ADRP: Agent Dispute Resolution Protocol

1.1. 1.1 The Problem

Conduit and similar cryptographic browser-automation verifiers produce SHA-256 hash-chained audit trails of agent task delivery. The proof bundles they produce are self-verifiable: any third party can replay the chain and confirm the recorded events occurred in the recorded order with the recorded signatures.¶

This is necessary but not sufficient.¶

A proof bundle attests that an agent took actions X, Y, and Z. It does not attest that X, Y, and Z satisfied the principal's Intent Mandate. Empirical data from Kleros (~40% of decentralized arbitration cases turn on spec ambiguity, not on whether action occurred) and from Upwork, Stripe Connect, and eBay (auto-resolve ceilings of 60-95% with all systems hitting walls below 95%) demonstrates that cryptographic proof of execution does not eliminate disputes — it relocates them to spec interpretation.¶

ADRP addresses the relocated dispute surface without breaking the cryptographic substrate.¶

1.2. 1.2 What ADRP Defines

A five-layer protocol stacked on the existing Conduit + AP2 + ATXN stack:¶

Layer 5: Precedent corpus (signed RulingBundles indexed by Cart Mandate template hash)
Layer 4: Tier router (L1 atomic / L2 mandated / L3 fiduciary)
Layer 3: Resolution engine (cryptographic-class auto, semantic-class arbitration)
Layer 2: Counter-attestation primitive (append-only override of Conduit ProofBundle)
Layer 1: Arbitration Mandate (4th AP2 mandate, FAA §2 written agreement)

1.3. 1.3 What ADRP Deliberately Does NOT Do

• ADRP does not modify the Conduit ProofBundle. Override is a verification-time precedence rule, not a write.¶

• ADRP does not grant agents independent dispute standing. Standing belongs to principals only.¶

• ADRP does not require statutory change. The Arbitration Mandate is the FAA §2 anchor.¶

• ADRP does not specify how acceptance criteria are authored. The accompanying NLP-to-checks helper is normative for v0.1 deployment but its internals are out of scope.¶

• ADRP does not promise >90% auto-resolution. That is a deployment-conditional target, not a protocol property. See Section 19.1.¶

1.4. 1.4 Design Tenets

• Bifurcation. Cryptographic and semantic disputes are different problems and require different paths.¶

• Append-only override. The hash chain is never mutated; "override" is a precedence rule applied at verification time.¶

• Principal-only standing. Agents flag; only principals file. Preserves the A2A executor-not-party model.¶

• Time-windowed default-resolution. Silence equals approval; default-resolution does most of the work.¶

• Economic friction on filing. Non-refundable filing fee deters spam without triggering securities classification.¶

• No tokenized stake. Filing fees are USD-denominated, non-refundable to the filer, refundable to the prevailing party. They are not securities under Howey.¶

• Pre-committed arbiter. The arbitration pool is named in the Arbitration Mandate at agent-deployment time, not selected post-hoc.¶

• Curated pool for v0.1. Decentralized token-staked pools deferred to v0.2 pending legal review.¶

• US-only B2B for v0.1. Cross-border, consumer, and PSD2/Reg E scope deferred to later versions.¶

4.1. 4.1 Purpose

The Arbitration Mandate records consent, forum, governing-law, fee, and tier parameters in a machine-verifiable form. It is designed to support enforceability under applicable arbitration law, but ADRP does not determine whether a particular mandate is legally enforceable. Deployments SHOULD obtain jurisdiction-specific legal review.¶

4.2. 4.2 Required Fields

4.3. 4.3 Anchoring

The Arbitration Mandate's SHA-256 hash MUST be referenced in the principal's Standing Token (per ATXN Section 4) under a new field arb_mandate_hash. A Standing Token without an anchored Arbitration Mandate hash MUST NOT participate in an L2 or L3 ATXN Bundle.¶

4.4. 4.4 Mutability

The Arbitration Mandate MAY be replaced by the principal at any time, but the replacement MUST NOT apply retroactively to in-flight Bundles. In-flight Bundles MUST be resolved under the Arbitration Mandate that was anchored in the Standing Token at Bundle-authorization time.¶

5.1. 5.1 Parties

The parties to any ADRP dispute are always principal-A and principal-B. Never agents. This preserves the A2A executor-not-party model from UETA §14 and Restatement (Third) of Agency.¶

