796-2:2010: Information technology - Security Techniques - Digital Signature Schemes Giving Message Recovery - Part 2: Integer Factorization Based MechanismsISO/IECLow-Exponent RSA with Related MessagesSecurity Proofs for the RSA-PSS Signature Scheme and Its VariantsA Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) as Standardized in PKCS #1 v2.0Cryptanalysis of MD4The First Two Rounds of MD4 are Not One-WayAn Attack on the Last Two Rounds of MD4New Attacks on PKCS #1 v1.5 EncryptionOptimal Asymmetric Encryption - How to Encrypt with RSARelations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption SchemesOn the Security of RSA PaddingChosen-prefix collisions for MD5 and applicationsPSS: Provably Secure Encoding Method for Digital SignaturesOptimal Security Proofs for PSS and Other Signature SchemesThe Exact Security of Digital Signatures - How to Sign with RSA and RabinOn the Security of RSA Encryption in TLSCryptanalysis on SHA-1FIPS Publication 180-4: Secure hash StandardNational Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)OAEP ReconsideredA Cost-Based Security Analysis of Symmetric and Asymmetric Key LengthsSubliminal Communication is Easy Using the DSAThis section defines ASN.1 object identifiers for RSA public and
private keys, and defines the types RSAPublicKey and RSAPrivateKey.
The intended application of these definitions includes X.509
certificates, PKCS #8 , and PKCS #12 .The object identifier rsaEncryption identifies RSA public and private
keys as defined in Appendices A.1.1 and A.1.2. The parameters field
associated with this OID in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL
have a value of type NULL.The definitions in this section have been extended to support multi-
prime RSA, but are backward compatible with previous versions.An RSA public key should be represented with the ASN.1 type
RSAPublicKey:The fields of type RSAPublicKey have the following meanings:modulus is the RSA modulus n.publicExponent is the RSA public exponent e.An RSA private key should be represented with the ASN.1 type
RSAPrivateKey:The fields of type RSAPrivateKey have the following meanings:version is the version number, for compatibility with future
revisions of this document. It SHALL be 0 for this version of the
document, unless multi-prime is used, in which case it SHALL be 1.modulus is the RSA modulus n.publicExponent is the RSA public exponent e.privateExponent is the RSA private exponent d.prime1 is the prime factor p of n.prime2 is the prime factor q of n.exponent1 is d mod (p - 1).exponent2 is d mod (q - 1).coefficient is the CRT coefficient q^(-1) mod p.otherPrimeInfos contains the information for the additional primes
r_3, ..., r_u, in order. It SHALL be omitted if version is 0 and
SHALL contain at least one instance of OtherPrimeInfo if version
is 1.The fields of type OtherPrimeInfo have the following meanings:prime is a prime factor r_i of n, where i >= 3.exponent is d_i = d mod (r_i - 1).coefficient is the CRT coefficient t_i = (r_1 * r_2 * ... * r_(i-1))^(-1) mod r_i.Note. It is important to protect the RSA private key against both
disclosure and modification. Techniques for such protection are
outside the scope of this document. Methods for storing and
distributing private keys and other cryptographic data are described
in PKCS #12 and #15.This section defines object identifiers for the encryption and signature schemes. The schemes compatible with PKCS #1 v1.5 have the same definitions as in PKCS #1 v1.5. The intended application of these definitions includes X.509 certificates and PKCS #7.Here are type identifier definitions for the PKCS #1 OIDs:The object identifier id-RSAES-OAEP identifies the RSAES-OAEP encryption scheme.The parameters field associated with this OID in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have a value of type RSAES-OAEP-params:The fields of type RSAES-OAEP-params have the following meanings:hashAlgorithm identifies the hash function. It SHALL be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms. For a discussion of supported hash functions, see Appendix B.1.The default hash function is SHA-1:maskGenAlgorithm identifies the mask generation function. It SHALL be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PKCS1MGFAlgorithms, which for this version SHALL consist of id-mgf1, identifying the MGF1 mask generation function (see Appendix B.2.1). The parameters field associated with id-mgf1 SHALL be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms, identifying the hash function on which MGF1 is based.The default mask generation function is MGF1 with SHA-1:pSourceAlgorithm identifies the source (and possibly the value) of the label L. It SHALL be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms, which for this version SHALL consist of id-pSpecified, indicating that the label is specified explicitly. The parameters field associated with id-pSpecified SHALL have a value of type OCTET STRING, containing the label. In previous versions of this specification, the term "encoding parameters" was used rather than "label", hence the name of the type below.
