| Internet-Draft | learnlog | October 2026 |
| Srivastava | Expires 10 April 2027 | [Page] |
This document defines learnlog, a log format for learning software. A record holds typed events that describe what a learner did and what other parties, human or software, did in response. Entries are chained by hash, and a producer can sign the chain. A reader who trusts the signing key can then detect changes to the entries under a signed head that were made without that key. Some changes remain undetectable, and the security considerations list them. An event can be redacted, and the rest of the record still verifies. The format defines files, records, entries, events, and registries for event schemas. Event schemas for specific subject areas are out of scope.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
This first draft is a proposal for discussion. Appendix C lists open questions. Appendix B describes an earlier implementation.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 April 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
This document defines learnlog, a log format for learning software. The format has two aims. The first is to record actions that have meaning in the subject being learned, as distinct from interface activity such as clicks and page views. The second is to let a reader check a record for changes, within the limits that Section 10 states. Both aims cover the help that a learner receives, whether from a teacher, a tutoring system, or an AI assistant.¶
The format has the following properties:¶
The structure of files, records, and event schemas follows qlog [QLOG], which defines structured logging for network protocols. This document adds integrity rules and the members that a record of learning needs.¶
This document defines:¶
The following are out of scope:¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
Data structures are defined in the Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) [RFC8610]. Examples are in JSON [RFC8259]. Some figures wrap long lines as described in [RFC8792].¶
This document uses the following terms:¶
A log file holds one or more records. A record holds a header and a sequence of entries. Each entry holds one event.¶
log file
+-- record
+-- header what the record is about
+-- entry 1 one event and its hashes
+-- entry 2
+-- ...
+-- signed heads signed statements of the latest entry
Each entry holds the hash of its event and the hash of the entry before it. The first entry holds the hash of the header, and every entry hash covers that hash as well. A change to the header or to an earlier entry therefore changes every later entry hash. A producer can sign a statement of the latest entry hash, which gives a verifier a fixed point to check against.¶
+--------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| header |<------| entry 1 |<------| entry 2 |<------| entry 3 |
+--------+ prev +---------+ prev +---------+ prev +---------+
hash | hash | hash |
event hash event hash event hash
| | |
event 1 event 2 (redacted)
An entry commits to the hash of its event. The event itself can be removed later, and the chain still verifies (Section 7.3).¶
Event types live in namespaces that event schemas define. This document defines schemas for three namespaces that are not tied to one subject area. Other schemas are identified by URI.¶
A log file takes one of two forms. A contained file holds one or more records (Section 3.1). A sequential file holds one record and grows by appending (Section 3.2). Both forms hold the members of the log-file group, as in Section 3 of [QLOG].¶
LearnlogFile = {
log-file,
records: [+ Record]
}
log-file = (
file_schema: text,
serialization_format: text,
? title: text,
? description: text
)
file_schema:serialization_format:title, description:No hash covers these members. A producer SHOULD write file_schema and serialization_format within the first 256 octets of a file, as Section 3 of [QLOG] also asks, so that a tool can identify the file from its start.¶
The CDDL in this document has two root rules, LearnlogFile and LearnlogFileSeq. A third rule, SeqItem, describes each later element of a sequential file.¶
A LearnlogFile is one JSON text that holds one or more records. It suits export and exchange. Its file schema URI is urn:ietf:params:learnlog:file:contained.¶
The records in a file are verified one at a time. They can come from different producers and describe different subjects.¶
A LearnlogFileSeq holds one record and grows by appending. It suits a log that is written while the learner works. Its file schema URI is urn:ietf:params:learnlog:file:sequential.¶
LearnlogFileSeq = {
log-file,
record: RecordStart
}
; every element after the first
SeqItem = Entry / SignedHead
The first element of a sequential file is the LearnlogFileSeq object. Every later element is a SeqItem. An element with a seq member is an Entry. Any other element with a head member is a SignedHead. Entries appear in order of seq. A producer writes a SignedHead after the entry that it names, and a reader accepts one at any position.¶
The Entry elements, in file order, are the entries of the record, and the SignedHead elements are its signed heads. In a sequential file, event_schemas lists the schemas known when the file is started.¶
A registered file schema uses a URN of the form urn:ietf:params:learnlog:file:<identifier> (Section 12.2). Any other file schema uses a URI that its definer controls and MUST NOT use that URN form. Such a URI is not registered.¶
A record holds a header and the entries about one subject, written by one producer.¶
record-start = (
header: RecordHeader,
event_schemas: [+ text],
? truncated: Truncation
)
RecordStart = { record-start }
Record = {
record-start,
entries: [* Entry],
? signed_heads: [+ SignedHead]
}
header:event_schemas:truncated:entries:seq (Section 4.2).¶
signed_heads:The CDDL in this document defines what a producer writes. A reader MUST ignore a member that it does not recognize, wherever the member appears. A hash or a signature covers such a member only in a header, an event, or a head. A producer SHOULD NOT add members anywhere else.¶
The header states what a record is about and is fixed when the record is created.¶
RecordHeader = {
record_id: text,
subject: text,
hash_alg: HashAlg,
created: Timestamp,
? producer: Producer,
* text => any
}
Producer = {
name: text,
? version: text,
* text => any
}
HashAlg = "sha-256" / text
; lowercase hexadecimal
HashValue = text .regexp "([0-9a-f][0-9a-f])+"
; RFC 3339, UTC only
Timestamp = text .regexp
"[0-9]{4}(-[0-9]{2}){2}T[0-9]{2}(:[0-9]{2}){2}([.][0-9]{1,9})?Z"
record_id:subject:hash_alg:sha-256 [FIPS180].¶
created:producer:A header MAY hold other members. The record hash (Section 7.2) covers every member, so a change to the header changes the record hash and every entry hash.¶