5.2. 5.2 Agent Flag Rights

Agents MAY emit DisputeFlags — advisory, low-cost (≤1 KB JSON), signed by the agent's Standing Token. A DisputeFlag is non-binding and does not initiate the dispute state machine. It alerts the principal that the agent has detected an anomaly worthy of principal attention.¶

5.3. 5.3 Principal File Rights

Only principals MAY emit DisputeFilings — binding, fee-posting, claim-coded events that initiate the dispute state machine. A DisputeFiling MAY reference a prior DisputeFlag via a flag_ref field, but a flag is not required.¶

5.4. 5.4 Flag Expiration

A DisputeFlag expires if not ratified by the principal (via DisputeFiling that references it, or via explicit dismissal) within the tier-specific ratification window:¶

After expiration, the flag is preserved in the audit log but cannot anchor a DisputeFiling.¶

5.5. 5.5 Pre-Authorized Dispute Delegate

A principal MAY pre-authorize a dispute delegate (e.g., a fractional general counsel, an enterprise compliance team) via a delegation field in the Arbitration Mandate. The delegate's filings are treated as principal-filed for standing purposes.¶

6.1. 6.1 Cryptographic-Class Disputes

Resolved by code from (DisputeBundle, RulingBundle, Standing Token chain) without arbitration.¶

A cryptographic-class dispute MUST NOT be routed to arbitration. It is resolved by verify_resolution and emits an EscrowDirective directly.¶

6.2. 6.2 Semantic-Class Disputes

Resolved by arbitration against the Cart Mandate's acceptance criteria.¶

A semantic-class dispute MUST be routed to the arbitrator pool named in the Arbitration Mandate.¶

6.3. 6.3 Classification

The DisputeFiling's claim_code field declares the class. ADRP verifiers MUST validate that the declared class matches the evidence — a filing claiming bundle_integrity (cryptographic) but providing only natural-language complaints (semantic) MUST be reclassified or rejected.¶

6.4. 6.4 Out of Scope (v0.1)

Three classes from the ATXN dispute taxonomy are explicitly out of scope for ADRP v0.1:¶

7.1. 7.1 Invariant

The Conduit ProofBundle's tip hash H_c is never modified. No byte of the original ProofBundle is rewritten. Override is a verification-time precedence rule applied to the chain, not a mutation.¶

7.2. 7.2 RulingBundle Structure

R = {
  type: "RulingBundle",
  supersedes: H_c,                  // points at, does not replace
  dispute_chain_tip: H_d,
  verdict: "release" | "refund" | "partial",
  partial_split: { to_buyer: 0.30, to_seller: 0.70 },  // if verdict == "partial"
  rationale_hash: H_rationale,
  arbitrator_did: "did:web:...",
  arbitrator_vc_hash: H_vc,         // proves authorized at signing_time
  signing_time: "<RFC3339>",
  prev_hash: H_d
}
sig = Ed25519(arbitrator_priv, JCS(R))

7.3. 7.3 Verification Rule

The latest valid RulingBundle (by signing_time) whose supersedes equals the underlying ProofBundle's tip hash AND whose signing arbitrator was authorized at signing_time, with chain integrity verified, is the verification winner.¶

Both H_c and R are preserved forever. "Override" is the precedence rule, not a mutation.¶

7.4. 7.4 Why This Works

• Hash-chain immutability is preserved — no ProofBundle bytes are rewritten.¶

• Verification is offline and deterministic — any third party can run verify_resolution and reach the same EscrowDirective.¶

• Arbitrator authority is anchored to signing_time, not to verification time — so a later-revoked arbitrator's prior valid ruling remains valid.¶

• The chain becomes a precedent corpus indexed by Cart Mandate template hash (Section 15).¶

8.1. 8.1 Message Types

ADRP defines six wire message types:¶

8.2. 8.2 Common Message Envelope

Every ADRP message MUST include:¶

{
  "msg_type": "<one of the six>",
  "msg_id": "<UUID>",
  "prev_hash": "<SHA-256 of prior chain event>",
  "submitter_did": "<DID>",
  "submitter_signature": "<Ed25519 base64 over JCS of preceding fields>",
  "timestamp": "<RFC3339>",
  "payload": { ... type-specific ... }
}

