DRIP A. Wiethuechter Internet-Draft S. Card Intended status: Standards Track AX Enterprize Expires: 11 January 2021 R. Moskowitz HTT Consulting 10 July 2020 DRIP Authentication Formats draft-wiethuechter-drip-auth-01 Abstract This document describes how to include trust into the ASTM Remote ID specification defined in ASTM 3411-19 under a Broadcast Remote ID (RID) scenario. It defines a few different message schemes (based on the authentication message) that can be used to assure past messages sent by a UA and also act as an assurance for UA trustworthiness in the absence of Internet connectivity at the receiving node. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 11 January 2021. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 1] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. DRIP Requirements Addressed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Problem Space And Document Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. ASTM Authentication Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3. Thoughts on ASTM Authentication Message . . . . . . . . . 6 3. DRIP Authentication Framing Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. General Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1.1. DRIP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.2. DRIP Authentication Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2. Wrapper Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2.1. UA Hierarchical Host Identity Tag . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.2.2. Trust Timestamp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.2.3. Authentication Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2.4. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2.5. Forward Error Correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. Bluetooth 4.X Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.2. ASTM Message Wrapper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.3. Manifest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.3.1. Hash Algorithm And Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.3.2. 4 Byte Manifest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.3.3. 8 Byte Manifest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.3.4. Pseudo-blockchain Hashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.3.5. Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.4. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5. Bluetooth 5 Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.1. Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5.2. Message Pack Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7. ASTM Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 2] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 1. Introduction UA Systems (UAS) are usually in a volatile environment when it comes to communication. UA are generally small with little computational (or flying) horsepower to carry standard communication equipment. This limits the mediums of communication to few viable options. Observer systems (e.g. smartphones and tablets) place further constraints on the communication options. The Remote ID Broadcast messages MUST be available to applications on these platforms without modifying the devices. The ASTM standard [F3411-19] focuses on two ways of communicating to a UAS for RID: Broadcast and Network. This document will focus on adding trust to Broadcast RID in the current (and an expanded) authentication message format. 1.1. DRIP Requirements Addressed The following [drip-requirements] will be addressed: 1. GEN 1: Provable Ownership 2. GEN 2: Provable Binding 3. GEN 3: Provable Registration 1.2. Terms and Definitions 1.2.1. Requirements Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 1.2.2. Definitions See [drip-requirements] for common DRIP terms. 2. Background Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 3] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 2.1. Problem Space And Document Focus The current standard for Remote ID (RID) does not, in any meaningful capacity, address the concerns of trust in the UA space with communication in the Broadcast RID environment. This is a requirement that will need to be addressed eventually for various different parties that have a stake in the UA industry. The following subsections will provide a high level reference to the ASTM standard for authentication messages and how their current limitations effect trust in the Broadcast RID envirorment. 2.2. ASTM Authentication Message Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 4] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 Page 0: 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | Auth Header | | +---------------+ ASTM Authentication Headers +---------------+ | | | +-----------------------------------------------+ | | | | | | | | Authentication Data / Signature | | | | | | | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ Page 1 - 4: 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | Auth Header | | +---------------+ | | | | | | | | | | Authentication Data / Signature | | | | | | | | | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ Auth Header (1 byte): Contains basic Authentication information such as page number and authentication type. ASTM Authentication Headers: (6 bytes) Contains other header information for the authentication message from ASTM UAS RID Standard. Authentication Data / Signature: (109 bytes: 17+23*4) Opaque authentication data. The above diagram is the format defined by ASTM that is the frame which everything this document fits into. The specific details of Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 5] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 the ASTM headers are abstracted away as they are not necessarily required for this document. One important detail that is relevant is the Authentication page has its own 1 byte header (Auth Header) which contains Authentication Type and Data Page Number. 