tls C. Wood Internet-Draft Apple, Inc. Intended status: Experimental October 22, 2018 Expires: April 25, 2019 Importing External PSKs for TLS 1.3 draft-wood-tls-external-psk-importer-00 Abstract This document describes an interface for importing external PSK (Pre- Shared Key) into TLS 1.3. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Wood Expires April 25, 2019 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Importing External PSKs for TLS 1.3 October 2018 Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Key Import . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Deprecating Hash Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. TLS 1.2 Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Introduction TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] supports pre-shared key (PSK) resumption, wherein PSKs can be established via session tickets from prior connections or externally via some out-of-band mechanism. The protocol mandates that each PSK only be used with a single hash function. This was done to simplify protocol analysis. TLS 1.2, in contrast, has no such requirement, as a PSK may be used with any hash algorithm and the TLS 1.2 PRF. This means that external PSKs could possibly be re- used in two different contexts with the same hash functions during key derivation. Moreover, it requires external PSKs to be provisioned for specific hash functions. To mitigate these problems, external PSKs can be bound to a specific hash function when used in TLS 1.3, even if they are associated with a different KDF (and hash function) when provisioned. This document specifies an interface by which external PSKs may be imported for use in a TLS 1.3 connection to achieve this goal. In particular, it describes how KDF-bound PSKs can be differentiated by different hash algorithms to produce a set of candidate PSKs, each of which are bound to a specific hash function. This expands what would normally have been a single PSK identity into a set of PSK identities. However, it requires no change to the TLS 1.3 key schedule. 2. Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Wood Expires April 25, 2019 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Importing External PSKs for TLS 1.3 October 2018 3. Overview Intuitively, key importers mirror the concept of key exporters in TLS in that they diversify a key based on some contextual information before use in a connection. In contrast to key exporters, wherein differentiation is done via an explicit label and context string, the key importer defined herein uses a label and set of hash algorithms to differentiate an external PSK into one or more PSKs for use. Imported keys do not require negotiation for use, as a client and server will not agree upon identities if not imported correctly. Thus, importers induce no protocol changes with the exception of expanding the set of PSK identities sent on the wire. 3.1. Terminology o External PSK (EPSK): A PSK established or provisioned out-of-band, i.e., not from a TLS connection, which is a tuple of (Base Key, External Identity, KDF). The associated KDF (and hash function) may be undefined. o Base Key: The secret value of an EPSK. o External Identity: The identity of an EPSK. o Imported Identity: The identity of a PSK as sent on the wire. 4. Key Import A key importer takes as input an EPSK with external identity 'external_identity' and base key 'epsk', as defined in Section 3.1, along with an optional label, and transforms it into a set of PSKs and imported identities for use in a connection based on supported HashAlgorithms. In particular, for each supported HashAlgorithm 'hash', the importer constructs an ImportedIdentity structure as follows: struct { opaque external_identity<1...2^16-1>; opaque label<0..2^8-1>; HashAlgorithm hash; } ImportedIdentity; A unique and imported PSK (IPSK) with base key 'ipskx' bound to this identity is then computed as follows: epskx = HKDF-Extract(0, epsk) ipskx = HKDF-Expand-Label(epskx, "derived psk", Hash(ImportedIdentity), Hash.length) Wood Expires April 25, 2019 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Importing External PSKs for TLS 1.3 October 2018 The hash function used for HKDF [RFC5869] is that which is associated with the external PSK. It is not bound to ImportedIdentity.hash. If no hash function is specified, SHA-256 MUST be used. The resulting IPSK base key 'ipskx' is then used as the binder key in TLS 1.3 with identity ImportedIdentity. With knowledge of the supported hash functions, one may import PSKs before the start of a connection. EPSKs may be imported for early data use if they are bound to protocol settings and configurations that would otherwise be required for early data with normal (ticket-based PSK) resumption. Minimally, that means ALPN, QUIC transport settings, etc., must be provisioned alongside these EPSKs. 5. Deprecating Hash Functions If a client or server wish to deprecate a hash function and no longer use it for TLS 1.3, they may remove this hash function from the set of hashes used during while importing keys. This does not affect the KDF operation used to derive concrete PSKs. 6. TLS 1.2 Compatibility Key importers do not affect TLS 1.2 in any way. Recall that TLS 1.2 permits computing the TLS PRF with any hash algorithm and PSK. Thus, a PSK may be used with the same KDF (and underlying HMAC hash algorithm) as TLS 1.3 with importers. However, critically, the derived PSK will not be the same since the importer differentiates the PSK via the identity and hash function. Thus, TLS 1.3 imported PSKs are distinct from those used in TLS 1.2 and avoid cross-protocol collisions. 7. Security Considerations This is a WIP draft and has not yet seen significant security analysis. 8. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA requirements. 9. Normative References [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035, November 1987, . Wood Expires April 25, 2019 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Importing External PSKs for TLS 1.3 October 2018 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010, . [RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, . Appendix A. Acknowledgements The authors thank David Benjamin, Eric Rescorla, and Martin Thomson for discussions that led to the production of this document. Author's Address Christopher A. Wood Apple, Inc. Email: cawood@apple.com Wood Expires April 25, 2019 [Page 5]