A Timestamp is a date and time in the format of [RFC3339], in UTC, with an uppercase T and the suffix Z. The pattern in Figure 6 admits some impossible values, such as month 13. A Timestamp MUST also be a valid date and time. The second 60 is valid only in the time 23:59:60. A HashValue is the whole output of the hash named by hash_alg, written as two lowercase hexadecimal digits for each octet.¶
Entry = {
seq: Seq,
time: Timestamp,
event_hash: HashValue,
prev_hash: HashValue,
entry_hash: HashValue,
( event: Event // redacted: true )
}
; a position in a record, from 1 to (2^53)-1
Seq = 1..9007199254740991
seq:seq 1. Each later entry has the seq of its predecessor plus 1. A Seq is an integer of at least 1 and below 2^53.¶
time:seq. Values of time SHOULD NOT decrease from one entry to the next.¶
event_hash:prev_hash:entry_hash:event:redacted:event, when the event was removed (Section 7.3).¶
An entry holds exactly one of event and redacted.¶
A producer appends an entry when the event occurs, or as soon after as it can. A written entry keeps its position and its hashes. This document permits two changes to the entries of a record. Redaction removes an event, and a party that kept the event can put it back (Section 7.3). Truncation removes the oldest entries (Section 4.3).¶
A holder can remove the oldest entries of a record, for example to meet a retention limit. The truncated member then holds the seq and entry_hash of the last entry that was removed.¶
Truncation = {
seq: Seq,
entry_hash: HashValue
}
The first remaining entry has a seq of truncated.seq plus 1 and a prev_hash equal to truncated.entry_hash.¶
A record can be truncated more than once. The truncated member then names the last entry removed overall. A holder can remove every entry, which leaves entries empty.¶
A signed head that names an entry before truncated.seq can no longer be compared with an entry, and a holder MAY remove it. A holder SHOULD keep every other signed head.¶
A verifier cannot check the entries that were removed. A change to the header still shows in the remaining entries, because every entry hash covers the record hash (Section 7.2). Section 10.1 states what such a check establishes.¶
An event describes one action: something the learner did, or something another party did that bears on the learner's work.¶
Event = $Event
event-type<Name, Data> = {
name: Name,
salt: Salt,
data: Data,
? actor: Party,
? to: Party,
? session: text,
? activity: Activity,
? instrument: Instrument,
* text => any
}
; 22 or more characters of the base64url alphabet
Salt = text .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,}"
The event-type rule is a CDDL generic. An event type is an instance of the rule that fixes the name and the type of data. The $Event socket collects the instances (Section 5.5).¶
name:salt:data:actor:to:session:activity:instrument:An event MAY hold other members. The event hash covers every member of the event.¶
A Party describes who acted or who was addressed.¶
Party = {
role: Role,
? kind: "human" / "software",
? id: text,
* text => any
}
Role = "learner" / "instructor" / "assistant" / "peer" /
"guardian" / "system" / text
The role member has one of these values:¶
learner:id is the subject of the record.¶
instructor:assistant:peer:guardian:system:Other values MAY be used.¶
The kind member states whether the party is a person (human) or a program (software). When the member is absent, a learner, peer, or guardian is a person, and a system is a program. The member is REQUIRED with any other role. The CDDL in Figure 10 does not express this rule.¶
The id member identifies a party other than the subject. For a person, the value is pseudonymous and follows Section 11.1. For a program, the value names the program.¶
Table 1 shows how some common parties are described.¶
| Party | role | kind |
|---|---|---|
| A teacher working with the learner | instructor | human |
| An intelligent tutoring system | instructor | software |
| A general AI chat assistant | assistant | software |
| A classmate | peer | human |
When the actor is a program, the instrument member (Section 5.3) describes the model or the version that produced the data.¶
The meaning of an event can depend on the task it belongs to. A producer SHOULD include activity in every event that belongs to a task.¶
Activity = {
id: text,
? version: text,
? variant: text,
* text => any
}
The instrument member states how the data of an event came to be. A reader needs it to weigh an event that a model wrote or judged.¶
Instrument = {
source: "deterministic" / "model" / "human" / text,
? model: text,
? config_hash: HashValue,
? parameters: { * text => any },
? validated: bool,
* text => any
}
The source member has one of these values:¶
deterministic:model:human:Other values MAY be used. The remaining members are:¶
model:config_hash:parameters:validated:An event without an instrument member makes no statement about how its data was produced.¶
Event types are grouped in namespaces, as in Section 8 of [QLOG]. An event schema is a document that defines a namespace or extends one. The name of an event is the namespace identifier, a colon, and the type identifier. Each identifier starts with a letter from a to z and continues with such letters, digits, or underscores.¶
Each event schema has a URI. A registered schema uses the form urn:ietf:params:learnlog:events:<namespace> (Section 12.3). A schema that extends a namespace adds a fragment identifier to the URI of that namespace. Any other schema uses a URI that its definer controls and MUST NOT use that URN form. A URI that contains a domain name SHOULD include a month and year in the form mmyyyy. Section 8.1 of [QLOG] gives the same rule, to avoid problems when a domain name changes ownership.¶
A record can hold an event whose schema a tool does not know. Such an event does not match the CDDL that the tool has. Verification (Section 7.5) checks its hashes like any others and does not depend on its schema.¶
An event schema adds each of its event types to the $Event socket. The lines below, taken from the example schema in Appendix A.1, define the event type sim:prediction_committed.¶
$Event /= event-type<"sim:prediction_committed",
SimPredictionCommitted>
¶
Each data type in this document ends with a group socket named after the type, such as $$dialog-message-extension. A later schema can add members to the data type through that socket.¶
The points below apply to any event schema.¶
instrument member.¶
seq.¶
This section defines event schemas for three namespaces that are not tied to one subject area: consent, assist, and dialog.¶
The schema URI is urn:ietf:params:learnlog:events:consent. The namespace has two event types, consent:granted and consent:withdrawn. Both carry the same data.¶
ConsentChange = {
scopes: [+ ConsentScope],
? ref: text,
* $$consent-change-extension
}
ConsentScope = "instruction" / "research" / "export" / text
$Event /= event-type<"consent:granted", ConsentChange>
$Event /= event-type<"consent:withdrawn", ConsentChange>
scopes:ref:This document defines three scopes. Other values MAY be used.¶