The default label is an empty string (so that lHash will contain the hash of the empty string):
If all of the default values of the fields in RSAES-OAEP-params are used, then the algorithm identifier will have the following value:The object identifier rsaEncryption (see Appendix A.1) identifies the RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 encryption scheme. The parameters field associated with this OID in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have a value of type NULL. This is the same as in PKCS #1 v1.5.The object identifier id-RSASSA-PSS identifies the RSASSA-PSS encryption scheme.The parameters field associated with this OID in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have a value of type RSASSA-PSS-params:The fields of type RSASSA-PSS-params have the following meanings:hashAlgorithm identifies the hash function. It SHALL be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms (see Appendix A.2.1). The default hash function is SHA-1.maskGenAlgorithm identifies the mask generation function. It SHALL be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PKCS1MGFAlgorithms (see Appendix A.2.1). The default mask generation function is MGF1 with SHA-1. For MGF1 (and more generally, for other mask generation functions based on a hash function), it is RECOMMENDED that the underlying hash function be the same as the one identified by hashAlgorithm; see Note 2 in Section 9.1 for further comments.saltLength is the octet length of the salt. It SHALL be an integer. For a given hashAlgorithm, the default value of saltLength is the octet length of the hash value. Unlike the other fields of type RSASSA-PSS-params, saltLength does not need to be fixed for a given RSA key pair. trailerField is the trailer field number, for compatibility with the draft IEEE 1363a-2004 . It SHALLL be 1 for this version of the document, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value 0xbc. Other trailer fields (including the trailer field HashID || 0xcc in IEEE 1363a-2004) are not supported in this document.If the default values of the hashAlgorithm, maskGenAlgorithm, and trailerField fields of RSASSA-PSS-params are used, then the algorithm identifier will have the following value:Note. In some applications, the hash function underlying a signature scheme is identified separately from the rest of the operations in the signature scheme. For instance, in PKCS #7 , a hash function identifier is placed before the message and a "digest encryption" algorithm identifier (indicating the rest of the operations) is carried with the signature. In order for PKCS #7 to support the RSASSA-PSS signature scheme, an object identifier would need to be defined for the operations in RSASSA-PSS after the hash function (analogous to the RSAEncryption OID for the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 scheme). S/MIME CMS takes a different approach. Although a hash function identifier is placed before the message, an algorithm identifier for the full signature scheme may be carried with a CMS signature (this is done for DSA signatures). Following this convention, the id-RSASSA-PSS OID can be used to identify RSASSA-PSS signatures in CMS. Since CMS is considered the successor to PKCS #7 and new developments such as the addition of support for RSASSA-PSS will be pursued with respect to CMS rather than PKCS #7, an OID for the "rest of" RSASSA-PSS is not defined in this version of PKCS #1.The object identifier for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHALL be one of the following. The choice of OID depends on the choice of hash algorithm: MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, or SHA-512/256. Note that if either MD2 or MD5 is used, then the OID is just as in PKCS #1 v1.5. For each OID, the parameters field associated with this OID in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have a value of type NULL. The OID should be chosen in accordance with the following table:The EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method includes an ASN.1 value of type DigestInfo, where the type DigestInfo has the syntaxdigestAlgorithm identifies the hash function and SHALL be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms. For a discussion of supported hash functions, see Appendix B.1.This section gives several examples of underlying functions supporting the encryption schemes in Section 7 and the encoding methods in Section 9. A range of techniques is given here to allow compatibility with existing applications as well as migration to new techniques. While these supporting techniques are appropriate for applications to implement, none of them is required to be implemented. It is expected that profiles for PKCS #1 v2.2 will be developed that specify particular supporting techniques.This section also gives object identifiers for the supporting techniques.Hash functions are used in the operations contained in Sections 7 and 9. Hash functions are deterministic, meaning that the output is completely determined by the input. Hash functions take octet strings of variable length, and generate fixed length octet strings.
