Internet-Draft PQC SACKS September 2026
Song & Fu Expires 2 April 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
EMU
Internet-Draft:
draft-song-emu-eapaka-pqc-sack-00
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Authors:
X. Song
ZTE Corp.
H. Fu
China Mobile

Bitstring-based Fragmentation Mechanism for EAP-AKA'

Abstract

This document specifies an extension to the EAP-AKA' protocol by introducing a Bitmap-based Selective Acknowledgment (SACK) mechanism to the AT_FRAGMENT attribute. This mechanism enables window-based transmission and precise recovery of lost fragments, optimizing fragment delivery during post-quantum identity concealment and authentication exchanges.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 April 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

EAP-AKA' [RFC9048] is a widely adopted authentication framework in cellular and non-3GPP access networks. To mitigate the threat of Cryptanalytically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQC), the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is essential. However, PQC algorithms (e.g., ML-KEM, ML-DSA) yield payloads that heavily exceed the typical MTU constraints of access networks, requiring fragmentation.

The [I-D.ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka] utilizes a strict stop-and-wait fragment acknowledgment. Each individual segment requires a dedicated EAP-Request/EAP-Response round-trip. When dealing with ML-DSA signatures (which can span over 4 Kilobytes), this lock-step approach inflicts an unacceptable latency penalty on initial network attachment.

This document bridges the gap by importing the bitstring selective retransmission methodology from IKEv2's large message fragmentation [I-D.smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-fragm-large-msg] into the EAP layer. By embedding a Fragment Bitmap into the AT_FRAGMENT attribute, the EAP Peer can transmit multiple fragments in a windowed manner, and the EAP Server can selectively request only the dropped segments within a single round-trip.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Protocol Capability Negotiation

To maintain backward compatibility with legacy [RFC9048] nodes, the bitmap fragmentation feature MUST be explicitly negotiated during the initial Identity exchange phase.

The EAP Server includes the modified AT_FRAGMENT_B attribute in its initial EAP-Request/AKA'-Identity message.

The Format of AT_FRAGMENT_B is defined as follows:

 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|     Type      |    Length     |  Version (1)  |B|  Reserved   |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|      Maximum Window Size      |  Max Reassembled Attr Length  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

3. Extended AT_FRAGMENT_Ext Attribute Format

When Bit 'B' is negotiated, the AT_FRAGMENT_Ext attribute MUST use the following layout to carry fragmented PQC-SUCI or PQC-Signatures:

 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  Type (TBD)   |    Length     |S|M|R|A|  Res  | Total Frags   |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  Current Seq  | Bitstring Len |   Fragment Bitmap (Variable)  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Total Attribute Length (Opt)  |   Maximum Retransmit Number   |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                  Fragment Data (Variable)                     |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

4. Bitstring-SACK Operational State Machine

4.1. Peer Transmission Logic

Upon executing PQC encapsulation (generating a long SUCI via ML-KEM), the Peer partitions the raw bytes into N segments. Instead of waiting for an ACK for Fragment 0, the Peer transmits fragments up to the negotiated "Maximum Window Size" sequentially or via bundled NAS containers if upper layers permit.

The final fragment within the local transmission window MUST have the 'A' (ACK Mode) bit set to 1, forcing the EAP Server to reply with the current bitmap compilation.

4.2. Server Selective Mechanism

The Server maintains an index array mapped to the incoming "Current Seq". As fragments land, the Server populates its internal bitmap vector:

  • Continuous In-order Delivery: If the Server accumulates all pieces monotonically (Bitmap = 1111...), and the last received piece has M=0, the Server skips explicit SACK feedback, reassembles the large attribute, and immediately transitions to the standard EAP-Request/ AKA'-Challenge phase. This achieves the theoretical 1-RTT bound.

  • Discontinuous Gap Detection: If a gap occurs (e.g., Fragment 1 is missing but 0 and 2 arrive), the Server marks its local bitmap as 1010... Upon processing a packet with A=1 or upon a reassembly timer expiry, the Server transmits an empty EAP-Request/AKA'-Identity payload containing the AT_FRAGMENT attribute configured with: A = 1 (ACK Mode); Fragment Bitmap = 10100000... (indicating Fragment 1 is missing).

4.3. Peer Error Recovery

When the Peer parses an incoming EAP-Request containing a Fragment Bitmap with A=1, it cross-references the 0-bits inside the bitstring. The Peer isolates the failed sequence indices and triggers **selective retransmission** for only those specific fragments, maintaining their original "Current Seq" indices. It sets A=1 on the final retransmitted segment to prompt a fresh bitmap re-evaluation.

5. Security Considerations

The secuirity considerations of [I-D.ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka] applies to this document.

The Bitstring SACK mechanism introduces potential vectors for Memory Exhaustion Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Rogue peers could advertise a massive "Total Attribute Length" and send scattered fragments to hold Server RAM allocations open indefinitely.

6. IANA Considerations

TBD.

7. References

7.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka]
Reddy.K, T. and A. Banerjee, "Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ KEMs) in EAP-AKA prime", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka-02>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9048]
Arkko, J., Lehtovirta, V., Torvinen, V., and P. Eronen, "Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3GPP Mobile Network Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA')", RFC 9048, DOI 10.17487/RFC9048, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9048>.

7.2. Informative References

[I-D.smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-fragm-large-msg]
Smyslov, V., "Using IKE Fragmentation for Large Messages", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-fragm-large-msg-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-fragm-large-msg-01>.

Authors' Addresses

Xueyan Song
ZTE Corp.
China
Huawei Fu
China Mobile
China