8.3. 8.3 Canonicalization

All signatures MUST be over the JCS (RFC 8785) canonicalization of the signed object minus the signature field itself.¶

9.1. 9.1 States

Pre-FILED:    FLAGGED         (agent-emitted; expires if not ratified)
              FILED           (principal-emitted; fee posted)
                ↓
              ASSIGNED        (arbitrator bound to dispute)
                ↓
              EVIDENCE_OPEN   (parties submit evidence)
                ↓
              UNDER_REVIEW    (arbitrator deliberating)
                ↓
              RULED           (RulingBundle signed)
                ↓
              SETTLED         (EscrowDirective consumed by payment rail)

Terminal:     WITHDRAWN       (filer withdraws; fee partial-refunded)
              EXPIRED         (filing or evidence window expired)

9.2. 9.2 Invariants

10.1. 10.1 Tier Routing

Tier is determined by the ATXN Bundle's Tier (per ATXN Section 5) AND by the transaction value relative to the max_txn_auto_arb ceiling. A Bundle declared L2 with transaction value > $1,000 MUST auto-escalate to L3.¶

10.2. 10.2 Action on SLA Miss

An SLA miss MUST NOT silently create a merits ruling. The Arbitration Mandate MUST declare a default_action. The RECOMMENDED value is hold_and_reassign, which preserves escrow and assigns a fallback panel. A mandate MAY select refund, release, or another profile-defined action when the parties explicitly pre-commit to that consequence.¶

This avoids turning arbitrator unavailability or denial-of-service into an automatic transfer of funds.¶

11.1. 11.1 Required Field

The Cart Mandate (existing AP2 element) MUST contain a new field:¶

"acceptance_criteria": {
  "schema_version": "1",
  "checks": [
    { "type": "regex", "selector": "$.output", "pattern": "..." },
    { "type": "json_schema", "selector": "$.deliverable", "schema": { ... } },
    { "type": "deterministic_function", "function_hash": "sha256:..." },
    { "type": "human_review_required", "reason": "..." }
  ],
  "default_window_hours": 72,
  "silence_equals": "release"
}

11.2. 11.2 Check Types

11.3. 11.3 Conduit Attestation Against Checks

Conduit attests against acceptance_criteria.checks at delivery time. If all checks pass deterministically, the dispute path auto-resolves cryptographically. If checks include human_review_required OR are missing, dispute auto-routes to L2 semantic arbitration.¶

11.4. 11.4 The Authoring Helper (Normative for Deployment)

A natural-language-to-checks helper that converts a principal's English-language description into machine-checkable predicates is REQUIRED for v0.1 deployment. Its internals are out of scope for this specification, but its presence is normative: an ADRP deployment without a viable authoring helper will fail the >50% auto-resolution threshold and the protocol's unit economics will collapse on sub-$10 transactions.¶

This is the load-bearing operational dependency surfaced in the synthesis as the EpistemicAuditor / Archaeologist dissent.¶

12.1. 12.1 v0.1: Curated Pool

v0.1 ships with a SwarmSync-curated arbitrator pool — a centralized list of vetted human-or-model arbitrators registered as DIDs in TRUSTED_REGISTRIES. The pool is published at a stable URI referenced by every Arbitration Mandate.¶

12.2. 12.2 Selection Algorithm

Arbitrator selection MUST use a verifiable random function (VRF) seeded by the DisputeFiling's hash. The VRF output indexes into the curated pool. This produces deterministic-but-unpredictable selection — neither party can choose the arbitrator, but any third party can verify the selection was unbiased.¶

12.3. 12.3 Pool Composition

12.4. 12.4 Arbitrator Credentialing

Every arbitrator MUST hold a Verifiable Credential issued by a trusted registry that:¶

• Names the arbitrator's DID;¶

• States the arbitrator's valid_from and valid_until timestamps;¶

• Names the arbitrator's qualifications (jurisdictional bar membership for L3 humans; model card + provenance for L2 AI panels);¶

• Is signed by a registry in TRUSTED_REGISTRIES.¶

12.5. 12.5 v0.2 Roadmap

Decentralized stake-weighted arbitrator pools are deferred to v0.2 pending legal review on securities classification, jurisdictional enforceability, and Sybil resistance.¶