The hash functions used in the operations contained in Sections 7 and 9 should generally be collision-resistant. This means that it is infeasible to find two distinct inputs to the hash function that produce the same output. A collision-resistant hash function also has the desirable property of being one-way; this means that given an output, it is infeasible to find an input whose hash is the specified output. In addition to the requirements, the hash function should yield a mask generation function (Appendix B.2) with pseudorandom output.Nine hash functions are given as examples for the encoding methods in this document: MD2 , MD5 , SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, and SHA-512/256 . For the RSAES-OAEP encryption scheme and EMSA-PSS encoding method, only SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, and SHA-512/256 are RECOMMENDED. For the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, and SHA-512/256 are RECOMMENDED for new applications. MD2, MD5 and SHA-1 are recommended only for compatibility with existing applications based on PKCS #1 v1.5.The object identifiers id-md2, id-md5, id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512, id-sha512/224, and id-sha512/256, identify the respective hash functions:The parameters field associated with these OIDs in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have a value of type NULL.The parameters field associated with id-md2 and id-md5 in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type NULL.The parameters field associated with id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512, id-sha512/224, and id-sha512/256 should generally be omitted, but if present, shall have a value of type NULL.This is to align with the definitions originally promulgated by NIST. For the SHA algorithms, implementations MUST accept AlgorithmIdentifier values both without parameters and with NULL parameters.Exception: When formatting the DigestInfoValue in EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (see 9.2), the parameters field associated with id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512, id-sha512/224, and id-sha512/256 shall have a value of type NULL. This is to maintain compatibility with existing implementations and with the numeric information values already published for EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 which are also reflected in IEEE 1363a-2004 .Note. Version 1.5 of PKCS #1 also allowed for the use of MD4 in signature schemes. The cryptanalysis of MD4 has progressed significantly in the intervening years. For example, Dobbertin demonstrated how to find collisions for MD4 and that the first two rounds of MD4 are not one-way . Because of these results and others (e.g. ), MD4 is NOT RECOMMENDED.Further advances have been made in the cryptanalysis of MD2 and MD5, and especially after Stevens et al. findings on chosen-prefix collisions on MD5. MD2 and MD5 should be considered cryptographically broken and removed from existing applications. This version of the standard supports MD2 and MD5 just for backwards compatibility reasons.There have also been advances in the cryptanalysis of SHA-1. Particularly the results of Wang et al. (which have been independently verified by M. Cochran in his analysis ) on using a differential path to find collisions in SHA-1, which conclude that the security strength of the SHA-1 hashing algorithm is significantly reduced. However, this reduction is not significant enough to warrant the removal of SHA-1 from existing applications, but its usage is only recommended for backwards compatibility reasons.To address these concerns, only SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, and SHA-512/256 are RECOMMENDED for new applications. As of today, the best (known) collision attacks against these hash functions are generic attacks with complexity 2L/2, where L is the bit length of the hash output. For the signature schemes in this document, a collision attack is easily translated into a signature forgery. Therefore, the value L / 2 should be at least equal to the desired security level in bits of the signature scheme (a security level of B bits means that the best attack has complexity 2B). The same rule of thumb can be applied to RSAES-OAEP; it is RECOMMENDED that the bit length of the seed (which is equal to the bit length of the hash output) be twice the desired security level in bits.A mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of the desired length. There may be restrictions on the length of the input and output octet strings, but such bounds are generally very large. Mask generation functions are deterministic; the octet string output is completely determined by the input octet string. The output of a mask generation function should be pseudorandom: Given one part of the output but not the input, it should be infeasible to predict another part of the output. The provable security of RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS relies on the random nature of the output of the mask generation function, which in turn relies on the random nature of the underlying hash.One mask generation function is given here: MGF1, which is based on a hash function. MGF1 coincides with the mask generation functions defined in IEEE 1363-2000 and ANSI X9.44-2007 . Future versions of this document may define other mask generation functions.MGF1 is a Mask Generation Function based on a hash function.MGF1 (mgfSeed, maskLen)Options:Input:Output:Error:"mask too long"Steps:If maskLen > 2^32 hLen, output "mask too long" and stop.Let T be the empty octet string.For counter from 0 to \ceil (maskLen / hLen) - 1, do the
following:
Convert counter to an octet string C of length 4 octets (see
Section 4.1):
C = I2OSP (counter, 4) .Concatenate the hash of the seed mgfSeed and C to the octet
string T:
T = T || Hash(mgfSeed || C) .Output the leading maskLen octets of T as the octet string mask.The object identifier id-mgf1 identifies the MGF1 mask generation
function:The parameters field associated with this OID in a value of type
AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type hashAlgorithm,
identifying the hash function on which MGF1 is based.The RSA public-key cryptosystem is described in U.S. Patent 4,405,829, which expired on September 20, 2000. EMC Corporation makes no other patent claims on the constructions described in this document, although specific underlying techniques may be covered.
