| Internet-Draft | OAuth RT Scope | July 2026 |
| Parecki | Expires 25 January 2027 | [Page] |
This specification defines a new OAuth 2.0 token response parameter,
refresh_token_scope, that indicates the scope authorized for a
refresh token when it differs from the scope of the access token
issued alongside it. This allows clients to discover that a refresh
token carries broader authorization than the initial access token,
enabling just-in-time requests for elevated access without requiring
a new authorization flow.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://aaronpk.github.io/draft-parecki-oauth-refresh-token-scope-response/draft-parecki-oauth-refresh-token-scope-response.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-parecki-oauth-refresh-token-scope-response/.¶
Discussion of this document takes place on the Web Authorization Protocol Working Group mailing list (mailto:oauth@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/aaronpk/draft-parecki-oauth-refresh-token-scope-response.¶
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Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
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The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] defines a token
endpoint response that includes a scope parameter indicating the
scope of the issued access token. When an authorization server issues
a refresh token alongside an access token, the refresh token may be
authorized for a broader set of scopes than the initial access token.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] does not define a mechanism for the authorization server
to communicate this broader authorization to the client.¶
This gap creates a practical problem: a client that receives a refresh
token has no reliable way to determine whether that refresh token can
be used to obtain access tokens with scopes beyond those reflected in
the initial access token's scope parameter. Without this
information, a client that needs elevated access must either
speculatively attempt a refresh with a larger scope (and handle
potential failure), or initiate an entirely new authorization flow,
even when the user or policy has already approved the broader scope.¶
Consider the following scenarios:¶
In an authorization code flow, a user may approve a broad set of scopes during the initial authorization. The authorization server issues a minimal access token for the immediate operation but includes a refresh token authorized for the full approved scope. The client has no way to know that it may request additional scopes via the refresh token grant without attempting it.¶
In a client credentials flow, an authorization server may issue a refresh token pre-authorized for a range of operations, while the initial access token is scoped only to a particular operation. The client service may need to perform higher-privilege operations later and could use the refresh token to obtain the appropriate access token on demand.¶
This specification defines a new token response parameter,
refresh_token_scope, that the authorization server includes when it
issues a refresh token. The parameter communicates the scope
authorized for the refresh token, enabling clients to make informed
decisions about when and how to request elevated access using the
refresh token grant.¶
This mechanism provides a simpler alternative to dynamic challenge-response protocols for many just-in-time authorization use cases. Rather than defining new error codes, roundtrips, and challenge sessions, an authorization server can pre-authorize a refresh token with elevated scope and rely on the existing refresh token grant flow, extended by this specification, to deliver the right access token at the right time.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document uses the terms "access token", "authorization server", "client", "refresh token", "scope", "token endpoint", and "token response" as defined by [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1].¶
This specification defines the following token response parameter for use in OAuth 2.0 token endpoint responses.¶
refresh_token_scope:OPTIONAL. The scope authorized for the issued refresh token,
expressed as a space-separated list of scope values as described in
Section 1.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1]. This parameter MUST be included in the
token response when a refresh token is issued and its authorized
scope differs from the access token scope indicated by the scope
parameter. This parameter MAY be included even when the refresh
token scope is identical to the access token scope.¶
When this parameter is present, it indicates the set of scopes that
the client MAY request when using the refresh token at the token
endpoint. The authorization server is not obligated to grant all
scopes listed in refresh_token_scope on any individual refresh
request; it MAY apply additional policy, credentials requirements, or
other conditions when deciding whether to honor a particular scope
request.¶
A client that receives a token response containing both a
refresh_token and a refresh_token_scope parameter MUST treat the
refresh_token_scope value as the authoritative indicator of the
scopes available via the refresh token grant.¶
A client that needs an access token with a scope that is listed in
refresh_token_scope but not in the current access token's scope
SHOULD use the refresh token grant to request an access token with
the desired scope, rather than initiating a new authorization flow.¶
A client MUST NOT request scopes via the refresh token grant that are
not listed in the refresh_token_scope parameter. Doing so will
result in an invalid_scope error from the authorization server.¶
A client that does not receive a refresh_token_scope parameter in
the token response MUST assume that the refresh token is authorized
only for the scope indicated by the scope parameter (or, if the
scope parameter is also absent, the scope originally requested by
the client per Section 3.2.3 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1]).¶
