Internet-Draft tigress-gssapi-impl February 2023
Astiz & Pelletier Expires 22 August 2023 [Page]
Workgroup:
TIGRESS
Internet-Draft:
draft-tigress-gssapi-impl-00
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Authors:
C. Astiz
Apple Inc
A. Pelletier
Apple Inc

Tigress-GSS API-Sample Implementation

Abstract

This document describes a sample implementation of transferring digital credentials securily (Tigress) using GSS API.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tigress-gssapi-impl/. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tigress-gssapi-impl/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/dimmyvi/tigress-requirements.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 August 2023.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Prevously Tigress reviewed an implementation of digital credentials transfer using Tigress protocol (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-art-tigress/). In previous IETF meetings community asked to review other possible solutions using alternative standards to illustrate how Tigress problem can be solved differently. In this document we are trying to describe how an alternative potential implementation of a solution to Tigress [Tigress-req-02] problem of transferring digital credentials securily can be done using GSS API [RFC2743].

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. GSS-Api Proposal

General security service application program interface, or GSS-API, from [RFC2743] defines a generic protocol for the security of messages being transferred and can provide authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. GSS-API does not define how the messages are sent between parties.

Leveraging GSS-API provides flexibility to easily change the security of how a credential is transferred, but a lot of work to define the communication channel between two devices is still required. GSS-API also requires that each party have auth credentials before the communication occurs, which isn’t a requirement for our use case.

## Secure Credential Transfer with GSS-API

Because GSS-API does not define the communication channel we will assume the devices are able to communicate via an arbitrary intermediary server. An example transfer using GSS-API + Tigress could like like:

  1. Sender creates a single use auth credential and encrypts it with a symmetric key that will be a shared secret.

    1. Tigress: The creation, structure, and validation of this single use auth credential would need to be defined by Tigress.
  2. Sender creates a GSS-API security context token with the encrypted credential.
  3. Sender sends security context token + shared secret to receiver.

    1. If a mailbox style intermediate server is used this can be done via a url where the shared secret is include in the url fragment.
    2. Tigress: How this information is sent to the intermediary server would need to be defined by tigress.
  4. Receiver gets information for communicating with the sender and the shared secret.

    1. This information could be transferred via a url, a file, a QR code, etc.
    2. Tigress: The high level format of this information would need to be defined by tigress so that devices could parse the data and extract the GSS-API specific parts.
    3. Tigress: We could recommend that this information have a nice preview, but that wouldn't be required.
  5. Receiver accepts the security context token, and uses the shared secret to validate the credential.
  6. Receiver sends back security context token to sender. This process is repeated until the security context is full established.

    1. Tigress: How the receiver sends the opaque blob to the sender via the intermediary server would need to be defined by tigress.
  7. Sender creates credential to share, use GSS-API to create a message token, send message token to receiver.
  8. Receiver gets message token and uses GSS-API to extract the underlying credential.

    1. If the receiver is done they can terminate the transfer and send a GSS-API termination back to the sender.

      1. Tigress: How the session with the intermediary server between the sender and receiver is terminated would need to be defined by tigress.
    2. Or, the receiver can perform additional calls with the sender to complete transferring the credential.

4. Security Considerations

TODO Security

5. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

6. References

6.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC2743]
Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, DOI 10.17487/RFC2743, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2743>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

6.2. Informative References

[Tigress-req-02]
Vinokurov, D., Pelletier, A., Astiz, C., and B. Lassey, "Tigress requirements", , <https://github.com/dimmyvi/tigress-requirements/>.

Acknowledgments

TODO acknowledge.

Authors' Addresses

Casey Astiz
Apple Inc
Alex Pelletier
Apple Inc