Multi-prime RSA is described in U.S. Patent 5,848,159.The PSS signature scheme is described in U.S. Patent 6,266,771, which expired on July 24, 2009, and U.S. Patent 7,036,014, which expired on April 25, 2010, and was held by the University of California. The PSS signature scheme is specified in IEEE P1363a-2004 . Prior to the finalization of this standard, the University of California provided a letter to the IEEE P1363 working group stating that if the PSS signature scheme is included in an IEEE standard, "the University of California will, when that standard is adopted, FREELY license any conforming implementation of PSS as a technique for achieving a digital signature with appendix" .EMC Corporation makes no other representations regarding intellectual property claims by other parties. Such determination is the responsibility of the user.Versions 1.0 -- 1.3Versions 1.0 -- 1.3 were distributed to participants in RSA Data Security, Inc.'s Public-Key Cryptography Standards meetings in February and March 1991.
Version 1.4Version 1.4 was part of the June 3, 1991 initial public release of PKCS. Version 1.4 was published as NIST/OSI Implementors' Workshop document SEC-SIG-91-18.
Version 1.5Version 1.5 incorporated several editorial changes, including updates to the references and the addition of a revision history. The following substantive changes were made:Section 10: "MD4 with RSA" signature and verification processes were added.Section 11: md4WithRSAEncryption object identifier was added.Version 1.5 was republished as IETF RFC 2313.Version 2.0Version 2.0 incorporated major editorial changes in terms of the document structure and introduced the RSAES-OAEP encryption scheme. This version continued to support the encryption and signature processes in version 1.5, although the hash algorithm MD4 was no longer allowed due to cryptanalytic advances in the intervening years. Version 2.0 was republished as RFC 2437.Version 2.1Version 2.1 introduces multi-prime RSA and the RSASSA-PSS signature scheme with appendix along with several editorial improvements. This version continues to support the schemes in version 2.0.Version 2.2Version 2.2 updates the list of allowed hashing algorithms to align them with FIPS 180-4 , therefore adding SHA-224, SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256. The following substantive changes were made:Object identifiers for sha224WithRSAEncryption, sha512-224WithRSAEncryption and sha512-256WithRSAEncryption were added.This version continues to support the schemes in version 2.1.The Public-Key Cryptography Standards are specifications produced by RSA Laboratories in cooperation with secure systems developers worldwide for the purpose of accelerating the deployment of public-key cryptography. First published in 1991 as a result of meetings with a small group of early adopters of public-key technology, the PKCS documents have become widely referenced and implemented. Contributions from the PKCS series have become part of many formal and de facto standards, including ANSI X9 and IEEE P1363 documents, PKIX, SET, S/MIME, SSL/TLS, and WAP/WTLS. Further development of PKCS occurs through the IETF. Suggestions for improvement are welcome.This document is based on a contribution of RSA Laboratories, the
research center of RSA Security Inc.