Section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] states that a refresh token SHOULD NOT be included in the response to a client credentials grant. This guidance reflects the typical case where the client can simply re-authenticate to obtain a new access token. However, [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] does not prohibit issuing a refresh token for a client credentials grant, and there are deployment scenarios where doing so is appropriate.¶
In machine-to-machine contexts, a client may be pre-authorized for a range of operations that span different privilege levels. Rather than issuing a single long-lived, high-privilege access token, the authorization server can issue:¶
A minimal-privilege access token for the current operation, and¶
A refresh token authorized for the broader set of operations the client may need to perform.¶
The refresh_token_scope parameter enables this pattern by informing
the client of what it may request later. The client requests only the
scope it needs for the current operation and uses the refresh token to
obtain higher-privilege access tokens on demand, without
re-authenticating to the token endpoint from scratch.¶
This pattern provides meaningful security benefits in environments where access token leakage is a concern: high-privilege tokens are only obtained and circulated when needed, and their lifetimes can be kept short relative to the refresh token's lifetime.¶
Authorization servers that choose to issue refresh tokens in client credentials responses SHOULD apply the same refresh token security requirements described in Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] and in [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]. In particular, refresh token rotation SHOULD be applied, and the refresh token SHOULD be bound to the client using mTLS [RFC8705] or DPoP [RFC9449].¶
A client service requests an access token for a read operation:¶
POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: authorization-server.example Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW grant_type=client_credentials &scope=records%3Aread¶
The authorization server issues an access token for the requested scope and a refresh token authorized for a broader set of scopes:¶
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"access_token": "2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_in": 3600,
"scope": "records:read",
"refresh_token": "tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA",
"refresh_token_scope": "records:read records:write records:delete"
}
¶
When the client later needs to perform a write operation, it uses the refresh token to obtain a suitable access token:¶
POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: authorization-server.example Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW grant_type=refresh_token &refresh_token=tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA &scope=records%3Awrite¶
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"access_token": "9dEJolkQr2",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_in": 300,
"scope": "records:write",
"refresh_token": "9tCvLOkF0XG5Qx2pE7iWIA",
"refresh_token_scope": "records:read records:write records:delete"
}
¶
When a client uses a refresh token to request a new access token, the
response MUST include a refresh_token_scope parameter if a new
refresh token is issued and its authorized scope differs from the
newly issued access token scope. The authorized scope of the new
refresh token MUST NOT exceed the authorized scope of the presented
refresh token.¶
If the client omits the scope parameter from the refresh token grant
request, the authorization server issues an access token with the same
scope as the previously issued access token for that refresh token,
consistent with Section 4.3 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1].¶
If the client includes a scope parameter in the refresh token grant
request, the authorization server MUST verify the requested scope is
within the authorized scope of the presented refresh token. If the
requested scope is valid, the authorization server issues an access
token for the requested scope. The authorization server MAY also issue
a new refresh token; if it does, the refresh_token_scope of the new
token MUST NOT exceed the refresh_token_scope of the presented
token.¶
The refresh_token_scope parameter informs the client of available
scopes but does not by itself grant those scopes. The authorization
server retains full authority to deny any refresh token grant request
based on current policy, the state of the client's authentication
credentials, risk signals, or any other factor. The presence of a
scope value in refresh_token_scope is not a guarantee that the
authorization server will issue an access token for that scope on
demand.¶
Implementors SHOULD NOT treat refresh_token_scope as an irrevocable
commitment. Authorization servers MAY narrow or revoke refresh token
scope at any time in response to policy changes or security events.¶
Because a refresh token carrying broad scope authorization is a high-value credential, implementors MUST follow the refresh token security requirements in Section 10 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]. Sender-constraining the refresh token using mTLS [RFC8705] or DPoP [RFC9449] is strongly RECOMMENDED, particularly in deployments where the refresh token is authorized for elevated or sensitive scopes.¶
Refresh token rotation (issuing a new refresh token on each use and invalidating the previous one) limits the window of exposure if a refresh token is compromised.¶
When an authorization server issues a refresh token in response to a client credentials grant, it MUST ensure that the client is confidential and capable of maintaining the confidentiality of the refresh token. Refresh tokens MUST NOT be issued for public clients using the client credentials grant.¶
The authorization server SHOULD bind the refresh token to the client's authentication credential (e.g., via DPoP key binding or mTLS) to prevent use of the refresh token by a party other than the authenticated client.¶
This document defines the following value for the IANA "OAuth Parameters" registry established by [RFC6749].¶
TODO acknowledge.¶