2.3. Thoughts on ASTM Authentication Message The format standardized by the ASTM is designed with a few major considerations in mind, which the authors feel put significant limitations on the expansion of the standard. The primary consideration (in this context) is the use of the Bluetooth 5.X Extended Frame format. This method allows for a 255 byte payload to be sent in what the ASTM refers to as a "Message Pack". The idea is to include up to five standard ASTM Broadcast RID messages (each of which are 25 bytes) plus a single authentication message (5 pages of 25 bytes each) in the Message Pack. The reasoning is then the authentication message is for the entire Message Pack. The authors have no issues with this proposed approach; this is a valid format to use for the authentication message provided by the ASTM. However, by limiting the authentication message to ONLY five pages in the standard it ignores the possibility of other formatting options to be created and used. Another issue with this format, not fully addressed in this document is fragmentation. Under Bluetooth 4.X, each page is sent seperately which can result in lose of pages on the reciever. This is disasterous as the loss of even a single page means any signature is incomplete. With the current limitation of 5 pages, Forward Error Correction (FEC) is nearly impossible without sacrificing the amount of data sent. More pages would allow FEC to be performed on the Authentation message pages so loss of pages can be mitigated. All these problems are further amplified by the speed at which UA fly and the Oberserver's position to recieve transmissions. There is no guarentee that the Observer will recieve all the pages of even a 5 page Authentication Message in the time it takes a UA to traverse across their line of sight. Worse still is that is not including other UA in the area, which congestes the spectrum and could cause further confusion attempting to collate messages from various UA. Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 6] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 This specific problem is out of scope for this document and our solutions in general, but should be noted as a design consideration. 3. DRIP Authentication Framing Formats Currently the ASTM AuthType of 0xD should be used to denote DRIP based Authentication. 3.1. General Frame Page 0: 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | Auth Header | | +---------------+ ASTM Authentication Headers +---------------+ | | DRIP Header | +-----------------------------------------------+---------------+ | | | | | | | DRIP Authentication Data | | | | | | | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ Page 1 - 9: 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +---------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | Auth Header | | +---------------+ | | | | | | | | DRIP Authentication Data | | | | | | | | | | | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ DRIP Header (1 byte): Message Type (4 bits): Message Type Values ------------ ------ Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 7] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 Wrapped ASTM Message 0-1, 3-E DRIP Authentication Message 2 DRIP AuthType (4 bits): Only used with upper 4 bits are 0x2. AuthType Values -------- ------ Certificate 0 Message Pack Signature 1 4 Byte Manifest (cSHAKE128) 2 8 Byte Manifest (cSHAKE128) 3 DRIP Authentication Data (223 bytes): DRIP Authentication data up to 223 bytes long. 3.1.1. DRIP Header The DRIP Header consists of two 4 bit fields and should be read as follows. First when wrapping an ASTM Message (see Section 4.3) the DRIP Header is filled with the first byte of the full 25 byte ASTM Message. This first byte is always the ASTM Header, which contains the Message Type and Protocol Version. To determine if a DRIP Authentication Message is actually wrapping an ASTM Message the upper 4 bits of the DRIP Header should be checked. If these bits are anything but 0x2 then the message is a wrapped message. When the upper 4 bits are 0x2 then the Authentication Message is a specific DRIP format, which is defined in the lower 4 bits of the DRIP Header. 3.1.2. DRIP Authentication Data This field has a maximum size of 223 bytes. If the data is less than 223 bytes and a page is only partially filled then the rest of the partially filled page must be null padded. 