13.1. 13.1 Fee Structure

13.2. 13.2 Why Not a Tokenized Stake

The fee is designed as a non-transferable, USD-denominated filing charge rather than a tokenized investment stake. ADRP makes no determination about securities, payments, money-transmission, tax, or consumer-law classification; deployments MUST obtain applicable legal review.¶

13.3. 13.3 Slashing

Forfeited fees MAY fund the arbitrator pool and a public dispute-quality dataset.¶

13.4. 13.4 Arbitrator Compensation

Arbitrators are compensated 2% of transaction value (min $0.50) from the losing party's escrow. This sustains arbitrator economics on micro-disputes without additional protocol-level subsidy.¶

14.1. 14.1 Trigger

Either party MAY file an appeal within the tier-specific appeal window (12h L2, 48h L3). Appeals require a fresh filing fee at 1.5x the original rate.¶

14.2. 14.2 Appeal Panel

A 5-arbitrator panel (up from the original 3-arbitrator quorum) selected via VRF from a different pool slice than the original ruling. Quorum: 4 of 5.¶

14.3. 14.3 Finality

Appeal rulings are FINAL. There is no second appeal. Finality is a design feature.¶

14.4. 14.4 Appeal Override

An appeal RulingBundle supersedes the original RulingBundle by the same signing-time precedence rule (Section 7). Both the original ruling and the appeal ruling are preserved forever.¶

15.1. 15.1 Indexing

Every signed RulingBundle is content-addressed and indexed by:¶

• Cart Mandate template hash;¶

• Dispute claim_code;¶

• Verdict;¶

• Arbitrator DID;¶

• Signing time.¶

15.2. 15.2 Citation Requirement

Future arbitrators MUST query the precedent corpus for prior rulings on similar Cart Mandate templates and either CITE or DISTINGUISH them in their RulingBundle's rationale_hash content.¶

15.3. 15.3 v0.1 vs v0.2

v0.1 ships the data layer (signed rulings, indexed, queryable by hash). v0.2 ships the search and citation infrastructure (semantic search, similarity scoring, citation graph). A pre-v0.1 commitment per the RemixForge dissent: ship the data-collection pipeline in v0.1 even if productized search is deferred. Otherwise the corpus accumulates in a schema that requires breaking changes.¶

16.1. 16.1 The verify_resolution Function

Any third party, given (DisputeBundle, RulingBundle), MUST be able to run verify_resolution offline and deterministically derive the same EscrowDirective.¶

def verify_resolution(db: DisputeBundle, rb: RulingBundle) -> Result:
    # 1. Anchor checks
    assert db.conduit_proof_ref == rb.supersedes
    assert rb.prev_hash == db.chain_tip

    # 2. Chain integrity
    h = db.conduit_proof_ref
    for ev in [db.filing, *db.evidence_chain, db.arbitrator_assignment]:
        assert ev.prev_hash == h
        assert verify_sig(ev.submitter_did, ev.sig, jcs(ev))
        h = sha256(jcs(ev))
    assert h == db.chain_tip

    # 3. Arbitrator authority at signing_time (not now)
    vc = fetch_vc(rb.arbitrator_vc_hash)
    assert vc.subject == rb.arbitrator_did
    assert vc.issuer in TRUSTED_REGISTRIES
    assert vc.valid_from <= rb.signing_time <= vc.valid_until
    assert verify_sig(vc.issuer, vc.sig, jcs(vc))

    # 4. Ruling signature
    assert verify_sig(rb.arbitrator_did, rb.sig, jcs(rb_minus_sig))

    # 5. Verdict well-formed
    assert rb.verdict in {"release", "refund", "partial"}
    if rb.verdict == "partial":
        assert sum(rb.partial_split.values()) == 1.0

    # 6. Derive directive
    return Result(valid=True, escrow_directive=EscrowDirective(
        payment_mandate_ref=db.payment_mandate_ref,
        action=rb.verdict,
        split=rb.partial_split,
        ruling_ref=sha256(jcs(rb))
    ))

16.2. 16.2 Determinism Requirement

Two honest verifiers given the same inputs MUST reach the same EscrowDirective. If they do not, the implementation is non-conformant.¶