instruction:research:export:The actor of a consent event is the party that gave or withdrew consent, for example a guardian.¶
A consent event records that consent was given or withdrawn, as the producer observed it. This document does not define how consent is obtained or how a producer acts on it.¶
A scope is in effect from a consent:granted event that names it until a later consent:withdrawn event that names it. A reader cannot tell which scopes are in effect when a consent event may be among the entries that were redacted or removed. For that reason, a holder SHOULD NOT redact a consent event.¶
The schema URI is urn:ietf:params:learnlog:events:assist. The namespace records the help that the producer observed. A reader can treat an action by the learner that follows a scaffold in the same activity as possibly assisted.¶
assist:help_requested:to member of the event names the party that was asked.¶
assist:scaffold_provided:actor member, because an absent actor would mean the subject.¶
AssistHelpRequested = {
? type: ScaffoldType,
* $$assist-help-requested-extension
}
AssistScaffoldProvided = {
type: ScaffoldType,
? request: Seq,
? level: uint .ge 1,
? reveals_answer: bool,
? modality: "text" / "speech" / text,
? content: text,
? content_ref: text,
? content_hash: HashValue,
* $$assist-scaffold-provided-extension
}
ScaffoldType = "socratic" / "probing" / "metacognitive" /
"scaffolding" / "explain" / "hint" /
"demonstrate" / text
$Event /= event-type<"assist:help_requested", AssistHelpRequested>
$Event /= event-type<"assist:scaffold_provided",
AssistScaffoldProvided>
In AssistHelpRequested, type is the kind of help that was asked for, when the interface distinguishes kinds. The members of AssistScaffoldProvided are:¶
type:request:seq of the entry that this scaffold answers, such as an assist:help_requested entry or a dialog:message entry. Absent when the scaffold was not requested.¶
level:reveals_answer:modality:text.¶
content:content_ref:content_hash:content is left out. An event MUST NOT hold both content and content_hash.¶
| Value | Meaning |
|---|---|
| socratic | An open question that leads the learner toward an idea |
| probing | A question about an assumption the learner made |
| metacognitive | A prompt about the learner's own approach |
| scaffolding | The problem broken into parts |
| explain | A direct explanation |
| hint | A hint |
| demonstrate | A worked example |
Other values MAY be used.¶
A producer SHOULD record every scaffold given to the learner, requested or not. The actor member identifies the provider.¶
Help can arrive as a turn in a conversation. A producer that knows a turn to be help records it as assist:scaffold_provided, with the words in content or their hash in content_hash, and writes no dialog:message for that turn. When a producer cannot tell whether a turn is help, it records the turn as dialog:message (Section 6.3). The replies of a general chat assistant are an example.¶
The schema URI is urn:ietf:params:learnlog:events:dialog. The namespace has one event type, dialog:message, which is one turn in an exchange between the subject and another party. The actor is the party that produced the turn, and to names the party addressed.¶
DialogMessage = {
? modality: "text" / "speech" / text,
? content: text,
? content_hash: HashValue,
? reply_to: Seq,
* $$dialog-message-extension
}
$Event /= event-type<"dialog:message", DialogMessage>
modality:text.¶
content:content_hash:content is left out. An event MUST NOT hold both content and content_hash.¶
reply_to:seq of the entry that this turn answers.¶
A producer SHOULD include activity when the exchange takes place during a task. A reader can then treat a turn by another party as possible help.¶
The words of a turn can hold personal data, and Section 11 applies. When software transcribes speech, the event SHOULD carry an instrument member that identifies the transcriber.¶
Hashes are computed over a canonical form, so that two implementations produce the same octets for the same value. The canonical form of a JSON value is its serialization under the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS) [RFC8785], encoded in UTF-8.¶
The following rules apply to a whole log file, including the parts that no hash covers:¶
A serialization other than JSON (Section 8.3) is mapped to the JSON data model first. Hashes are always computed over the canonical JSON form.¶
In this section, H(x) is the hash named by hash_alg, applied to the octets x and written in lowercase hexadecimal. C(v) is the canonical form of the JSON value v.¶
record hash = H(C(header))
event_hash = H(C(event))
prev_hash = record hash in the entry with seq 1
= entry_hash of the preceding entry, otherwise
entry_hash = H(C({ "record_hash": record hash,
"seq": seq, "time": time,
"event_hash": event_hash,
"prev_hash": prev_hash }))
header object.¶
event_hash is the hash of the event object with all its members.¶
prev_hash of the entry with seq 1 is the record hash. In every other entry, it is the entry_hash of the entry before it.¶
entry_hash is the hash of an object with exactly five members. The member record_hash holds the record hash. The other four are the seq, time, event_hash, and prev_hash of the entry.¶
content_hash or config_hash holds the hash of a string of octets. For text, the octets are its UTF-8 encoding. For other content, the producer chooses the octets.¶
Every entry hash covers the record hash. An entry that is moved to a record with another header therefore fails step 4e of Section 7.5, even after the entries before it are removed (Section 4.3).¶
A header and an event each require members that the object hashed for an entry lacks. The canonical form of that object therefore differs from the canonical form of any header or event.¶
A holder redacts an entry by removing its event member and adding the member redacted with the value true. No other member changes.¶
The entry hash is computed from event_hash, without the event itself. Every hash in the record therefore still verifies, and so does every signed head.¶
The salt is removed with the event. A party that does not have the salt cannot confirm a guess at the event from event_hash (Section 10.7).¶
Redaction leaves seq, time, and the hashes of the entry in place. A holder that needs to remove those as well truncates the record (Section 4.3) or deletes it.¶
A verifier reports which entries are redacted. Redaction does not cause a check to fail.¶
Only a party that kept the event can restore it. A restored event is checked against event_hash like any other.¶
A head names the latest entry of a record at some moment. A producer signs a head so that a verifier can authenticate the record up to that entry.¶
SignedHead = {
head: Head,
signature: text
}
Head = {
record_hash: HashValue,
seq: Seq,
entry_hash: HashValue,
time: Timestamp,
* text => any
}
record_hash:seq, entry_hash:seq and entry_hash of the entry that the head names.¶
