Akamai

mnot@mnot.net http://www.mnot.net/

Mozilla

mcmanus@ducksong.com https://mozillians.org/u/pmcmanus/

General Internet-Draft This document introduces “alternate services” to allow an HTTP origin’s resources to be available at a separate network location, possibly accessed with a different protocol configuration. It also specifies one means of discovering alternate services, the “Alt-Svc” header field.

specifies a few ways to negotiate the use of HTTP/2.0 without changing existing URIs. However, several deficiencies in using the “upgrade dance” for “http://” URIs have become apparent. While that mechanism is still being investigated, some have expressed interest in an alternate approach. Furthermore, some implementers have expressed a strong desire utilize HTTP/2 only in conjunction with TLS. Alternate-Services provides a potential mechanism for achieving that for “http://” URIs; see for details. Finally, HTTP/2.0 is designed to have longer-lived, fewer and more active TCP connections. While these properties are generally “friendlier” for the network, they can cause problems for servers that currently exploit the short-lived flow characteristics of HTTP/1.x for load balancing, session affinity and maintaining locality to the user. This document specifies a new concept in HTTP, the “alternate service,” to address these use cases. An alternate service can be used to interact with the resources on an origin server at a separate location on the network, possibly using a different protocol configuration.

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in . This document uses the Augmented BNF defined in along with the “OWS”, “DIGIT”, “parameter”, “uri-host”, “port” and “delta-second” rules from , and uses the “#rule” extension defined in Section 7 of that document.

On the Web, a resource is accessed through a scheme (e.g., “https” or “http”) on a nominated host / port combination. These three pieces of information collectively can be used to establish the authority for ownership of the resource (its “origin”; see ), as well as providing enough information to bootstrap access to it. This document introduces the notion of an “Alternate Service”; when an origin’s resources are accessible through a different protocol / host / port combination, it is said to have an alternate service. For example, an origin:

might declare that its resources are also accessible at the alternate service:

By their nature, alternate services are explicitly at the granularity of an origin; i.e., they cannot be selectively applied to resources within an origin. Alternate services do not replace or change the origin for any given resource; in general, they are not visible to the software “above” the access mechanism. The alternate service is essentially alternate routing information that can also be used to reach the origin in the same way that DNS CNAME or SRV records define routing information at the name resolution level. Furthermore, it is important to note that the first member of an alternate service tuple is different from the “scheme” component of an origin; it is more specific, identifying not only the major version of the protocol being used, but potentially communication options for that protocol. This means that clients using an alternate service will change the host, port and protocol that they are using to fetch resources, but these changes MUST NOT be propagated to the application that is using HTTP; from that standpoint, the URI being accessed and all information derived from it (scheme, host, port) are the same as before. Importantly, this includes its security context; in particular, when TLS is in use, the alternate server will need to present a certificate for the origin’s host name, not that of the alternate. Likewise, the Host header is still derived from the origin, not the alternate service (just as it would if a CNAME were being used). The changes MAY, however, be made visible in debugging tools, consoles, etc. Formally, an alternate service is identified by the combination of: An ALPN protocol, as per A host, as per A port, as per Additionally, each alternate service MUST have: A freshness lifetime, expressed in seconds; see A numeric priority; see Potentially, there are many ways that a client could discover the alternate service(s) associated with an origin; this document currently defines one, the Alt-Svc HTTP Header Field ().

Clients MUST NOT use alternate services with a host other than the origin’s without strong server authentication; this mitigates the attack described in . One way to achieve this is for the alternate to use TLS with a certificate that is valid for that origin. For example, if the origin’s host is “www.example.com” and an alternate is offered on “other.example.com” with the “http2-tls” protocol, and the certificate offered is valid for “www.example.com”, the client can use the alternate. However, if “other.example.com” is offered with the “http2” protocol, the client cannot use it, because there is no mechanism in that protocol to establish strong server authentication.

Mechanisms for discovering alternate services can associate a freshness lifetime with them; for example, the Alt-Svc header field uses the “ma” parameter. Clients MAY choose to use an alternate service instead of the origin at any time when it is considered fresh; see for specific recommendations. To mitigate risks associated with caching compromised values (see for details), user agents SHOULD examine cached alternate services when they detect a change in network configuration, and remove any that could be compromised (for example, those whose association with the trust root is questionable). UAs that do not have a means of detecting network changes SHOULD place an upper bound on their lifetime.

Mechanisms for discovering alternate services can associate a priority with them; for example, the Alt-Svc header field uses the “pr” parameter. Priorities are numeric, with a range of 1-64, and are relative to the origin server, which has a static priority of 32. Higher values are preferable. Therefore, an alternate with a priority of 48 will be used in preference to the origin server, whereas one with a priority of 10 will be used only when the origin server becomes unavailable. Note that priorities are not specific to the mechanism that an alternate was discovered with; i.e., there is only one “pool” of priorities for an origin.