3.2. Wrapper Frame 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | | | UA Hierarchical | Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 8] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 | Host Identity Tag | | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | Trust Timestamp | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | | . . . Authentication Data . . . | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signature | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | | | | | Forward Error Correction | | | | | | +---------------+ | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+ UA Hierarchial Host Identity Tag (16 bytes): The UAs HHIT in byte form. Hashed from the EdDSA25519 public key. Trust Timestamp (4 bytes): Timestamp denoting current time plus an offset to trust message to. Authentication Data (116 bytes): Opaque authentication data using DRIP format specified in the DRIP Header (not shown here). Up to 116 bytes. Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 9] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 Signature (64 bytes): Signature over precedding fields using the EdDSA25519 keypair. Forward Error Correction (23 bytes): Mandatory under Bluetooth 4.X. Always last auth page. Reed Solomon across precedding pages. This framing resides within the General Frame's DRIP Authentication Data section. 3.2.1. UA Hierarchical Host Identity Tag To avoid needing to the the UAs HHIT via the ASTM Basic ID in a detached fashion the 16 byte HHIT is included in the wrapper frame. The HHIT for the UA (and other entities in the RID and greater UTM system under DRIP) is an enhancement of the Host Identity Tag (HIT) of HIPv2 [RFC7401] introducing hierarchy as defined in HHIT [hierarchical-hit]. Using Hierarchical HITs for UAS RID is outlined in HHIT based UAS RID [drip-uas-rid]. 3.2.2. Trust Timestamp Trust Timestamp MUST be current UNIX time plus an offset into the future. To avoid replay attacks the Trust Timestamp field must be well founded. When wrapping a vector (position) message the payload WILL contain (by ASTM rules) constantly changing data, this includes its own timestamp. In this case the Trust Timestamp could be argued as superfoulous. Other message types, such as Basic ID and Self-ID are static messages with no changing data. To protect a replay of these signed messages the Trust Timestamp is the field during signing to be guarenteed to change. The offset used against the UNIX timestamp is not defined in this document. Best practices to identify a acceptable offset should be used taking into consideration the UA envirorment, and propgation characteristics of the messages being sent. Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 10] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 3.2.3. Authentication Data This field has a max of 116 bytes in length. 3.2.4. Signature The wrapper signature is generated using the private key half of the the UAs Host Identity (HI) and is done over all precedding data. ASTM/DRIP Headers are exclude from this operation. 3.2.5. Forward Error Correction To help Bluetooth 4 achieve the goal of reliable reciept of paged messages a Forward Error Correction (FEC) scheme is introduced and is mandatory under DRIP. Due to the nature of Bluetooth 4 and the existing ASTM paging structure an optomization can be used. If a Bluetooth frame fails its CRC check, then the frame is dropped without notification to the upper protocol layers. From the Remote ID perspective this means the loss of a complete frame/message/page. In Authentication messages, each page is already numbered so the loss of a page allows the recieving application to build a "dummy" page filled with nulls (other than the ASTM Header which is known). The prefered form of FEC is using Reed Solomon. With this the entire authentication message (all pages, including headers) are used to generate 23 bytes of parity. This parity is appended in one full page (always the last) allowing for recovery when any single page is lost in transmission. If more than one page is lost (>1/5 for 5 page messages, >1/10 for 10 page messages) than the error rate of the link is already beyond saving and the application has more issues to deal with. 4. Bluetooth 4.X Formats With Bluetooth 4.X formatting the goal is to attempt to bring reliable reciept of paged messages. 4.1. Certificate Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 11] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | | . . . Certificate: Registry on Aircraft . . . | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | | | | | Forward Error Correction | | | | | | +---------------+ | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+ Certificate: Registry on Aircraft (200 bytes): A certificate granted by the Registry that asserts the binding of UA to the given Registry. Forward Error Correction (23 bytes): Mandatory under Bluetooth 4.X. Reed Solomon across precedding fields (including ASTM/DRIP Headers). This DRIP Authentication type uses the General Frame format, filling the DRIP Authentication Data field with a 200 byte Certificate and 23 bytes of Reed Solomon FEC. What this grants is the ability to authenticate UA information when the receiving device of the observer (e.g. a smartphone with a dedicated RID application) has no Internet service (e.g. LTE signal). The Certificate: Registry on Aircraft (Cra) is in practice a binding claim between the Registry and the Aircraft, asserting the relationship between the two entities. Cra signs another certificate, Caa (Certificate: Aircraft on Aircraft), that is created during UA provisioning. Importantly this certificate allows offline signature verification from the UA. This is as the UA HI is included in the certificate. Also included is the HHIT of the Registry to check the local shortlist of Registries that the Observer device trusts (mapping HHITs to HIs). Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 12] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 More details about Caa, Cra, other certificates and the provisioning process can be found in [drip-identity-claims]. 4.2. ASTM Message Wrapper 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | | . . . ASTM Message: Type 0-1, 3-5 . . . | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ ASTM Message: Type 0-1, 3-5 (24 bytes): A valid ASTM Message of Types 0, 1, 3, 4, or 5. First byte (ASTM Header) removed and used as DRIP Header. This DRIP Authentication type uses the Wrapper Frame format, filling the Authentication Data field with an ASTM Message (all types except Message Pack [0xF] and Authentication [0x2]). The first byte of the wrapped message should be used to fill in the DRIP Header field. This corresponds directly with the ASTM Header field and can be used by the reciever to decode the wrapped message. 4.3. Manifest By hashing previously sent messages and signing them we gain trust in UAs previous reports. An observer who has been listening for any length of time can hash received messages and cross check against listed hashes. The signature is signed across the list of hashes. 4.3.1. Hash Algorithm And Operation The recommended hash to implement as a baseline is cSHAKE128 from [NIST.SP.800-185]. With cSHAKE128, the hash is computed as follows: cSHAKE128(MAC|Message, 8*H-Len, "", "RemoteID Auth Hash") The message MAC is prepended to the message, as the MAC is the only information that links a UA's messages from a specific UA. Other hash algorithms can be considered and used. In this scenario an unused DRIP AuthType can be allocated for such. Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 13] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 4.3.2. 4 Byte Manifest 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | Hash of Previous Manifest | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | Hash of Current Manifest | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | Message Hash 1 | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | Message Hash 2 | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ . . . . . . +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | Message Hash 27 | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ Hash of Previous Manifest: (4 bytes) A hash of the previously sent Authentication message. Hash of Current Manifest: (4 bytes) A hash of the current Authentication message. Message Hash: (4 bytes) A hash of a previously sent message. 27 max. 4.3.3. 8 Byte Manifest Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 14] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | Hash of Previous Manifest | | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | Hash of Current Manifest | | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | Message Hash 1 | | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | Message Hash 2 | | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ . . . . . . +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | Message Hash 12 | | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ Hash of Previous Manifest: (8 bytes) A hash of the previously sent Authentication message. Hash of Current Manifest: (8 bytes) A hash of the current Authentication message. Message Hash: (8 bytes) A hash of a previously sent message. 12 max. 4.3.4. Pseudo-blockchain Hashes Two special hashes are included; a previous manifest hash, which links to the previous manifest message, as well as a current manifest hash. This gives a pseudo-blockchain provenance to the manifest message that could be traced back if the observer was present for extended periods of time. In regards to the creation and use of the current manifest hash field: During creation and signing of this message format this field MUST be set to 0. So the signature will be based on this field being 0, as well as its own hash. It is an open question of if we compute the hash, then sign or sign then compute. Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 15] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 There a few different ways to cycle this message. We can "roll up" the hash of 'current' to 'previous' when needed or to completely recompute the hash. This mostly depends on the previous note. 4.3.5. Limitations A potentional limitation to this format is dwell time of the UA. If the UA is not sticking to a general area the most likely the Observer will not obtain many (if not all) of the messages in the manifest. Without the original messages recieved no verification can be done. Examples of such scenarios include delivery or survey UA. 4.4. Recommendations Under ASTM Bluetooth 4.X rules transmission of dynamic messages are at a minumum of 1 per second while static messages (which is what Authentication is classified under) are 3 per second. Under DRIP the Certificate Message MUST be transmitted to properly meet the GEN 1 and GEN 3 requirement. The ASTM Message Wrapper and Manifest both satisify the GEN 2 requirement. At least one MUST be implemented to comply with the GEN 2 requirement. A single Manifest can carry at most (using the full 10 page limit and 8 byte hashes) 12 unique hashes of previously sent messages (of any type). This results in a total of 22 (12 + 10) frames of Bluetooth data being transmitted over Bluetooth. In comparison the Message Wrapper sends 5 pages (each a single frame) for each wrapped message. For backwards compatibility the implementation should also send the standard ASTM message that was wrapped for non-DRIP compliant recievers to obtain. This method results in 72 total Bluetooth frames (12 + (12 * 5)) sent [this increases to 84 if using FEC]. The question of which is better suited is up to the implementation. 