time:The signature member is a JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] in the compact serialization with detached content (Appendix F of [RFC7515]). The JWS payload is the canonical form of the head object. The value of signature is therefore the encoded protected header, two periods, and the encoded signature.¶
alg and kid and MUST NOT contain crit.¶
alg MUST name a digital signature algorithm that uses a public key. The value none and MAC algorithms such as HS256 MUST NOT be used. Implementations MUST support ES256 [RFC7518].¶
kid MUST be the JWK Thumbprint [RFC7638] of the public key, computed with SHA-256 and encoded in base64url without padding.¶
To check a signature, a verifier computes the canonical form of head, encodes it in base64url, places it between the two periods, and verifies the result as a JWS. A verifier uses each key it trusts with exactly one algorithm (Section 3.1 of [RFC8725]).¶
A producer SHOULD sign a head at the end of each session and whenever a record leaves its control.¶
This document does not define how a verifier obtains the public key or decides to trust it. A key that travels in the file itself shows nothing about who signed.¶
A verifier is configured with the public keys it trusts and, for each key, the one signature algorithm it accepts. A verifier MUST report the result that the steps below define. Any procedure that gives the same result is acceptable.¶
Read the file.¶
file_schema names a file schema that the verifier knows and that fits the serialization. Check that a contained file holds a records array with at least one element, and that the first element of a sequential file holds a record object.¶
A verifier MUST reject a file when its JSON text fails this step, or when the first element of a sequential file does. None of its records is verified. A later element of a sequential file that fails step 1b is discarded (Section 8.2). Steps 2 to 5 apply to each record of a file that passes.¶
Check the header.¶
header is an object, that record_id, subject, and hash_alg are strings, and that created is a Timestamp.¶
hash_alg, the outcome for the record is "unsupported" and no further step applies. A verifier MUST NOT support an algorithm whose output is shorter than 256 bits.¶
seq to 1 and the expected link to the record hash. If truncated is present, check that truncated.seq is a Seq and that truncated.entry_hash is a HashValue. The expected seq is then truncated.seq plus 1, and the expected link is truncated.entry_hash.¶
Check that entries is an array. For each entry, in order:¶
seq is a Seq, that time is a Timestamp, and that event_hash, prev_hash, and entry_hash are HashValues. Check that the entry holds exactly one of event and redacted.¶
seq equals the expected seq.¶
prev_hash equals the expected link.¶
event is present, check that it is an object, that its name has the form given in Section 5.4, that its salt matches the Salt pattern of Figure 9, and that its data is an object. Then check that the hash of the event equals event_hash. If redacted is present, check that its value is true.¶
entry_hash.¶
entry_hash and add 1 to the expected seq.¶
If signed_heads is present, check that it is an array. For each signed head:¶
head is an object in which record_hash and entry_hash are HashValues, seq is a Seq, and time is a Timestamp. Check that signature consists of two base64url strings, neither of them empty, joined by two periods. Check that the first string decodes to a JSON object that conforms to I-JSON. Check that this object holds the strings alg and kid, that alg is not none, and that crit is absent.¶
head.record_hash equals the record hash.¶
head.seq is no greater than the seq of the last entry. A greater value shows that entries are missing from the end of the record. For a record without entries, the comparison uses truncated.seq, or 0 when the record is not truncated.¶
seq that the head names, check that head.entry_hash equals its entry_hash. If head.seq equals truncated.seq, check that head.entry_hash equals truncated.entry_hash. A head with a lower seq names an entry that was removed, and this check does not apply to it.¶
kid, check that alg is the algorithm it accepts for that key, and verify the signature with that key as Section 7.4 describes. If the verifier trusts no such key, the signature is not checked.¶
Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 define the terms Timestamp, HashValue, and Seq. A member that this document does not define is ignored in every step, apart from its part in a hash or a signature.¶
Once a check in steps 2 to 5 fails, the outcome is settled, and a verifier MAY stop.¶
The result for a record has these parts:¶
seq among the heads that had an entry hash to compare in step 5d and a signature that verified in step 5e, together with the kid of a head that names it. This part is absent when no head qualifies. Entries up to that seq were in the record when the holder of that key signed. Later entries are consistent and unauthenticated.¶
seq of each redacted entry.¶
truncated.seq, when the record is truncated. The entries up to that seq were not checked.¶
A verifier reports the following conditions, and they leave the outcome unchanged:¶
time that is earlier than the one before it, with the two compared as instants;¶
Verification does not use title, description, serialization_format, or event_schemas. The data of an event is not checked against an event schema, and an event of an unknown type is handled like any other. A tool MAY validate events against the schemas it knows and report the result separately.¶
A consistent record agrees with itself. A verified head ties the entries up to its seq to a key. Section 10.1 states what these results establish and what they leave open.¶
The structures in this document are defined in CDDL. Section 11 of [QLOG] takes the same approach and maps its structures to JSON and to JSON text sequences. This document defines the same two serializations. Hashes always use the canonical JSON form (Section 7.1).¶
Where this document defines a member as an integer, a producer writes the number without a fraction or an exponent. A reader compares numbers by value.¶
A LearnlogFile is serialized as a JSON text [RFC8259] in UTF-8. The media type is application/learnlog+json, which is also the value of serialization_format. The file extension is .learnlog.¶
A LearnlogFileSeq is serialized as a JSON text sequence [RFC7464]. Each element is preceded by a record separator (0x1E) and followed by a line feed (0x0A). The media type is application/learnlog+json-seq, which is also the value of serialization_format. The file extension is .slearnlog.¶
A producer can add an entry or a signed head to a sequential file without rewriting what came before. Redaction and truncation rewrite the file. In Figure 18, <RS> stands for the record separator and most values are left out.¶
<RS>{"file_schema":"urn:ietf:params:learnlog:file:sequential",
"serialization_format":"application/learnlog+json-seq",
