Global Token Revocation

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

An OAuth Authorization Server issues tokens in response to a user authorizing a client. A party external to the OAuth Authorization Server may wish to instruct the Authorization Server to revoke all tokens belonging to a particular user.¶

For example, a security incident management tool may detect anomalous behaviour on a user's account, or if the user logged in through an enterprise Identity Provider, the Identity Provider may want to revoke all of a user's tokens on a security incident or on the employee's termination.¶

This specification describes an API endpoint so that an authorization server can accept requests from external parties to revoke all tokens associated with a given user.¶

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

3. Token Revocation

A revocation request is a POST request to the Global Token Revocation endpoint. This URL MUST conform to the rules given in [RFC6749], Section 3.1.¶

The means to obtain the location of the revocation endpoint is out of the scope of this specification. For example, the authorization server may publish documentation of the location of the endpoint, or may manually register it with tools that will use it.¶

Upon receiving a token revocation request, implementations MUST support the revocation of refresh tokens and active user sessions, and SHOULD support the revocation of access tokens (see Section 4).¶

POST /global-token-revocation
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer f5641763544a7b24b08e4f74045

{
  "subject": {
    "format": "email",
    "email": "user@example.com"
  }
}

POST /global-token-revocation
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer f5641763544a7b24b08e4f74045

{
  "subject": {
    "format": "opaque",
    "id": "U1234567890"
  }
}

4. Implementation Notes

OAuth 2.0 allows deployment flexibility with respect to the style of access tokens. The access tokens may be self-contained (e.g. [RFC9068]) so that a resource server needs no further interaction with an authorization server issuing these tokens to perform an authorization decision of the client requesting access to a protected resource. A system design may, however, instead use access tokens that are handles referring to authorization data stored at the authorization server.¶

While these are not the only options, they illustrate the implications for revocation. In the latter case of reference tokens, the authorization server is able to revoke an access token by removing it from storage. In the former case, without storing tokens, it may be impossible to revoke tokens without taking additional measures.¶

For this reason, revocation of access tokens is optional in this specification, since it may post too significant of a burden for implementers. It is not required to revoke access tokens to be able to return a success code to the caller.¶

5. Security Considerations

TODO Security¶

6. IANA Considerations

Appendix A. Document History

(( To be removed from the final specification ))¶

-00¶

• Initial Draft¶

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the following people for their contributions and reviews of this specification: George Fletcher, Karl McGuinness, Mike Jones.¶

Author's Address