16.3. 16.3 Offline Requirement

verify_resolution MUST be executable offline from the supplied evidence package. Any arbitrator credential, status proof, or registry snapshot needed for verification MUST be embedded in or content-addressed by the DisputeBundle. Implementations MAY refresh those artifacts online before verification, but the verification result MUST NOT depend on live network availability.¶

17.1. 17.1 Appeal as Re-Entry

An appeal is file_dispute with the prior_ruling_ref field set. No new SDK primitive is required.¶

17.2. 17.2 LOC Budget

Approximate breakdown:¶

17.3. 17.3 Golden Test Cases

A conformant SDK MUST pass the following test cases:¶

19.1. 19.1 The >90% Auto-Resolution Target Is NOT a Protocol Property

The most dangerous claim in any ADRP deployment is that >90% of disputes will auto-resolve. This is a deployment-conditional target, not a protocol property. It depends on whether principals author Cart Mandates with sufficient acceptance_criteria.checks coverage.¶

Empirical base rates (Kleros, eBay, Upwork, Mechanical Turk) cap auto-resolution at 60-95%, with all systems hitting walls below 95%. Kleros data shows ~40% of cases turn on spec ambiguity. Two formal dissents (Archaeologist, EpistemicAuditor) preserved verbatim in the synthesis assign probabilities of 35-45% and 25% respectively to the median Cart Mandate having sufficient acceptance criteria.¶

Implementations MUST:¶

• Ship a normative NLP-to-checks authoring helper as load-bearing infrastructure;¶

• Run a 90-day shadow-mode pilot before GA;¶

• Measure check-coverage and auto-resolution rate as primary metrics;¶

• Pivot to mandatory human_review_required flag if check coverage is <30% at day 30.¶

19.2. 19.2 The Bifurcation Seam

Adversaries will probe the seam between cryptographic-class and semantic-class disputes by filing claims structured as one but actually belonging to the other. The classification validation in Section 6.3 is REQUIRED, not optional. A non-validating implementation creates an attack surface that does not exist in unified-arbitration designs.¶

19.3. 19.3 Arbitrator Collusion

A 4-of-5 threshold is compromisable via collusion of 4 arbitrators. The VRF selection algorithm (Section 12.2) reduces but does not eliminate this risk. Mitigations:¶

• Diversify the curated pool across non-correlated risk profiles (operator, jurisdiction, model provider);¶

• Monitor for arbitrator-pair correlation in rulings;¶

• Periodically audit a random sample of rulings against an independent panel.¶

19.4. 19.4 Filing Fee as DoS Vector

A wealthy adversary can pay the filing fee repeatedly to harass a counterparty via dispute spam. Mitigations:¶

• Per-principal rate limit (max 0.5% of rolling 30-day transaction count);¶

• Frivolous slash (100% fee forfeit) accumulating to reputation impact in v0.2;¶

• Account suspension after N frivolous filings (operator policy).¶

19.5. 19.5 Standing Token Replay

A revoked Standing Token MUST NOT anchor a new DisputeFiling. Verifiers MUST check the Standing Token revocation list at filing time. Cached revocation lists with a Profile-specific TTL are acceptable.¶

19.6. 19.6 Time-Skew Attacks

The signing_time precedence rule (Section 7.3) is vulnerable to clock-skew attacks if any individual arbitrator can backdate a signature. Mitigations:¶

• Threshold-signature timestamps for L2 and L3 rulings (3-of-5 from a federated timestamping authority, per ATXN Section 9.3);¶

• Reject rulings with signing_time more than 5 minutes in the future relative to the verifier's clock.¶

19.7. 19.7 Jurisdictional Enforceability of the Arbitration Mandate

The Arbitration Mandate's legal effect depends on formation, assent, capacity, scope, governing law, and forum rules. Implementations SHOULD obtain a written legal opinion in each deployment jurisdiction and MUST NOT represent ADRP conformance as a guarantee that a court will compel arbitration.¶

19.8. 19.8 Sanctions Screening

Every party receiving funds via an EscrowDirective MUST be screened against OFAC and equivalent sanctions lists. ADRP defines no specific screening mechanism, but a non-screening implementation is non-conformant for US deployment.¶