"record":{"header":{...},"event_schemas":[...]}}
<RS>{"seq":1,"time":"2026-10-07T14:00:05Z","event":{...},
"event_hash":"...","prev_hash":"...","entry_hash":"..."}
<RS>{"seq":2,"time":"2026-10-07T14:01:10Z","event":{...},
"event_hash":"...","prev_hash":"...","entry_hash":"..."}
<RS>{"head":{...},"signature":"..."}
A crash can leave the last element of a file cut off. A reader MUST discard an element that is cut off (Section 2.3 of [RFC7464]) or that fails step 1b of Section 7.5. The same applies to an element that is neither an Entry nor a SignedHead. When the first element is unusable, the file is rejected. When an entry is discarded, the entries after it fail verification.¶
Other serializations MAY be defined, for example one in CBOR. A serialization MUST map every structure to the JSON data model without loss, because hashes are computed over the canonical JSON form (Section 7.1).¶
A record that verifies as consistent has entries that agree with one another and with the header. Consistency alone does not show who wrote the record or that nothing was replaced. Anyone who holds a record without a signed head can change an event and recompute every later hash.¶
A signed head limits this. Take a party without the signing key that changes the seq, time, or event of an entry at or before the head. The head stays valid only when the change is a redaction, the restoring of a redacted event, or a truncation (Section 10.3). After any other such change, a verifier that trusts the key reports the record as inconsistent, or as unauthenticated when the head was removed as well.¶
Neither property shows that events took place as recorded. A producer can write an event that is false. Verification establishes at most that the signed entries were not changed by a party without the key.¶
No hash covers title, description, or event_schemas. The same holds for a member that this document does not define, unless it sits in a header, an event, or a head. A reader cannot rely on those values.¶
A holder can remove the latest entries of a record together with any signed head that covers them. What remains verifies. A verifier detects the removal only if it knows a later head from another source. This document defines no way to exchange heads.¶
Any holder can redact an event or truncate a record, and the result still verifies. A verifier reports which entries are redacted and whether the record is truncated. What the missing events said, and who removed them, stays unknown to the verifier.¶
A reader that draws a conclusion from the absence of an event SHOULD treat each redacted or removed entry as a possible instance of that event. A redacted entry inside an activity may have been a scaffold. A redacted or removed entry may have been a withdrawal of consent.¶
The producer holds the signing key, so it can rewrite a record and sign a new head. Detection requires that another party received a head before the rewrite. A time stamping authority [RFC3161] can provide evidence that a head existed before a given time. This document does not define how to use one. The time of a head is a statement by the signer and proves nothing about when the head was signed.¶
A signature that verifies shows that the holder of a trusted key signed a head. Any trusted key authenticates any record. A verifier that trusts the keys of several producers needs to know which producer each key belongs to. The result of verification names the key for that purpose.¶
A signature shows that the holder of a key signed a head. When the producer runs on a device that the learner controls, the learner may control the key. A verifier needs to know where signing took place before it treats a record as evidence about that learner.¶
An event can have few possible values. Without a salt, a party could hash each candidate and compare the result with event_hash. The salt prevents this only if it is unpredictable and is deleted with the event. A producer MUST NOT reuse a salt and MUST NOT derive one from the content of the event.¶
The position and time of a redacted entry stay visible, as do the entries around it. Together they can suggest what was removed.¶
Members named content_hash and config_hash carry no salt. A party can test a guess at a short or predictable text against such a hash. Redaction of the event removes these members with it.¶
A hash covers the name of an event. No hash covers event_schemas, the list that ties a namespace to a schema URI. For a registered namespace (Section 12.3), the name alone identifies the schema. For any other namespace, a holder can replace the URI in the list, and with it the apparent meaning of the events. A reader that depends on such events needs to know the schemas of the producer from another source.¶
The integrity of a record rests on the collision resistance of the hash algorithm. A checksum or any other function that is not a cryptographic hash MUST NOT be used.¶
All hashes in a record use one algorithm, so a record cannot move to another. A producer that needs a new algorithm starts a new record.¶
Two parsers that read the same text differently can disagree about a hash, or agree about a hash while they hold different values. Sections 4, 6, and 8.2 of [RFC8259] describe three such cases: member names that are not unique, numbers beyond the range or precision of a double, and strings with unpaired surrogates. The rules in Section 7.1 address these cases, and step 1 of Section 7.5 applies them before any hash is computed.¶
A log file can come from a source that is not trusted. Implementations need limits on file size, nesting depth, and string length.¶
A record describes the behavior of a person in detail, and that person can be a child. The considerations of [RFC6973] apply. This section covers points that are specific to this format.¶
The subject member, and the id member of a party that is a person, MUST NOT hold a name, an email address, or an identifier taken from another system, such as a student number.¶
A RECOMMENDED construction is HMAC [RFC2104] with SHA-256 over the internal identifier, under a secret key that the producer keeps, with at least 128 bits of the output retained. A hash without a key is not sufficient, because identifiers can be guessed and hashed.¶
The subject identifier is part of the header and stays fixed for the life of a record. Every party that receives the record sees the same identifier and can link the record to other copies.¶
A record can describe instructors, peers, and guardians, and a dialog event can hold their words. The data is then about them as well. Their identifiers follow Section 11.1.¶
Redaction removes the content of an event. The entry remains and shows that something happened at that time. Copies of the content in other events, or outside the record, are not affected.¶
The event_hash of a redacted entry remains as well. A party that kept a copy of the event can still show that the event belonged to the record. Truncation or deletion of the record removes that hash.¶