5. Bluetooth 5 Formats Under ASTM specification, Bluetooth 5 transport of Remote ID is to use the Message Pack (Type 0xF) format for all transmissions. Under Message Pack all messages are sent together (in Message Type order) in a single Bluetooth frame (up to 250 bytes). Message Packs are required by ASTM to be sent at a rate of 1 per second (like dynamic messages). Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 16] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 This gives the benefit of no longer is there any messsage or page fragmentation in transmission. For this reason the recommended use of FEC such as Reed Solomon using in Bluetooth 4.X is not needed here and is impractical. Any of the Bluetooth 4.X formats can theoretically be used during Bluetooth 5 operation under ASTM, however the following subsections define a number of formats optomized for Message Pack and Bluetooth 5. 5.1. Certificate 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | | . . . Certificate: Registry on Aircraft . . . | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ Certificate: Registry on Aircraft (200 bytes): A certificate granted by the Registry that asserts the binding of UA to the given Registry. With Message Pack the following MUST be included in when sending a DRIP Certificate Message: 1x Location Message 1x Authentication Message, DRIP AuthType 0 The Certificate Message (without FEC) only needs 9 pages for transmission, allowing the final 25 bytes to be used for a Location message. 5.2. Message Pack Signature Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 17] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | Trust Timestamp | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signature | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+ Trust Timestamp: (4 bytes) Timestamp denoting current time plus an offset to trust message to. Signature: (64 bytes) Signature over all messages in Message Pack using the EdDSA25519 keypair. The DRIP Message Pack Signature is a DRIP AuthType 1. All messages in the message pack (excluding the authentication message itself) is signed. 6. Security Considerations 1. Hash lengths (length vs strength/collision rate) 2. replay attacks with timestamps 3. static Cra (issue but nulled if UA signing other stuff dynamically meaning signatures will fail as HI won't match - this is probably a deeper disucssion topic for provisioning security considerations when we get to there) 7. ASTM Considerations 1. Increase Authentication Page Count Max from 5 to 10. 2. Add Authentication Type for DRIP (currently using 0xD) Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 18] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 8. Acknowledgments Ryan Quigley and James Mussi at AX Enterprize for early prototyping to find holes in the draft specifications. 9. References 9.1. Normative References [NIST.SP.800-185] Kelsey, J., Change, S., and R. Perlner, "SHA-3 derived functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and ParallelHash", National Institute of Standards and Technology report, DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-185, December 2016, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . 9.2. Informative References [drip-identity-claims] Wiethuechter, A., Card, S., and R. Moskowitz, "DRIP Identity Claims", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- wiethuechter-drip-identity-claims-00, 23 March 2020, . [drip-requirements] Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A. Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- ietf-drip-reqs-01, 25 May 2020, . [drip-uas-rid] Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov, "UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-02, 28 May 2020, . Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 19] Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020 [F3411-19] ASTM International, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking", February 2020, . [hierarchical-hit] Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, "Hierarchical HITs for HIPv2", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit-05, 13 May 2020, . [RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015, . Authors' Addresses Adam Wiethuechter AX Enterprize 4947 Commercial Drive Yorkville, NY 13495 United States of America Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com Stuart W. Card AX Enterprize 4947 Commercial Drive Yorkville, NY 13495 United States of America Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com Robert Moskowitz HTT Consulting Oak Park, MI 48237 United States of America Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page 20]