19.9. 19.9 Principal Capacity Mid-Dispute

If a principal's capacity attestation expires or is revoked mid-dispute (e.g., sanctions added, corporate dissolution), the dispute MUST be halted and routed to a capacity_dispute (Section 6.4), bypassing ADRP's normal flow and defaulting to refund-to-buyer.¶

19.10. 19.10 Acknowledged Residual Risks

• Hallucinated mandates (a Cart Mandate the principal did not actually intend, generated by a compromised or LLM-confused operator): partially mitigated by L3 epistemic attestation per ATXN, unsolved for L1/L2.¶

• Adversarial sub-agency chains (deep delegation graphs that obscure the originating principal): bounded by sub_delegation_depth per ATXN; ADRP routes sub-agency disputes to the originating principal.¶

• Arbitrator pool capture (curated pool dominated by a single operator): mitigated by VRF selection but not eliminated; v0.2 decentralization is the long-term mitigation.¶

20.1. 20.1 ADRP JSON-LD Context

URI: https://swarmsync.ai/spec/adrp/v1¶

20.2. 20.2 ADRP Claim Code Registry

A new IANA registry "ADRP Claim Codes" is requested. Initial entries:¶

Registration policy: Specification Required (per RFC 8126).¶

20.3. 20.3 ADRP Verdict Enum

A new IANA registry "ADRP Verdicts" is requested. Initial entries:¶

20.4. 20.4 ADRP Trusted Registries List

A new IANA registry "ADRP Trusted Arbitrator Registries" is requested for the initial list of registries permitted to issue arbitrator Verifiable Credentials.¶

22.1. 22.1 Normative References

• [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.¶

• [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017.¶

• [RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, January 2017.¶

• [RFC8785] Rundgren, A., et al., "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, June 2020.¶

• [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, July 2002.¶

• [RFC8126] Cotton, M., et al., "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, June 2017.¶

• [W3C-VC-2.0] W3C, "Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0", https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/¶

• [W3C-DID] W3C, "Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0", https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/¶

• [draft-stone-atxn-01] Stone, B., "ATXN: Agent-to-Agent Transaction Definition Protocol", Internet-Draft, work in progress.¶

• [draft-stone-aivs-01] Stone, B., "AIVS: Agentic Integrity Verification Standard", Internet-Draft, work in progress.¶

• [draft-stone-vcap-01] Stone, B., "VCAP: Verified Commerce for Agent Protocols", Internet-Draft, work in progress.¶

• [draft-stone-atep-01] Stone, B., "ATEP: Agent Trust and Execution Passport", Internet-Draft, work in progress.¶

22.2. 22.2 Informative References

• [FAA] Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16¶

• [NY-CONVENTION] Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958¶

• [UETA-14] Uniform Electronic Transactions Act §14, "Automated Transactions"¶

• [REST-AGENCY-3D] Restatement (Third) of Agency, American Law Institute¶

• [HOWEY] SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946)¶

• [AP2] Google Agentic Commerce, "Agent Payments Protocol", https://github.com/google-agentic-commerce/AP2¶

• [KLEROS] Kleros, "Decentralized Court Protocol", https://kleros.io¶

• [UMA] UMA Protocol, "Optimistic Oracle"¶

• [STRIPE-CONNECT] Stripe, "Connect Disputes and Chargebacks"¶

• [UPWORK-MEDIATION] Upwork, "Dispute Process for Hourly and Fixed-Price Contracts"¶

• [VISA-CHARGEBACK-CODES] Visa Inc., "Visa Chargeback Reason Codes"¶

• [OFAC-SANCTIONS] U.S. Treasury OFAC, "Specially Designated Nationals List"¶

23.1. A.1 DisputeFiling

{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "$id": "https://swarmsync.ai/spec/adrp/v1/dispute-filing.schema.json",
  "title": "DisputeFiling",
  "type": "object",
  "required": ["msg_type", "msg_id", "prev_hash", "submitter_did", "submitter_signature", "timestamp", "payload"],
  "properties": {
    "msg_type": { "const": "DisputeFiling" },
    "msg_id": { "type": "string", "format": "uuid" },
    "prev_hash": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" },
    "submitter_did": { "type": "string" },
    "submitter_signature": { "type": "string" },
    "timestamp": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
    "payload": {
      "type": "object",
      "required": ["payment_mandate_ref", "claim_code", "claim_detail", "filing_fee"],
      "properties": {
        "payment_mandate_ref": { "type": "string" },
        "claim_code": { "type": "string" },
        "claim_detail": { "type": "string", "maxLength": 4096 },
        "flag_ref": { "type": "string" },
        "prior_ruling_ref": { "type": "string" },
        "filing_fee": {
          "type": "object",
          "required": ["amount", "currency", "transaction_id"],
          "properties": {
            "amount": { "type": "number", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 1000 },
            "currency": { "enum": ["USD", "USDC"] },
            "transaction_id": { "type": "string" }
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