A client must only use a TLS based alternate service if the client also supports TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) . This supports the conservation of IP addresses on the alternate service host.

By their nature, alternate services are optional; clients are not required to use them. However, it is advantageous for clients to behave in a predictable way when they are used by servers (e.g., for load balancing). Therefore, if a client becomes aware of an alternate service that has a higher priority than a connection currently in use, the client SHOULD use that alternate service as soon as it is available, provided that the security properties of the alternate service protocol are desirable, as compared to the existing connection. For example, if an origin advertises a “http2-tls” alternate service using an “Alt-Svc” response header field, the client ought to immediately establish a connection to the most preferable alternate service, and use it in preference to the origin connection once available. The client is not required to block requests; the origin’s connection can be used until the alternate connection is established. However, if the security properties of the existing connection are weak (e.g. cleartext HTTP/1.1) then it might make sense to block until the new connection is fully available in order to avoid information leakage. Furthermore, if the connection to the alternate service fails or is unresponsive, the client MAY fall back to using the origin, or a less preferable alternate service.

A HTTP(S) origin server can advertise the availability of alternate services to clients by adding an Alt-Svc header field to responses.

]]>

For example:

This indicates that the “http2” protocol on the same host using the indicated port (in this case, 8000). Alt-Svc can also contain a host:

This indicates that all resources on the origin are available using the “http2-tls” profile on other.example.com port 443. It can also have multiple values:

The value(s) advertised by Alt-Svc can be used by clients to open a new connection to one or more alternate services immediately, or simultaneously with subsequent requests on the same connection. Intermediaries MUST NOT change or append Alt-Svc values.

When an alternate service is advertised using Alt-Svc, it is considered fresh for 24 hours from generation of the message. This can be modified with the ‘ma’ (max-age’) parameter;

which indicates the number of seconds since the response was generated the alternate service is considered fresh for.

See Section 4.2.3 for details of determining response age. For example, a response:

indicates that an alternate service is available and usable for the next 60 seconds. However, the response has already been cached for 30 seconds (as per the Age header field value), so therefore the alternate service is only fresh for the 30 seconds from when this response was received, minus estimated transit time. When an Alt-Svc response header is received from an origin, its value invalidates and replaces all cached alternate services for that origin. This includes the empty Alt-Svc header, which clears all cached alternate services for an origin. See for general requirements on caching alternate services. Note that the freshness lifetime for HTTP caching (here, 600 seconds) does not affect caching of Alt-Svc values.

Finally, an explicit priority can be associated with an Alt-Svc header field value by using the “pr” parameter:

See for details of the priority mechanism.

If the “pr” parameter is not present or is invalid, the default priority for alternate services discovered with the Alt-Svc header field is 48.

Using an alternate service implies accessing an origin’s resources on an alternate port, at a minimum. An attacker that can inject alternate services and listen at the advertised port is therefore able to hijack an origin. For example, an attacker that can add HTTP response header fields can redirect traffic to a different port on the same host using the Alt-Svc header field; if that port is under the attacker’s control, they can thus masquerade as the HTTP server. This risk can be mitigated by restricting the ability to set the Alt-Svc response header field on the origin, and restricting who can open a port for listening on that host.

When the host is changed due to the use of an alternate service, it presents an opportunity for attackers to hijack communication to an origin. For example, if an attacker can convince a user agent to send all traffic for “innocent.example.org” to “evil.example.com” by successfully associating it as an alternate service, they can masquerade as that origin. This can be done locally (see mitigations above) or remotely (e.g., by an intermediary as a man-in-the-middle attack). This is the reason for the requirement in that any alternate service with a host different to the origin’s be strongly authenticated with the origin’s identity; i.e., presenting a certificate for the origin proves that the alternate service is authorized to serve traffic for the origin. However, this authorization is only as strong as the method used to authenticate the alternate service. In particular, there are well-known exploits to make an attacker’s certificate appear as legitimate. Alternate services could be used to persist such an attack; for example, an intermediary could man-in-the-middle TLS-protected communication to a target, and then direct all traffic to an alternate service with a large freshness lifetime, so that the user agent still directs traffic to the attacker even when not using the intermediary. As a result, there is a requirement in to examine cached alternate services when a network change is detected.

When the ALPN protocol is changed due to the use of an alternate service, the security properties of the new connection to the origin can be different from that of the “normal” connection to the origin, because the protocol identifier itself implies this. For example, if a “https://” URI had a protocol advertised that does not use some form of end-to-end encryption (most likely, TLS), it violates the expectations for security that the URI scheme implies. Therefore, clients cannot blindly use alternate services, but instead evaluate the option(s) presented to assure that security requirements and expectations (of specifications, implementations and end users) are met.