Redaction may not be enough after consent is withdrawn. Truncation or deletion of the record removes more. Unless it is redacted or removed, the consent:withdrawn event remains in the record as the trace of the withdrawal.¶
The actions and times in a record can be combined with other data about a person. Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 of [RFC6973] describe how such correlation can lead to identification. A record SHOULD be treated as personal data whatever identifiers it carries.¶
The kid of a signed head is the same in every record signed with one key. A key that serves one learner or one device links the records of that learner, whatever their subject identifiers. A key that serves a whole deployment does not.¶
Records SHOULD be encrypted in transit and at rest. Access to them SHOULD be controlled and logged. A holder SHOULD set a retention period.¶
IANA is requested to register the following in the "IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol Parameter Identifiers" registry [RFC3553]:¶
IANA is requested to create the "learnlog File Schema URIs" registry at https://www.iana.org/assignments/learnlog. The registration policy is Expert Review [RFC8126]. The expert checks that the URI has the form given in Section 3.3 and that a public specification defines the file schema. An entry holds a file schema URI, a description, and a reference. The initial entries are:¶
IANA is requested to create the "learnlog Event Schema URIs" registry at the same location. The registration policy is Expert Review [RFC8126]. The expert checks the following:¶
An entry holds an event schema URI, a namespace, the event types, a description, and a reference. The initial entries are:¶
IANA is requested to register the following media types [RFC6838].¶
This appendix shows one record in full. Every hash in it can be recomputed from the text of this document.¶
The example uses a private event schema with the namespace sim and the URI https://example.org/102026/sim. It defines two event types for a simulation.¶
SimPredictionCommitted = {
prediction: text,
? confidence: "guess" / "fairly_sure" / "certain",
* $$sim-prediction-committed-extension
}
SimExplanationFiled = {
explanation: text,
* $$sim-explanation-filed-extension
}
$Event /= event-type<"sim:prediction_committed",
SimPredictionCommitted>
$Event /= event-type<"sim:explanation_filed", SimExplanationFiled>
The file in Figure 20 holds one record with eight entries and one signed head. Entry 4 is a hint from a tutoring system. Entries 5 and 6 are an exchange with an AI chat assistant. Entry 7 is a spoken hint from a teacher, transcribed by software.¶
The content_hash and config_hash values are hashes of the texts in Table 3. Each text is one line, with single spaces between words and no line ending.¶
| Entry | Member | Text |
|---|---|---|
| 4 | content_hash | Look for a number that divides both 12 and 16. |
| 4 | config_hash | example tutor configuration 7 |
| 6 | content_hash | Simplifying a ratio means dividing both parts by the same number. |
| 6 | config_hash | example chat configuration 3 |
The explanation in entry 8 holds the character U+00BE, written in the figure as an escape. In the canonical form, that character is the two octets C2 BE.¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{
"file_schema": "urn:ietf:params:learnlog:file:contained",
"serialization_format": "application/learnlog+json",
"title": "Example record",
"records": [
{
"header": {
"record_id": "66a921d7-55be-4589-afcc-84ea4d2c26ef",
"subject": "L-fdda6e0e3413590a303a3737d4176389",
"hash_alg": "sha-256",
"created": "2026-10-07T14:00:00Z",
"producer": {"name": "example-sim", "version": "1.4.0"}
},
"event_schemas": [
"urn:ietf:params:learnlog:events:consent",
"urn:ietf:params:learnlog:events:assist",
"urn:ietf:params:learnlog:events:dialog",
"https://example.org/102026/sim"
],
"entries": [
{
"seq": 1,
"time": "2026-10-07T14:00:05Z",
"event": {
"name": "consent:granted",
"salt": "SUe3daeuE7ZsSfKRHA9RkQ",
"actor": {"role": "guardian", "kind": "human"},
"data": {"scopes": ["instruction", "research"]}
},
"event_hash": "0e144a6edfb39ded22fab2dba4f60a69dc9fc72cdfe\
7006ab78001e5ac11deef",
"prev_hash": "dcfc869849b6088bb8cba0761987f4fa90a181335e20\
a95b120bb0e8dfcd5556",
"entry_hash": "ff3f6b48ed7a77379e68a08f6a0c2bfa71bdc757671\
ceb88d905e5d307638433"
},
{
"seq": 2,
"time": "2026-10-07T14:01:10Z",
"event": {
"name": "sim:prediction_committed",
"salt": "yqUo0sZAN2gYAhADsPJjKw",
"session": "s-01",
"activity": {
"id": "https://example.org/activities/ratio-mixing",
"version": "2.0",
"variant": "seed-8675309"
},
"data": {
"prediction": "3:4",
"confidence": "fairly_sure"
}
},
"event_hash": "1b878146c3e51d20d0411979dc7fbac81da5fd08846\
9a725b9afcf8395c2a518",
"prev_hash": "ff3f6b48ed7a77379e68a08f6a0c2bfa71bdc757671c\
eb88d905e5d307638433",
"entry_hash": "ac64c6867336279286d1837e60312b56b106978d648\
db62360f211306d65b6e5"
},
{
"seq": 3,
"time": "2026-10-07T14:01:42Z",
"event": {
"name": "assist:help_requested",
"salt": "eKmBaP2uRROEiC4HVbWZfA",
"to": {
"role": "instructor",
"kind": "software",
"id": "example-tutor"
},
"session": "s-01",
"activity": {
"id": "https://example.org/activities/ratio-mixing",
"version": "2.0",
"variant": "seed-8675309"
},
"data": {"type": "hint"}
},
"event_hash": "5485100233e98c7bca12183cf9f9da23ee91f8bb029\
d82e46ddab320661cc51b",
"prev_hash": "ac64c6867336279286d1837e60312b56b106978d648d\
b62360f211306d65b6e5",
"entry_hash": "afa914e1952ca0d6878b901e32279a09f1462f252df\
b3f289ea846c63b048e06"
},
{
"seq": 4,
"time": "2026-10-07T14:01:43.200Z",
"event": {
"name": "assist:scaffold_provided",
"salt": "DgQiQwSuZLoHwnBLIox60g",
"actor": {
"role": "instructor",
"kind": "software",
"id": "example-tutor"
},
"session": "s-01",
"activity": {
"id": "https://example.org/activities/ratio-mixing",
"version": "2.0",
"variant": "seed-8675309"
},
"instrument": {
"source": "model",
"model": "example-tutor-2026-09",
"config_hash": "c9f3b7ca43165de9e1df7bc7ec6cff14e7498d\
a4250a6df8e8f1885a9b4aeea8",
"parameters": {"temperature": 0.2}
},
"data": {
"type": "hint",
"request": 3,
"level": 1,
"reveals_answer": false,
"content_hash": "86c2216ed616d2d0097475056db432d1f9f76\
e1ac5e712742157a3fe64ded70d"
}
},
"event_hash": "b4bd1e82ee9019fb8ece8ab96192a64fdc953fc9ab2\
7b2d046664ac8525cc789",
"prev_hash": "afa914e1952ca0d6878b901e32279a09f1462f252dfb\
3f289ea846c63b048e06",
"entry_hash": "3b8fb5a69bc9701329888b081538f1cc243a2fadb14\
8f6fc2f619de4f7671f61"
},
{
"seq": 5,
"time": "2026-10-07T14:02:30Z",
"event": {
"name": "dialog:message",
"salt": "HySIGmOXiD_e0G3jppGMVg",
"to": {
"role": "assistant",
"kind": "software",
"id": "example-chat"
},
"session": "s-01",
"activity": {
"id": "https://example.org/activities/ratio-mixing",
"version": "2.0",
"variant": "seed-8675309"
},
"data": {
"modality": "text",
"content": "What does simplifying a ratio mean?"