23.2. A.2 RulingBundle

{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "$id": "https://swarmsync.ai/spec/adrp/v1/ruling-bundle.schema.json",
  "title": "RulingBundle",
  "type": "object",
  "required": ["type", "supersedes", "dispute_chain_tip", "verdict", "rationale_hash", "arbitrator_did", "arbitrator_vc_hash", "signing_time", "prev_hash", "sig"],
  "properties": {
    "type": { "const": "RulingBundle" },
    "supersedes": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" },
    "dispute_chain_tip": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" },
    "verdict": { "enum": ["release", "refund", "partial"] },
    "partial_split": {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {
        "to_buyer": { "type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 1 },
        "to_seller": { "type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 1 }
      }
    },
    "rationale_hash": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" },
    "arbitrator_did": { "type": "string" },
    "arbitrator_vc_hash": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" },
    "signing_time": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
    "prev_hash": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" },
    "sig": { "type": "string" }
  }
}

(Full schemas for all six message types are published at the IANA-registered URI.)¶

24.1. B.1 Scenario

A small business principal (did:web:smb.example) dispatches an agent to research and book a $250 hotel reservation. The agent uses Conduit to record its actions. The reservation is booked, but the hotel is in the wrong city — the agent confused "Portland, OR" with "Portland, ME" due to an ambiguous Cart Mandate that did not specify state.¶

24.2. B.2 Sequence

1. Agent emits DisputeFlag (advisory): claim_code quality_mismatch, evidence_ref pointing at the reservation confirmation. The agent's Standing Token signs the flag.¶

2. Principal reviews flag within 72h ratification window. Principal agrees the booking is wrong.¶

3. Principal emits DisputeFiling: claim_code quality_mismatch, claim_detail "City mismatch: requested Portland, OR; booked Portland, ME", filing_fee $25.00 USDC, flag_ref points at the agent's flag.¶

4. Arbitrator assigned via VRF from L2 curated AI pool: did:web:arb-pool-001, 3-of-5 panel.¶

5. EvidenceSubmission by principal: original Cart Mandate showing "Portland" without state qualifier; Conduit ProofBundle showing agent's reasoning trace.¶

6. EvidenceSubmission by counterparty (hotel-side agent operator): the Cart Mandate's acceptance_criteria.checks is empty.¶

7. Arbitrator panel deliberates. Finding: spec ambiguity (semantic-class). Cart Mandate did not specify state; agent's choice was reasonable but principal's intent was OR. Verdict: partial, split 70/30 to buyer/seller (buyer bears 30% due to ambiguous spec).¶

8. RulingBundle signed by panel arbitrator. supersedes = ProofBundle tip hash. signing_time = within 4h SLA.¶

9. EscrowDirective derived: $175 to buyer, $75 to seller, ruling_ref = SHA-256 of RulingBundle.¶

10. AP2 Payment Mandate executor consumes EscrowDirective, executes split.¶

11. Filing fee disposition: principal prevailed on the existence of dispute but lost on full refund (received 70%, not 100%). Outcome classified as "novel-but-lost" since spec ambiguity was a real issue but not fully attributable to seller. 50% of fee forfeited ($12.50); 50% refunded ($12.50).¶

24.3. B.3 Verification

Any third party, given the resulting (DisputeBundle, RulingBundle), can run verify_resolution and reach the same EscrowDirective deterministically. Both the original ProofBundle and the RulingBundle are preserved forever in the chain.¶

24.4. B.4 Precedent

The RulingBundle is indexed in the precedent corpus by Cart Mandate template hash. Future arbitrators ruling on Cart Mandates with similar acceptance_criteria.checks gaps for location specification MUST cite or distinguish this ruling.¶