Harvard University

1350 Mass. Ave. Cambridge MA 02138 - +1 617 495 3864 sob@harvard.edu

General keyword In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. Authors who follow these guidelines should incorporate this phrase near the beginning of their document: The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. Note that the force of these words is modified by the requirement level of the document in which they are used. World Wide Web Consortium

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 77 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge MA 02139 USA +1-617-253-5702 +1-617-258-5999 timbl@w3.org http://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/

Day Software

5251 California Ave., Suite 110 Irvine CA 92617 USA +1-949-679-2960 +1-949-679-2972 fielding@gbiv.com http://roy.gbiv.com/

Adobe Systems Incorporated

345 Park Ave San Jose CA 95110 USA +1-408-536-3024 LMM@acm.org http://larry.masinter.net/

Applications uniform resource identifier URI URL URN WWW resource A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. Internet technical specifications often need to define a formal syntax. Over the years, a modified version of Backus-Naur Form (BNF), called Augmented BNF (ABNF), has been popular among many Internet specifications. The current specification documents ABNF. It balances compactness and simplicity with reasonable representational power. The differences between standard BNF and ABNF involve naming rules, repetition, alternatives, order-independence, and value ranges. This specification also supplies additional rule definitions and encoding for a core lexical analyzer of the type common to several Internet specifications. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document provides specifications for existing TLS extensions. It is a companion document for RFC 5246, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2". The extensions specified are server_name, max_fragment_length, client_certificate_url, trusted_ca_keys, truncated_hmac, and status_request. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document defines the concept of an "origin", which is often used as the scope of authority or privilege by user agents. Typically, user agents isolate content retrieved from different origins to prevent malicious web site operators from interfering with the operation of benign web sites. In addition to outlining the principles that underlie the concept of origin, this document details how to determine the origin of a URI and how to serialize an origin into a string. It also defines an HTTP header field, named "Origin", that indicates which origins are associated with an HTTP request. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes a Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension for application layer protocol negotiation within the TLS handshake. For instances in which the TLS connection is established over a well known TCP/IP port not associated with the desired application layer protocol, this extension allows the application layer to negotiate which protocol will be used within the TLS session. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. HTTP has been in use by the World Wide Web global information initiative since 1990. This document provides an overview of HTTP architecture and its associated terminology, defines the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes, defines the HTTP/1.1 message syntax and parsing requirements, and describes general security concerns for implementations. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document defines requirements on HTTP caches and the associated header fields that control cache behavior or indicate cacheable response messages. This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK] When a server's IPv4 path and protocol are working, but the server's IPv6 path and protocol are not working, a dual-stack client application experiences significant connection delay compared to an IPv4-only client. This is undesirable because it causes the dual- stack client to have a worse user experience. This document specifies requirements for algorithms that reduce this user-visible delay and provides an algorithm. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This specification describes an optimized expression of the syntax of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). HTTP/2.0 enables a more efficient use of network resources and a reduced perception of latency by introducing header field compression and allowing multiple concurrent messages on the same connection. It also introduces unsolicited push of representations from servers to clients. This document is an alternative to, but does not obsolete, the HTTP/1.1 message syntax. HTTP's existing semantics remain unchanged. This version of the draft has been marked for implementation. Interoperability testing will occur in the HTTP/2.0 interim in Zurich, CH, starting 2014-01-22. This document proposes a way to optimistically encrypt HTTP/2.0 using TLS for HTTP URIs.

Thanks to Eliot Lear, Stephen Farrell, Guy Podjarny, Stephen Ludin, Erik Nygren, Paul Hoffman, Adam Langley and Will Chan for their feedback and suggestions. The Alt-Svc header field was influenced by the design of the Alternate-Protocol header in SPDY.

GOAWAY: A GOAWAY-like frame (or just a GOAWAY modification) that allows an alternate service to be switched to might be suggested in a future revision. DNS: Alternate services are also amenable to DNS-based discovery. If there is sufficient interest, a future revision may include a proposal for that. Indicating Chosen Service: It’s likely necessary for the server to know which protocol the user agent has chosen, and perhaps even the hostname (for load balancing). This could be conveyed as part of the “magic”, or as a request header. IPV6: The intersection between Alternate Services and Happy Eyeballs should be investigated. ALPN strings: all of the ALPN strings in this document are fictional; they need to be updated based upon that specification’s progress (and the registry, eventually). Advice for setting headers: guidelines for servers that use the Alt-Svc header field.