}
},
"event_hash": "a83a6d085d8ae61dfe3b3783ecaea3c51d52588d7a4\
c2182245236b2b0b7d2dd",
"prev_hash": "3b8fb5a69bc9701329888b081538f1cc243a2fadb148\
f6fc2f619de4f7671f61",
"entry_hash": "4cf6025ac1e0aa85ed8a9f1e3c678f544a73319d1e0\
8eecb3fbe6ae695b65a2d"
},
{
"seq": 6,
"time": "2026-10-07T14:02:33.500Z",
"event": {
"name": "dialog:message",
"salt": "wf_VFXE_2WNouptIJguFuQ",
"actor": {
"role": "assistant",
"kind": "software",
"id": "example-chat"
},
"session": "s-01",
"activity": {
"id": "https://example.org/activities/ratio-mixing",
"version": "2.0",
"variant": "seed-8675309"
},
"instrument": {
"source": "model",
"model": "example-chat-2026-08",
"config_hash": "fcfd5153bc5c0d1f52417f66ab078c749eb21f\
4cebb5504cf274821a79a17aa5"
},
"data": {
"modality": "text",
"reply_to": 5,
"content_hash": "fb4ede48d160a985aeca77af68fcc7abdc3af\
cdbff6781574146ecd02c2b45ed"
}
},
"event_hash": "0d8d14d15cb3a606a857e86fc4fbe838a9ec11dfa3e\
bdb73a5eef53bbb96d4c9",
"prev_hash": "4cf6025ac1e0aa85ed8a9f1e3c678f544a73319d1e08\
eecb3fbe6ae695b65a2d",
"entry_hash": "43f068599a10f02217bc7287ca082d99818aa1fd92f\
a3e12115cf1a7d5bfc23b"
},
{
"seq": 7,
"time": "2026-10-07T14:03:05Z",
"event": {
"name": "assist:scaffold_provided",
"salt": "lMgpY68f-AMZ-mEMbfR3cg",
"actor": {
"role": "instructor",
"kind": "human",
"id": "T-c1a8a3a416c9098d21b2baf451464304"
},
"session": "s-01",
"activity": {
"id": "https://example.org/activities/ratio-mixing",
"version": "2.0",
"variant": "seed-8675309"
},
"instrument": {
"source": "model",
"model": "example-transcriber-1"
},
"data": {
"type": "hint",
"level": 2,
"reveals_answer": false,
"modality": "speech",
"content": "Try it with the smaller numbers first."
}
},
"event_hash": "3e305baf5a3fad47f1e9c3d412d799fdd18926ff159\
169a26034af74e6214f91",
"prev_hash": "43f068599a10f02217bc7287ca082d99818aa1fd92fa\
3e12115cf1a7d5bfc23b",
"entry_hash": "4a0646f97bb877a347b7ba98eb6d1a7d9e0e3e0978e\
d5706b0e07b7ef6ec4668"
},
{
"seq": 8,
"time": "2026-10-07T14:04:20Z",
"event": {
"name": "sim:explanation_filed",
"salt": "y0_vEXCW8JNMCBA0MnLr2w",
"session": "s-01",
"activity": {
"id": "https://example.org/activities/ratio-mixing",
"version": "2.0",
"variant": "seed-8675309"
},
"data": {
"explanation": "12 out of 16 is \u00be. Both divide b\
y 4."
}
},
"event_hash": "3689aa3e1f8fdea9494f10a9607ffd84db805ad0475\
f57077129a34cd8ebb5d0",
"prev_hash": "4a0646f97bb877a347b7ba98eb6d1a7d9e0e3e0978ed\
5706b0e07b7ef6ec4668",
"entry_hash": "d2b47063f53bcce905ef687c5f7f1c3f008078d0a3e\
ece78d2bc54bf8c1ca5b5"
}
],
"signed_heads": [
{
"head": {
"record_hash": "dcfc869849b6088bb8cba0761987f4fa90a18133\
5e20a95b120bb0e8dfcd5556",
"seq": 8,
"entry_hash": "d2b47063f53bcce905ef687c5f7f1c3f008078d0a\
3eece78d2bc54bf8c1ca5b5",
"time": "2026-10-07T14:04:21Z"
},
"signature": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IkNPSWFUYTctOFoz\
VElOYmhBOFJjczZmcjAyWlRERzExMzM3MVQzR01aUlUifQ..9SbLqNvt-_gfXkz4sYqC\
znBecvxy1YojXXOujGN2pdy5jJ7IZOOw37pxBsrdjr7K4p52Rqlo4va5MGFbP5vVWg"
}
]
}
]
}
The canonical form of the header is:¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{"created":"2026-10-07T14:00:00Z","hash_alg":"sha-256","producer":{"\
name":"example-sim","version":"1.4.0"},"record_id":"66a921d7-55be-45\
89-afcc-84ea4d2c26ef","subject":"L-fdda6e0e3413590a303a3737d4176389"}
¶
Its SHA-256 hash is the record hash, which is also the prev_hash of entry 1:¶
dcfc869849b6088bb8cba0761987f4fa90a181335e20a95b120bb0e8dfcd5556¶
The canonical form of the event in entry 2 is:¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{"activity":{"id":"https://example.org/activities/ratio-mixing","var\
iant":"seed-8675309","version":"2.0"},"data":{"confidence":"fairly_s\
ure","prediction":"3:4"},"name":"sim:prediction_committed","salt":"y\
qUo0sZAN2gYAhADsPJjKw","session":"s-01"}
¶
Its hash is the event_hash of entry 2:¶
1b878146c3e51d20d0411979dc7fbac81da5fd088469a725b9afcf8395c2a518¶
The canonical form of the object that is hashed for entry 2 is:¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{"event_hash":"1b878146c3e51d20d0411979dc7fbac81da5fd088469a725b9afc\
f8395c2a518","prev_hash":"ff3f6b48ed7a77379e68a08f6a0c2bfa71bdc75767\
1ceb88d905e5d307638433","record_hash":"dcfc869849b6088bb8cba0761987f\
4fa90a181335e20a95b120bb0e8dfcd5556","seq":2,"time":"2026-10-07T14:0\
1:10Z"}
¶
Its hash is the entry_hash of entry 2:¶
ac64c6867336279286d1837e60312b56b106978d648db62360f211306d65b6e5¶
The head was signed with the private key that matches this public key:¶
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "hLOF5epJKOENr_YLdw3iuvlSeuuUdVewL1BqcNtOKYw",
"y": "PwQdWqmdT3_EOKIQvttI8kFeZLUePMifTFD5CpM-1WY"
}
¶
The JWK Thumbprint of the key, used as kid, is:¶
COIaTa7-8Z3TINbhA8Rcs6fr02ZTDG113371T3GMZRU¶
The protected header is:¶
{"alg":"ES256","kid":"COIaTa7-8Z3TINbhA8Rcs6fr02ZTDG113371T3GMZRU"}
¶
The JWS payload is the canonical form of the head:¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{"entry_hash":"d2b47063f53bcce905ef687c5f7f1c3f008078d0a3eece78d2bc5\
4bf8c1ca5b5","record_hash":"dcfc869849b6088bb8cba0761987f4fa90a18133\
5e20a95b120bb0e8dfcd5556","seq":8,"time":"2026-10-07T14:04:21Z"}
¶
The value of signature in the file is:¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IkNPSWFUYTctOFozVElOYmhBOFJjczZmcjAyWlRE\ RzExMzM3MVQzR01aUlUifQ..9SbLqNvt-_gfXkz4sYqCznBecvxy1YojXXOujGN2pdy5\ jJ7IZOOw37pxBsrdjr7K4p52Rqlo4va5MGFbP5vVWg¶
The private key is not given here, so an implementation cannot reproduce this value. The value can be verified with the public key above.¶
After entry 8 is redacted, it reads as shown below. Every hash in the record and the signed head verify as before.¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{
"seq": 8,
"time": "2026-10-07T14:04:20Z",
"redacted": true,
"event_hash": "3689aa3e1f8fdea9494f10a9607ffd84db805ad0475f5707712\
9a34cd8ebb5d0",
"prev_hash": "4a0646f97bb877a347b7ba98eb6d1a7d9e0e3e0978ed5706b0e0\
7b7ef6ec4668",
"entry_hash": "d2b47063f53bcce905ef687c5f7f1c3f008078d0a3eece78d2b\
c54bf8c1ca5b5"
}
¶
If entries 1 to 5 are removed from the original record instead, the record gains the member shown below and its first remaining entry is entry 6. The signed head still verifies.¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{
"truncated": {
"seq": 5,
"entry_hash": "4cf6025ac1e0aa85ed8a9f1e3c678f544a73319d1e08eecb3\
fbe6ae695b65a2d"
}
}
¶
The record above has few values that separate the canonical form of [RFC8785] from other compact JSON output with sorted member names. The JSON text in Figure 21 has more of them. It holds numbers in several spellings, a control character, and two member names whose order by UTF-16 code unit differs from their order by code point.¶
{
"numbers": [1e21, 1.0, 0.000001, 1e-7, -0, 0.2, 4.50, 2E-3,
333333333.33333329],
"string": "\u000f\u00be/\"\\\n",
"\ud83d\ude00": 1,
"\ufb33": 2,
"a": null,
"A": true
}
In the canonical form, the member names appear in the order A, a, numbers, string, U+1F600, U+FB33. The numbers appear as 1e+21, 1, 0.000001, 1e-7, 0, 0.2, 4.5, 0.002, and 333333333.3333333. The canonical form has 131 octets, shown here in hexadecimal:¶
7b 22 41 22 3a 74 72 75 65 2c 22 61 22 3a 6e 75 6c 6c 2c 22 6e 75 6d 62 65 72 73 22 3a 5b 31 65 2b 32 31 2c 31 2c 30 2e 30 30 30 30 30 31 2c 31 65 2d 37 2c 30 2c 30 2e 32 2c 34 2e 35 2c 30 2e 30 30 32 2c 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 2e 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 5d 2c 22 73 74 72 69 6e 67 22 3a 22 5c 75 30 30 30 66 c2 be 2f 5c 22 5c 5c 5c 6e 22 2c 22 f0 9f 98 80 22 3a 31 2c 22 ef ac b3 22 3a 32 7d¶
The SHA-256 hash of those octets is:¶
afbc268398163c4f856a4d881d1eb85ba85b85e609c8473a11ebaf56cf28a0d1¶
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
This section records the status of known implementations at the time of writing, as described in [RFC7942].¶
qlm-measure version 0.7.0 (Quantum Learning Machines; TypeScript and Python; Apache 2.0 license; https://github.com/QuantumLearningMachines/qlm-measure) writes and verifies records that it labels schema 0.3. This document was derived from that format. Both chain entries by hash and allow an event to be redacted. Both place consent events in the chain. The differences are:¶
seq and prev_hash.¶
Quantum Learning Machines plans to extend qlm-measure so that it writes records in the format of this document.¶
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
session and activity. Section 7.5 of [QLOG] lets a trace state such values once, as common fields. An equivalent here would have to fit the rule that each event is hashed by itself.¶
content_hash and config_hash members carry no salt (Section 10.7).¶